Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-0 I 1789 EFTA00192835

Memorandum Subjeci Operation Leap Year: Notification of Breach USAO No. 2006R0 181 June 9, 2009 To Jeffrey H. Sloman Acting United States Attorney Robert K. Senior First Assistant U.S. Attorney Rolando Garcia Deputy Chief, Criminal Division, West Palm Beach Karen Atkinson, Chief Chief, Criminal Section I, Northern Division, WPB From A. Marie Villafan AUSA, Ft Laude INTRODUCTION. This memorandum seeks approval to serve the attached letter providing notice of a breach of the Non-Prosecution Agreement on attorneys for Jeffrey Epstein. On Friday, June 12, 2009, Judge Marra will be presiding ova a hearing on Jeffrey Epstein's motions to stay all of the civil lawsuits filed against him by victims identified through our investigation. In his Order setting the matter for a hearing, Judge Marra stated: This hearing shall be limited to the issue of whether Defendant Epstein's defense of the civil actions filed against him violates the non-prosecution agreement between Epstein and the United States. The United States' position in this matter would be very helpful to the Court and, accordingly, the Court requests that the United States appear at the hearing. Based upon a review of pleadings filed by Epstein in connection with the civil suits, Epstein has taken positions directly in contravention of the Non-Prosecution Agreement between Epstein PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-01 1790 EFTA00192836

and the United States. Accordingly, I recommend that we provide Epstein's counsel with Notice of the Breach at the hearing on June 12th, and proceed to indictment promptly thereafter. BACKGROUND In the summer of 2006, the FBI approached the U.S. Attorney's Office about an investigation of Jeffrey Epstein ("Epstein") into allegations of enticing minors to engage in prostitution. The Town of Palm Beach Police Department ("PBPD") had approached the FBI after it became convinced that Epstein's attorneys had placed undue pressure on the Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office ("SAO"), causing them to forego prosecution of Epstein. When the SAO presented the case to a state grand jury rather than proceeding by information, and when the state grand jury returned an indictment charging only solicitation of adult prostitution, PBPD asked the FBI to begin a federal investigation. FBI, in turn, approached the USAO about possible federal prosecution. The federal grand jury investigation began in the summer of 2006, and the first grand jury subpoenas were issued in August 2006. Towards the end of 2006, Epstein's attorneys began making contact with the U.S. Attorney's Office to seek resolution of the case. A meeting in West Palm Beach was held with Epstein's attorneys in February 2007. Aftcr that meeting, the investigation continued, and an indictment package was prepared in May 2007 with the intent to present to the grand jury in mid-May. At the requests of Epstein's counsel, the indictment was delayed to allow Epstein's attorneys to meet with additional members of the U.S. Attorney's Office. A meeting was held on Junc 26,2007, when Epstein's attorneys presented their arguments why federal prosecution was inappropriate. On July 31, 2007, another meeting occurred between Epstein's attorneys and the U.S. PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 2 ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-01 1791 EFTA00192837

Attorney's Office. At that meeting, the United States presented a list of terms of a possible non- prosecution agreement. One of those terms was: Epstein agrees that, if any of the victims identified in the federal investigation file suit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, Epstein will not contest thc jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida over his person and the subject matter. Epstein will not contest that identified victims are persons who, while minors, were victims of violations of Title 18, United States Code, Section(s) 2422 and/or 2423. At that time, Epstein's attorneys advised that an agreement involving jail time would not be acceptable. On August 31, 2007, the FBI agents and I met with Drew Oosterbaan, Chief of the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, to discuss the evidence and theory of the prosecution. Ile had previously been provided with a copy of the prosecution memo related to the indictment. On September 7, 2007, Epstein's attorneys met with the U.S. Attorney, Drew Oosterbaan, Jeff Sloman, John McMillan, and I. Ken Starr presented federalism arguments, urging deferral to state prosecution. When those arguments failed, Epstein's attorneys slated that he wanted to engage in plea negotiations. Epstein's attorneys wavered back and forth between a Non-Prosecution Agreement, involving pleading to state charges, or a plea to federal charges. Finally, on September 24, 2007, the Non-Prosecution Agreement was signed.' The Agreement contains the following provisions: 'An amended indictment package had been prepared and was scheduled for presentation to the grand jury on September 25, 2007. Judge Marra also had scheduled a hearing on Epstein's motion to quash grand jury subpoenas for the computer equipment removed from Epstein's home by Roy Black's investigator when they learned of the stale investigation. This was postponed to allow plea negotiations and eventually was withdrawn pursuant to the terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreement. PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 3 ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011792 EFTA00192838

8. If any of the individuals referred to in paragraph (7),2 supra, elects to file suit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, Epstein will not contest the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida over his person and/or the subject matter, and Epstein waives his right to contest liability and also waives his right to contest damages up to an amount as agreed to between the identified individual and Epstein, so long as the identified individual elects to proceed exclusively under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and agrees to waive any other claim for damages, whether pursuant to state, federal, or common law. Notwithstanding this waiver, as to those individuals whose names appear on the list provided by the United States, Epstein's signature on this agreement, his waivers and failures to contest liability and such damages in any suit are not to be construed as an admission of any criminal or civil liability. 10. Except as to those individuals who elect to proceed exclusively under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, as set forth in paragraph (8), supra, neither Epstein's signature on this agreement, nor its terms, nor any resulting waivers or settlements by Epstein arc to be construed as admissions or evidence of civil or criminal liability or a waiver of any jurisdiction or other defense as to any person, whether or not her name appears on the list provided by the United States. The Agreement also called upon Epstein to use his "best efforts" to enter a guilty plea and be sentenced not later than October 26, 2007. (1 I 1.) Citing conflicts with attorney schedules, Epstein's attorneys asked the USAO to extend the deadline for his plea and sentencing. After a series of delays, Epstein's attorneys sought review by members of the Justice Department. When it appeared that the Non-Prosecution Agreement would be undone, the indictment package was prepared again, and was reviewed in anticipation of presentation to the grand jury. On June 23, 2008, Senior Associate Deputy Attorney General John Roth denied the various appeals of Epstein's attorneys and wrote, "Even if we were to substitute our judgment for that of the U.S. Attorney, we believe that federal prosecution of this case is appropriate. Moreover, having 2The"indiv iduals referred to in paragraph (7)" are"individuals whom (the United States) has identified as victims, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2255." PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 4 ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011793 EFTA00192839

reviewed your allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, and the facts underlying them, we see nothing in the conduct of the U.S. Attorney's Office that gives us any reason to alter our opinion." After several more skirmishes regarding the wording of the plea agreement with the State Attorney's Office, Epstein entered his guilty plea and was sentenced on June 30, 2008. In accordance with the terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, later that day, Special Agent Kuyrkcndall and I met with Attorneys Jack Goldberger and Michael Tein and provided them with a written list of the 32 identified victims. Since the entry of the plea and sentencing, a number of concerns have been raised with Epstein's attorneys, including: (I) their objections to our efforts to notify victims of the resolution of the case; (2) their refusal to abide by and pay for the victims' representative, Bob Josefsberg, who had been selected by Judge Michael acting pro bono as a Special Master; (3) their representations to the Court about the continued pendency of the motion related to the subpoena for the computer equipment removed by a private investigator; (4) inappropriate contact between people working for Epstein and the identified victims; and (5) Epstein's application for and participation in the work release program. Some written notifications of potential breaches have been provided to Epstein's counsel. Those have all been resolved without a determination of breach by the U.S. Attorney's Office and a resultant indictment. THE CIVIL SUITS AGAINST EPSTEIN Not surprisingly, since the entry of the guilty plea, a number of victims have filed suit against Epstein. In federal court, fourteen suits have been filed against Epstein. All of those casts have been assigned to Judge Marra who also was assigned the lawsuit filed against the United States by two of Epstein's victims. In the Victims' Rights suit, Judge Marra ordered the United States to make PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 5 AITORNEY WORK PRODUCT Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011794 EFTA00192840

the Non-Prosecution Agreement available to each of the victims and/or her attorney, so long as they agreed to be bound by a Protective Order. Each victim (or her attorney) was provided with notice of the Court's ruling, and several executed the Protective Order and were provided with copies of the Non-Prosecution Agreement. From the beginning, Epstein has "vigorously defended" the suits, and has filed several motions to dismiss. In all of the early suits, the plaintiffs raised only common law tort claims or a combination of common law claims and a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. A number of plaintiffs' attorneys have argued that Epstein's defenses violate the NPA. Reviewing the language of the NPA and resolving any ambiguities in favor of Epstcin, those defenses do not breach thc NPA. However, some of the later plaintiffs, especially those represented by Bob Josefsberg, filed claims exclusively under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. Epstein has filed answers and Motions to Dismiss those Complaints as well, asserting defenses to liability, including that there can be no liability because Epstein was not convicted of an offense enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255. By doing so, Epstein has breached the NPA. The following is a brief synopsis of the suits filed in federal court.' I. Doe I. Epstein, 08-CV-80804-KAM: This suit was filed in state court, but was removed to federal court on July 18, 2008 by Epstein. The suit was filed by IM G., the first victim identified in PBPD's investigation. Plaintiff filed motion to remand to state court, which was granted by Judge Marra. 2. Jane Doe #2I. Epstein, 08-CV-80 I 19-KAM: Complaint filed on February 6, 2008, alleging: sexual assault (Count l), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count II). Epstein moved to stay the litigation, which was denied by Judge Marra. Epstein moved to dismiss Count I, claiming that there was no civil cause of action iAs mentioned above, the NPA provides protection only to victims who proceed exclusively pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255. By definition, the lawsuits filed in state court do not contain claims for relief under section 2255. Accordingly, this memo will not address those lawsuits. PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 6 ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011795 EFTA00192841

for "sexual assault." Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint asserting: sexual assault and battery (Count I), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 11), and "coercion and enticement to sexual activity in violation of I8 U.S.C. § 2422 (Count III). Epstein again moved to dismiss, claiming that there was no civil cause ofaction for"sexual assault and battery," and arguing that the plaintiff had not made sufficient factual allegations to support a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2422. Plaintiff then filed a Second Amended Complaint raising the same claims, hut providing additional factual allegations. Epstein filed an Answer, in which he cited his Fifth Amendment privilege from self-incrimination as the response to the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. Epstein also raised the following affirmative defenses: As to all counts, Plaintiff consented to and was a willing participant in the acts alleged. 2. As to all counts alleged, Plaintiff consented to and participated in conduct similar and/or identical to the acts alleged with other persons which were the sole or contributing cause of Plaintiff's alleged damages. 3. As to all counts, Defendant reasonably believed that the Plaintiff had attained the age of 18 years old at the time of the alleged acts. 4. Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Epstein then filed another Motion to Stay all of the civil litigation. Judge Marra ordered theUnited States to file a written response, and the matter is set for hearing on Friday, Junc 12, 2009. Today, Epstein filed an Amended Answer, raising a number of additional affirmative defenses, including that the claims are barred by the statute of limitations and that the pre-2006 version of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 applies, which only creates a cause of action for a person who is still a "minor," as opposed to "any person who, while a minor," was a victim of an offense. 3. Jane Doe #3 I. Epstein, 08-CV-80232-KAM: This suit was filed by the same lawyers as in the Jane Doe #2 suit, and the procedural history is identical. 4. Jane Doe #4'. Epstein, 08-CV-80380-KAM: This suit was filed by the samc lawyers as in the Jane Doe #2 suit, and the procedural history is identical. 5. Jane Doe #51 Epstein, 08-CV-80381-KAM: This suit was filed by the same lawyers as in the Jane Doe #2 suit, and the procedural history is identical. 6. Jane Doe #6l. Epstein, 08-CV-80994-KAM: This suit was filed by the same PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 7 ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011796 EFTA00192842

lawyers as in the Jane Doe #2 suit, and the procedural history is identical. 7. Jane Doe #7'. Epstein, 08-CV-80993-KAM: This suit was filed by the same lawyers as in the Jane Doe #2 suit, and the procedural history is identical. 8. C.M.A. I. Epstein, 08-CV-80811-KAM: This suit was filed in state court and removed to federal court. Plaintiff sued Epstein and Sarah Kellen (Epstein's assistant). Kellen is represented by Bruce Reinhart. CMA's initial Complaint alleged sexual abuse and intentional infliction of emotional distress. CMA later filed a First Amended Complaint, which alleged 30 separate claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255. Epstein filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that a victim can raise only one claim under section 2255, not a separate claim for each occurrence. A few days ago, CMA filed a document entitled "Conditional Notice of Intent to Exclusively Rely on Statutory Damages provided by 18 U.S.C. § 2255." In that document, CMA states that, if the statutory floor applies to each of her 30 claims under § 2255, then she will forego her civil claims. If, however, the Court decides that the statutory floor can apply to each victim only once, then she wants to be able to pursue both her statutory and common law claims. 9. Doe'. Epstein, 08-CV-80893-KAM: This suit was filed by one of the victims who brought the victim's rights suit against the United States. She is represented by Brad Edwards. The Complaint raises the following claims: sexual exploitation, sexual abuse and/or sexual assault of a minor (Count 1), "Cause of Action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255" (Count II), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count Ill), and "Civil Remedy for Criminal Practices" (Count IV). Plaintiff also filed a separate "Civil RICO Statement." Epstein filed a motion to dismiss or for a more definite statement, which was granted in part by Judge Marra. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in April, adding a claim for damages under a Florida statute providing compensation forerime victims. Epstcin has filed several motions to extend the time to file his Answer pending the outcome of his motion to stay all the civil litigation. Epstcin must file his Answer to this Amended Complaint by June 12th, the date of thc hearing on the Motion to Stay. 10. Doe iii. Epstein, 09-CV-80469-KAM: This Complaint is based exclusively on 18 U.S.C. § 2255. Plaintiff alleges that she was a victim of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and that Epstein "has made an agreement with the United States Attorney's Office to not contest liability for claims brought exclusively pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, in exchange for avoiding federal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(6), which provides a sentence of 10 years for each violation of thc law." On May 6, 2009, Epstein filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the case should be dismissed because the plaintiff had already filed a state court suit for common law claims arising from the same activity. Epstcin also argued that the version of I8 U.S.C. § 2255 that was in effect at the time of the sexual encounters applies (with its $50,000 PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 8 ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011797 EFTA00192843

minimum rather than the $ I 50,000 minimum).' I I. Doe No. 1011. Epstein, 09-CV-80591-KAM: This was the first suit filed by Bob losefsberg's firm. On May I, 2009, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint alleging six claims under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 —a separate count for each predicate offense that Epstein committed. Thus, Count I alleges that defendant Epstein "used a facility or means of interstate and/or foreign commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce Janc Doe No. 101, when she was under the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution and/or sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense .. . in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)." The other counts charge that Epstein violated § 2423(b) (travel with intcnt to engage in illicit sexual conduct); § 2251 (production of child pornography); §2252(a)(I) (transportation of child pornography); § 2252A(a)(1) (distribution of child pornography); and § 2252A(g) (engaging in a child exploitation enterprise). 12. Doe No. 102 I. Epstein, 09-CV-80656-KAM: This suit also was filed by Josefsberg's firm. On May I, 2009, Plaintiff filed suit alleging the same claims raised by Doe No. 101. Epstein has not yet filed his answer to that Complaint. 13. Doe No. 81 Epstein, 09-CV-80802-KAM: This is the most recently filed suit. It was filed on May 28, 2009. This suit was filed by the same lawyers as in the Jane Doe N2 suit, and the procedural history is identical. THE PLEADING THAT VIOLATED THE NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT Epstein's Non-Prosecution Agreement speaks of waiving challenges to liability and damages and one could certainly argue that the liability waiver applies to any 2255 claim filed by one of the listed victims. However, construing any ambiguity in favor of Epstein, the most conservative reading of the NPA requires him to waive challenges to liability in those cases where the plaintiff proceeds exclusively under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. Jane Doe #101 has stated all claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255 and is not seeking any common law, state, or other federal statutory remedies. In response to those claims, Epstein has made the following arguments in his Motion to Dismiss the 'Although not raised in the Motion to Dismiss Jane Doe 11's Complaint, Epstein has argued in another suit that, under the pre-2006 law, only persons who are still "minors" can file suit under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. In the 2006 version of the law, the language was changed to allow suit by any person who, "while a minor," was a victim of a violation. PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 9 ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011798 EFTA00192844

First Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, for a More Definite Statement (which is attached hereto): A. The applicable version of § 2255 only permits "minor" to sue: . .. Yet the FAC [First Amended Complaint] affirmatively admits that Plaintiff is over the age of 18.... Plaintiff is bound by that admission, and the FAC must be dismissed with prcjudicc... . B. Nor is Plaintiff the "victim of a violation" of a predicate criminal statute within the meaning of § 2255. 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a). In our system of justice, those accused of "violating" a criminal statute arc innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal court. With due respect to the courts that have concluded otherwise, it defies common sense to think that Congress intended to invert that fundamental legal norm, and the legislative history of § 2255 expressly confirms that Congress intended to condition § 2255 actions on an antecedent criminal conviction. The FAC therefore must be dismissed because it does not—and cannot—allege that Defendant has been convicted of a predicate criminal offense. C. Even if the applicable version of § 2255 were construed to allow adults to sue in the absence of a predicate conviction, the FAC.. .-even taken as true-would not establish a legally "plausible" claim that Plaintiff is a victim of any predicate criminal offense giving rise to a § 2255 cause of action. (Epstein's Mot' n at 2-3.) The motion expands each of these arguments. With respect to his argument that only "minors" can sue for damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, Epstein asserts that the 2006 amendment to § 2255 was not meant to apply retroactively and cannot apply retroactively because it would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.' The pre-2006 statute reads: "Any minor who is a victim of [certain federal crimes] and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. any minor as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $50,000 in value." In 2006, the statute was revised to state: "Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of [certain federal crimes] and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation, regardless of whether the injury occurred while such person was a minor, may sue in any appropriate United PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 10 ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011799 EFTA00192845

As to his second argument, Epstein reiterates that the "FAC still would fail as a matter of law because it does not (and cannot consistent with Rule I 1) allege that Defendant is guilty of 'a violation' of a predicate statute.... As set forth below, the plain text of the statute and its legislative history demonstrate that § 2255 is conditioned on a prior federal conviction. Because Defendant has never been convicted of a predicate federal offense, the FAC must be dismissed." (Epstein's Mot'n at 14-15.) He explains: Given the presumption of innocence that animates our system of criminal justice, Congress's reference to "a victim of a violation" of a criminal statute can only be interpreted to require proof that the defendant has been convicted of a predicate federal offense against the plaintiff. After all, an individual accused of "violating" a criminal statute is deemed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It would turn that principle upside down if plaintiffs could sue in the absence of an antecedent criminal conviction. (Id. at IS.) Epstein notes that the only district courts to have addressed § 2255 have held that an "antecedent conviction" is not required, but argues that those cases were wrongly decided. In her Complaint, Jane Doe #101 asserted that Epstein had been convicted of state law crimes and, taking language directly from Alex Acosta's letter to Lilly Ann Sanchez, wrote that Epstein "is in the same position as if he had been tried and convicted of the sexual offenses committed against Plaintiff and, as such, must admit liability unto Plaintiff." (Id. at 20.) Epstein quotes from the state plea colloquy and the state charging instrument to show that the state charges do not relate to Janc Doc #101. Further, he writes, "even if Defendant's state-law pleas did involve state-law offenses against Plaintiff—which they did not—§ 2255 only authorizes suit based on predicate convictions under certain federal statutes..:' (Id. at 21 (emphasis added).) States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such person sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any person as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than 5150,000 in value." PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL II ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011800 EFTA00192846

Epstein then addresses each of Jane Doe #101's claims. Taking his arguments directly from the various "position papers" that Epstein submitted to our office to urge declination, he argues: (I) Epstein could not have violated 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) because he did not use a facility of interstate commerce to persuade Jane Doc #101 to engage in sexual activity — the persuasion always occurred in person. (2) Epstein could not have violated 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) because the "dominant motive" for Epstein's interstate travel was not to engage in unlawful sexual activity. "Instead, as the FAC makes clear, Defendant is a successful businessman who maintains homes and properties around the world. Even if the FAC's fanciful allegations regarding Defendant's conduct while at those homes were true, the FAC does not remotely allege that his dominant motive for travel was to engage in illicit sexual acts ..." (Id. at 28 (emphasis in original).) (3) Plaintiff failed to adequately plead violations of IS U.S.C. § 2251, 2252(a)(1) and 2252A(a)( I ) because she does not allege that Epstein intended to transmit or actually did transmit images of child pornography in interstate commerce, and alleged only that Epstein "may have taken lewd photographs of Plaintiff . ." (4) Epstein could not have violated 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g) because the statute was not enacted until 2006, and Jane Doc # 101 alleges that her interactions with Epstein occurred in 2003. RECOMMENDATION As explained above, the Non-Prosecution Agreement provides, in relevant part, that "If any of the individuals referred to in paragraph (7),6 supra, elects to file suit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, 'The "individuals referred to in paragraph (7)" are "individuals whom [the United States) has identified as victims, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2255." PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL I2 ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011801 EFTA00192847

Epstein will not contest the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida over his person and/or the subject matter, and Epstein waives his right to contest liability and also waives his right to contest damages up to an amount as agreed to between the identified individual and Epstein, so long as the identified individual elects to proceed exclusively under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and agrees to waive any other claim for damages, whether pursuant to state, federal, or common law." The United States has performed its obligations under the NPA, and Jane Doe #101 has proceeded exclusively under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, yet Epstein is contesting liability. Moreover, Epstein is not simply contesting whether Jane Doc #101 is owed damages because of the particular circumstances of his interactions with Jane Doe 4101, he is asserting that he can never be forced to pay damages pursuant to I8 U.S.C. § 2255 because—in reliance on the NPA—the United States never prosecuted and convicted him of a predicate offense. The protection of the victims' rights to restitution was one of the most important aspects of the NPA and the failure of that key piece of consideration cannot be tolerated. This is especially true when one considers that Epstein has served virtually no jail time, in contravention of the NPA and representations made to our Office by Epstein's attorneys. The importance of this consideration is reiterated later in the NPA: "In consideration of Epstein's agreement to plead guilty and to provide compensation in the manner described above, if Epstein successfully fulfills all of the terms and conditions of this agreement, the United States also agrees that it will not institute any criminal charges against any potential co- conspirators of Epstein." (NPA at p.5.) The Agreement continues: "By signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that each of these terms is material to this agreement and is supported by independent consideration and that a breach of any one of these conditions allows the United States to elect to terminate the agreement and to investigate and prosecute Epstein and any other PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAl. 13 ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011802 EFTA00192848

individual or entity for any and all federal offenses." (NPA at p.6.) Accordingly, I recommend that the Office declare that Epstein has breached the NPA and proceed promptly to indictment. NOTICE REOUIREMENTS OF TILE NPA Pursuant to the NM, the U.S. Attorney's Office is required to provide prompt notice of a breach: If the United States Attorney should determine, based on reliable evidence, that, during the period of the Agreement, Epstein willfully violated any of the conditions of this Agreement, then the United States Attorney may, within ninety (90) days following the expiration of the term of home confinement discussed below, provide Epstein with timely notice specifying the condition(s) of the Agreement that he has violated, and shall initiate its prosecution on any offense within sixty (60) days' of giving notice of this violation. Any notice provided to Epstein pursuant to this paragraph shall be provided within 60 days of the United States learning of facts which may provide a basis for a determination of a breach of the Agreement. (NPA at p.2.) The pleading that is the subject of the breach was filed with the Court on May 26, 2009. Thus, we must provide notice of the breach not later than Saturday, July 25, 2009. The Office also must indict within 60 days of giving notice. In light of Judge Marra's directive that the Office address the issue of breach at the hearing on Friday, June 12, 2009, I recommend that we provide that Notice at the hearing. PRI VILF.GED AND CONFIDENTIAL 14 ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011803 EFTA00192849

DIRE: INVESTIGATION OF JEFFREY EPSTEBS IS.QPPIROSECITTIOLLAGEEEMENT IT APPEARING that the City of Palm Beach Police Department and the Slate Attorney's Office for the ISth Judicial Circuit in and foe Palm Beach County Oureinafter, the "Sum Attorney'. Office, have conducted an investigation into the conduct of kffrcy Epstein (hereinafter "Epstein"; IT APPEARING that the Sale AtI0OICY$ Office Nu charged Epstein by indktnxre with solicitation of prottltugon, in vildko of Floddy Stamm Sutton 79607; IT APPEARING that the United States Attorney's Office end the Federal Bum. of Inveuimetion have conducted their own investigation into Epstein'. background end any offenses that may have been committed by Epstein against de United Stow Bunt in or around 2001 through in or around September 2007, Including: (I) (2) (7) knowingly and willfully cornicing with othen known and unknown to commit an offemc againn the United States. that is, lo use. facility ot means of interstate or fievign commerce to knowingly persuade, Induce, or entice talon: famaka to engage in prostitution, in violation of TItle IL United States Cork,Section2d22(b); all in violation oflitIc IS, United Mahn Code, Section knowingly and willfully conspiring with others known and unknown to travel in Interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sans./ conduct as defined in It U.S.C. § 2423(0. with minor female., in violation of Tide United States Code, Section 2423(b), all In viobation of Title It, United Stases Code, Section 2427(e); wing a facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, or entice minor female. to engage In prostitution; in violation of Title ILI/ailed States Code, Sections 2422(2) and 2; (4) traveling (n Interstate ~one for the purpose of tooting in illicit actual conducts, defined in It U.S.C. § 2427(0, with minor females; in violpion Page I or 7 Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011804 EFTA00192850

of Title IS. United Stain Code, Section 2423(b); and knowingly. l and effecting interstate and foreip commove, recruiting. enticko, std obtaining by any mean a person, knowing th t the person had not attained the age of IS years and Would be caused to engage in a commercial sax eel as defined In IS U.S.C. § I591(eXI); in violation of rifle IS, United Slate, Code, Sections 1391(.Xl)and 2; end IT APPEAR1NO that Epstein seeks to resolve globally hls slate and ftdetst criminal liability and Epstein understands and &knowledge, that, in exchange for the benefit, provided by this agreement, &agrees to comply with its temo,Including andertakkotattath actions with the Stale Anomey's Office; IT APPEARING, after an investigation of the offenses and Eintcm's background by both Sow and Federal law enforcement 'omelet, and idler due tenni:tenon with do State Ammons Office, that the interests of the United Sines, the State of Florida, and the Defendant soil) be sewed by the following proodum, THEREFORE, on the authority of It. Alexander Acosta, United Slates Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, prosecution in this District foe these offenses shall be defined in favor of prosecuticm by the State of Florida, provided that Epstein abides by the following conditions and the roquinmatts of this Aapecemnt set forth below. If the United States Attorney should &leonine, bawd on reliable evidence, that, during the period of the Agreement, Epstein willfully violated any of the conditions of this Agreement. then the United States Attorney any, within ninety (90) days following the expiation of the tear of home confinement dismissed below, provide Epstein with timely notice specifying the condition(s)of the Agreement that he has violated, and shall initiate Its prosecution on any offane within sixty (60) days' of giving notice of the violation. Any notice provided to Epstein pursuant to this paragraph shall be provided within 60 days of the United States learning of facts which may provide a bans for • determined& of a breach of the ANorment. After timely ft:Inning all the tame end conditions of the Agreement, no proscanton for the offenses set orlon pages I and 2 oft/ItsAgreement, nor any other offenses that have been the ambled of the joint investigation by the federal Hunan of Investigation and the United States Attorney's Office, nor any offenses that arose from the Federal (nand July investigation will be instituted in this District. and the charges against Epstein if any, will be dismissed. Pau 2 of 7 Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011805 EFTA00192851

Terms of the Agreement: IiPtieln shall Plead guilty (not robs contendere) to the kakonent currently pending against him In the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County (Case NO. 2006-cf-00919SAX)O(MB) charging roe (I) count of solicitation of prostitution, in violation of Fl. Stat. 796.07. In addition, Epstein shall plead guilty to an Information filed by the State Attorney's Office charging Epstein with an offense that requires him to register to a sex offender, that is, the soliductica of minas to engage in restitution. in viotation of Florida Statutes Section 796.03. 2. Epstein shall make a binding recommendation that the Court impose thirty (J0) month sentence to be divided a follows: (a) Epstein shall be sentenced to consecutive terms of twelve (12) months and Mx (6) months in county jail foe all charges, without any opportunity for withholding edJudleadon eras:Mewing, and without probation w community control In lieu of Inspriscninan; and (b) Epstein shall be unlaced toe term of twelve (12) months of community control comocutivc to hie two mina In comityJail as described k Term 2(e), nye°. 3. Ills senescent b continual upon a fudge of the 15th hadkial Circuit accepting and executing ft /4111CIWA tweed upon between the State Attonsey's Office sod Epstein. the details orwhich are set fords In this agreement. 4. The tennis contained in puamsphs I and 2, supra, do not foreclose Epstein and the Slate Attorney's Office from agreeing to recommend any additional charge(s) 04 any additional krm(s) of probation ardor Incarcetation. 5. Epstein shall waive all challenges to 0se Information flied by the Suite Attorneys 0111ce and shall waive the right to cusped' his conviction and seetena, except a sentence that exceeds what 13 set forth in paragraph (2), aup'o. 6. Epstein skill provide to the O.S. Attorney's Office copies of all Pssc3of 7 Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011806 EFTA00192852

proposed aptemenu with the Suite Attorney's Office prior mastering into those agreements. The United Siam shell provide Epstein's attorneys with a lin of individuals whom it has Identified as victims, a defined in I g U.S.C. 2255, after Epstein has signed this agreement and been sentenced. Upon the netcution of this egreeuwnt the United Sates,in consultation with and subject to the good faith approval of Epstein's cartel, shall seket an anomey representative for these persons, who shall be paid foe by Epstein. Epstein's counsel may contact the identified individuals through that representative. If any of the individuals referred to in paragraph (7), supra. elect. to MC suit pursuant to IS U.S.C. § 2255. Epstein will not contest the junsdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ova his person andror the subject matter, end Ea:kitty/Dives his rialst to contest liability and also waives his fight to contst damages up to an amount as agreed to between the Identified Individual and Epstein, so long as the identified individual elites to proceed exclusively under IS V.S.C. § 2255. and agrees to waive any other claim for damages, whether pus:tent estate, Meal, or common law. Nowrithsondird; this waiver, as to those Individuals whose names appear on the list provided by the United States. Epstein's signature on this az:icemen, his waivers and Gam to contest liability and suth damages In nay suit arc not to be construed as an admission of any criminal or civil liability. Epstein's signature on this agyeanent also is not to be caromed as en admission of civil or criminal liability or a waiver °forty jurisdktional or other defense as to any person whose name does not appear on the list provided by the United Stale. 10. Except es to those individuals who elect to proceed exclusively under IS U.S.0 f 2255, as set (whin penigntph (St manta. neither Epstein's signature on this agreement not Mums, nor any resulting %vulvas or settlements by Epstein are to be construed as admissions or evitkexe of civil or criminal liability or a waiver of any Jurisdictional or other defense as to any person. whether or not her name appun on the list provided by the United States. 11. Epstein shall we his bat efforts to enter his guilty plea end be Page a of 7 Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011807 EFTA00192853

sentenced net bier thm October 26, 2007. The United States hr no objection to Epstein self-rtgorting to begin serving his sentence not later than January 4. 2006. 12. Epstein agree, Chit he not be afforded any benefits with ~set to pin time,other Menthe rights, opportungies, and benefits as any other inmate, including but not limited to, eligibility for gain time credit based on ruusdud role, and regulations that apply In the State of Fonda. Al the United Sias' toques«. Epstein *gnu M provide en accounting of the gain time he eamwd during his period of Incer«ration. I3. the ponies anticipate Nat this agreement will not be mede pan of any public record. if the United Slates receive, e Freedom of Information Act request or any compubory worm conunanding the disclosure of the agreement, int will provide notice to Epstein before making that disclosure. Epstein cederstands that the United States Attorney has no authority lo requite the Slate Attorney', Office to abide by any tema of this agreement Ennoln undershuldt that it Is Ma obligation to undertake din-Lesions with the Stale Artorerry's Office ard 10 we his but efforts to ensure compliance with them prwedurts which compliance will be necessary to ardsfy the United States' interest. Epstein alm understands that It is his obligation louse hin blot ,Ron, to convince the lodge of the 12th Judicial Circuit to accept Epstein', binding recc nmendation regarding the sentence to be imposed, and understand, that the failure to do so will be e breach of the agreement In consideration of Epstein, agreement to plead guilty and to provide compensation In the rriamwrdeseribed above, if fipseeir.succesfiilly NNW' all of the forma andconditions *IOW agreement, the United Slats also »grow that It will not institute any criminal charges against any potential coconspirator* of Epstein, Including but not limited to Sarah Kellen Adrian& R033, Lesley Groff, r $.dia hiarcinkova Further, upon execution of this op temcrel sod a plea agreement with the State Attorney's Office, the federal Omni Jury investigation will be suspended, and all pending federal Cmuul Jury subpoenas will be MN LI abeyance odes, and until the defendant violates any term of Nis agreement. The defendant likewise agree, to withdraw his pending motion to intervene and toquash certain grand jury subpoenas. Both parties agree to maintain their evidence, sweifkally evidence requested by or directly related to the wand jury subpoenas that have been issued, end includingoertain computer equipment, inviolate until all of the terms of Nis agreement have been satisfied. Upon the successful completion of the terms of this agreement, all outstanding grand jury subpoenas *hell be deemed withdrawn. Pap S of 7 Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011808 EFTA00192854

Dy signifia this agreement. Epstein usons and eertilks that mari of dies. Items is mataial Io Nb agreement and If supported by independall eawideration and Ne a lunch °Demy onc of the... condition; alloua the United Steel to edect to terminate the agnement and to invertigke and protocole Epstein and any °the; individuel or entity te dey and ail Coderai offenses sysigningthis agreement, Renias usent and outilles thmhe mare °tee (euh.: Uw Shah Arceiximent to the Coralituion of the United States uovides 141 ln a11 uirninal prosecutions the keuao1stioll enjoy the right to a spzedy and publie trid. Esowin furexr is 'watt dut Ruk Ill(b) of the Redent{ Rulea ofCriminel Procedtae provides dut the Cowt may &kolas an Infonnation, or complaini for traweessuy delay it pteartaing a charge to the Grand Rn, Ming an Informatiog ce ln bringing a Uri:adent to trial. Epstein hereby soumets that the United States Attorney for ne Southem Distrietof Floride de r« sikh proseseution Epstein egree and contenu thal anyckley Dom the due of titis Agnerunt to the date of initiation of prou:notion, 03 provided for th the tenu tantes:cd herein, thall te dan be a neeessary *lapa Alamos mue«, and he hcreby %s'Iwo anydefense b mach proxoution on the t'oued Nat nich delay operatcd w deny him nets Linder Rule 48(b) of the Roderai Rides of enterrai Procedwe and the Sbilh Arnendmentto the Constitution of the UnitedStaffatom speedy trial or to bu lie proseeutionby tesson of the moins of the 'talle of limitations for a pulod of monte <quai la Na period banco the signIng of Une 0g:cernent and the kaaeh of US OgIVellall 03 us th'« offensa that vere the subito of the grand jury's Investigation. Epstein further muta and ratifia tint he undenumda Mat the Flfth Amenament and Rule 7(a) of the Roderai Rule. of Crimiral Wou:dure Koulak daall Mordes mut lys charged in en {cillement praentod to a grand Jury. Epstein hereby aigres and (CeSetw the if • prosecution apaisai him h irntinned for any offense that usis the 'objecter0e grandjuria inwangation, il may be by way of anInfonnwion sIgned and filai by the United States Anone); end hereby nives Ma rie to be Indktcd by e gnnd jury as ha any aie offense, lit tyy lff hie 6of 7 Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011809 EFTA00192855

By signing Ibis agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read and explained to him. Epstein hereby states that be understands the conditions of this Non- Prosecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA UNITED STATES ATTORNEY Dated: By: Dated: 77P/4" Dated: Dated: A. MARIE VTLLAFARA ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY OERALD LEFCOURT, ESQ. COUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN LILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ. ATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN Page 7 of 7 Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-01 1810 EFTA00192856

By signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read and explained to him. Epstein hereby states that he understands the conditions of this Non- Prosecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA UNITED STATES ATTORNEY Dated: By: Dated: Dated: HD 7 Dated: A. MARIE VILLAFARA ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY JEFFREY EPSTEIN EFCOL ES Q. OUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN LILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ. ATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN Pogo 7 of 7 Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011811 EFTA00192857

By Arniog :Ms Lirknamt, PosWai steers end catnips NY the above Ina bran IS ad explained whim. Epsiola hereby macs the he uodastsais the coodEloca of Mt Non. Erossorrtion Aryirsmeat sod wets to comply with them R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA %MIMED SIAM ATTORNEY Mud: Deb!: Oast HY: A. MARIE YILLAPA9A ASSISTANT US ATTORNEY JEFFREY EPSTEIN ATTORNEY FOR EIFTIO3Y EPSOM hp /of 7 Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-01 1 8 12 EFTA00192858

IN RE: IMIESTIGA11074 OP JEMMY IIPSTIPN 612jamiamm twor IT APPEARING that W pullet seek to elerity cenaln peosisloas «page 4, puma 7 of Oa Non,hosccutIon Agnarnan Nation': 'pongees* 7), Wu agreement Is neodiflod ot %Porn: 7A The United States tat the right to au@ to an Indopendmt ettedftaity the responsibility ftr consulting with ted, subject to the good YON apron; of Epsteires counsel. relict* Wt money reftatiftetive for els ladiviehmis Wonted ur/.<: to Agyeemenl. IS No lirfted %us elects 4> assign this rospottititey to at. iftetepenteM thitatarty, boa the Undid States end P.pstelsa robin the right to make µok ION objemloas to We eummey npiesenusftvo rvapasied by the Intl:widen, third-pray ?dot to the Mn ckalpariees of the anomey represeabilve. 70. lbc panics will jointly moans a short veekan nsbmIssicm to No Indowklent thInSparty :exalting the solo piths atterney roprescntatins and regaiding Epocein's Agromert on pay wok attorney rtmeoentethe hit te her stouter ontoussey hearty rate tot tronstating toch *Cm subject to i7e pfterisken of prograph C. Infra. 7C Piesewit to additional paragraph 7A,E➢srin/as,Ereedlo py We fees or the ottomey nyernaftstive telakd by the ladepenclud ihtd patty.11t pcooision, hosnwr, stall ea obligate Pastel» to pay the fee and cot of oftneolod inolun nw «Silts* b;',, ;tin« comblerelce of ',medal fettleincm. en °nano teprestrgatIn elects to flit e corium.: lovesoit penman. to I8 V.S.C. t 2235 or cleat to pate Sty mho: waited ,7medY. the Pun rif h 7 obitgatilin of Ne Atnemeet to pay the togs of the eteftecy repitscralive,M opposed to any netstory et oft* obligilkot to pay reat:neifie attorneys foes sad costs mots el those Oallehlig k t 2253 to boe: doe cons of Ne annrey repextmelve. shall caw. Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011813 EFTA00192859

Ey t;p:ng Mb Addentkm, Efmcb Isme end meien GA1 iba above km boer iod ani espisIned b Mm. !nuk henby. sist Pat te vederrards OM GhlifiCatiord CO We Non- Pr oucuton Agraimen1 and *pm to tomply wkihztote. R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA VinTED STATER ATTOMEY A. MARE VII1APA A ASSISTANT VS. ATTORNEY Dáie.1 ril - Os& Dw.* GERALD LEPCOURT,ESO. COUNSEL TO MPFREY MIEN LILLY ANN SANCHEZ. ESQ. ATTORNEY POR WEM ETSTEN Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011814 EFTA00192860

By signing this Addendum, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read and explained to him. Epstein hereby states that he understands the clarifications to the Non- Prosecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA UNITED STATES ATTORNEY Dated: By: Dated: Dated: Dated: A. MARIE VILLAFARA ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY JEFFREY EPSTEIN RALD LEFCO r RT ESQ. COUNSEL TO JEFFR Y EPSTEIN LILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ. ATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011815 EFTA00192861

By signing this Addendum, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read and explained to him. Epstein hereby states that he understands the clarifications to the Non- Prosecution Agreement and agrees to comply with than. R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA UNITED STATES ATTORNEY Dated: By: Dated: Dated: Dated: ) 219"" A. MARIE VILIAFAFIA ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY JEFFREY EPSTEIN OBRALD LEFCOURT, ESQ. COUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN LILLY ANPPSANCHEZ, ES . ATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011816 EFTA00192862

U.S. Department of Justice United States Attorney Southern District of Florida R ALEXANDER ACOSTA UNITED STATES ATTORNEY DELIVERY BY FACSIMILE Lilly Ann Sanchez Fowler White Burnett, PA 1395 Stickel! Ave, le Floor Miami, FL 33131 Re: Jeffrey Epstein Dear Ms. Sanchez: 99N£ !Street USK FL 13112 003)961.9100 - Tetteatle O03)3366444 - FaesteSk December 19, 2007 I write to follow up on the December le meeting between defense counsel and the Eps prosecutors, as well as our First Assistant, the Miami FBI Special A ent in Charge and mysel . 'Section 2255 provides that: Imlay person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation of (enumerated SCCII0115 of Title IS] and who suffen personal Injury as a result of such violation ... may sue in any appropriate United States DiStliet Court and shall recover the actual damages such person sustains and the cost of the suit, Including a reasonable attorney's fee." Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011817 EFTA00192863

With this in mind, I have considescd defamecount' nouns, rep/ding the Section 2255 prtions of the Agreement. As I previously absent:Iour Intral has been to place the victims in the woe position as they would have been had Mr. Epstein been convicted al trial. No more; no less. From our muting. It appears Mu the defense wets that ibis was the Weed. Uwing the comae of nesoliMions that intent was reduced 10 tithing in Pang aph3 7 and 8, which all wrote previnsfr. was fa: from simple to undersuod. I meld thus propose that we solve our eksagitements over ink:veterans by saying precisely whet we mean in a simple fashion. I would replace Paragraphs 7 sod S with the following language: "Any person, who while a minor, was a victim of a violation of an offense enumerated in Title IS. United States Code. Section 2255, will have the same riche to proceed undo Secdon nss 14 ale would have had. if Mt.Epsteinbeen tried federally and convicted of an enumerated °Menu- For ImPose Of imPlenwnling this awagraph, the United Saks shall provide Mr. Epstein's atkencys with a list of individuals *horn it was petpued toriame in an 44kt:oral as victims of an exonerated offense by Mr. P.pskin Any judicial authority ink:pitting thin provision, including any euthorityiklennining which evidentiary burdens if any e plaintiff must meet, shall consider that it is the intent of the panics In place these identified 1114111113 in the 1411% position ILI they would have been had Mt. Epstein been convicted al vial. No mac; no kis." 2 Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011818 EFTA00192864

Srstrely. R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 3 Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011819 EFTA00192865

U.S. Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530 June 23, 2008 Jay Lefkowitz„ Esq. Kenneth Starr, Esq. Kirkland and Ellis LLP 777 South Figueroa Street Los Angeles, CA 90017 Gentlemen: This Office has completed a thorough review of the U.S. Attorney's handling of the matter involving your client, Jeffrey Epstein. We have received and reviewed your letters of May 19, June 3 and June 19, 2008, the attachments to the June 19 letter, as well as your submissions to the Criminal Division and the U.S. Attorney's Office. Additionally, we have reviewed en extensive set of materials provided by the U.S. Attorney's Office and conferred with a number of highly experienced Department attorneys about this matter. The Deputy Attorney General has also been briefed. As you know, the Department of Justice vests considerable discretion in its U.S. Attorneys, and the Deputy Attorney General will intervene in only the most unusual of circumstances. We do not believe such intervention is warranted here. Even if we were to substitute our judgment for that of the U.S. Attorney, we believe that federal prosecution of this case is appropriate. Moreover, having reviewed your allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, and the facts underlying them, we see nothing in the conduct of the U.S. Attorney's Office that gives us any reason to alter our opinion. cc: Alex Acosta Sincerely, John Roth Senior Associate Deputy Attorney General Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011820 EFTA00192866

FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES CALCULATION (Using November 1.2004 Guidelines Manual} Each count of §§ 1591, 2422(b) and 2423(6): Base Offense Level under 2G1.3: Offense involved sexual contact: 24 +2 26 Counts do not group, so add 5 levels for more than 5 units, pursuant to 3D1.4 Offense Level 31 Apply Repeat and Dangerous Sex Offender against Minors enhancement at 4B1.5 Total Offense Level 36 Assuming Criminal History Category!, advisory guideline range is 188 - 235 months with lifetime supervised release. Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011821 EFTA00192867

CONFIDENTIAL PLEA NEGOTIATIONS TERMS OF EPSTEIN NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT ■ Epstein pleads guilty (not nolo contendere) to an Information filed by the Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office charging him with: (a) lewd and lascivious battery on a child, in violation of Fl. Stat. 800.04(4); (b) solicitation of minors to engage in prostitution, in violation of Fl. Stat. 796.03; and (c) engaging in sexual activity with minors at least sixteen years of age, in violation of Fl. Stat. 794.05. ■ Epstein and the State Attorney's Office make a joint, binding recommendation that Epstein serve at least two years in prison, without any opportunity for withholding adjudication or sentencing; and without probation or community control in lieu of imprisonment. ■ Epstein agrees to waive all challenges to the information filed by the State and the right to appeal. ■ Epstein agrees that, if any of the victims identified in the federal investigation file suit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, Epstein will not contest the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida over his person and the subject matter. Epstein will not contest that the identified victims arc persons who, while minors, were victims of violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections(s) 2422 and/or 2423. ■ After Epstein enters his state court plea and is sentenced, the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office will close their investigations. Case No. 08-R0736-CV-MARRA P-011822 EFTA00192868

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 1 of 19 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JANE DOE No. 101, Plaintiff, VS. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 09 - 8059 1 Civil Action No. CIV-MARRP MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHNSON Etrpy ,fir DC INTAKE APR 1 7 2009 STEVEN M. LARIMORE CLERK U.S. OIST. CT. S.O. OF FLA. MIAMI COMPLAINT AND Defendant. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Plaintiff, Jane Doe No. 101 ("Jane Doe"), brings this Complaint against Defendant. Jeffrey Epstein, and states as follows: PARTIES• JURISDICTION. AND VENUE I. At all times material to this cause of action, Plaintiff, Jane Doe, was a resident of Palm Beach County, Florida. 2. This Complaint is brought under a fictitious name to protect the identity of Plaintiff, Jane Doe, because this Complaint makes sensitive allegations of sexual assault and abuse of a then minor. 3. At all times material to this cause of action, Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, had a residence located at 358 El Bulb Way, West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida. 4. Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, is currently a citizen of the State of Florida, as he is currently incarcerated in the Palm Beach County Stockade. 5. At all times material to this cause of action, Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, was an adult male born in 1953. Podhunt Orseck, P.A. 25 West Hagler Street Suite 800, MWµ FL 33130, MINA 3053582800 Fax 305358.238I • For Lauder:10e 051.4624346 www.podhuyst corn CILSC No. 08.80736-CV-MARRA P-011823 EFTA00192869

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 2 of 19 6. This Court has jurisdiction of this action and the claims set forth herein pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255. 7. This Court has venue of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), as a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in this District. STATEMENT OF FACTS 8. At all relevant times, Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, was an adult male, approximately 50 years old. Epstein is known as a billionaire financier and money manager with a secret clientele limited exclusively to billionaires. He is a man of tremendous wealth, power, and influence. He owns a fleet of aircraft that includes a Gulfstream IV, a helicopter, and a Boeing 727. Until his incarceration, he maintained his principal place of residence in the largest home in Manhattan, a 51,000-square-foot eight-story mansion on the Upper East Side. Upon information and belief, he also owns a S6.8 million mansion in Palm Beach, Florida, a $30 million 7,500-acre ranch in New Mexico he named "Zorro," and a 70-acre private island known as Little St. James in St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands. The allegations herein concern Defendant's conduct while at his lavish estate in Palm Beach. 9. Upon information and belief, Defendant has a sexual preference for underage minor girls. He engaged in a plan, scheme, or enterprise in which he gained access in his home to countless relatively economically disadvantaged minor girls, sexually assaulted or molested these girls, and then gave them money. 10. Beginning in or around 2001 through in or around September 2007, Defendant used his resources and his influence over vulnerable minor children to engage in a systematic pattern of sexually exploitative behavior. 11. Defendant's plan and scheme reflected a particular pattern and method. Defendant coerced and enticed impressionable, vulnerable, and relatively economically less Podhurat Orseck, P.A. 2 2s West Flagler Street Sae 800, Mkerd, FL 33134 WKS 3053582000 Pax 301.158.2382 • Pert Lauderdale 954.463.°46 I www.podhwitaom Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011824 EFTA00192870

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 3 o(19 fortunate minors to participate in various acts of sexual misconduct that he committed upon them. Defendant's scheme involved the use of underage girls as well as other individuals to recruit other underage girls. Upon information and belief, Defendant or an authorized agent would call and alert Defendant's assistants shortly before or after he arrived at his Palm Beach residence. His assistants would seek out economically disadvantaged and underage girls from West Palm Beach and surrounding areas who would be enticed by the money being offered— generally $200 to $300 per "massage" session—and who Defendant and/or his assistants perceived as less likely to complain to authorities or have credibility issues if allegations of improper conduct were made. The then minor Plaintiff and other minor girls, some as young as 14 years old, were transported to Defendant's Palm Beach county mansion by Defendant's employees, agents, and/or assistants in order to provide Defendant with "massages." 12. Defendant would pay the procurer of each girl's "appointment" approximately $200. Many of the instances of illegal sexual conduct committed by Defendant were perpetrated with the assistance, support, and facilitation of at least three assistants who helped him orchestrate this child exploitation enterprise. These assistants would often arrange times for underage girls to come to Defendant's residence, transport or cause the transportation of underage girls to Defendant's residence, escort the underage girls to the massage room where Defendant would be waiting or would enter shortly thereafter, urge the underage girls to remove their clothes, deliver cash from Defendant to the underage girls and/or their procurers at the conclusion of each "massage appointment," and, upon information and belief, take nude photographs and/or videos of the underage girls' for Defendant without their knowledge. 13. Epstein designed the scheme to secure a private place in Defendant's mansion where only persons employed and invited by Epstein would be present, so as to reduce the chance of detection of Defendant's sexual abuse and prostitution as well as to make it more Podhurst Orscck, P.A. 3 25 West Flaglier Strait, Suite 500, Miami, FL 33130, Mimi 3C635&2200 PM 3053582382 • loon Isuderdele %tate* Case No. 08.80736-CV-MARRA R-011825 EFTA00192871

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 4 of 19 difficult for the minor girls to flee the premises and/or to credibly report his actions to law enforcement or other authorities. The girls were usually transported by his employees, agents, and/or assistants or by a taxicab paid for by Defendant in order to make it difficult for the girls to flee his mansion. 14. Upun arrival at Defendant's mansion, each underage victim would generally be introduced to one of Defendant's assistants, who would gather the girl's personal contact information. The minor girl would then be led up a flight of stairs to a room that contained a massage table and a large shower. The staircase leading to the room was plastered with nude photographs of young girls, including some photographs depicting two or more young girls engaged in lewd acts. Upon information and belief, Defendant, Jeffrey Epstcin, had such photographs in each of his four homes and on his computer. 15. At times, if it was the girl's first "massage" appointment, another female would be in the room to "lead the way" until Defendant would have her leave. Generally, Defendant would start his massage wearing only a small towel, which eventually would be removed. Defendant would direct the girl to massage him, giving her specific instructions as to where and how he wanted to be touched, and then direct her to remove her clothing. He would then perform one or more lewd, lascivious, and sexual acts, including masturbation, fondling the minor's breasts and/or sexual organs, touching the minor's vagina with a vibrator and/or back massager, digitally penetrating her vagina, performing intercourse, oral sex, and/or anal sex, and/or coercing or attempting to coerce the girl to engage in lewd acts and/or prostitution. The exact degree of molestation and frequency with which the sexual crimes took place varied and is not yet completely known; however, at least when Defendant was in Palm Beach, Florida, such acts occurred usually on a daily basis and, in most instances, several times a day. Podhurst Orsecic P.A. 4 23 West Flagler Sate, Suite 800, Miami. FL 33130, Mad X6.35511300 Pax 3(59582342 • Port Lauderdale 954.461.4346 veww.podlturattom Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011826 EFTA00192872

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 5 of 19 16. As previously stated in paragraph 14, Defendant displayed nude photographs of underage girls throughout his homes in New York, Palm Beach, Ncw Mexico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Upon information and belief, some of the photographs in the possession of Defendant were taken with hidden cameras set up throughout his home in Palm Beach. On the day of his arrest, police found two hidden cameras and photographs of underage girls on a computer in Defendant's home. Upon information and belief, Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, may have taken lewd photographs of Plaintiff, Jane Doe, with his hidden cameras and may have transported lewd photographs of Plaintiff (among many other victims) to his other residences and elsewhere using a facility or means of interstate commerce. 17. Consistent with the foregoing plan and scheme, Defendant used his money, wealth, and power to unduly and improperly manipulate and influence the then minor Plaintiff Plaintiff, Jane Doe, was recruited by one of Defendant's agents to give Defendant a massage for compensation. Plaintiff was apprehensive, but needed the money and finally agreed to go. Plaintiff was first thought to Defendant's mansion in or about the spring of 2003, when she was merely 17 years old and in high school. Epstein's procurer drove her to Jeffrey Epstcin's mansion. Plaintiff was led up a flight of stairs by a blonde woman to a spa room with a shower and a massage table, where she was left alone. A woman with dark hair, an accent, and naked from the waist up entered and tried to coax Plaintiff to remove her shirt, but Plaintiff refused. After the woman showed Plaintiff how to use the lotions that were there, the woman left. Defendant walked in wearing only a small towel. He lay down on the massage table still wearing the small towel, and Plaintiff began to massage his shoulders and neck. Nervously, she asked him what he did for a living. Defendant responded that he was a scientist. Defendant asked Plaintiff what year she would graduate high school, to which Plaintiff honestly replied that she would graduate in 2004. Plaintiff massaged Defendant's lower back and calves. Defendant Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 5 25 Was Mar Street Suite 800. Miami. Fl. 33130, Miam1305358.2800 Fax 305356238 • Port Louden:W.9544634346 www.podhuntscom Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011827 EFTA00192873

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 6 of 19 told her to remove his towel. Defendant told her that he had just worked out and wanted his buttocks massaged. Although disgusted, she was afraid to refuse and did it. At some point, Defendant ordered Plaintiff to remove her clothes. In shock, fear, and trepidation, Plaintiff partly complied, removing only her shirt and bra. When Defendant turned over, Plaintiff was afraid and embarrassed and she wanted to leave. Defendant repeatedly told her to relax and complimented her, saying that she had a nice body. Defendant then pulled Plaintiff closer to him. He began masturbating and then began fondling her breasts. He asked her to do more and mentioned more money, which she adamantly declined. Defendant continued masturbating until he ejaculated. Plaintiff next recalls that she received $200 and was transported by the procurer, whom she later learned received $200 for having brought her to Epstein's mansion. 18. Defendant thereafter lured the then minor Plaintiff to the Epstein mansion on at least one and perhaps two other occasions in the spring and/or summer of 2003. The procurer made another appointment for her to return, but Plaintiff didn't want to see Defendant. By having his assistants continue to contact Plaintiff and attempt to lure her to the mansion for other sexual acts, Defendant engaged in a continuous course of conduct that injured Plaintiff upon each instance of contact and/or abuse. 19. In addition to the direct sexual abuse and molestation of the then minor Plaintiff, Defendant used his money, wealth, and power to unduly and improperly manipulate and influence the then minor Plaintiff to bring him another minor girl in a promised exchange for money. Rather than go herself, Plaintiff and the procurer took another girl there one time. 20. As a result of these encounters with Defendant, Plaintiff, Jane Doe, has in the past suffered, and will in the future suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, psychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, loss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, and Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 6 25 Wed Hasler Street, Suite KO, Wail, FL 33130, Mond 3053532800 Pax 305358.2382 • Port Lauderdale 954.4614346 1 www.podtauslcom Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011828 EFTA00192874

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 7 of 19 other damages associated with Defendant's controlling and manipulating her into a perverse and unhealthy way of life. 21. Any assertions by Defendant that he was unaware of the age of the then minor Plaintiff are belied by her telling him her high school graduation year, as well as his own actions, and are rendered irrelevant by the provision of applicable federal statutes concerning the sexual exploitation and abuse of a minor child. Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, at all times material to this cause of action, knew and should have known of Plaintiff's age of minority. In fact, his preference for underage girls was well-known to those who regularly procured them for him. 22. Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, committed the above-referenced acts upon the then minor Plaintiff in violation of federal statutes condemning the coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in prostitution or sexual activity, travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, sex trafficking of children, sexual exploitation of minor children, transport of visual depictions of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, transport of child pornography, child exploitation enterprises, and other crimes, specifically including, but not limited to, those crimes designated in 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), § 2423(b), § 2423(e), § 2251, § 2252, § 2252A(a)(I), § 2252A(g)(I), and * 1591. 23. After investigations by the Palm Beach Police Department, the Palm Beach State Attorney's Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, entered picas of "guilty" to various Florida state crimes involving the solicitation of minors for prostitution and the procurement of minors for the purposes of prostitution in June 2008 in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in Palm Beach County, Florida. Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, is in the same position as if he had been tried and convicted of the sexual offenses committed against Plaintiff and, as such, Podhurat °neck, P.A. 7 23 Wen Phew Sind, Sults 800, MCI, Pt 33130, Miami 3053581BM Pax 305336.2W • Port Isuderdolo 9544614316 I Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011829 EFTA00192875

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 8 of 19 must admit liability unto Plaintiff, Jane Doe. Plaintiff hereby exclusively seeks civil remedies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255. COUNT ONE fCause of Action for Coercion and Enticement of Minor to Engage in Prostitution or Sexual Activity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ti 2255 in Violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(bfl 24. Plaintiff, Jane Doe, hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs I through 23 above. 25. Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, used a facility or means of interstate commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, or entice Jane Doe, when she was under the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution and/or sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(h). 26. Plaintiff, Jane Doe, was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and, as such, asserts a cause of action against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, pursuant to this Section of the United States Code. 27. As a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255 being committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, and will in the future suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, psychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, loss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, and other damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and leading her into a perverse and unhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, and Plaintiff will in the future suffer additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of income, a toss of the capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the capacity to enjoy life. These injuries are permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to suffer these losses in the future. Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 8 25 wet Malec Sent, suite eao, MbaJ, FL 33130, Miami 305.358.21C0 Fax 303358.2162 • Pert Lauderdale 934.463.4346 www.podhuroloaat Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011830 EFTA00192876

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 9 of 19 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Jane Doe, demands judgment against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, for all damages available under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, including, without limitation, actual and compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this Court deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by a jury. COUNT TWO (Cause of Action for Travel with Intent to Engage in Illicit Sexual Conduct pursuant to 18 U.S.C. & 2255 in Violation of 18 U.S.C. & 2423(bi) 28. Plaintiff, Jane Doe, hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 23 above. 29. ijpon information and belief, Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, traveled in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f), with minor females, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). 30. Plaintiff. Jane Doe, was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and, as such, asserts a cause of action against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, pursuant to this Section of the United States Code. 31. As a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255 being committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, and will in the future suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, psychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, loss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, and other damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and leading her into a perverse and unhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, and Plaintiff will in the future suffer additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the Poclhurst Orseck, R A. 9 25 west Meer Street Suite SOO, Miami, PI. 33130. Mead 3053362800 Fax 346358.2M • Poet Lauderdale 954463046 Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-0[1831 EFTA00192877

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 10 of 19 capacity to enjoy life. These injuries are permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to suffer these losses in the future. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Jane Doe, demands judgment against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, for all damages available under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, including, without limitation, actual and compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this Court deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by a jury. COUNT THREE (Cause of Action for Sex Traffickine of Children pursuant to 18 U.S.C. b 2255 in Violation of 18 U.S.C. ti 1591(a)) 32. Plaintiff, Jane Doe, hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs I through 23 above. 33. Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, knowingly, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, recruited, enticed, and obtained Plaintiff, Jane Doe, knowing that she had not attained the age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1591(0)(1), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1). 34. Plaintiff, Jane Doe, was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and, as such, asserts a cause of action against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, pursuant to this Section of the United States Code. 35. As a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255 being committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, and will in the future suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, psychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, loss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, and other damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and leading her into a perverse and Podhurst Once& P.A. 10 25 West Plagler Stet. Suite KO, Nand. FL 33130, Kuril 305.3932800 Fax 3053582382 • Fort Lauderede 951.163.4346 I inewpodhurstroot Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011832 EFTA00192878

Case 9:09-Oi-80591-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 11 of 19 unhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, and Plaintiff will in the future suffer additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the capacity to enjoy life. These injuries are permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to suffer these losses in the future. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Jane Doe, demands judgment against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, for all damages available under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, including, without limitation, actual and compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this Court deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by a jury. COUNT FOUR (Cause of Action for Sexual Exploitation of Children pursuant to 18 U.S.C. & 2255 in Violation of 18 U.S.C. & 22511 36. Plaintiff, Jane Doc, hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 23 above. 37. Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, knowingly induced, enticed, or coerced then minor Plaintiff Jane Doe to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251. As previously stated in paragraphs 14 and 16, Defendant displayed a myriad of photographs of underage girls throughout his homes in New York, Palm Beach, New Mexico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Upon information and belief, many of the photographs in the possession of Defendant were taken with hidden cameras set up throughout his home in Palm Beach. On the day of his arrest, police found two hidden cameras and photographs of underage girls on a computer in Defendant's home. Upon information and belief, Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, may have taken lewd photographs of Plaintiff, Jane Doc, with his hidden cameras and may have transported lewd photographs of Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 11 13 West Hagler Steen Suite 800. Miami. FL33130, Miami 305358.21X* Fax 301.3582382 • Port Lauderdale 954.463.4346 .podhuntcozn Case No. 08.80736-CV-MARRA P-011833 EFTA00192879

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 12 of 19 Plaintiff (among many other victims) to his other residences and elsewhere using a facility or means of interstate commerce. 38. Plaintiff, Jane Doe, was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and, as such, asserts a cause of action against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, pursuant to this Section of the United States Code. 39. As a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255 being committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, and will in the future suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, psychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, loss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, and other damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and leading her into a perverse and unhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, and Plaintiff will in the future suffer additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the capacity to enjoy life. These injuries are permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to suffer these losses in the future. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Jane Doe, demands judgment against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, for all damages available under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, including, without limitation, actual and compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this Court deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by a jury. Podhurst Orseck, P.A. I2 25 West Rasher Street, SUMP SOO, Maud, FT. 33130, MIanL 3053582880 Fax 3053582382 • Fort Lauderdale 554.463A346 www.podlutroterom Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011834 EFTA00192880

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 13 of 19 COUNT FIVE (Cause of Action for Transport of Visual Depiction of Minor Eneanine in Sexually Explicit Conduct pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4 2255 in Violation of 18 U.S.C. & 2252(a)(1)1 40. Plaintiff, Jane Doe, hereby adopts, repeats, =lieges, and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs I through 23 above. 41. Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, knowingly mailed, transported, or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(1). As previously stated in paragraphs 14, 16, and 37, upon information and belief, Defendant displayed a myriad of photographs of underage girls throughout his homes in New York, Palm Beach, New Mexico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Upon information and belief, many of the photographs in the possession of Defendant were taken with hidden cameras set up throughout his home in Palm Beach. On the day of his arrest, police found two hidden cameras and photographs of underage girls on a computer in Defendant's home. Upon information and belief, Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, may have taken lewd photographs of Plaintiff, Jane Doe, with his hidden cameras and may have transported lewd photographs of Plaintiff (among many other victims) to his other residences and elsewhere using a facility or means of interstate commerce. 42. As previously stated in paragraph 21, any assertions by Defendant that he was unaware of the age of the then minor Plaintiff are belied by his actions and rendered irrelevant by the provision of applicable federal and state statutes concerning the sexual exploitation and abuse of a minor child. Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, at all times material to this cause of action, knew and should have known of Plaintiff's age of minority. In fact, his preference for underage girls was well-known to those who regularly procured them for him. 43. Plaintiff, Jane Doe, was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and, as such, asserts a cause of action against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, pursuant to this Section of the United States Code. Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 13 25 Wed Meer Sued. Suite 800. Mlwt FL03130. Mang 3(5.158.2800 Fax 305358.2382 • Foci Lauderdale 954.461.4346 I www.podlwtteasn Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA PA11835 EFTA00192881

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 14 of 19 44. As a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255 being committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, and will in the future suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, psychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, loss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, and other damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and leading her into a perverse and unhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, and Plaintiff will in the future suffer additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the capacity to enjoy life. These injuries are permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to suffer these losses in the future. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Jane Doe, demands judgment against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, for all damages available under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, including, without limitation, actual and compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this Court deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by a jury. COUNT SIX (Cause of Action for Transport of Child Pornography pursuant to 18 U.S.C. & 2255 in Violation of 18 U,S.C. ti 2252A(a)(1)1 45. Plaintiff, Jane Doe, hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs I through 23 above. 46. Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, knowingly mailed, transported, or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1). Podhurst Orsecic, P.A. 14 ZS West Meer Street. Suite 800, MWµ P1.13130. Ittlen0 305.1582800 Pax 305358.2382 • Port Lauderdale 951.463.8346 .podhuntcom Case No. 08.80736-CV-MARRA P-011836 EFTA00192882

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 15 of 19 47. Plaintiff, Jane Doe, was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and, as such asserts a cause of action against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, pursuant to this Section of the United States Code. 48. Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, is in the same position as if he had been tried and convicted of the sexual offenses committed against Plaintiff and, as such, must admit liability unto Plaintiff, Jane Doe. 49. As a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255 being committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, and will in the future suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, psychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, loss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, and other damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and leading her into a perverse and unhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, and Plaintiff will in the future suffer additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the capacity to enjoy life. These injuries are permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to suffer these losses in the future. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Jane Doe, demands judgment against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, for all damages available under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, including, without limitation, actual and compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this Court deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by a jury. Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 25 Wag FlalJer Street Suite SOO, Wan* FL 33130. Miura 305358.2800 Fax 305358.2382 • Rift Lauderdale 958463.4346 I www.podhuntaxm 15 Case No. 08.80736-CV-MARRA P-011837 EFTA00192883

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 16 of 19 COUNT SEVEN (Cause of Action for Envie.Ina in a Child Exploitation Enterprise pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255 in Violation of 18 U.S.C. 6 2252Alafi 50. Plaintiff, Jane Doe, hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs I through 23 above. 51. Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, knowingly engaged in a child exploitation enterprise, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g)(2), in violation of 18 USC § 2252A(g)(1). As more fully set forth above in paragraphs 9 through 19, Defendant's actions involved countless victims and countless incidents of abuse, and he committed those offenses against minors in concert with at least three other persons. 52. Plaintiff, Jane Doe, was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and, as such, asserts a cause of action against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, pursuant to this Section of the United States Code. 53. As a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255 being committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, and will in the future suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, psychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, loss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, and other damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and leading her into a perverse and unhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, and Plaintiff will in the future suffer additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the capacity to enjoy life. These injuries arc permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to suffer these losses in the future. Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 16 23 West Hagler Week Suite 800, Ma, FL 33130, Miami 3053582900 Fax 3053581242 • Fort Lauderdale 954.463.4346 twatcom Case No. 08.80736-CV-MARRA P-011838 EFTA00192884

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 17 of 19 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Jane Doe, demands judgment against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, for all damages available under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, including, without limitation, actual and compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this Court deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by a jury. Date: April 17, 2009 C. 6-1 Robert C. Jose s re gt1tIo. 040856 Katherine W. Ezell, Bar No. 114771 Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800 Miami, Florida 33130 (305) 358-2800 (305)358-2382 (fax) [email protected] [email protected] Attorneys for Plaintiff REMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Plaintiff demands to have her case tried before a jury. Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 17 Robert C. Josefstrreei r No. 04\0-;. -6 Katherine W. Ezell, Bar No. 114771 Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800 Miami, Florida 33130 (305) 358-2800 (305) 358-2382 (fax) riosefsbenaoodhurst.com [email protected] Attorneys for Plaintiff C • i•Ln 25 Wat Hagler Stmt.Sat SOO, 1,41sent FI, 33130. Pallid 3053%2903 Fax 305.3567382 • Fort Lauderdale 954463.4346 www.padhurst coen Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-0 I I 819 EFTA00192885

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 18 of 19 J544 (Rev. I103) CIVIL COVER SHEET • lbelS MI civil covet shod end lhelnfOnnelionceetainedhereinneihrvcohet NNSupg6pmenllho filing and strike of pleadings of other papers as required by law, except as provided •by local rules °rowel This form approved by lbelldicial COnkrence of Die United Slate% in SoNanbm 1974. is scomed forthe use of the flak of Court foe Ilse purpose of milialing the civil dada shed. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE RE VERSE OF THE FOAM I NOTICE: Attoroeys MUST ladkate All Re-filed Cones Below. I. (R) PLAINTIFFS Jane Doe No. 101 (b) COunly Of Reddest* of Eitel Lime, Plaintiff Weal Palm Beach (EXCEPT NUS. PLAINTS'S CASES) (C) Anomeys Sinn Nana. Addrem, endTelephone Asti Robert C. losefsberg, EsqACatherine W. Ezell, Esq. Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 25 W. Magic: St., Suite 800 mini"; Pt O9_ O41 sosq, ... Morro, Id) Check County When Anion Atom 0 MIAM6 DAVE 0 SICHROB 0 BROWARD j1 PAW BEACH 0 MARTIN 0 ST. (ACE 0 INDIAN RIVER CI OKEECHOBEE HIGHLANDS II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Slam WI' FOR Ordy) 0 I 11S. Geninlicild V) 3 Want ()union PNiniR (U.S. Gnawer. Ha a Perry) DEFENDANTS Jeffrey Epstein County of Residence of Final Lilted Defendant Fli*P0 Pa w_SL IM Exc. (IN US. PLAINTIFF CA pgpgikE, NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASE USE THE LOCATION OF THE LAND INVOLVED. APR 1 Attorneys DtKrown) Jack A. Goldberger, Esq., Atterbury Ausuallan Ave., PICA West Palm STEVEN M. old id „taw et B O 2 U.S. Government 0 4 Diven6y Ds knew* In Cittuntan, of Panics In Item III) III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIESirace uric...on aim Re ?Mart V. NATURE Ot' SUIT irkedoolc...no.oaco. (For Dinnby Cams Only) PTV DEF and One Boa for De &Seal PIS DEP Ciliate a TN, Stale • ' I I bcorpsisted ne PrincipalPlaca of Business In Tah Stan 0 4 04 Chiles of Manta Sale 0 2 0 2 Irecepomio1 and ',inns/ Phu of Buttress In Amite Stec 0 II 5 Mune( Stied as CI 3 0 3 Fortin, Notion 0 6 n 6 Faris Omar/ I COYIRACT TOMS TOMEMARVPLYALTY aMtaarrcv OCHER S(ATUIES I 0 Ile Insurance CI 12004 0 130 Am 140, PERSONAL INJURY 0 310Mmbre 0 3 If Aimbre PnxIset Liability 0 MAssault.Litel & Shade, 0 130 'Semi Emplom' Liable), 0 240Madre 0 245 Madre Pirdtxt Liability 0330 Mae* Veliek 0 333 Max Veliek PERSONAL INJURY 0 362 Persons, Injury • Ma ItOnake C2 MS Personal le+sry • PICCluel Liability 0 364 Aetna. Pence& Inpuy Praban Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY 0 3/0 GeetInnd 0 371 Twat in Lading 0 MO Other Personal Eneeely Dung. 0 313 Property Donne Pro3,61 Vanity 0 6I0Aerkace 0 620 0/6tr Tec4 & Drug 0 623 Dap Related Seines of horny 21 USCUI 0 00 Liver lies 0 640 RR. & Intl 0 630 Metre Rep. 0 660 Ocomatentl Sarnyellealth 0 (AO Otter 0 422 *Wee 28 WC III 0 423 Withiravral 21IUSC 13? 0 440 Sue Itaceeniarmen O 410 Ardlinva 0 4)0 Banks andBanLien 0 450 forwent 0 460 Deponition 0 4)0 Redeem Influence.' rod Comes OrpnInsinne Cl 440 Cemurnm Clew 0 490(62.4/Sal TV 0 IIIISdectire Senior 0 tS0 Semeidarteem:ditiest Deem n sis orate Chat Re 12 US(' 3410 0 WO Odes Slavery Mikan gr 0 891 AIcedneal Am 0 192 Eetoomk Stabilization Am 0 193 EnvInmenesal Mown 0 694 Emery AlszatIon An 019$ Freedom of ledmitthon Mt 1 90Mical of la Detection:n:1 Urdu Egos, Mass to Mike 0 950 Costinabrollty of SW. Sumas 0 esonalskInunasea 0 ISO Ktecnery of Ovespement & EnIoneners of halmemis O MI Medicine Ad O 132 Recoetsy of Defailice &Wen Loud (Fd. Velatfts) O HI Recovery of Overpayment of VeieNa's Nooks 0 I60 Siockholden' Wm 0 190 Cste. Conant: O 193 hada L Miley MB J All a 4 A a CI Kt s 0 820Copyneo 0 830 Petri+, 0540 Tn4onark TABOR COCIAL SECURITY 0 762 ler Libor Steam& An 0 720 LetonTAgn. Rtimkni 0 710 Lsborrelenteponing & Disekeust Aa 0 2431bsittny Lobe An 0 7900der laboaireasen 0 791 Ertel Act Mc Security An 0 161 HIA 039311) 0 Ma Block Lang 1923) CI 141 DIWC/DIWW (403101 O ICA SSW Title XVI 0 MS RSI (01)% Melon Liability B )400041Penonal lanwi roterN O I% Frwettise I REAL Pawl arz a PRISONER PETMONS TS 0 210 Lard Cortkertnen 0 220 retteloutsw 0 230 Ere Lease & Uecomea 0 240 Tons to Lard 0 2.437on Eredoes Llabiliry 0 MAIM/Real recoaly 0441 Veen 0 442 Drobylnert 0 443 HoutItt AectunerodatIor 0 444 Welfare 0 443 Ant ,nDisabilitliii • EnplaYma4 O 446 Am. eMitabileics • Other 0 440 Other Civil Met C/ 51014Mosio Wee. Sesame Hans Coma, CI 510 Cent& 0 115 Dualnimbly O 540 Msnanus A OtIee 0 350 Civil RIM* O 353 Prison Corraine 06'70 Taw (US Plaintiff a Detmemi} 0 271 IRS—Tlid hew 26 USC74O9 I. ORIGIN (Placa an "X" la Ore Ike OLIO rom A31 Ocilla) fl 2 Remove:dill/in Cl 3 ReAlod 4 Eel/malodor Cl 5 Trans another rred f district 6 MISIthISSSncl Proceeding Sure Coon (set VI below) Reopened (sPeeitY) Litigaciess 0 7 Apr-el lo ()Writ( Judge from Magistrate Judgment VI. RELATED/RE-FILED (50C IsSINMONIO • CASE(S). word perk a) Re-filed Case OYES 9) NO JUDGE Kenneth A. Marra b) Related Cases OYES ONO DOCK MBETER See Attached NU VII. CAUSE OF ACTION CI e Ilse U.S. Civil Statute under Mikis you ere filing and Wnie a Brie( Slalom,/ of Cause (Do ea ate Jurttelklioant Haunt sinks, di realty): IS U.S.C. 2255 (Predicale Stabiles I SI U.S 2422(b), 2423(b), 2423(e), 2251. 2252. 2252A(a)( I ), 2252A(g)(I) and 15911 LENGTH OPTRIAL via 4 days estimated (for bosh sides lo Try entire case) O CHIOCIC IP THIS IS A CLASS ACTION DEMANDS CHECK YES oaly Ildemanded in coreobial: JURY DEMAND: RI Yes p' s2 VIII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT: ABOVE INFORMA nor,: IS TRUE & CORRECT TO SIGNATURE CIA OF AECC00 DATE THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE is4034a 4^ 4k- t..45 /TM> 0 MADD"Tyr111 7PtE CT/PTK ?Le n OV/ 1 7/ 0 UNDER F.R.C.P. 23 Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011840 EFTA00192886

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 19 of 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA WEST PALM BEACH DIVISION ATTACHMENT TO CIVIL COVER SHEET FOR: Jane Doe No. 101'. Jeffrey Epstein VI. RELATED/RE-FILED CASE(S): 08.80069 08-80119 08-80232 08-80380 08-80381 08-08804 08-80811 08-80893 08-80993 08-80994 08.80469 Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P411841 EFTA00192887

Case 9:09-cv-80591 -KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 1 of 36 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JANE DOE No. 101, Plaintiff, I JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Defendant. Case No.: 9:09-CV-80591-KAM DEFENDANT JEFFREY EPSTEIN'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN, by and through his undersigned counsel, moves to dismiss or, alternatively, for a more definite statement of, the First Amended Complaint. Fed. R. Civ. RR. 12(b)(6) & 12(e) (2009); Loc. Rule 7.1 (S.D. Fla. 2009). In support, Defendant states: Pleadine Standard & Summary of Areument The First Amended Complaint ("FAC") alleges claims under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 that explicitly incorporate, and thus necessarily require Plaintiff to prove that Defendant is guilty of violating, specific criminal prohibitions set forth in Title 18 of the U.S. Code. While the Supreme Court has held that every complaint "'must contain something more than a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion of a legally cognizable right of action,'" Hell Atlantic Corn. 1 Twomblv, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and just last week made clear that "Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions' and not just pleadings made in the context of an antitrust dispute," Ashcroft'. Iqbal No. 07-1015 (U.S. May 18, 2009) (slip op. at 20) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1), the need to enforce these pleading requirements is especially acute in this context. After all, the defendant in a § 2255 action is essentially being put on trial for violating criminal laws, and the statutory penalty is obviously and intentionally punitive. As a result, it not only is appropriate to require "more than an unadorned, the-defendant- Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011842 EFTA00192888

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 2 of 36 unlawfully-harmed-me accusation" before allowing plaintiffs to launch a fishing expedition for evidence of possible crimes, label, slip op. at 14 (citing Thyombly, 550 U.S. at 555), but essential that the accused be given "'such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform [him] of the specific offense ... with which he is charged," including a "specific identification of fact[s)" required to establish "fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, ... all the elements necessary to constitute the offence." Russell'. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 764-65 (1962) (quoting United States Hess 124 U.S. 483, 487 (1888); United States Carl[, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881)). The FAC does not come close to discharging that burden. & The applicable version of § 2255 only permits "minors" to sue: "Any minor who is a victim of a violation of [certain criminal statutes] and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue." 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2003) (emphasis added). Yet the FAC affirmatively admits that Plaintiff is over the age of 18. See FAC ¶ 18 ("Plaintiff was first brought to Defendant's mansion in or about the spring of 2003, when she was merely 17 years old."). Plaintiff is bound by that admission, and the FAC must be dismissed with prejudice. Best Canvas Prods. & Supplies, Inc.'. Ploof Truck Lines, Inc., 713 F.2d 618, 621 (11th Cir. 1983) ("[A] party is bound by the admissions in his pleadings."). L. Nor is Plaintiff the "victim of a violation" of a predicate criminal statute within the meaning of § 2255. 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a). In our system of justice, those accused of "violating" a criminal statute are innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal court. With due respect to the courts that have concluded otherwise, it defies common sense to think that Congress intended to invert that fundamental legal norm, and the legislative history of § 2255 expressly confirms that Congress intended to condition § 2255 actions on an antecedent criminal conviction. The FAC therefore must be dismissed because it does not—and cannot— allege that Defendant has been convicted of a predicate criminal offense. c z Even if the applicable version of § 2255 were construed to allow adults to sue in the Case No. 08-80736-CV•MARRA P-011843 EFTA00192889

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 3 of 36 absence of a predicate conviction, the FAC not only fails to meet the modest pleading standards elucidated by Twombly and Tribal, but—even taken as true--would not establish a legally "plausible" claim that Plaintiff is a victim of any predicate criminal offense giving rise to a § 2255 cause of action. See Iqbal, slip op. at 15 (explaining that every civil complaint must state "a plausible claim for relief," and that "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'shown'—`that the pleader is entitled to relief.") (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). D. Finally, Plaintiff's attempt to multiply the penalties recoverable under § 2255(a) by pleading six separate counts is inconsistent with the language and structure of § 2255. The law allows for a single action predicated on any and all predicate criminal acts, and entitles the plaintiff only to a single recovery of actual damages (subject only to a presumptive minimum). I. THE COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF IS NOT A MINOR. A. The Version of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 In Effect When The Predicate Acts Allegedly Were Committed Allowed Only "Minors" To File Suit. The FAC is predicated exclusively on acts that allegedly occurred in 2003. FAC 1 18 ("Plaintiff was first brought to Defendant's mansion in ... the spring of 2003."); id. 119 ("Defendant thereafter lured [Plaintiff] to [his home] on at least one and perhaps two other occasions in the spring and/or summer of 2003."). At that time, 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) provided: Any minor who is a victim of a violation of [certain specified federal statutes] and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $50,000 in value. It is well settled that in interpreting a statute, the court's inquiry begins with the text and structure of the law. CBS. Inc... Prime Time 24 Venture 245 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001) ("We begin our construction of [a statutory provision] where courts should always begin the process of legislative interpretation, and where they often should end it as well, which is with the Case No. 08.80736•CV•MARRA P-011844 EFTA00192890

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 4 of 36 words of the statutory provision.") (quoting Karns I. Garner 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 2000) (en bane)) (first alteration omitted). In this case, the plain text of the 2003 statute is both clear and unmistakable. It allowed only minors (or the representative of a then-minor, see Fed R. Civ. P. 17(c)) to initiate suit under § 2255. It provided only that "any minor ... may sue" and that "any minor ... shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains" as a result of the predicate acts. Id. (emphasis added). The law's use of the present tense further underscored its limited scope: It spoke of "any minor who is a victim," provided that "such minor ... shall recover" damages arising from the underlying offense, and stated that "any minor ... shall be deemed" to have sustained at least $50,000 in damages. Id. (emphasis added). Where the statute's words are unambiguous--as the arc here—the "judicial inquiry is complete." Mewl s Pittard Paver Co 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted)). Under the 2003 version of the statute, only minors could initiate suit. To the extent there is any ambiguity in the text—and there is none—the law's legislative history further underscores Congress's intent to limit the right of action to minors: "Current law provides for a civil remedy for personal injuries resulting from child pornography offenses. This section expands the number of sex offenses in which a minor may pursue a civil remedy for personal injuries resulting from the offense." H.R. Rep. 105-557, at 23 (1998), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 692. And perhaps most telling, Congress amended § 2255 in 2006— three years after the alleged misconduct in this case supposedly took place—to make the civil action available to persons who had turned 18 by the time they filed suit: (a) In general.—Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation, regardless of whether the injury occurred while such person was a minor, may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such person sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any person as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $150,000 in value. -4- Case No. 08.80736-CV-MARRA P-011845 EFTA00192891

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 5 of 36 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006) (emphasis added). The contrast between the 2003 and 2006 versions of § 2255 is stark. The 2006 law replaces each of the 2003 law's uses of the term "minor" with the term "person." Where the 2006 law does refer to a "minor," it changes the 2003 law's present-tense references ("is") to past-tense references ("was"). And the 2006 law's new language now makes clear that, unlike the 2003 statute, those victimized while under the age of 18 may sue after they turn 18. Given that amendments must be interpreted "to have real and substantial effect," Stone'. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995), there can be no doubt that Congress recognized the prior statute's strict limitations and for the first time expanded the tight of action to adults. Indeed, the history of the 2006 amendments clearly shows that Congress intended to change the law, not merely to clarify it. Those amendments were made by § 707 of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, 650 (2006), and are known as "Masha's Law." As Senator Kerry—the author of Masha's Law—explained: What Masha's law does, and what is incorporated in here, is it changes "any minor" to "any person," so that if a minor Is depicted in photographs pornographically that are distributed over the Internet, but by the time the abuser is caught, the minor is an adult, they can still recover. They cannot LtqL,v and that is ridiculous. It makes sure that recovery on the part of a minor cart take place when they become an adult.... Although I don't think there is any price too high to cost an individual who would take advantage of a minor, I think it is only appropriate to ... make sure that reaching the age of adulthood does not exempt someone from recovery. It is a tribute to continuing to do what this bill does, and that is look after the protection of minors and ensure that those who violate them are caught and punished and have to pay to the maximum extent. 152 Cong. Rec. S8012-02 at 58016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (emphasis added). Courts typically give special weight to the statements of a bill's sponsor, Corley'. U.S. 129 -5- Cast No. 08.80736-CV-MARRA P-011846 EFTA00192892

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 6 of 36 S.Ct. 1558, 1569 (Apr. 6, 2009) ("[A] sponsor's statement to the MI Senate carries considerable weight."),I There is no basis to depart from that rule here. It thus is no answer that the 2003 statute's limitations clause provided that "in the case of a person under a legal disability, [the complaint may be filed] not later than three years after the disability," 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2003), such that the unamended version of the law implicitly must have permitted victims to sue even after they turned 18. That interpretation not only would render Masha's Law superfluous; it would make Masha's Law's internally redundant, because Masha's Law retained the "legal disability" language from the 2003 version of § 2255(b). See 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2006). In short, the retained "legal disability" language in § 2255(b) of the 2006 statute would be entirely redundant were it construed to do implicitly what the law elsewhere did expressly. In these circumstances, the traditional Ma against surplusage and redundancy apply with double force. See, e.g., Duncan'. Walker 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). The "legal disability" language in § 2255(b) should be interpreted to reference classic legal disabilities like insanity, mental disability, or imprisonment—not age. Indeed, that is precisely how Congress typically uses the term "legal disability": most federal statutes that use the term make clear that it doesn't include age. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 590c CA share or interest payable to enrollees less than eighteen years of age or under legal Similarly, the official summary prepared by the Congressional Research Service ("CRS") explained that Masha's Law "(devises provisions allowing victims of certain sex-related crimes to seek civil remedies to: (I) allow adults as well as minors to sue for injuries; and (2) increase from 550,000 to $150,000 the minimum level of damages." Official Summary of Pub. Law No. 109-248 (July 27, 2006), as reprinted at http://thomas.loc.goviegi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:EiR04472:@@/(gL&summ2amt& (emphasis added) (last visited w ay 10, 2009). Courts have long consulted official CRS summariesto assess legislative intent, see, e.g., &nig Pension Ben. Guar. Com. 744 F.2d 133, 145 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984); fIRECI'V Inc. I. Cignarella No. I. Civ.A 03-2384, 2005 W 1252261 at *7 (D.N.J. May 24, 2005); Clokesav St. Francis Hoso. & Healthcare No. 98-C-4818, 1999 WL 46898 *2-1,3 (ND. III. Jan. 28, 1999), and there is good reason to do so. By design, CRS summaries are intended to "objectively describe(] the measure's ... effect upon ... current law" so that Congress can make infonned judgments about the impact of proposed bills. See The Library of Congress, About CM Summary, available at http://thomaaloc.govrbss/abt_dget.btml (last visited May 10, 2009). -6- Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011847 EFTA00192893

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 7 of 36 disability shall be paid ....") (emphasis added); id. § 783 ("Funds payable under sections 781 to 785 of this title to minors or to persons under legal disability shall be paid....") (emphasis added); id. § 1128 ("Sums payable to enrollees ... who are less than eighteen years of age or who are under a legal disability shall be paid....") (emphasis added); id. § 1253 ("Sums payable ... to enrollees ... who are less than eighteen years of age or who are under a legal disability shall be paid....") (emphasis added); id. § 1273 (same); id. § 1283 (same); id. § 1295 (same); id. § 1300a-3 (same); id. § 1300c-3 (same); id. § 1300d-7 (same); see also 38 U.S.C. § 3501. Needless to say, Congress would not have had to address age expressly in any of these statutes if the term "legal disability" necessarily included one's status as a minor; instead, Congress's mere use of the term "legal disability" already would account for a would-be plaintiff's minority status. Given the rule "against reading a text in a way that makes part of it redundant," Nat'l Ass'n of Home BuildersI, Defenders of Wildlife 551 U.S. 644 (2007) (citing TRW Inc. Andrews 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)), and the canon that "where words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning ... in the law of this country, they are presumed to have been used in that sense," $tandard Oil Co. I, United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911), § 2255's reference to "legal disability" can only be interpreted as a reference to classic disabilities like insanity or mental incapacity, but not age. But this Court need not even reach that issue in this case. Regardless of whether § 2255(6) would allow a minor to sue within three years of turning 18, that carve-out would not help Plaintiff in this case. After all, she openly admits that she was 17 years-old in 2003. FAC 11 18, 19. That means that she was either 22 or 23 when she filed this case in April 2009—at least a full year beyond the three-year period set forth in § 2255(6), regardless of how the "legal disability" language in that subsection of the statute is construed. In shod, and under any reasonable interpretation of the law, the version of the statute in effect at the time of the alleged criminal conduct giving rise to this suit would preclude Plaintiff from maintaining this action. -7- Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011848 EFTA00192894

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 8 of 36 B. Masha's Law Does Not Apply To This Case. The presumption against retroactivity and the Ex Post Facto clause preclude application of Masha's Law in this case, where the alleged predicate conduct was completed before 2006. 1. Congress Dld Not Intend To Apply Masha's Law Retroactively. It is axiomatic that "retroactivity is not favored," Bowen'. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988), and the "traditional presumption teaches that [an amended statute) does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result." Lanchtraf I. USI Film Prods. 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). As the Supreme Court has explained, this presumption embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the "principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the con uct took place has timeless and universal appeal." Kaiser Alum. & trt Corp . B mo 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Id. at 265 (footnote omitted). Courts therefore apply the statute in effect at the time of the underlying conduct unless there is a clear statement that an amendment should apply retroactively to pre-enactment conduct. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co.', United States ex rel. Schumer 520 U.S. 939, 952 (1997) ("Given the absence of a clear statutory expression of congressional intent to apply the 1986 amendment to conduct completed before its enactment, we ... hold that, under the relevant 1982 version of the [statute), the District Court was obliged to dismiss this action."). There is no clear indication that Congress intended Masha's Law to apply retroactively. Unlike the many cases in which Congress has specified that a particular amendment applies in proceedings "commenced on or after the date of enactment," Tello I. Dean Witter Reynolds ke„ 410 F.3d 1275, 1283 (1 lth Cir. 2005) (collecting examples), Masha's Law was subject only to a standard effective date provision that sheds no light on its retroactivity. See Landkraf, 511 U.S. at 1493 ("A statement that a statute will become effective on a certain date does not even -8- Case No. 08.80736-CV-MARRA P-011849 EFTA00192895

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 9 of 36 arguably suggest that it has any application to conduct that occurred at an earlier date."). Far more important, the only expression of congressional intent regarding retroactivity strongly suggests that Congress did not intend Masha's Law to apply retroactively. As set forth above, Masha's Law was enacted as part of the Adam Walsh Act. The centerpiece of that Act was an expanded sex-offender registry ("SORNA") intended to bolster tracking of convicted sex offenders. See Pub. L. 109-248 §§ 1-155, 120 Stat. 587, 590-611 (2006). To effectuate SORNA, Congress provided that offenders must register "before completing a sentence of imprisonment with respect to the offense giving rise to the registration requirement, or not later than 3 business days after being sentenced" if no prison term was imposed. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(b). It also imposed penalties on offenders who fail to register. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). At the same time, and of particular relevance in this case, Congress recognized that applying SORNA to past offenders would raise retroactivity concerns. It therefore addressed retroactivity expressly: The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before July 27, 2006 or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for the registration of any such sex offenders. 42 U.S.C. § 16913 (d). While Congress clearly provided that SORNA could be applied retroactively, it did not do so with respect to Masha's Law. As the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have long observed, "'where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." United States I. lordm, 915 F.2d 622, 628 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Rodriguez,. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525 (1987) (itself quoting Russell° I. United States 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))). There is no basis for departing from that rule. Given the strong evidence that Congress did not intend retroactively to apply Masha's Law, the 2003 version of § 2255 supplies the governing law. -9- Case No. 08.80736-CV-MARRA P-011850 EFTA00192896

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 10 of 36 2. The Ex Post Facto Clause Bars Application Of Masha's Law. Even if Congress did intend Masha's Law to apply retroactively, doing so would violate the Ex Post Facto clause. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained: [The] Constitution provides that "[Mt) Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed" by Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. A law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it "'applies to events occurring before its enactment and disadvantages the offender affected by it' by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime." Lynce I. Mathis 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997) (quoting Weaver,. Graham 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981)). United States'. Sim!, 153 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added; internal alterations omitted). Even though this case nominally involves a civil cause of action, the Ex Post Facto Clause is triggered both because Masha's Law dramatically increased the penalties for predicate criminal violations and because its retroactive application would revive Defendant's exposure to penalties that previously had become barred as a matter of law. a. Retroactive Application Of Masha's Law Would Increase The Penalties For Violating The Predicate Criminal Statutes. While the 2003 statute provided that "[a]ny minor ... shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $50,000," 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2003) (emphasis added), Masha's Law trebles the minimum statutory damages by providing that plaintiffs "shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $150,000." Id. (2006) (emphasis added). As a result, the enhanced monetary penalties provided by Masha's Law "increas[e] the punishment for the crime," Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441, and make "the punishment for crimes committed before its enactment 'more onerous"' than the punishment would have been under the unamended statute. Id. at 442 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 36). Those penalties are the direct consequence of a defendant's commission of a predicate criminal offense and form a deliberate part of the punishment for that crime. See, e.g., 134 Cong. Rec. S372-01 (Feb. 1, 1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley) ("rifle sanctions provided for in my bill, such as ... the amended civil remedy section ... provide much needed criminal enforcement tools.") (emphasis added); 152 Cong. Rec. -10- Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011851 EFTA00192897

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 11 of 36 S8012-02 at S8016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry) ("[Masha's Law) raises from $50,000 to $150,000 the penalty ... if, in fact, someone ... is caught and convicted.") (emphasis added). Accordingly, Masha's Law cannot lawfully be applied in this case. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States I, Siegel 153 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1998), is virtually on point. In Siegel, the defendant pleaded guilty to charges under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and § 1956(a)(1XA) that arose out of actions taken he took between February 1, 1988 and May 1, 1990. Id. at 1259. Under the restitution statute in effect when the crimes were committed ("VWPA'), courts had discretion "to order `that the defendant make restitution to any victim of the offense." Id. at 1259 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (1985)). But that discretion was limited: "In exercising this discretion, the court was required to consider `the amount of the loss sustained by any victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate,' before fixing the amount of the restitution, if any, that the defendant was required to pay." Id. at 1260 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) (1985)). Before Siegel pleaded guilty in July 1996, Congress passed the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act ("MVRA"). Id. at 1258-59 (citing Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 211). That law mandated the award of full restitution without regard to the defendant's economic circumstances. Id. at 1260. Congress expressly made those changes "effective for sentencing proceedings in cases in which the defendant is convicted on or after April 24, 1996." Id. at 1258 (quoting statute; alteration omitted). The district court applied MVRA at Siegel's sentencing and ordered him to pay restitution totaling $1,207,000 without considering his inability to do so. Id. at 1258. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that MVRA "cannot be applied to a person whose criminal conduct occurred prior to [its effective date)." Id. at 1260. It explained: At the time [of sentencing), the amended VWPA thus had the potential to increase the amount of restitution they would have to pay, from an amount set by the court by taking into account appellants' financial circumstances, to full restitution. -11- Case No. 08.80736-CV-MARRA P-011852 EFTA00192898

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 12 of 36 Accordingly, if the court determines that the VWPA should apply to this case, it must use the old version to avoid running afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. (quoting United States,. Baggett, 125 F.3d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1997)). This case is indistinguishable from Siegel. As in Siegel, Masha's Law caused "a substantive change ... to [defendantrs detriment," by trebling the minimum statutory penalty payable to the victim of a predicate crime. Id. at 1260. As in Siegel, Masha's Law thus has "the potential to increase the amount of restitution [defendants] would have to pay" to victims of a predicate crime. Id. Accordingly, and as in Siegel, Masha's Law cannot be applied where the predicate criminal conduct allegedly occurred prior to the amended statute's effective date. It is no answer that the law at issue in Siegel provided "restitution" to the victim of a criminal offense while this statute provides "damages" to the victim of a criminal offense; by definition, damages paid by an offender to the victim of a criminal offense are restitution. See Black's Law DIet. (8th ed. 2004) (defining restitution as "[c]ompensation for loss; esp., full or partial compensation paid by a criminal to a victim."). Indeed, the case for applying ex post facto principles is even stronger here than in Siegel: While MVRA mandated the award of actual damages to the victim, Masha's Law mandates the payment of at least $150,000 to the victim even if the victim did not actually sustain $150,000 in damages. See 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006) ("My [victim] shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $150,0001n value.") (emphasis added). Given its obviously penal nature, there is little wonder why Senator Kerry repeatedly described Masha's Law as increasing "the penalty" for persons convicted of a predicate crime. 152 Cong. Rec. 58012-02, S8016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry). Because applying the 2006 amendments would increase the punishment for violating a predicate criminal statute, Masha's Law cannot lawfully be applied in this case. b. Retroactively Applying Masha's Law Impermissibly Would Revive Defendant's Exposure To Previously Barred Penalties For His Alleged Violation Of The Predicate Criminal Statutes. -12- Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011853 EFTA00192899

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 13 of 36 Perhaps more important, the Ex Post Facto clause precludes application of Masha's Law here because it would revive Defendant's exposure to penalties that previously had become barred by operation of law—no matter their amount. As set forth above, the 2003 statute allowed only "minors" to file suit. Because Plaintiff was 17 when the predicate offenses allegedly were committed, she could have sought the statutory penalty under the 2003 version of § 2255. Once Plaintiff turned 18, however, she lost her ability to sue. That extinguished Defendant's exposure to penalties for his alleged crimes. Applying Masha's Law thereby would revive Defendant's exposure to penalties in direct contravention of the Ex Post Facto clause. The Supreme Court's decision in California Stogner 539 U.S. 607 (2003), perfectly illustrates the point. In Stegner, the defendant was charged in 1998 based on sex crimes that he allegedly committed between 1955 and 1973. While the original three-year statute of limitations for those offenses long had lapsed, a California law purported to "revive" stale claims by authorizing the filing of charges within one year of a new police report alleging past child sexual abuse. 539 U.S. at 609-10 (discussing Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 803(g) (2003)). The defendant moved unsuccessfully to dismiss the indictment, and later appealed to the Supreme Court. That Court reversed, explaining that "the new statute threatens the kinds of harm that ... the Ex Post Facto Clause seeks to avoid," because its revival of previously barred claims would subject the defendant to penalties for criminal conduct "after the State has assured 'a man that he has become safe from its pursuit,"' and thus would "deprive the defendant of the 'fair warning' that might have led him to preserve exculpatory evidence." 539 U.S. at 611 (quoting Falter t United States 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir. 1928) (Hand, J.) and Weaver 450 U.S. at 28). More important, the Court observed, California's revival of otherwise barred claims fell squarely within a category of ex post facto laws condemned by the Supreme Court's seminal ex post facto decision, Calder'. Bull—namely, laws providing for "punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment." Id. at 612 (quoting Calder, 3 Dail. 386, 391 (1798)). -13- Casc No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011854 EFTA00192900

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 14 of 36 The second category—including any "law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed," describes California's statute as long as those words are understood as Justice Chase understood them—i.e., as referring to a statute that "inflict[s] punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment." After (but not before) the original statute of limitations had expired, a party such as Stogner was not "liable to any punishment." California's new statute therefore "aggravated" Stogner's alleged crime, or made it "greater than it was, when committed," in the sense that, and to the extent that, it "inflicted punishment" for past criminal conduct that (when the new law was enacted) did not trigger any such liability. Id. at 613 (quoting Calder, 3 DaII. at 391) (internal citations omitted). The Court held that the Post Facto clause precludes the revival of claims predicated on past crimes. The precise concerns animating Stogner are present in this case. As in Stogner Defendant was "liable to punishment" under § 2255 before Plaintiff turned 18, but once she attained that age, he no was longer "liable to punishment" under § 2255 for his alleged commission of the predicate crimes against her. And as in Stegner, retroactively applying Masha's Law in a manner that would revive Defendant's exposure to statutory penalties would "aggravate" his alleged crimes "in the sense, and to the extent that, it 'inflicted punishment' for past criminal conduct that (when the new law was enacted) did not trigger any such liability." Id. (quoting Calder 3 Dail. at 391). At bottom, then, well-settled retroactivity and ex post facto principles preclude application of Masha's Law to Defendant's alleged pre-enactment conduct. C. The FAC Must Be Dismissed Because Plaintiff Concededly Is Not A Minor. As the FAC makes clear, Plaintiff was 17 in the spring of 2003, and she thus was either 22 or 23 when she filed this suit in April 2009. MC ¶ 18. Because Masha's Law cannot lawfully be applied to the alleged conduct in this case, and because the prior statute provided that only "minors" may sue, the FAC must be dismissed with prejudice. II. THE FAC MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED OF A PREDICATE OFFENSE. Even if Plaintiff were entitled to maintain this suit—and without regard to which version of § 2255 applies—the MC still would fail as a matter of law because it does not (and cannot -14- Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA 11-011855 EFTA00192901

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 15 of 36 consistent with Rule 11) allege that Defendant is guilty of "a violation" of a predicate statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2003 & 2006) (plaintiff must be "a victim of a violation of [certain federal statutes]"). As set forth below, the plain text of the statute and its legislative history demonstrate that § 2255 is conditioned on a prior federal conviction. Because Defendant has never been convicted of a predicate federal offense, the FAC must be dismissed. A. The Statute Requires Proof Of A Prior Federal Conviction. By its plain terms, § 2255 only permits "a victim of a violation" of certain federal criminal statutes to seek statutory penalties. See 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2003 & 2006). Given the presumption of innocence that animates our system of criminal justice, Congress's reference to "a victim of a violation" of a criminal statute can only be interpreted to require proof that the defendant has been convicted of a predicate federal offense against the plaintiff After all, an individual accused of "violating" a criminal statute is deemed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It would turn that principle upside down if plaintiffs could sue in the absence of an antecedent criminal conviction. Given that "Congress is understood to legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles," Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Assn. Solimino 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991), 'the courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident."' Id. (quoting Jsbrandtsen Co. I. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which it is—§ 2255's legislative history confirms that Congress intended to require a prior criminal conviction. While the history accompanying the passage of the original 1986 statute is sparse—§ 2255 was inserted with little debate into an omnibus appropriations bill for 1987, see Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 1783 (1986)—the 1998 and 2006 extensions of § 2255 produced clear statements regarding Congress's intent. In 1998, for instance, Congress added additional predicate statutes to § 2255. Senator Grassley, who wrote -15- Case No. 08.80736-CV-MARRA P-011856 EFTA00192902

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 16 of 36 the amendments, explained that "the sanctions provided for in my bill, such as ... the amended civil remedy section [would] provide much needed criminal enforcement tools" against convicted offenders. 134 Cong. Rec. 5372-01 (Feb. 1, 1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley). Not surprisingly, the House Report accompanying that legislation used classic terms associated with an adjudicated conviction in order to make clear that the bill targeted those convicted of the predicate crimes: "It is the intention of the Committee that only the offender who perpetrated the offense against the minor is liable for damages under this section." H.R. Rep. 105-557, P.L. 105-314: Protection of Children From Sexual Predators Act of 1998, at 23 (emphasis added). The legislative history of Masha's Law is even more explicit: What Masha's law does, and what is incorporated in here, is it ... makes sure that recovery on the part of a minor can take place when they become an adult, whether or not the guilty person is incarcerated. It raises from $50,000 to $150,000 the penalty for which that individual can be recompensated if, in fact, someone who depicts that picture and puts it on the Internet and uses them is caught and convicted. 152 Cong. Rec. S8012-02 at S8016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry). These references could hardly be clearer: for the statute to apply, the defendant must be arrested, tied, and found "guilty"—the "penalty" is available only "if, in fact, someone ... is caught and convicted." Id. As noted above, courts give special weight to the statements of a bill's sponsor. Corlev 129 S.Ct. at 1569. Given these clear statements from Senator Kerry, the only plausible conclusion is that § 2255 requires proof of an antecedent criminal conviction. That having been said, we do recognize that two district courts have held that plaintiffs may pursue a § 2255 action even without a prior conviction, Smith I. Husband, 376 F. Supp. 2d 603 (E.D. Va. 2005); Doe I. Liberatore 478 F. Supp. 2d 742 (E.D. Pa. 2007). But with due respect, these decisions overlook the relevant legislative history set forth above and rely instead on legislative history that is at best inapposite, and at worst irrelevant. In particular, Smith and Liberatore (which itself rested entirely on Smith) hinge on two pieces of legislative history -16- Casc No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011857 EFTA00192903

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 17 of 36 relating to unenacted drafts of the legislation. See Smith, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 610-12; Liberatore 478 F. Supp. 2d at 754-55. First, both courts found it significant that § 2255 initially was proposed as an amendment to the civil RICO statute, and in particular that an early draft of the legislation allowed "[a]ny person injured (1) personally by reason of a violation of [RICO] if such injury results from an act Indictable under sections 2251 and 2252 of this title (relating to sexual exploitation of children) ... [to] sue therefor." Smith 276 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. E1983-01 (June 5, 1986) (statement of Rep. Siljander during extension of remarks)); Liberatore, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 755 (relying on Smith, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 611). As Smith concluded, "[t]his language ... indicates that it was not Congress's intent that a conviction under the other sexual exploitation statutes be a prerequisite to the initiation of a civil suit for damages," because the draft bill grounded the cause of action on "'an act indictable' under the statute" instead of one that actually produced an indictment and conviction. Smith, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 612. Smith's analysis draws precisely the wrong conclusion from this unenacted draft language. After all, the law Congress actually passed did not contain the language on which Smith and Liberatore relied. Instead, it allowed only by minors injured by an actual "violation" of the predicate statutes to sue—not those who merely alleged that a defendant could have been indicted (but was neither indicted nor convicted) for conduct that allegedly breached those statutes. It is odd to treat the removal of language from draft legislation as proof that the enacted bill carried the same meaning. Instead, courts draw the opposite inference. F.ussello 464 U.S. at 23-24 ("Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended."). Smith and Liberatore also relied on excerpts from a CRS report analyzing another early draft of the legislation. Smith, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (citing 132 Cong. Rec. E3242-02 (Sept. 23, 1986) (statement of Rep. Green during extension of remarks)); see also Liberatore, 478 F. -17- Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011858 EFTA00192904

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 18 of 36 Supp. 2d at 755 (citing Smith). According to Smith, the CRS report stated that "violations are to be determined by a preponderance of the evidence. Successful plaintiffs are entitled to recover the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, from those found guilty of a violation." Id. (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. 83242-02 (Sept. 23, 1986)). smith thus held that "[t)he analysis of that proposed draft indicated that a violation under § 2255 was to be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence," and "indicates that 18 U.S.C. § 2255 was intended to provide a remedy ... without requiring a criminal conviction." Id. at 611-12. Set aside that Congress eventually deleted from the bill the preponderance-of-the- evidence standard discussed in the CRS report; while that alone renders this portion of the CRS report irrelevant, the key point here is that Smith's analysis of the report is flawed on its own terms. To begin with, the fact that draft's proposed preponderance-of-the-evidence standard does not remotely prove that Congress sought to permit § 2255 actions in the absence of a predicate criminal conviction. To the contrary, requiring a prior criminal conviction is perfectly consistent with such a standard, since the plaintiff in a § 2255 case could simply introduce proof of the prior conviction and thereby discharge her burden of proving a violation under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. As a result, the (never adopted) preponderance-of-the- evidence standard on its own sheds no light on the question. Moreover, the Smith court overlooked the key line in its quotation from the CRS report— namely, the report's statement that the draft version of § 2255 would allow plaintiffs to recover penalties from "'those found guilty of a violation." Smith, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (emphasis added) (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. 83242-02 (Sept. 23, 1986) (statement of Rep. Green during extension of remarks)). Needless to say, civil courts do not find defendants "guilty"—only criminal courts do. On this point, the report's explicit reference to adjudicated guilt in connection with the statute's use of the term "violation" provides clear and obvious evidence that Congress intended to require proof of a criminal violation as a precondition to suit. -18- Case No. 0840736-CV-MARRA P-011859 EFTA00192905

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 19 of 36 Finally—and perhaps most important—Smith's selective quotation from the CRS report omitted key language showing Congress's intent to require proof of an antecedent criminal conviction. Quoted in its entirety, the relevant portion of the CRS report explained: For purposes of this section, violations are to be determined by a preponderance of the evidence. Successful plaintiffs are entitled to recover the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, from those found guilty of a violation. Proposed § 2250(d) states that a defendant found guilty in any criminal proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter is estopped from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding. Since the standard of proof in criminal cases, "beyond a reasonable doubt," is stronger than the "preponderance of the evidence" standard contained in proposed § 2255, this relieves the plaintiff from having to establish those facts which have already been proven under a higher standard of proof in a finalized criminal proceeding. 132 Cong. Rec. E3242-02 (Sept. 23, 1986) (statement of Rep. Green) (emphasis added). As the omitted language makes clear, the whole point of the proposed preponderance-of- the-evidence standard was that it would work hand-in-glove with the draft legislation's estoppel provision in order to ensure that plaintiffs would not have to replicate proof of guilt after the defendant was convicted in a prior criminal case. Thus, to the extent the draft bills that eventually led to § 2255 have any bearing on the meaning of the language that Congress actually enacted, the legislative history relied upon by Smith and Liberatore makes clear that Congress intended to authorize a"subsequent civil proceeding" only after a defendant had been convicted "beyond a reasonable doubt ... in afinalized criminal proceeding." Id. (emphasis added). At bottom, the plain text and legislative history clearly show that § 2255 authorizes an action only after the defendant has been convicted of violating a predicate criminal statute. B. Defendant's Plea To Certain State-Law Offenses Is Insufficient To Authorize Suit Under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. The FAC seeks to overcome this hurdle by asserting that Defendant "entered pleas of 'guilty' to various Florida state crimes involving the solicitation of minors for prostitution and the procurement of minors for the purposes of prostitution [and therefore) is in the same position -19- Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA Ml 1860 EFTA00192906

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 20 of 36 as if he had been tried and convicted of the sexual offenses committed against Plaintiff and, as such, must admit liability unto Plaintiff." FAC 124. While it generally is true that a complaint's allegations must be taken as true, "unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal." Oxford Asset Mgnt.. Ltd.'. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002). Courts likewise may take note of public-record materials subject to judicial notice—even if those materials were not attached to the Complaint. N. (citing cases). The key point, then, is that Defendant's plea to two single-count charges under Florida law (one involving solicitation of prostitution — without regard to the prostitute's age — and one involving procurement of a minor for prostitution) does not remotely establish that Defendant committed any offense against Plaintiff much less that Defendant was convicted of violating any predicate federal statute that can give ground liability under § 2255. The official Florida judgment of conviction contains no reference to Plaintiff. See Exh. A. The official transcript of Defendant's plea colloquy makes clear that the state-law offenses to which he pleaded guilty took place in 2004 and 2005—years after the events alleged to give rise to this case. THE COURT: State, please give me a factual basis. MS. BELOHLAVEK: In 069454 CF AMB, between August 1, 2004 and October 31, 2005, the defendant in Palm Beach County did solicit or procure someone to commit pros[titution] on three or more occasions. And in 08 CF 9381 CF AMB between August 1, 2004 and October 9, 2005, the defendant did procure a minor under the age of 18 to commit prostitution in Palm Beach County also. Exh. Bat 41-42; compare al. with FAC 118 ("Plaintiff was first brought to Defendant's mansion in or about the spring of 2003.") (emphasis added) and FAC 1 19 ("Defendant thereafter lured [Plaintiff] to [his home] on at least one and perhaps two other occasions in the spring and/or summer of 2003.") (emphasis added). These official records are subject to judicial notice, see, e.g., Cones' I. Smith, 738 F.2d 1199, 1200 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Moore'. Estelle, 526 F.2d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 1976)), and this Court can and should take note of them. Oxford Asset Mant. 297 F.3d at 1188. -20- Casc No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011861 EFTA00192907

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 21 of 36 But even if Defendants' state-law pleas did involve state-law offenses against Plaintiff— which they did not—§ 2255 only authorizes suit based on predicate convictions under certain federal statutes: "Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 22524, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title ... may sue." 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2003 & 2006). Needless to say, a conviction under Florida law is not a conviction under federal law, and there is no basis for accepting Plaintiff's assertion that Defendant's Florida pleas put him "in the same position as if he had been tried and convicted of the sexual offenses committed against Plaintiff and, as such, must admit liability unto Plaintiff." FAC ¶ 24. To reiterate, this Court may not accept "unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts," Oxford Asset Mgnt, 297 F.3d at 1188 (citing Femandez-Montes 987 F.2d at 284), and Plaintiff's contrary assertions "will not prevent dismissal." Id. Because Plaintiff has not alleged—and cannot allege—that Defendant has been convicted of committing a predicate federal criminal offense against her, the FAC must be dismissed. III. COUNT ONE OF THE FAC MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT DOES NOT PLEAD A VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Count I of the FAC asserts a cause of action under IS U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on a claim that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). As set forth above, this Count is legally unsustainable for the simple reason that Defendant has never been convicted of an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Supra at § II. In the alternative, Count I must be dismissed because the FAC does not make factual allegations that, even if true, would establish that Defendant violated § 2422(b) or that Plaintiff is the victim of such a violation. That statute provides: Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate ... commerce ... knowingly persuades, induces, entice; or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage In prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2003). -21- Case No. 08-80736-CV-NIAFtRA P-011862 EFTA00192908

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 22 of 36 As the statute's text makes clear, the essence of this crime is the misuse of an interstate facility to communicate prohibited things—that is, the using of a means or facility of interstate commerce to persuade, induce, entice or coerce a person known by the defendant to be a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct—rather than the sexual conduct itself. As a result, the communication (the inducement of a known minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct) must occur through the interstate facility (the mail, phone, or intemet)—not thereafter—and the scienter element must be present while the facility is being used. See United States'. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he government must first prove that [Defendant], using the Internet, acted with a specific intent to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in unlawful sex.") (emphasis added); United States'. 165 Fed. Appx. 586, 588 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he government must show: '(1) use of a facility of interstate commerce; (2) to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce; (3) any individual who is younger than 18; (4) to engage in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempting to do so.") (quoting United States', ThontaE 410 F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 2005)). A simple example illustrates this point. Suppose that a "John" walks to a downtown area where prostitutes are known to gather. He approaches several women, and asks each one how old she is. The first few women state that they are 18, but eventually one states that she is 16. The "John" then threatens to call the police unless she has intercourse with him. She does so; he pays her $200 and walks away. There is no question that the "John" has knowingly solicited (and, indeed, coerced) prostitution from a minor in violation of state law. But there also is no question that the "John" cannot be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), because he did not use a facility of interstate commerce to coerce the victim: he merely talked to her in person. This point helps explain why the Eleventh Circuit recently noted that federal law "does not criminalize all acts of prostitution (a vice traditionally governed by state regulation)." United States,. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, n.1 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Offense Instruction 80, Eleventh -22- Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011863 EFTA00192909

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 23 of 36 Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions—Criminal (2003) (instructing jury that it must find beyond reasonable doubt that "the Defendant knowingly used [the mail] [a computer] [describe other interstate facility as alleged in indictment] to attempt to persuade, induce, entice [or coerce] an individual under the age of eighteen (18) to engage in sexual activity") (emphasis added). While the statute is unambiguous on this point, it bears note that this plain-text reading of the law finds additional support in the law's legislative history. Congress first enacted § 2422(b) as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to combat sexual predators who solicit minors over the Internet. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104.458, at 193 (1996) (expressing "the need for Congress to take effective action to protect children and families from online harm") (emphasis added); see also United States'. Searcy, 418 F.3d 1193, 1197 (Ilth Cir. 2005) (noting that Congress enacted § 2422(b) "after the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing regarding child endangerment via the Internet") (emphasis added). Prior to that time, § 2422 targeted only inducements to travel across state or national borders: "Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices or coerces any individual to travel in interstate or foreign commerce ... to engage in prostitution or any [criminal] sexual activity ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (1995). With no nexus to use of an interstate instrumentality, the existing law did nothing to address the problem of intemet predators, whose conduct might have nothing to do with interstate or transnational travel. Accordingly, when Congress added § 2422(b), it borrowed the predecessor statute's language about knowing persuasion, and—with an eye to online communications—criminalized the use of an interstate facility to knowingly persuade a minor to engage in otherwise unlawful conduct. Congress clearly was aiming at the use of the intcmet to recruit minors into unlawful sexual activity—not in-person solicitation. See, e.g., 144 Cong. Rec. H4491-03, H4491 (statement of Rep. McCollum) (June 11, 1998) ("H.R. 3494 targets pedophiles who stalk children on the Internet. It prohibits contacting a minor over the Internet for the purposes of -23- Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011864 EFTA00192910

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 24 0136 engaging in illegal sexual activity."). This simple point is dispositive. The FAC never alleges that Defendant "persuade[d], induce[d], entice[d], or coerce[d]" Plaintiff to engage in prohibited sexual conduct "using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). It does not allege that Defendant ever mailed Plaintiff anything, much less that he coerced her to engage in prohibited sexual activity by doing so. It does not allege that Defendant ever called or text- messaged Plaintiff, much less that he coerced her to engage in prohibited sexual activity by doing so. It does not allege that Defendant ever e-mailed or instant-messaged Plaintiff, much less that he coerced her to engage in prohibited sexual activity using any intemet technology. To the contrary, the MC alleges that Defendant's efforts to induce Plaintiff to engage in prohibited sexual conduct took place exclusively in person, without any use of an interstate means or facility. The FAC alleges that "in or about the spring of 2003," Plaintiff "was recruited by one of Defendant's agents to give Defendant a massage for compensation," and that Defendant's agent "drove [Plaintiff] to [Defendant's] mansion." FAC 1 18. After she allegedly was led to the massage room, the FAC alleges that a topless woman "with dark hair [and] an accent ... tried to coax Plaintiff to remove her shirt." Id. Defendant entered the room, and eventually asked Plaintiff to massage his buttocks. Id. He then allegedly "ordered Plaintiff to remove her clothes," "began masturbating and fondling her breasts," and "asked her to do more," but "she adamantly declined." Id. She allegedly was paid $200, and then driven away by Defendant's agent. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that she was "lured" to the mansion "on at least one and perhaps two other occasions in the spring and/or summer of 2003," but provides no details regarding those alleged encounters. Id. 1 19. Given the lack of any claim that Defendant used the mail, phone, or intemet to induce Plaintiff to engage in prohibited sexual conduct—and the FAC's admission that all alleged inducements and solicitations occurred In person, without use of an interstate instrumentality—Count One must be dismissed because it fails to provide -24- Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011865 EFTA00192911

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 25 of 36 factual allegations that, if true, would show that Plaintiff is the victim of a violation of § 2242(b). To be sure, Plaintiff does allege that "Defendant or an authorized agent would call and alert Defendant's assistants shortly before or after he arrived at his Palm Beach residence," FAC ¶ ll—just like any professional would alert his or her administrative assistant that he or she was coming to town. But Congress has not made that a crime, and even if Defendant's assistants later "would seek out economically disadvantaged and underage girls from West Palm Beach," id., it cannot reasonably be said that Defendant was "using the mail or any facility or means of interstate ... commerce [to) knowingly persuade[], induce()) entice[], or coerce[ a minor) to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity." 18 U.S.C. § 2242(b). Again, the statute only prohibits online or telephonic contact with minors—not with one's secretary. Nor is it sufficient that Plaintiff baldly asserts that Defendant "traveled to his mansion in Palm Beach for the purpose of luring minor girls," and "used the telephone to contact these minor girls for the purpose of coercing them into acts of prostitution." 18 U.S.C. § 2242(6). These bald allegations cannot survive a motion to dismiss. See Iqbal, slip op. at 14 ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."); Thrombi)+, 550 U.S. at 561 (it is not enough that "the pleadings le[ave] open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some set of undisclosed facts to support recovery") (quotation and alteration omitted). And even if they could, these unsupported claims do not demonstrate that this Plaintiff is entitled to relief: whether or not Defendant ever used to phone to contact some minor, a bare allegation that he called someone, sometime, does not remotely establish that he called Plaintiff—much less that he used the phone to coerce Plaintiff into engaging in prohibited sexual contact. The bottom line is that Plaintiff would have alleged that Defendant called her and induced her over the phone to commit a prohibited sex act if she could, and she would have done so with at least the same amount of detail with which she has alleged the single encounter she -25- Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-01 l 866 EFTA00192912

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 26 of 36 describes. But she hasn't—because she can't—and Count I must be dismissed with prejudice. IV. COUNT TWO MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT DOES NOT PLEAD A VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). Count II of the FAC asserts a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on a claim that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2423(6). Again, as set forth above, this Count is legally unsustainable for the simple reason that Defendant has never been convicted under § 2423(b). Supra at § II. In the alternative, Count II still must be dismissed because the FAC does not make factual allegations that, even if true, would establish that Defendant violated § 2423(6) or that Plaintiff is the victim of such a violation. As a threshold matter, however, it bears note that the FAC's factual allegations are so vague that it cannot be determined which version of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) even applies to this Count. Prior to April 30, 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) provided that: A person who travels in interstate commerce, or conspires to do so, or a United States citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States who travels in foreign commerce, or conspires to do so, for the purpose of engaging in any sexual act (as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of age that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2002) (emphasis added). On April 30, 2003, the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, or "PROTECT Act," Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, became effective, and § 2423 was amended to read: A person who travels in interstate commerce or travels into the United States, or a United States citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States who travels in foreign commerce, for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. 18 U.S.C. §2423(b) (2003) (emphasis added). The obvious problem is that Plaintiff has not pleaded the dates on which the alleged travel or resulting sexual activity occurred. She merely alleges that she "was first brought to -26- Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011867 EFTA00192913

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLS0 Docket 05/26/2009 Page 27 of 36 Defendant's mansion in or about the spring of 2003," FAC 1 18, and that she later was "lured ... to the Epstein mansion on at least one and perhaps two other occasions in the spring and/or summer of 2003." Id. 119. Since these vague allegations leave open the possibility that the alleged predicate conduct could have occurred either before or after the PROTECT Act's effective date, it is impossible to determine what law governs. No matter how generously ono construes the pleading standards, they at least require allegations that are sufficiently precise to permit the Court to determine what law governs. Yet without alleging any specific dates, the FAC falls well short of that mark and ought to be dismissed for that reason alone. Under either version of the statute, however, the key point is that § 2423 does not prohibit interstate travel that merely happens to result in illicit sexual conduct. Instead, the courts repeatedly have held that the statute applies only if the defendant's dominant motive for interstate travel was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See, e.g., United States'. Tvkarskv, 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incidental one.") (citing United State/. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 638 (3d Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added). That interpretation of the law is obviously correct. While § 2423(b) is relatively new—it first was enacted as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat 1796, 2037—it was added to the Mann Act (first passed in 1910) and uses the identical "for the purpose of language set forth in the original version of that statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (1986). Accordingly, courts addressing § 2423(b) have relied on longstanding case law interpreting the Mann Act's use of the statutory phrase. See, e.g., United States'. Garcia-M, 234 F.3d 217, 220 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000); United States I. Yang, 128 F.3d 1065, 1069-70 (7th Cir. 1997); United Statosi. Ellis 935 F.2d 385, 389-90 (1st Cir. 1991); see also United States'. Hoschouer, 224 Fed. Appx. 923, 926-27 (11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished opinion); cf. Gustafson'. Alloyd Co.. Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) ("[W]e adhere[] to the normal rule ... that "identical words used in different parts of -27- Case No. 08.80736-CV-MARRA P411868 EFTA00192914

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 28 of 36 the same act are intended to have the same meaning.") (quotation and citation omitted). Two Mann Act cases are particularly apt. In Hansen', Half, 291 U.S. 559 (1934), the Government charged the defendant with violating the Mann Act after she returned to the country with a man with whom she was having "illicit relations." Id. at 561. Despite the fact that the woman intended to "continue her irregular and improper conduct [after] returning," the Court held that she had not violated the Act: "People not of good moral character like others, travel from place to place and change their residence. But to say that, because they indulge in illegal or immoral acts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which is incidental and ignore what is of primary significance." Id. at 562-63. Likewise, in Mortensen'. United States 322 U.S. 369 (1944), defendants were convicted after two women they employed as prostitutes at their Nebraska brothel traveled to Utah and back, where they resumed their unlawful activities. Id. at 372. Again, the Supreme Court reversed: "An intention that the women or girls shall engage in the conduct outlawed by [the Mann Act] must be found to exist before the conclusion of the interstate journey and must be the dominant motive of such interstate movement. And the transportation must be designed to bring about such result." Id. at 374. The FAC does not remotely allege that Defendant's dominant motive for traveling to Palm Beach "in or about the spring of 2003" was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. FAC ¶ 18. Instead, as the FAC makes clear, Defendant is a successful businessman who maintains homes and properties around the world. Id.1 8. Even if the FAC's fanciful allegations regarding Defendant's conduct while at those homes were true, the FAC does not remotely allege that his dominant motive for travel was to engage in illicit sexual acts (much less that he traveled with the dominant purpose of engaging in illicit activities with Plaintiff) or that his travel was specifically "designed to bring about such a result." Mortenson, 322 U.S. at 374. As Jabal and Twombly make clear, plaintiffs cannot withstand a motion to dismiss by baldy asserting that an offense occurred and holding out hope that they "might later establish some set of undisclosed -28- Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011869 EFTA00192915

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 29 of 36 facts" to support the claim. Instead, each element must be supported by an adequate factual allegation. Twombly 550 U.S. at 561; see also iqbal, slip op. at 14 ("The plausibility standard ... asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.") (quoting Thvombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)). Indeed Twombly itself supplies an excellent parallel. Plaintiffs there alleged that the defendants engaged in coordinated activities that violated the antitrust laws, and asserted that defendants thus must have agreed to restrain trade. As the Court observed, however, plaintiffs' otherwise specific allegations of parallel conduct were as likely innocent as they were consistent an agreement to restrain trade: [A]n allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice. Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality. Hence, when allegations of parallel conduct are set out..., they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent. Id. at 556.57. So too here. The mere fact that Defendant traveled between his residences and allegedly engaged in illicit conduct while at his homes hardly suggests that the dominant purpose of his travel was to engage in illicit sexual activity. Instead, Defendant's travel is equally consistent with the truth: that his vast business operations and charitable activities required frequent travel, and that any sexual activity—legal or not—that occurred was incidental to the legitimate purposes that motivated his trips. See, e.g., Hansen 291 U.S. at 562-63 ("[T]o say that, because [persons] indulge in illegal or immoral acts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which is incidental and ignore what is of primary significance."). Without more, the FAC thus fails to allege facts that, even if true, would establish that Defendant engaged in the sort of sex -29- Case No. 08-80736-CVNARRA P-011870 EFTA00192916

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 30 of 36 tourism that violates 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), or that Plaintiff herself is the victim of such an offense. See Twomblv 550 U.S. at 557. Count U muse be dismissed. COUNT THREE MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT DOES NOT PLEAD A VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. § 2251. Count III of the FAC asserts a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on allegations that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2251. Again, as set forth above, this Count is legally unsustainable for the simple reason that Defendant has never been convicted under § 2251. Supra at § II. In the alternative, Count III still must be dismissed because the FAC does not make factual allegations that, even if true, would establish that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2251 or that Plaintiff is the victim of such a violation. Yet again, Plaintiff's failure adequately to plead the dates on which the alleged predicate conduct occurred makes it impossible to determine which version of § 2251 applies in this case. Prior to April 30, 2003, § 2251 provided that: Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in ... any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished ... If such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported In interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported in Interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2002) (emphasis added). As with § 2423(b), however, Congress made significant changes to the statute when the PROTECT Act became effective on April 30, 2003: Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in ... any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct shall be punished ... if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting Interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported or transmitted using any means or facility of Interstate or foreign commerce or In or affecting interstate -30- Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011871 EFTA00192917

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 31 of 36 or foreign commerce or mailed. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2003) (emphasis added; underscored to denote amended text). Under either version, however, Count III must be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to plead that Defendant's dominant motive for enticing her to engage in sexual conduct was to produce images of that conduct; that Defendant actually produced an image of Plaintiff; or that Defendant either knew that the resulting images would be transported in interstate commerce or actually transported or transmitted those photographs in interstate commerce. Instead, the FAC alleges only that Defendant displayed photos of other women in his homes and on his computer, see FAC at ¶¶ 14 & 16, and "may have taken lewd photographs of Plaintiff ... and may have transported lewd photographs of Plaintiff ... to his other residences and elsewhere using a facility or means of interstate and/or foreign commerce." all 16 & 34 (emphasis added). Those speculative assertions are insufficient to sustain Plaintiff's burden at the pleading stage. In our legal system, defendants cannot properly be subjected to the burden and expense of discovery—and the accompanying pressure to settle—based on claims that they "may have" done something wrong. Instead, "the complaint's allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level; if they do not, the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed." James River Ins. Co. I. Ground Down Ellett. Inc. 540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation omitted); see also jqbal, slip op. at 15 (complaint must be dismissed "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct") (emphasis added); Bawa I. U.S. No. C 07- 00200 WHA, 2007 WL 1456040, *5 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2007) (dismissing complaint alleging that defendant "may have played a substantial role" in the underlying crime). Plaintiff has not remotely alleged that a crime actually was committed, and if she could have done so in good faith, there is little doubt that she would have. Having failed to push her claims from the realm of the possible into the realm of the plausible, there is no basis for -31- Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011872 EFTA00192918

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 32 of 36 allowing Plaintiff to proceed. Count III must be dismissed with prejudice. VI. COUNTS FOUR AND FIVE MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THEY DO NOT PLEAD VIOLATIONS OF 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1) OR 2252A(a)(1). Count IV of the FAC asserts a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on allegations that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2252(aX1). Count, of the FAC asserts a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on allegations that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(I). Again, as set forth above, these Counts are legally unsustainable for the simple reason that Defendant has never been convicted under § 2252(a)(1) or § 2252A(a)(1). Supra at § II. In the alternative, Counts IV and, still must be dismissed because the FAC does not make factual allegations that, even if true, would establish that Defendant violated either statute or that Plaintiff is a victim of such a violation. By its plain terms, § 2252(a)(1) provides: Any person who ... knowingly transports or ships using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce ... any visual depiction, if ... the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct and ... such visual depiction is of such conduct ... shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) (2002 & 2003) (emphasis added). Similarly, the pre- and post- PROTECT Act versions of § 2252A(aX I ) provide: Any person who ... knowingly malls, or transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, Including by computer, any child pornography ... shall be punished as provided [by law). 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) (2002 & 2003) (emphasis added). In turn, the term "child pornography" was defined both pre- and post-PROTECT Act, and in relevant part, as: any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture... of sexually explicit conduct, where ... the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2002 & 2003). As with Count III, however, the FAC does not remotely allege that Plaintiff is a victim of a violation of §§ 2252(a)(1) or 2252A(aX1). Instead, the FAC alleges only that Defendant -32- Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011873 EFTA00192919

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 33 of 36 displayed photos of other unidentified women in his homes and on his computer, see FAC at ¶¶ 14 & 16, and "may have taken lewd photographs of Plaintiff ... with his hidden cameras and may have transported lewd photographs of Plaintiff ... to his other residences and elsewhere using a facility or means of interstate and/or foreign commerce." FAC ¶¶ 16, 38, 43 (emphasis added). Again, it simply is not enough to allege that Defendant "may have" done something wrong: "the complaint's allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level; if they do not, the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed." James River Ins. Co., 540 F.3d at 1274 (citation and quotation omitted); see also lqbal, slip op. at 15 (holding the a complaint must be dismissed "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct") (emphasis added). Because the FAC only speculates that Defendant "may have" committed a crime, and because Plaintiff surely would have charged that Defendant actually committed a crime if she had a good-faith basis for doing so, Counts IV and, must be dismissed with prejudice. VII. COUNT SIX MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g) WAS NOT ENACTED UNTIL 2006. Count VI of the FAC asserts a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on allegations that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g). Again, as set forth above, this Count is legally unsustainable for the simple reason that Defendant has never been convicted under § 2251. Supra at § IL In the alternative, Count VI still must be dismissed because § 2252A(g) was not enacted until 2006—three years after the alleged conduct underlying this case took place. See Pub. L. 109-248, Title VII, § 701, July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 614, 647. As set forth above, supra § I.B.2, the Ex Post Facto Clause flatly precludes the application of new statutes to conduct completed prior to the statute's enactment, and there is any event no indication that Congress intended to apply this provision of the Adam Walsh Act retroactively to completed conduct. See supra § I.B.1 (noting that Congress expressly made certain provisions of the Adam -33- Case No. 08-S0736-CV-MARRA P-011874 EFTA00192920

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on F LSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 34 of 36 Walsh Act retroactive, but not others). Thus, while Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded a violation of § 2252A(g) in the first place, there is no lawful basis under which she could assert a cause of action predicated on that statute. Count VI must be dismissed with prejudice. VIII. ANY SURVIVING COUNTS SHOULD BE MERGED INTO A SINGLE COUNT. While we respectfully submit that none of the FAC's counts are viable and that each should be dismissed with prejudice, this Court should require the merger of all claims into a single count to the extent it rejects the foregoing analysis and allows more than one count to proceed. Contrary to Plaintiff's attempt to multiply her recovery by asserting six separate counts, § 2255 creates a single cause of action with a single penalty for all violations of a predicate offense, not separate causes of action and separate recoveries on a "per violation" basis. We have not found a single precedent where a § 2255 plaintiff has been allowed to assert claims on a "per violation" basis—each of the prior cases (including the prior cases involving this defendant in this Court) involved a single count predicated on multiple alleged violations of predicate criminal statutes. See Tilton Playboy Entertainment Group. Inc., 554 F.3d 1371 (I lth Cir. Jan. 15, 2009); Smith, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 432; Doe, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 754; poc No. 2 I. Epstein 2009 WL 383332 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); Doe No. 3 1. Epstein 2009 WL 383330 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); poe No. 41. Epstein, 2009 WL 383286 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); and Doe No. 5I, Epstein 2009 WL 383383 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009). There is no basis for indulging Plaintiff's contrary approach. Instead, the plain language and structure of the statute foreclose Plaintiffs unprecedented approach. First, the order of the two sentences establishing the statutory penalty under § 2255(a) demonstrate that Congress did not mean to allow for a minimum mandatory recovery in the amount of 550,000 for each predicate violation. The first sentence provides that "(a]ny person who ... suffers personal injury as a result of such violation ... shall recover the actual damages such person sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (emphasis added). -34- Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011875 EFTA00192921

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 35 of 36 Then, in recognition of the fact that damages in these cases may be hard to prove, the second sentence provides for recovery of a minimum amount: "My minor as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $50,000." Id. Together, these provisions indicate that Congress intended to provide restitution to victims—that is, to award them "actual damages"—but that where actual damages were less than $50,000 or otherwise impossible to prove, the statute would guarantee a lump-sum, make-whole penalty of $50,000 for all injuries sustained as a result of the predicate acts. Moreover, the fact that Congress did not expressly provide for damages on a "per violation" basis further underscores the fact that Congress sought to provide only a lump-sum recovery for all injuries sustained by a victim. After all, while Congress lmows exactly how to provide for damages on a "per violation" basis when it wants to, it did not do so here. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 216 (authorizing a "civil action ... against any person who engages in conduct constituting an offense under" specified sections of the bribery, graft, and conflicts of interest statutes, and authorizing "a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for each violation or the amount of compensation which the person received or offered for the prohibited conduct, which ever amount is greater') (emphasis added); see also 18 U.S.C. § 49; 18 U.S.C. § 1034; 18 U.S.C. § 2318. As the Eleventh Circuit repeatedly has explained, "where Congress knows how to say something but chooses not to, its silence is controlling." Delgado,. United States Att'y Gen. 487 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting CBS, 245 F.3d at 1226 (itself quoting Griffith, 206 F.3d at 1394 with citation and quotations omitted))) (alteration omitted). Because the statute provides a single cause of action with a single remedy, this Court should order Plaintiff to merge all surviving claims—if any—into a single count. -35- Casa No. 08.80736-CV-MARItA P-011876 EFTA00192922

Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 36 of 36 Certificate of Service I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using CM/BCF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served this day on all counsel of record identified on the following Service List in the manner specified by CM/BCF on this 26th day of May , 2009 Robert C. Josefsbcrg, Esq. Katherine W. Ezell, Esq. Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800 Miami, FL 33130 305 358-2800 Fax: 305 358-2382 [email protected] [email protected] Counsel for Plaintiff Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq. Atterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A. 250 Australian Avenue South Suite 1400 West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012 561-659-8300 Fax: 561-835-8691 [email protected] Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein Respectfully submitted: By: Robert D. ntton, ., Esq. Florida Bar No. 2 162 [email protected] Michael J. Pike, Esq. Florida Bar No. 617296 [email protected] Burman Critton Luther & Coleman, P.A. 515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 Telephone: (561) 842-2820 Facsimile: (561)515-3148 [email protected] Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA P-011877 EFTA00192923

U.S. Department of Justice United States Attorney Southern District of Florida 5001 Australian Ave, Ste 400 West Palm Reach, FL 33401 (561) 820-8711 Facsimile.• (561) 820.8777 June 12, 2009 DELIVERY BY HAND Jack A. Goldberger, Esq. Atterbury, Goldberger & Weiss, P.A. One Clearlake Centre, Suite 1400 250 Australian Ave S. West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5015 Re: Jeffrey Epstein Dear Mr. Goldberger: Pursuant to the terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida hereby provides you with notice that the United States Attorney has determined, based on reliable evidence, that Jeffrey Epstein has willfully violated one of the conditions of the Non-Prosecution Agreement. Specifically, on May 26, 2009, Jeffrey Epstein, through his counsel, filed a "Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaipt or, in the Alternative, for a More Definite Statement," in the matter of Jane Doe No. 101 Jeffity Epstein, Court File No. 09-CV-80591-ICAM. "Jane Doe No. 101" was on the list provided to Mr. Epstein's attorneys of individuals whom the United States had identified as victims, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and "Jane Doe No. 101" has elected to proceed exclusively under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. By filing the Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Epstein is contesting liability and, therefore, has violated Term 8 of the Non-Prosecution Agreement. Gus! POI 187S EFTA00192924

JACK GOLDBERGER, ESQ. JUNE 12,2009 PAGE 2 OF 2 Based upon Mr. Epstein's breach of that term, the U.S. Attorney's Office has elected to terminate the Non-Prosecution Agreement and to investigate and prosecute Mr. Epstein and others for federal offenses. Sincerely, Jeffrey H. Sloman Acting United States Attorney By: A. Marie Villafana Assistant United States Attorney cc: Karen Atkinson, Chief, Northern Division Roy Black, Esq. (via electronic mail) Ca< Sta C4.$0736 CV-MARRA P-01379 EFTA00192925

Dispoto, Mark (USAFLS) From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject: Carlton, Stephen (USAFLS) Wednesday, May 8, 2019 4:53 PM Acosta, Diana (USAFLS); Bella, Gabrielle (USAFLS); Cannon, Aileen (USAFLS); Coxless, Kelly (USAFLS); Funk Daniel (USAFLS); Gyires, Marton (USAFLS); Hem, Mara (USAFLS); Mazari, Jessica (USAFLS) [Contractor); Lineberger, Carmen (USAFLS); Porter, Michael (USAFLS) USAFLS-WPB Blue Cross contact A new Blue Cross rep. stopped by the office today, Omar Amador; here is his contact information. He is available to personally assist you on ANY problem you have with Blue Cross if you have a health issue that needs attention, or want to make sure your doctor is in network, etc.; he covers the area from Vero to Key West, and the sw coast of FLA also: He also reminded me that our coverage is nationwide, and he can help if you need to go out of state for any treatment for you or a family member. Florida Blue 41 In the pursuit of health Omar Amador Account Manager Federal Employee Program / Motors OmarAmaclor@bcbsfIcom 8600 NW 36th Street Suite 800 Miami, FL 33166 Steve Carlton Chief, Ft. Pierce United States Attorney's Office S.D. Fla. (772) 293-0947 Cell. (561) 398-7727 C c44 Tel 305.921.7023 Toll Free 800.955.7635 Ext. 17023 Fax 904.301.1953 EFTA00192926