for the purpose of “ requirement fly in the face of the two Supreme Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal sta

r the purpose of " requirement fly in the face of the two Supreme Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal st

cts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which is incidental and ignore what is of primary significance." Id. at 562-63. Likewise, in Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944), defendants were convicted after two women they employed as prostitutes at their Nebraska brothel traveled to

cts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which is incidental and ignore what is of primary significance." Id. at 562-63. Likewise, in Mortensen'. United States 322 U.S. 369 (1944), defendants were convicted after two women they employed as prostitutes at their Nebraska brothel traveled to U

for the purpose of " requi ment fly in the face of the two Suprems Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen'. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal stat

cts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which is incidental and ignore what is of primary significance." Id. at 562-63. Likewise, in Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944), defendants were convicted after two women they employed as prostitutes at their Nebraska brothel traveled to

cts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which is incidental and ignore what is of primary significance." Id. at 562-63. Likewise, in Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944), defendants were convicted after two women they employed as prostitutes at their Nebraska brothel traveled to

n another state. The travel must be for the purpose of engaging in the unlawful sexual act. See so Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559, 562-63 (1934) and Mortensen v. UnitekStates, 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944) ("An intention that the women or girls shall engage in the conduct outlawed by Section 2 must be found to

cts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which is incidental and ignore what is of primary significance." Id. at 562-63. Likewise, in Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944), defendants were convicted after two women they employed as prostitutes at their Nebraska brothel traveled to

cts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which is incidental and ignore what is of primary significance." Id. at 562-63. Likewise, in Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944), defendants were convicted after two women they employed as prostitutes at their Nebraska brothel traveled to

in another state. The travel must be for the purpose of engaging in the unlawful sexual act. See s2 liftmen HufT, 291 U.S. 559, 562-63 (1934) and Mortensen'. United Stales. 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944) ("An intention that the women or girls shall engage in the conduct outlawed by Section 2 must be found to

prove that the defendant's sole purpose for traveling and transporting the individual was to have the individual engage in illegal sexual activity. Mortensen v. United States , 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944); Crespo v. United States , 151 F.2d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 1945). This offense carries a statutory maximum of

prove that the defendant's sole purpose for traveling and transporting the individual was to have the individual engage in illegal sexual activity. Mortensen v. United States , 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944); Crespo v. United States , 151 F.2d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 1945). This offense carries a statutory maximum of

prove that the defendant's sole purpose for traveling and transporting the individual was to have the individual engage in illegal sexual activity. Mortensen v. United States , 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944); Crespo v. United States , 151 F.2d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 1945). This offense carries a statutory maximum of

prove that the defendant's sole purpose for traveling and transporting the individual was to have the individual engage in illegal sexual activity. Mortensen v. United States , 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944); Crespo v. United States , 151 F.2d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 1945). This offense carries a statutory maximum of

prove that the defendant's sole purpose for traveling and transporting the individual was to have the individual engage in illegal sexual activity. Mortensen. United States, 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944); Crespo I. United States, 151 F.2d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 1945). This offense carries a statutory maximum of ten

another state. The travel must be for the purpose of engaging in the unlawful sexual act. See also Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559, 562-63 (1934) and Mortensen v. Unikd Stales, 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944) ("An intention that the women or girls shall engage in the conduct outlawed by Section 2 must be found to

. Meacham, supra, 115 F.3d at 1495.96. We can place the blame for judicial preoccupa- tion with the word "dominant" on the Supreme Court, which in Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369, 374, 64 S.Ct. 1037, 88 L.Ed. 1331 (1944) , a Mann Act case, said that engaging in forbidden sexual activity "must

.7 The Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted this language to require that the illegal activity be the dominant motive for the travel. See, e.g., Mortensen 'United States, 322 U.S. 369, 373 (1944) (". . .an intention that the women or girls shall engage in the conduct outlawed by Section 2 must be foun

going determination, it is not necessary to examine the further contention of appellant that the judgment should be versed under authority of of Mortensen United States, 322 U.S. 369, 64 S.Ct. 1 . The judgment is reversed and the caw remanded with directions to enter judg- ment of acquittal. SANBOR