to engage in a criminal sex act or (b) that Owens was under the age of 18.) (emphasis added). Again, none of these factors is present in this case. The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the statute makes perfect sense: were § 1591 not limited in this fashion, it would threaten to criminalize a host of localized be

cant lack of uniformity in the DOJ's current approach to privilege reviews. But a recent Eleventh Circuit decision may lead to greater consistency. The Eleventh Circuit's Recent Decision In U.S. v. ICorf,[4] the Eleventh Circuit upheld the DOJ's use of a taint team to conduct a privilege review of materials seized fro

gainst strict liability, especially since it applies in cases where there is no sexual contact at all with any person, let alone with a real minor. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States Murrell, supra, reflects this same understanding of the statute. The Murrell court wrote that, under the "plain language"

penalty ... if, in fact, someone ... is caught and convicted.") (emphasis added). Accordingly, Masha's Law cannot lawfully be applied in this case. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Siegel, 153 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1998), is virtually on point. hi Siegel the defendant pleaded guilty to charges under

gainst strict liability, especially since it applies in cases where there is no sexual contact at all with any person, let alone with a real minor. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States, Murrell, supra, reflects this same understanding of the statute. The Murrell court wrote that, under the "plain language

gainst strict liability, especially since it applies in cases where there is no sexual contact at all with any person, let alone with a real minor. The Eleventh Circuit's' decision in United States Murrell, supra, reflects this same understanding of the statute. The Murrell court wrote that, under the "plain language"

penalty ... if, in fact, someone ... is caught and convicted.") (emphasis added). Accordingly, Masha's Law cannot lawfully be applied in this case. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States I, Siegel 153 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1998), is virtually on point. In Siegel, the defendant pleaded guilty to charges under

to engage in a criminal sex act or (b) that Owens was under the age of 18.) (emphasis added). Again, none of these factors is present in this case. The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the statute makes perfect sense: were § 1591 not limited in this fashion, it would threaten to criminalize a host of localized be

penalty ... if, in fact, someone ... is caught and convicted.") (emphasis added). Accordingly, Masha's Law cannot lawfully be applied in this case. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Siegel, 153 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1998), is virtually on point. hi Siegel the defendant pleaded guilty to charges under

penalty ... if, in fact, someone ... is caught and convicted.") (emphasis added). Accordingly, Masha's Law cannot lawfully be applied in this case. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Siegel, 153 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1998), is virtually on point. hi Siegel the defendant pleaded guilty to charges under

penalty ... if, in fact, someone ... is caught and convicted.") (emphasis added). Accordingly, Masha's Law cannot lawfully be applied in this case. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Siegel, 153 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1998), is virtually on point. hi Siegel the defendant pleaded guilty to charges under

penalty ... if, in fact, someone ... is caught and convicted.") (emphasis added). Accordingly, Masha's Law cannot lawfully be applied in this case. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Siegel, 153 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1998), is virtually on point. hi Siegel the defendant pleaded guilty to charges under

gainst strict liability, especially since it applies in cases where there is no sexual contact at all with any person, let alone with a real minor. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Murrell, supra, reflects this same understanding of the statute. The Mini! court wrote that, under the "plain language

gainst strict liability, especially since it applies in cases where there is no sexual contact at all with any person, let alone with a real minor. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Muriel!, supra, reflects this same understanding of the statute. The Mum!! court wrote that, under the "plain language

gainst strict liability, especially since it applies in eases whcre there is no sexual contact at all with any person, let alone with a real minor. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States Murrell, supra, reflects this same understanding of the statute. The Murrell court wrote that, under the "plain language"

at (a) force or coercion would be used to cause Owens to engage in a criminal sex act or (b) that Owens was under the age of 18." (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the statute makes perfect sense: were § 1591 not limited in that fashion, it would threaten to criminalize a host of localized be

nduce criminal sexual activity at some point after such use, or if the defendant does not actually induce during the use, § 2422(b) does not apply. The Eleventh Circuit's Pattern Jury Instructions recognize as much. According to those Instructions, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: First: That the

gainst strict liability, especially since it applies in cases where there is no sexual contact at all with any person, let alone with a real minor. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States Murrell, supra, reflects this same understanding of the statute. The Murrell court wrote that, under the "plain language"