a,m (USAFLS) From: Roy BLACK To: Will . (USAFLS) Sent: Cc: ow mgw@wor ne .a .net Subject: Yesterdays Letter Dear On second thought my letter yesterday went too far in one respect. So that there Is no misunderstanding of the last paragraph of yesterdays letter, our concern is not that the attorney representative in fact has used the threat of a breach as leverage to get his fees, only that there exists the legitimate concern that the agreement could be so used and the reality that any concern about such use significantly and unfairly burdens Mr Epstein's right to resort to the courts to resolve outstanding legal issues regarding the criteria for payment and the amount of payment owed. I hope this clarifies our concern in this one area. Thanks Roy EFTA00183807

U.S. Department of Justice United States Attorney Southern District of Florida 500 S. Australian Ave, Ste 400 West Palm Beach, FL 3340! (561)820-8711 Facsimile: (561) 820-8777 February 11, 2010 DELIVERY BY ELECTRONIC MAIL Roy Black, Esq. Black Srebnick Kornspan & Stumpf P.A. 201 S. Biscayne Blvd, Suite 1300 Miami, FL 33131 Re: Jeffrey Epstein Dear Mr. Black: Thank you for meeting with our Office last week. During our discussion, you and your colleagues raised three issues: (1) whether our Office would consider it a breach of the Non- Prosecution Agreement for Mr. Epstein to file suit against the victim's attorney-representative relating to the amount of attorney's fees; (2) whether our Office would consider it a breach of the Non-Prosecution A g "fin t for Mr. Epstein to argue that he has no liability for claims raised exclusively under 18 . § 2255 as to any of the victims on the identified list; and (3) whether our Office would have any objection to Mr. Epstein applying for early termination of his community control. As we have told you before, our Office cannot give advisory opinions as to what will and will not be a breach of the Non-Prosecution Agreement. Furthermore, as to the first item, your colleagues admitted that efforts to reach an agreement with Robert Josefsberg regarding the amount of fees owed have not been completed. Similarly, as to the second itur colleagues admitted that there are no currently pending cases arising exclusively under 18 . § 2255 as to any of the victims on the identified list. Given that these matters may never arise and, if they do arise, there will be innumerable legal and factual issues that have not been shared with our Office, we again decline to provide any advisory opinions. As discussed during the meeting, the purpose of having the parties and a Special Master involved at the beginning of the process in the selection of the attorney- representative was to avoid dealing with this issue at the end of the process. As with all matters related to the Agreement, we expect that Mr. Epstein will act in good faith and comply with the letter and spirit of the NPA. As to the third item, we have reviewed your letter to Mr. Sloman of February 8, 2010. While Mr. Acosta did state in his letter of December 19, 2007, that he did not believe that the Office was EFTA00183808

ROY BLACK, ESQ. FEBRUARY 11, 2010 PAGE 2 OF 2 obligated to notify the victims identified through the federal investigation of proceedings occurring in state court, the U.S. Department of Justice's position may have chiral the interim ill of internal guidance regarding prosecutors' obligations pursuant to 18 . § 3771, 42 . § 10607, and Fed. R. Crim. P. 60 (effective December I, 2008). In light of Mr. Acosta's prior statements to Mr. Epstein's counsel that Mr. Epstein would be eligible for any benefit available to other similarly-situated state defendants, the Office agrees that Mr. Epstein may apply for early termination or modification of community control in accordance with Fl. Stat. §§ 948.05 and 948.10(4), assuming that Mr. Epstein has completed "the sanctions imposed in the community control plan." The Office takes no position regarding such an application; it is entirely within the discretion of the State Attorney's Office and the Palm Beach County Circuit Court Judge as to whether it is in "the best interests of justice and the welfare of society" to allow Mr. Epstein to terminate prematurely his community control. Mr. Epstein and his counsel may no make a representation to the State Attorney's Office, the Court, or any victim that the U.S. Attorney's Office agrees with, joins in, or does not oppose such a motion. In light of prior erroneous statements in court filings, we respectfully request that a copy of any court filing be provided to our office. If such a motion is made, in accordance with your proposal, the U.S. Attorney's Office will notify the federal victims that the application was filed and, if a hearing is scheduled, the date, time, and location of such hearing. The communication will consist merely of a notification and will neither encourage nor discourage attendance or submission of materials related to the application. Sincerely, Jeffrey H. Sloman United States Attorney By: s/A. Villa afia A. Assistant United States Attorney cc: Jeffrey H. Sloman, U.S. Attorney Robert K. Senior, Acting First Assistant U.S. Attorney Chief, Northern Division EFTA00183809

ROY BLACK HOWARD M. SREBNICK SCOTT A. KORNSPAN LARRY A. STUMPF MARIA NEYRA JACKIE PERCZEX MARK A.J. SHAPIRO JARED BLACK SREBNICK KORNSPAN &STUMPF -RA.- February 18, 2010 , Esq. Assistant United States Attorney 99 N.E. 4th Street Miami, FL 33132 RE: Jeffrey Epstein Dear Ms JESSICA FONSECA-NADER KATHLEEN P. PHILLIPS AARON AN'THON MARCOS BEATON, JR. MATTHEW P. O'BRIEN JENIFER J. SouumAs NOAH Fox E-Mail: Rfilack@Royffiackcom Thank you for your letter of February 11, 2010. We write to update you about ongoing efforts to reach an agreement with Robert Josefsberg regarding the amount of fees and costs properly owed to him by Mr. Epstein pursuant to the NPA. On February 16, 2010 Mr. Epstein's principal civil counsel Bob Critton advised Mr. Josefsberg in writing that he and Mr. Epstein would meet with Mr. Josefsberg on two occasions between now and March 1, 2010 to review Mr. Josefsberg's outstanding bills on a line-by-line basis and attempt to reach a non- adversarial resolution of all outstanding fee issues. Mr. Critton also transmitted to Mr. Josefsberg an Agreement for Special Master to Determine Amount of Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("Special Master Agreement"), signed by Mr. Epstein, containing terms and conditions previously agreed to by Mr. Josefsberg, which would mandate binding mediation before a neutral third party in the event the proposed settlement discussions did not resolve all outstanding issues in an expeditious manner. We want to assure you that Mr. Epstein fully intends to fulfill his obligations under the NPA. We regret that issues remain unresolved regarding whether all of the fees and costs being sought by the attorney representative - which now total $1,947,000 exclusive of the $526,466 already paid by Mr. Epstein - meet the criteria set forth by the NPA. We assure you that both Mr. Epstein's prior civil counsel, Jay Lefkowitz, who, with you, was a primary negotiator of the NPA language, and Mr. Critton, each strongly believe that significant amounts of the fees and costs billed by Mr. Josefsberg are outside the scope of Mr. Epstein's fee- 201 S. Biscayne Boulevard. Suite 1300 • Miami. Florida 33131 • Phone: 305.371-6421 • Fax: 305-358-2006 • www.RoyBlack.com EFTA00183810

Esq. February 18, 2010 Page 2 related payment obligations under the NPA. We hope that the fee-related issues can be resolved by further settlement discussions or by relying on the Special Master Agreement signed Tuesday February 16, 2010 by Mr. Epstein. Mr. Epstein and his counsel believe that these options are consistent with the NPA, are good faith alternatives to contested litigation, and are reasonable given the unexpected magnitude of the bills and their inclusion of charges for legal work that was clearly related to the preparation of litigation and thus outside Par 7C of the Addendum as well as for extensive work performed by attorneys from outside Mr. Josefsberg's law firm. Mr. Josefsberg previously advocated for settling outstanding issues through a Special Master Agreement nearly identical to the one executed Tuesday by Mr. Epstein. In fact, Mr. Joscfsberg and Mr. Epstein had each agreed in the past to a specific Master as a third-party neutral to conduct proceedings to resolve the fee issues. However, the selected Master withdrew. We hope that the Special Master Agreement will provide a basis for a prompt resolution of any issue not resolved by the parties through further discussions. Respectfully submitted, MARTIN WEINBERG, ESQ. ROY LACK, ESQ. By /wg cc: , Esq. Robert Senior, Esq. Black. Srebnick, Kornspan & Stumpf, P.A. EFTA00183811

ROY BLACK HOWARD M. SREBNICK Scan A. KORNSPAN LARRY A. STUMPF MARIA NEYRA JACKIE PERCZEK MARK A.J. SHAPIRO JARED Jeff Sloman, Esq. United States Attorney 99 N.E. 4° Street Miami, FL 33132 BLACK SREBNICK KORNSPAN &STUMPF =PA.= March 5, 2010 , Esq. Assistant United States Attorney 99 N.E. 4i° Street Miami, FL 33132 RE: Jeffrey Epstein Dear Counsel: JESSICA FONSECA-NADER KATHLEEN P. PHILUPS AARON ANTHON MARCOS BEATON, JR. MATTHEW P. O'BRIEN JENIPER J. SOUUKIAS NOAH Fox E-Mail: [email protected] Esq. Assistant United States Attorney 99 N.E. 4th Street Miami, FL 33132 We write this letter to renew our request that the United States Attorney's Office provide us, as Mr. Epstein's counsel in the federal NPA matter, with clarity as to what legal issues we can advise his civil counsel can be litigated without causing you to consider the raising of legal issues to be in breach of Mr. Epstein's obligations under paragraph 8 of the NPA. A letter from civil counsel Robert Critton is attached. On February 11, 2010, you advised us that for reasons including the fact that at the time there were "no currently pending cases arising exclusively under 18 USC §2255 as to any of the victims on the identified list" you would "decline to provide any advisory opinions" in response to our requests during our meeting of February 3. Since February 11, 2010, a lawsuit has been filed by the attorney representative on behalf of Doe 103. Her identity is known by us and she is on the "identified list." Her lawsuit raises only §2255 claims. Although she has not waived her right to file any other state or federal or common law claim so as to fit squarely within the letter of 18 of the NPA, she does, in her lawsuit, quote 18 and claim rights as a beneficiary of that agreement, see Case No. 10-80309 (S.D. Fla.), Complaint, 1125-26, thus requiring that civil counsel consider 201 S. Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 1300 • Miami. Florida 33131 • Phone: 30S-371.6421 • Fax: 305-358-2006 • suww.RoyBlack.com EFTA00183812

Jeff Sloman, Esq. Esq. , Esq. March 5, 2010 Page 2 responsive motions that relate to the scope of waiver of liability that is memorialized in the NPA. Additionally, Mr. Epstein and his counsel have scheduled a meeting to review the attorney representatives outstanding bills but have been told that if there is no settlement agreement, then the attorney representative intends to initiate litigation rather than adopt the Special Master procedure that we referred to in our February 18, 2010 correspondence to you. It is the intention of Mr. Epstein's civil counsel to not contest that at least one predicate §2255 offense was committed believing that such a "waiver" satisfies, facially, Mr. Epstein's obligations under the NPA, see attached letter from Mr. Critton. As we said during our meeting on February 3, we have an obligation to provide advice to Mr. Epstein's civil counsel, Robert Critton, whether his raising of certain legal challenges to the Complaint will be perceived as being in conflict with Mr. Epstein's NPA obligations. These issues include: 1. Whether Mr. Epstein can contend that any waiver of liability is satisfied by his not contesting the occurrence of a single rather than multi edicate offenses as to each claimant? This issue is pertinent since Doe 103 has brought six separate claims for §2255 relief each implicating the statutory minimum damage recovery. Amongst the predicates alleged include a predicate offense allegation of a statute that was not even enacted until 2006, i.e., over a year after Doe 103 turned 18, and substantially after her last alleged contact with Mr. Epstein. Any requirement that Mr. Epstein not contest liability for that predicate would violate the ex post facto laws. Two other predicates are not supported by trustworthy evidence. It is our contention that Mr. Epstein satisfies his NPA obligations by not contesting that he committed at least one predicate offense. Prior correspondence from your office is not inconsistent with our belief that the required scope of waiver was to a predicate offense in the singular, see, e.g., Mr.Acosta's letter to Ken Starr, December 4, 2007, p.2 ("were Mr. Epstein convicted at trial, the plaintiff-victims would not have to show that a violation of an enumeration section of Title 18 took place")? 2. Whether Mr. Epstein can contend that the statutory provisions of §2255 in effect at the time of the offense (e.g., 2004-5) govern the minimum statutory damage amount ( 50,000 rather than $150,000) under ex post facto laws, see United States Scheidt, 2010 W.L. 144837 (E.D. Cal., 2010) (indicating that the statute in effect at the time of the violation governs the minimum damage remedy)? Black. SrebnIck, Kornspan & Stumpf. P.A. EFTA00183813

Jeff Sloman, Esq. Esq. , Esq. March 5, 2010 Page 3 3. Whether personal injury is a separate §2255 element from the predicate offense element so that Mr. Epstein could "agree" to the occurrence of a predicate pursuant to his NPA obligations but still contest that the plaintiff was injured, see United States,. Scheidt, supra (finding each to be a separate element) and the letter from Mr. Acosta to Mr. Star, supra December 4, 2007 letter at p.2 which agrees that Mr. Epstein can contest the injury element under the NPA ("were Mr. Epstein convicted at trial, the plaintiff-victims in a subsequent Section 2255 suit would still have had some burden to prove that they were `victims"? 4. Whether the 6-year civil statute of limitations contained in 18 USC §2255 could be raised as an affirmative defense if the facts or allegations demonstrate a greater than 6-year period between the accruing of the cause of action and the complaint, i.e., whether Mr. Epstein can "agree" (for civil §2255 purposes) to the occurrence of a predicate offense and still claim it occurred greater than 6 years before the filing of a Complaint? 5. Whether Mr. Epstein can contest certain claims that are unsupported by trustworthy proof (or in certain cases by any proof at all) so long as he has waives his right to deny the occurrence of at least one predicate offense as required by ¶8 of the NPA? 6. Whether damages are to be awarded based on injury to a plaintiff or based on the number of separately proven claims, see United States'. Raker, 2009 WL 4572785 (E.D.Tex., 2009) where the Court rejected the contention that damages were to be allocated per violation? We are not asking the government to adopt our legal positions; instead we are simply seeking the right for Mr. Epstein's civil counsel to raise principled good faith legal issues without fear of the irreparable collateral consequences that would result from any notice by you that you believed that a litigation position adopted by Mr. Epstein's civil counsel constituted a willful breach. Paragraph 8 and its waiver provisions are not clear (or as stated by Mr. Acosta are "far from simple," see Mr. Acosta letter to Ms. Sanchez, December 19, 2007). Paragraph 8 does not "speak for itself." That the provisions of ¶8 are "far from simple" is illustrated in the construction of those paragraphs by Mr. Epstein's prior counsel, Jay Lefkovvitz, who repeatedly advised Mr. Acosta, by letter, that he considered the waiver of liability to be limited to those who agreed to damages, and was inapplicable to those who chose to litigate, see, e.g., letters from Jay Lefkowitz to Black. Srebnick. Kornspan & Stumpf, P.A EFTA00183814

Jeff Sloman, Esq. Esq. , Esq. March 5, 2010 Page 4 Alex Acosta October 10, 2007, p.4 and November 29, 2007, p.2. Again, we are only requesting that you inform us whether in the event Mr. Epstein did not contest the commission of at least one predicate - the statutory precondition for the filing of a §2255 lawsuit - you would nevertheless believe that the raising of any of the legal arguments outlined above would violate the NPA Respectfully submitted, MARTIN W BERG, ESQ. ROY B CK, SQ. /wg By Black. Srebnick, Kornspan & Stumpf. PA EFTA00183815

BURMAN, CRITTON LUTTIER&COLEMAN, LLP YOUR TRUSTED ADVOCATES A LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP J. MICHAEL BURMAN. P.A22 GREGORY W. COLEMAN. P.A. ROBERT D. CRITTON. JP-. PA ' BERNARD A. LEBEDEKER MARKT. LuTTIER. PA. MICHAEL J. PIKE DAVID A. YAREMA RONDA BOARD CERTIFIED CIVIL TRIAL LAWYER 2ADRUTTED TO PRACTICE IN FLORIDA AND COLORADO Roy Black, Esq. Black, Srebnick, Kornspan & Ptumpf 201 S. Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 1300 Miami, FL 33131 March 4, 2010 Martin G. Weinberg, Esq. Martin G. Weinberg, PC 20 Park Plaza, Suite 1000 Boston, MA 02116 ADELCW I J. BENAVENTE PARATEGAViNVESSIGATOR JESSICA CADWELL BOBBIE M. MCKENNA ASHLIE STOKEN-BARING BETTY STOKES PARALLOALS RITA H. BUONYK OF COUNSEL EDWARD M. RICCI OF COUNSEL Re: Jeffrey Epstein Dear Roy and Marty: This letter represents my thoughts on issues concerning the NPA and my ability to fully defend Mr. Epstein in the civil case recently filed by Mr. Josefsberg. Based on a State criminal court ruling last summer, the Non-Prosecution Agreement ("NPA") was made available to the public. With regard to the civil aspect of the NPA, specifically paragraphs 7 and 8 (including the Addendum), our interpretation has been substantially different from that of the attorney representative, Mr. Josefsberg, and other attorneys representing alleged victims. They have interpreted those civil portions of the agreement to assist them in their civil cases in a manner which we believe is inconsistent with both the written word and the intent of the NPA.' Mr. Epstein has continued to fulfill his responsibilities under all aspects of the NPA. Mr. Josefsberg has represented or currently represents twelve individuals. Of those twelve individuals, eleven have resat their claims..athose eleven claims, only two individuals filed contested litigation, Doe 101 and E l Doe 102. Mr. Epstein and Mr. Josefsberg have attempted to resolve the issue associated with attorneys fees and costs. Mr. Epstein has, as you know, paid an excess of $500,000.00 toward the claimed outstanding fees and costs. It is the belief of all attorneys who represent Mr. Epstein that the fees and costs incurred by the attorney representative (for many attorneys and consultants) are excessive and duplicative. Mr. Epstein provided Mr. Josefsberg a signed Special Master Agreement for resolving the fees/costs issues In February 2010, in substantially the same format which was agreed upon as of December of 2009. The only significant change was use of an out-of-state special master. We were advised by Mr. Josefsberg and Mr. Podhurst that they no longer agree with using that process. 303 BANYAN BOULEVARD • SUITE 400 • WEST PALM BEACH. FL 33401 • PHONE: 561-842-2820 • Fax: 561-844-6929 • [email protected] WWW.BCLCLAWMOM EFTA00183816

March 4, 2010 Page 2 Doe 103 now has been filed. While Mr. Epstein clearly recognizes his obligation under the NPA to waive liability to a single predicate offense, Mr. Josefsberg has filed an action asserting multiple counts against Mr. Epstein based on multiple predicate acts, including one wherein the statute was not even in effect at the time of the alleged violation. Mr. Josefsberg is also aware and agreed that Mr. Epstein could file a declaratory action related to the interpretation of the NPA. Mr. Josefsberg reserved the right to contest issues that might be raised in such an action. It is facially unfair, unjust and inconsistent with the spirit and Intent of the NPA that Mr. Epstein be precluded from fully defending himself (except for the waiver of liability as to a single act) especially where no facts exist to support the claim, a statute was not in effect at the time of the alleged incident, etc. It is my understanding that you are sending a letter to the USAO. I have no objection to your Including my letter which expresses some of my concerns with which Mr. Epstein Is now confronted based on Mr. Josefsberg's interpretation of the NPA. While I am not asking the USAO to confirm Mr. Epstein and his attorneys' Interpretation of the NPA and/or its spirit and intent, I would request that the USAO give Mr. Epstein the opportunity to fully defend himself, In the civil suit, except for that which is specifically required of him under the NPA. Cordially you Robe D. Critton, Jr. RDC/clz EFTA00183817

U.S. Department of Justice United States Attorney Southern District of Florida 500 S. Australian Ave, Ste 400 West Palm Beach, FL 3340! (561)820-8711 Facsimile: (56!) 8204777 April 2, 2010 DELIVERY BY ELECTRONIC MAIL Roy Black, Esq. Black Srebnick Kornspan & Stumpf P.A. 201 S. Biscayne Blvd, Suite 1300 Miami, FL 33131 Re: Jeffrey Epstein Dear Mr. Black: The Office is in receipt of your letter of March 29, 2010. We have had a series of correspondence, telephone calls, and meetings regarding the issue of Mr. Epstein's obligation to his victims. We have repeatedly stated that Mr. Epstein is expected to abide by the letter and spirit of the Non-Prosecution Agreement. And we have repeatedly informed you that the U.S. Attorney's Office does not intend to provide advisory opinions to Mr. Epstein or his attorneys regarding the handling of the civil suits filed against him. Yet again, you have asked us to provide such an advisory opinion. The request relates to Mr. Epstein's Motion to Dismiss in toto the suit filed against him by Jane Doe 103, whom we understand is one of the victims identified through the 2006 through 2007 investigation that culminated in the signing of the Non-Prosecution Agreement. Jane Doe 103 is represented by Robert Josefsberg, the attorney-representative selected by the Special Master in accordance with the Non-Prosecution Agreement, and the Complaint raises claims exclusively under 18 . § 2255. As such, Mr. Epstein has waived his right to contest liability. Despite this waiver, Mr. Epstein and his attorneys want the Court to dismiss the Complaint. In a word, yes, the Office believes that this is a breach of the Non-Prosecution Agreement. Sincerely, Jeffrey H. Sloman United States A By: Assistant United States Attorney EFTA00183818

ROY BLACK, ESQ. APRIL 2, 2010 PAGE 2 OF 2 cc: Jeffrey H. Sloman, U.S. Attorney Robert K. Senior, Acting First Assistant U.S. Attorney Chief, Northern Division EFTA00183819

' Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 1 of 19 a3/e4//0 Seated IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA Civil Action No. 10 - 803 09 DOE No. 103, Plaintiff, 1. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Defendant. FILED bytt)....... FEB 2 3 20W STEVEN M. LARIMORE CLERK 01ST CT of ft.A. - MIAMI COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Plaintiff, ■ Doe No. 103 ("Plaintiff% brings this Complaint against Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein ("Defendant), and states as follows: PARTIES. JURISDICTION. AND VENUE 1. At all times material to this cause of action, Plaintiff was a resident of Palm Beach County, Florida. 2. This Complaint is brought under a fictitious name to protect the identity of Plaintiff because this Complaint makes sensitive allegations of sexual assault and abuse of a then minor. 3. At all times material to this cause of action, Defendant owned a residence located at 358 El Brillo Way, Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida. 4. Defendant is presently a citizen of the United States Virgin Islands. Pursuant to the plea agreement entered by the Defendant in state court and the sentencing which occurred on June 30, 2008, Defendant is currently under community control in Palm Beach County, Florida. Seated Podhurst Orseck, PA. 25 West noisier Street, Suite 800, Miami, FL 33130, Mush305.358.1900 Fax 305.1.58.2382 • Fort Lauderdale 954.463.4346 I EFTA00183820

' Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 2 of 19 5. Defendant is an adult male born on January 20, 1953. 6. This Court has jurisdiction over this action and the claims set forth herein pursuant to 18 !MI § 2255. 7. This Court has venue of this action pursuant to 28 1391(b), as a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in this District. STATEMENT OF FACTS 8. At all relevant times, Defendant was an adult male spanning the ages of 45 and 55 years old. Defendant is known as a billionaire financier and money manager with a secret clientele limited exclusively to billionaires. He is a man of tremendous wealth, power, and influence. He owns a fleet of aircraft that includes a Gulfstream IV, a helicopter, and a Boeing 727, as well as a fleet of motor vehicles. Until his incarceration pursuant to the plea entered and sentencing, which occurred on June 30, 2008, he maintained his principal place of residence in the largest dwelling in Manhattan, a 51,000-square-foot eight-story mansion on the Upper East Side. He also owns a $6.8 million mansion in Palm Beach, Florida, a $30 million 7,500-acre ranch in New Mexico he named "Zorro," a 70-acre private island known as Little St. James in the U.S. Virgin Islands, a mansion in London's Westminster neighborhood, and another residence in the Avenue Foch area of Paris. The allegations herein concern Defendant's conduct while at his lavish residence in Palm Beach and numerous other locations both nationally and internationally. 9. Defendant has a sexual preference for underage minor girls. He engaged in a plan, scheme, or enterprise in which he gained access to countless vulnerable and relatively economically disadvantaged minor girls, and sexually assaulted, molested, and/or exploited these girls, and then gave them money. Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 2 25 West Hagler Stmt, Suite 800, Miami, Fl. 33130, Warn! 305358.2800 Fax 305.3582382 • Fort Laudetdale 954.4638346 www.podhurstcom EFTA00183821

' Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 3 of 19 10. Beginning in or around 1998 through in or around September 2007, Defendant used his resources and his influence over vulnerable minor girls to engage in a systematic pattern of sexually exploitative behavior. II. Defendant's plan and scheme reflected a particular pattern and method. Defendant coerced and enticed impressionable, vulnerable, and relatively economically less fortunate minor girls to participate in various acts of sexual misconduct that he committed upon them. Defendant's scheme involved the use of underage girls, as well as other individuals, to recruit underage girls. Defendant and/or an authorized agent would call and alert Defendant's assistants shortly before or after he arrived at his Palm Beach residence. His assistants would call economically disadvantaged and underage girls from West Palm Beach and surrounding areas who would be enticed by the money being offered and who Defendant and/or his assistants perceived as less likely to complain to authorities or have credibility issues if allegations of improper conduct were made. The then minor Plaintiff and other minor girls, some as young as 14 years old, were transported to Defendant's Palm Beach mansion by Defendant's employees, agents, and/or assistants in order to provide Defendant with "massages." 12. Many of the instances of illegal sexual conduct committed by Defendant were perpetrated with the assistance, support, and facilitation of at least three assistants who helped him orchestrate this child exploitation enterprise. These assistants would arrange times for underage girls to come to Defendant's residence, transport or cause the transportation of underage girls to Defendant's residence, escort the underage girls to the massage room where Defendant would be waiting or would enter shortly thereafter, urge the underage girls to remove their clothes, deliver cash from Defendant to the underage girls and/or their procurers at the conclusion of each "massage appointment," and assist Defendant in taking nude photographs Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 3 I 25 West Plaster Street, State 800, Miami, FL 33130, Miami 305.35&2800 Fax 305358.2382 • Fort Lauderdale 95,1463.4346 www.poclhursteom EFTA00183822

Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 4 of 19 and/or videos of the underage girls with and/or without their knowledge. Defendant would pay the procurer of each girl's "appointment" hundreds of dollars. 13. Defendant designed this scheme to secure a private place in Defendant's Palm Beach mansion where only persons employed and invited by Defendant would be present, so as to reduce the chance of detection of Defendant's sexual abuse and/or exploitation, as well as to make it more difficult for the minor girls to flee the premises and/or to credibly report his actions to law enforcement or other authorities. The girls were usually transported by his employee(s), agcnt(s), and/or assistant(s) and/or by taxicab(s) and/or motor vehicle(s) paid for by Defendant, which also made it difficult for the girls to flee his mansion. 14. Upon her initial arrival at Defendant's Palm Beach mansion, each underage victim would generally be introduced to one of Defendant's assistants, who would gather the girl's personal contact information. The minor girl would be led up a remote flight of stairs to a room that contained a massage table and a large shower. 15. At times, if it was the girl's first "massage" appointment, another female would be in the room to "lead the way." Generally the other female would leave, or Defendant would dismiss her. Often, Defendant would start his massage wearing only a small towel, which eventually would be removed. Defendant and/or the other female would direct the girl to massage him, giving the minor girl specific instructions as to where and how he wanted to be touched, and then direct her to remove her clothing. Defendant would then perform one or more lewd, lascivious, and sexual acts, including masturbation; fondling the minor's breasts and/or sexual organs; touching the minor's vulva, vagina, and/or anus with a vibrator, back massager, his finger(s), and/or his penis; digitally penetrating her vagina; performing intercourse, oral sex, and/or anal sex; and/or coercing or attempting to coerce the girl to engage in lewd acts and/or Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 4 25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800, Maud, FL 33130, Miami 3053581800 Fax 305158.2382 • Port Lauderdale 954.463.4346 EFTA00183823

Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 5 of 19 ' • prostitution and/or enticing the then minor girl to engage in sexual acts with another female in Defendant's presence. The exact degree of molestation and frequency with which the sexual exploitations took place varied and is not yet completely known; however, Defendant committed such acts regularly on a daily basis and, in most instances, several times a day. In order to facilitate the daily exchanges of money for sexual assault and abuse, Defendant kept U.S. currency readily available. 16. Defendant traveled out of Florida to Palm Beach for the purpose of luring minor girls to his mansion to sexually abuse and/or batter them. He used the telephone to contact these minor girls for the purpose of coercing them into acts of prostitution and to enable himself to commit sexual battery against them and/or acts of lewdness in their presence, and he conspired with others, including his employee(s), assistant(s), driver(s), pilot(s), and/or agent(s), to facilitate these acts and to avoid police detection. Defendant's systematic pattern of sexually exploitative behavior described above also occurred in Defendant's other domestic and/or international residences, places of lodging, and/or modes of transportation. 17. Consistent with the foregoing plan and scheme, Defendant used his money, wealth, and power to unduly and improperly manipulate and influence the then minor Plaintiff. A vulnerable young girl, Plaintiff was merely a seventeen year old high school student when she was first lured into Defendant's sexually exploitative world in or about January 2004. Plaintiff was recruited while at work by a co-worker, one of the minor victims Defendant paid to procure underage females. Plaintiff went to Defendant's Palm Beach mansion accompanied by this co- worker. Upon arriving, Plaintiff was led by one of Defendant's assistants up a flight of stairs to a spa room with a shower and a massage table. Defendant entered this room wearing only a towel. Defendant suddenly removed his towel, exposing his naked body, and then lay on the massage Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 5 25 West Hagler Street, Suite 800, Miami, FL 33)30, Miami 305.3582800 Pax 305358.2382 • Fort Lauderdale 954.463.4346 I www.podburattom EFTA00183824

' Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 6 of 19 table. Defendant told Plaintiff to massage his back and take off her clothing, which she refused to do. Defendant then began to try to touch the minor Plaintiff and/or take off her clothing. After Defendant's relentless pawing, she reluctantly removed some of her clothing. During this encounter, Defendant turned over on his back and fondled Plaintiff's breasts, despite her repeatedly telling him not to do so. As Plaintiff massaged Defendant, Defendant proceeded to masturbate until ejaculation. Defendant then paid Plaintiff two hundred dollars, and Plaintiff was escorted out of Defendant's mansion and left Defendant's property. 18. A similar pattern of grooming continued, and the sexual exploitation progressively escalated, over the course of approximately seventeen months during which Defendant would often travel to Palm Beach. Prior to arriving and while in Palm Beach, Defendant and/or his agent(s) would frequently call Plaintiff at her home telephone number and/or other telephone numbers, arranging for encounters with her for Defendant, sometimes twice daily. While usually such contacts were made by his assistants, Defendant personally called Plaintiff repeatedly, despite being told to leave Plaintiff alone. After the first few encounters, Defendant coerced Plaintiff to remove all her clothing, and Defendant penetrated the minor Plaintiff's vagina digitally. Defendant sexually abused and/or battered and/or exploited Plaintiff at least a hundred times between approximately January 2004 and May 2005. Such exploitation included, but was not limited to, Defendant's sexual abuse and battery of Plaintiff with vibrator(s), back massager(s), his finger(s), and his penis. At times, Defendant manipulated Plaintiff to interact sexually with another female. During one encounter, Defendant penetrated the minor Plaintiff's vagina with his penis, all the while narrating and demonstrating his sexual battery of Plaintiff to another female present in the room. While some of the precise dates that Defendant's acts of sexual exploitation occurred arc unknown to Plaintiff, these dates are known Poilhurst Orseck, P.A. 6 25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800, MiamiL FL 33130, Miami 305.358.280D Fax 305.358.2382 • Fort Lauderdale 954.4&3A346 l www.podhunt.com EFTA00183825

• Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 7 of 19 to Defendant, as he and/or his assistants kept written records, some of which are in the custody of law enforcement, of each instance in which he committed lewd acts upon minor girls, including the then minor Plaintiff. 19. Defendant's preference for underage girls was well-known to those who regularly procured them for him. The above-described acts of abuse began to occur during a time when Defendant knew that Plaintiff was a minor. Defendant, at all times material to this cause of action, knew and/or should have known of Plaintiff's age of minority. In fact, Defendant repeatedly urged the minor Plaintiff to become legally emancipated in order to accompany him as he traveled, both nationally and internationally. Additionally, Defendant, knowing that Plaintiff was merely seventeen years old, lured her by inviting her to stay with him at his mansion in Manhattan and arranging and/or paying for airplane tickets, theater tickets, and a personal chauffeur as gifts for her upcoming birthday. 20. As part of Defendant's persistent process of grooming Plaintiff and immersing her in his lewd and abusive lifestyle, Defendant regularly showered the ado/. cent Plaintiff with gifts, including, but not limited to lingerie, flowers, bikini bathing suit(s), art book(s), purse(s), envelopes of U.S. currency, use of a car, and/or othcr accoutrements. 21. Defendant possessed photographs of nude underage girls, some of which may have been taken with hidden cameras set up in his residence in Palm Beach. On the day of Defendant's arrest, police found two hidden cameras and photographs of underage girls in Defendant's mansion. Defendant took lewd photographs of Plaintiff with his hidden cameras and transported lewd photographs of Plaintiff and other victims elsewhere using a facility or means of interstate and/or foreign commerce. On one occasion, Defendant manipulated the minor Plaintiff to pose nude for him and photographed her using several rolls of film. One or Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 7 25 West Flagler Street Suite 800. taunt P1.33130, Miami 305.358.2800 Fax 305,3582192 • Fun Lauderdale 959.463.4396 podhurst.com EFTA00183826

' Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 8 of 19 more of those nude photographs of Plaintiff that were taken by the Defendant when she was a minor were confiscated by the Palm Beach Police Department during its execution of a search warrant of Defendant's Palm Beach mansion on October 20, 2005. 22. Defendant was particularly skillful at discerning his minor victims' respective hopes, dreams, and ambitions. As he did with many of his victims, Defendant lured Plaintiff early-on with modeling opportunities, impressing her with his modeling business and contacts with supermodels, indicating that he could help her with a modeling career. 23. Knowing that the minor Plaintiff was an excellent student and desired to attend New York University or Columbia University, Defendant pretended to show great interest in her college admission, and offered to help her with her applications and to assist her with her tuition. Defendant had told Plaintiff of his substantial connections within the academic community, a matter about which he often bragged. Defendant took it upon himself to take control of Plaintiffs college application process and led Plaintiff to believe that he was sincere about helping her. Even though she had earned a Bright Futures Scholarship to the Florida college of her choice, Defendant insisted that she would not need it, and that, with his involvement, she would be admitted into one or both of the universities in New York. As a result of Defendant's manipulation, Plaintiff did not apply timely for the Bright Futures Scholarship or to any college, and therefore missed the fall semester of her freshman year. When the Palm Beach Police Department executed the search warrant on Defendant's mansion, among the artifacts found and confiscated were Plaintiffs high school transcript. 24. In June 2008, after an investigation by the Palm Beach Police Department, the State Attorney's Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the United States Attorney's Office, Defendant entered pleas of "guilty" to one count of solicitation of prostitution, in Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 8 25 West Flagler Street, Suite ea Miami, FL 33130, Miami 305.358.2800 Fax 305359.2382 • Fort Lauderdale 954.4634346 I www.;xxlituraleom EFTA00183827

Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 9 of 19 •••••••• violation of Fla. Stat. § 796.07, and one count of solicitation of a minor to engage in prostitution, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 796.03 in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in Palm Beach County, Florida. 25. As a condition of that plea, Defendant entered into a Non-Prosecution Agreement, Addendum, and Affirmation (collectively, the "NPA") with the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida on September 24, 2007, October 29, 2007, and December 7, 2007, respectively. In so doing, Defendant acknowledged that Plaintiff was one of his victims and agreed to the following provisions of the NPA : 8. If any of the [acknowledged victims] elects to file suit pursuant to 18 §2255, Epstein will not contest the jurisdiction of the United Statcs District Court for the Southern District of Florida over his person and/or the subject matter, and Epstein waives his right to contest liability and also waives his right to contest damages up to an amount agreed to between the identified individual and E stein, so long as the identified individual elects to proceed exclusively under 18 §2255, and agrees to waive any other claim for damages, whether pursuant to state, federal or common law. II :wept as to those individuals who elect to proceed exclusively under 18 §2255, as set forth in paragraph (8), supra, neither Epstein's signature on this agreement, nor its terms, nor any resulting waivers or settlements by Epstein are to be construed as admissions of evidence or evidence of civil or criminal liability or a waive of any jurisdictional or other defense as to any person, whether or not her name appears on the list provided by the United States (emphasis added). 26. Plaintiff was among the individuals identified by the United States Attorney's Office as victims of Defendant upon whose testimony it intended to base its federal prosecution of Defendant for his illegal conduct. Consequently, Defendant is estopped by his state court plea and the Non-Prosecution Agreement from denying the acts alleged in this Complaint and must effectively admit liability to Plaintiff, ■ Doe No. 103. COUNT ONE Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 9 75 West Flagler Street, Suite 800, Mint FL 33130, Miami 305.358.2800 Fax 305358.2182 • Fort Lauderdale 954.463.4346 vnwepoributsLcom EFTA00183828

' Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 10 of 19 ii i (Cause of Action for Coercion and Enticement of Minor to En a ,e in Prostitution or Sexual Activity pursuant to 18 M. & 2255 in Violation of 18 . & 2422(1)11 27. Plaintiff hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 26 above. 28. Defendant used a facility or means of interstate and/or foreign commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce Plaintiff, when she was under the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution and/or sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempted to do so, pursuant to 18 . § 2255 in violation of 18 . § 2422(b). 29. Plaintiff was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 . § 2255, and, as such, asserts a cause of action against Defendant pursuant to this Section of the United States Code. 30. As a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 . § 2255 being committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, and will in the future continue to suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, psychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, loss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, separation from her family, and other damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and luring her into a perverse and unhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, and Plaintiff will in the future incur additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the capacity to enjoy life. These injuries arc permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to suffer these losses in the future. Pocihurst Orseck, P.A. 10 25 West Flagkr Suet, Suite 800, Miami. FL 33130, Miami 305.358.2800 Fax 305.358.2382 • Fort Lauderdale 954.463.4316 www.podhurst.com EFTA00183829

Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 11 of 19 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant for all damages available under 18 . § 2255, including, without limitation, actual and compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this Court deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by a jury. COUNT TWO (Cause of Action for Travel with Intent to Enen/iii Illicit Sexual Conduct pursuant to 18 2255 in Violation of 18 . & 2423(19) 31. Plaintiff hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs I through 26 above. 32. Defendant traveled in interstate and/or foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct, as defined in 18 § 2423(f), with minor females, including the then minor Plaintiff, in violation of 18 § 2423(6). 33. Plaintiff was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 . § 2255, and, as such, asserts a cause of action against Defendant pursuant to this Section of the United States Code. 34. As a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 § 2255 being committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, and will in the future continue to suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, psychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, loss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, separation from her family, and other damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and luring her into a perverse and unhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, and Plaintiff will in the future incur additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 11 I 25 West Flatter Sheet, Suite 800, Miami, FL 33130, Miami 306358.2800 Fax 306.358.2382 • Fort Lauderdale 954.463.4346 www.podluust.com EFTA00183830

' Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 12 of 19 income in the future, and a loss of the capacity to enjoy life. These injur;es are permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to suffer these losses in the future. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant for all damages available under 18 § 2255, including, without limitation, actual and compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this Court deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by a jury. COUNT THREE (Cause of Action for Sexual Exploitation of Children pursuant to 18 & 2255 in Violation of 1S= & 22511 35. Plaintiff hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 26 above. 36. Defendant knowingly persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced the then minor Plaintiff to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct, in violation of 18 . § 2251. 37. Plaintiff was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 § 2255, and, as such, asserts a cause of action against Defendant pursuant to this Section of the United States Code. 38. As a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 § 2255 being committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, and will in the future continue to suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, psychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, loss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, separation from her family, and other damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and luring her into a perverse and unhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical Poclhurst Orseck, P.A. 12 25 West Hagler Street, Suite 800, Miami, FL 33130, Miami 305.358.2800 Fax 306358.2382 • rod Lauderdale 954.463.4346 www.podhuracorn EFTA00183831

Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 13 of 19 and psychological expenses, and Plaintiff will in the future incur additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the capacity to enjoy life. These injuries are permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to suffer these losses in the future. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant for all damages available under 18 TM § 2255, including, without limitation, actual and compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this Court deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by a jury. COUNT FOUR (Cause of Action for Transport of Visual Depiction of Minor Engaging in Sexually Explicit Conduct pursuant to 18 § 2255 in Violation of 18 2252(a)(1)) 39. Plaintiff hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 26 above. 40. Defendant knowingly mailed, transported, shipped, or sent via computer and/or facsimile in or affecting interstate and/or foreign commerce at least one visual depiction of the minor Plaintiff engaging in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18 § 2252(a)(I). 41. Defendant transported lewd photographs of Plaintiff and other victims elsewhere using a facility or means of interstate and/or foreign commerce. 42. Plaintiff was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 M. § 2255, and, as such, asserts a cause of action against Defendant pursuant to this Section of the United States Code. 43. As a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 M. § 2255 being committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, and will in the future continue to suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, psychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 13 25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800, Miami, FL 33130, Mlam1305.358.2800 Fax 305.358.2382 • Fort Lauderdale 954.463.4346 www.podhunt.com EFTA00183832

' Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 14 of 19 loss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, separation from her family, and other damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and luring her into a perverse and unhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, and Plaintiff will in the future incur additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the capacity to enjoy life. These injuries arc permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to suffer these losses in the future. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant for all damages available under 18 . § 2255, including, without limitation, actual and compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this Court deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by a jury. COUNT FIVE (Cause of Action for Transport of Child Pornography pursuant to 18 2255 in Violation of 18 =. $ 2252A(a)(1)I 44. Plaintiff hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 26 above. 45. Defendant knowingly mailed, transported, shipped, or sent via computer and/or facsimile in or affecting interstate and/or foreign commerce child pornography, in violation of 18 § 2252A(a)(1). 46. Defendant transported lewd photographs of Plaintiff and other victims elsewhere using a facility or means of interstate and/or foreign commerce. 47. Plaintiff was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 2255, and, as such, asserts a cause of action against Defendant pursuant to this Section of the United States Code. Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 14 25 West Hagler Street, Suite 800, Wand. FL 33130, Miami M.358.2800 Fax 305358.7382 • Fort Lauderdale 954.463.4346 www.podhurst.com EFTA00183833

Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 15 of 19 48. As a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in I8 . § 2255 being committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, and will in the future continue to suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, psychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, loss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, separation from her family, and other damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and luring her into a perverse and unhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, and Plaintiff will in the future incur additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the capacity to enjoy life. These injuries are permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to suffer these losses in the future. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant for all damages available under 18 . § 2255, including, without limitation, actual and compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this Court deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by a jury. COUNT SIX (Cause of for Eneaging in a Child Ex Enterprise pursuant to 18 . 2255 in Violation of 18 . § 2252A(e)) 49. Plaintiff hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 26 above and Counts One through Five above. 50. Defendant knowingly engaged in a child exploitation enterprise, as defined in 18 . § 2252A(g)(2), in violation of 18 . § 2252A(g)(1). As more fully set forth above, Defendant engaged in actions that constitute countless violations of 18 . § 1591 (sex trafficking of children), Chapter 110 (sexual exploitation of children in violation of 18 §§ Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 15 I 25 West Hagler Street, Suite 800, Mimi, FL 33130, Miami 305.35&2800 Fax 305358.2382 • Fort Lauderdale 954.463.4346 vinv.podhurst.com EFTA00183834

Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 16 of 19 2251, 2252(a)(1), and 2252(A)(a)(I)), and Chapter 117 (transportation for illegal sexual activity in violation of 18 §§ 2421, 2422(b), and 2423(b)). As more fully set forth above in paragraphs I through 26, Defendant's actions involved countless victims and countless separate incidents of sexual abuse, which he committed against minors, including Plaintiff, in concert with at least three other persons. 51. Plaintiff was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 . § 2255, and, as such, asserts a cause of action against Defendant pursuant to this Section of the United States Code. 52. As a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 . § 2255 being committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, and will in the future continue to suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, psychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, loss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, separation from her family, and other damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and luring her into a perverse and unhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, and Plaintiff will in the future incur additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the capacity to enjoy life. These injuries are permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to suffer these losses in the future. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant for all damages available under 18 § 2255, including, without limitation, actual and compensatory damages, Podhunt Orseck, P.A. 16 25 West Hagler Street, Suite 800, Miami, Ft. 33130, Miami 305.3581800 Fax 3115,358.Z382 • Port Lauderdale 951.463.4346 www.podlturst.com EFTA00183835

Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 17 of 19 `I. attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other farther relief as this Court deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by a jury. Date: 4artitA4-1-i-3 , 2010. Respectfully Submitted, By: ke-PO4 fe-Peet-vbv Robert (.Jose erg Bar No. 040856 Katherine W. Ezell Bar No. 114771 Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 25 West Flagler St., Suite 800 Miami, Florida 33130 Telephone: (305) 358-2800 Fax: (305) 358-2382 sefsber a) odhurst.corn Attorneys for Plaintiff Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 17 25 West Flagler Street Suite 800, Miami, FL 33130, Miami 305..358.2800 Fax: 05.358.2382 • Poet Lauderdale 954.4634346 I wvew.psdhurstrom EFTA00183836

ABOVE INFORMATION IS TRUE & CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE ' Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Pagel 18_ of 19 CIVIL COVER SHEET 036% - 1 Di evit 4( elev. 2/00) P- ThelS 44 civilcover sheet and thcinforniation contained herein wither ft:placenor Supplement the filing and service ef picadingsor other pen as required by law, except asprovidcd by local rules of court This form, approved by the ludkial Conference orate United States in September 1974, is required forth o 'leek ofecaut for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet (Sig INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.) NOTICE: Attorneys MUST Indic led Cases Below, I. (a) PLAINTIFFS Doe No. 103 10 8 0 3 jug,teNinis (b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff West Palm Beach (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) ft Attorney's (Um Nome. Addieti. and Telepheee Nuanns) Robert'. Josefsberg, EsqJKatherine W. Ezell, Esq. Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 25 W. Flagler St., Suite 800 Miami RI -4 I lft FILED County of Residency of Pint Listed Dcfcrient Uniretrebates VIE let ON US. PLAINT F CASES ONLY) NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION &ASES. fEe. 24,201, THE TA ACT LAND INVOLVED. TOMO AS U30)M0Erk AUOITIO9SOTKomrol CLERK U. e DIST. CT. Robed D. Critton, Esq., Burman, co"akastin ibP, 303 Banyan Blvd., Suite 400, West Palm Beach, FL 33401 (d) Cheek County Where Action Aran (' M IAMI. DADE 0 MONROE 0 IROWARD 08 PALM BEACH 0 MARTIN 0 ST. LUCK 0 INDIAN RIVER 0 OKEECHOBEE HIOHLANDS II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Moor art Om Boa Only) O I V.S. Ouctitmenl is 3 INdeallUoillon ?Wulff (U.S. Otnersusi Noes Petty) O 2 U.S. Coveitemni 3 4 Onctsity Ilefeadant Ind k ate Chit tttt ip of Patine In Item Ili) III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES(Poce 6.- X" la Om Box roe swam For DIvonily Cates Oaly) Cants or Taro MN 4 Clines of aloha Slam CE1844. sr SUDO of, C PT? 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Eleksdesn 0 aim IRS—Third Piny 24 USC 7600 I u. amfktmx O 442 Netwalizahon '-" Applicstion 40 Nantes Cumn.Alits (Male 465 Onto Inonntmlas O Aclin• ORIGIN ,r) I Original Proceeding 1Place a is Oa BOA Orly) n 2 R moved from O 3 Railed- kale Court (sae VI below) Cl 4 Reinstated or Reopened n 5 Trans erred from another district l / 6 Muhidinricl (4903 Litigation 0 7 Appeal to District Judge from Magistrate Judgment VI. RELATED/RE-FILED CASF.(S). (See hoc/moons second up). s) Re-filed Case 0 YES ,f6140 b) Related Cases IF YES ONO JUDGE Kenneth A. Marra DOCKET NUMBER See Attached. VII. CAUSE OF ACTION Ci14Ih9 U.S. Civil Statute under which you am filing and Write a Brief Statement of Cause (Do not eke Jurtulletional statutes unless diversity): IS 2255 (Predicate Statutes 18 2422(b), 2423(b), 2423(e), 2251, 2252, 2252A(aX1), 2252A(g)(1) LENGTH OF TRIAL via I days estimated (for both sides to try entire case) VIII. REQUESTED IN 0 CHECK EWA§ IS A CLASS ACTION DEM COMPLAINT: UNDER 23 CHECK YES any irdanindod in complaint: x i) eye , 4 0.6. g i s-Door JURY DEMAND: fad No SIGNATURE OP ATTORNEY OF RECORD Ead ia lr; OFFICE USE ONLY sr qa141,..4.4.. (A. 2:3 /0 AMOUNT 3..‘17 .0 0 RECEIPTS 10 VIP EFTA00183837

Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 19 of 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA WEST PALM BEACH DIVISION ATTACHMENT TO CIVIL COVER SIIEET FOR:. Doe 103 Jeffrey Epstein VI. RELATED PENDING CASES 08-80119 - KAM 08-80232 - KAM 08-80380 - KAM 08-80381 - KAM 08-80811 - KAM 08-80893 - KAM 08-80993 - KAM 08-80994 - KAM 09-80469 - KAM 09-80802 - KAM 09-81092 - KAM EFTA00183838

ROY BLACK HOWARD M. SREBNICK Scan A. KORESPAN LARRY A. STUMPF MARIA NCYRA JACKIE FERCZEK MARK AA. SHAPIRO JARED Jeff Sloman, Esq. United States Attorney 99 N.E. 4th Street Miami, FL 33132 BLACK SREBNICK KORNSPAN STUMPF PA. March 29, 2010 Esq. Assistant United States Attorney 99 N.E. 4th Street Miami, FL 33132 RE: Jeffrey Epstein Dear Counsel: JESSICA FONSECA-NADER KATHLEEN P. PHILLIPS AARON ANThON MARCOS BEATON, JR. MATTHEW P. O'BRIEN JENIPER J. SOULH0AS NOAH Fox E-Mail: Esq. Assistant United States Attorney 500 South Australian Avenue West Palm Beach, FL 33401-6223 Jeffrey Epstein has an April 5, 2010 deadline for the filing of a Motion to Dismiss, and thereafter an Answer, to claims brought by Doe 103 pursuant to 18 USC §2255 that were referenced in our earlier letter to you dated March 5, 2010, to which there has been no response. We firmly believe that the issues raised in the draft motion that is appended to this letter do not conflict with, nor, if filed, breach Mr. Epstein's obligations under the NPA. Please advise if any of the issues in the draft motion authored by his civil counsel Robert Critton are, from your perspective, in conflict with the §2255 provisions of the NPA so that we may reassess our legal opinion that Mr. Epstein's civil counsel can litigate the legal issues contained in the draft motion without fear that the litigation will be construed by your office as being in violation of the NPA. If the government believes that any of the issues intended to be raised in defense of the Doe 103 lawsuit are in breach of Mr. Epstein's obligations under the NPA, we request notice so that we could decide before any filing whether to file a ZQI S. Biscayne Boulevard. Suite 1300 • Miami. Florida 33131 • Phone: 305-371-6421 • Fax: 305-358-2006 • www RoyBlack.com EFTA00183839

Jeff Sloman, Esq. , Esq. March 29, 2010 Page 2 Declaratory Judgment action asking the Court presiding over the Doe 103 lawsuit to determine whether the raising of the issue by motion or defense would be in conflict with Mr. Epstein's contractual duties under the NPA or to withdraw the issue to the extent we become convinced that your position, if in conflict with ours, is correct. Again, Mr. Epstein's paramount priority, and ours, is that the terms of Mr. Epstein's agreement with the government be followed and fulfilled. Your truly, MARTIN WEINBERG, ESQ. ROY CK, ESQ. /wg By Black, Srebnick, Kornspan & Stumpf, P.A. EFTA00183840

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CASE NO. 10-80309-CIV- DOE No. 103, Plaintiff, vs. JEFFERY EPSTEIN, Defendant. DEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S MOTION TO DISMISS. & FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT & STRIKE DIRECTED TO PLAINTIFF DOE NO. 103'S COMPLAINT (dated 2/23/20101 Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, ("EPSTEIN"), by and through his undersigned counsel, moves to dismiss Counts One through Six of Plaintiff DOE 103's Complaint for failure to state a cause of action, as specified herein. Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. (2009); Local Gen. Rule 7.1 (S.D. Fla. 2009). Defendant further moves for more definite statement and to strike. Rule 12(e) and (f), In support of his motion, Defendant states: The Complaint attempts to allege 6 counts, all of which are purportedly brought pursuant to 18 M. §2255 — Civil Remedies for Personal Injuries. Dismissal is required on the following grounds: (1) 18 la §2255 allows for a single recovery of "actual damages." (A.) Statutory Considerations: the statute does not allow for the Plaintiff to allege multiple counts, six in this case, or multiple predicate act violations or incidents, in an effort to multiply or seek duplicate recoveries of her "actual damages" 1 EFTA00183841

based on the number of predicate act violations or incidents. The statutory minimum is just that — a minimum; nothing prevents a plaintiff from proving and recovering "actual damages" in excess of the minimum amount. (B.) Constitutional Considerations: in the alternative, constitutional principles require that the statute be interpreted as allowing for a single recovery of one's damages. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking to improperly multiply or seek duplicate recoveries of her actual damages, the action is required to be dismissed. (2) The statute in effect during the time of the alleged conduct applies — the version in effect from 1999 to July 26, 2006, not the statute as amended in 2006, effective July 27, 2006. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to rely on the amended version of the statute, such reliance is improper and also requires dismissal of the entire action. (3) Count VI is also subject to dismissal because the predicate act relied upon by Plaintiff did not come into effect until July 27, 2006, well after the conduct alleged by Plaintiff occurred. Supporting Memorandum of Law Principles of Statutory Interpretation It is well settled that in interpreting a statute, the court's inquiry begins with the plain and unambiguous language of the statutory text. CBS, Inc.'. Prime Time 24 Venture, 245 F.3d 1217 (1 Cir. 2001); U.S.'. Castroneves 2009 WL 528251, *3 (S.D. Fla. 2009), citing Reeves Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 734 (11th Cir. 2008); and Smith I, Husband, 376 F.Supp.2d at 610 ("When interpreting a statute, [a court's] inquiry begins with the text."). "The Court must first look to the plain meaning of the words, and scrutinize the statute's `language, structure, and purpose." Id. In addition, in construing a statute, a court is to presume that the legislature said what it means and means what it said, and not add language or give some absurd or strained interpretation. As stated in 2 EFTA00183842

CBS. Inc. supra at 1228 — "Those who ask courts to give effect to perceived legislative intent by interpreting statutory language contrary to its plain and unambiguous meaning are in effect asking courts to alter that language, and lijourts have no authority to alter statutory language.... We cannot add to the terms of Ethel provision what Congress left out.' Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1 187." See also Dodd U S , 125 S.Ct. 2478 (2005); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes §124. Title 18 of the is entitled "Crimes and Criminal Procedure." §2255 is contained in "Part I. Crimes, Chap. 110. Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children." 18 §2255 (2002), is entitled Civil remedy for personal injuries, and provides: (a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 22411, 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $50,000 in value. (b) Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues or in the case of a person under a legal disability, not later than three years after the disability. Sec endnote 1 hereto for statutory text as amended in 2006, effective July 27, 2006. Prior to the 2006 amendments, the version of the statute quoted above was in effect beginning in 1999.1 I The above quoted version of 18 . §2255 was the same beginning in 1999 until amended in 2006, effective July 27, 2006. 3 EFTA00183843

Motion to Dismiss 11) The remedy afforded pursuant to 18 42255 allows for a single recovery of "actual damages" by a plaintiff against a defendant. The recovery afforded is not on a per violation or per incident or per count basis? (A.) Statutory Considerations. 18 §2255 - Civil Remedy for Personal Injuries, creates a federal cause of action or "civil remedy" for a minor victim of sexual, abuse, molestation and exploitation, and allows for a single recovery of the "actual damages" sustained and proven by a "minor who is a victim of a violation" of an enumerated predicated act and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation." "18 . §2255 gives victims of sexual conduct who are minors a private right of action." Martinez'. White, 492 F.Supp.2d 1186, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 18 §2255 "merely provides a cause of action for damages in `any appropriate United States District Court." W at 1189. Under the plain meaning of the statute, §2255 does not allow for the actual damages sustained to be duplicated or multiplied on behalf of a plaintiff against a defendant on a "per violation" or "per incident" or "per count" basis. No where in the 2 In other §2255 is filed against Defendant, Defendant has previously asserted the position that 18 §2255's creates a single cause of action on behalf of a plaintiff against a defendant, as opposed to multiple causes of action on a per violation basis or as opposed to an allowance of a multiplication of the statutory presumptive minimum damages or "actual damages." EPSTEIN asserts his position regarding the single recovery of damages in order to properly preserve all issues pertaining to the proper application of §2255 for appeal. EPSTEIN will fully honor his obligations as set forth in the Non-Prosecution Agreement with the United States Attorney's Office; principally, as related to the claims made in this case by Doe 103, the obligations as set forth in paragraph 8 of that Agreement. In particular, EPSTEIN will not contest the allegation that he committed at least one predicate offense as Doe 103, a waiver sufficient to satisfy the 2255 statutory condition that Doe 103 was a victim of the commission of one of the enumerated predicate violations as required. 4 EFTA00183844

statutory text is there any reference to the recovery of damages afforded by this statute as being on a "per violation" or "per incident" or "per count" basis. 18 2255(a) creates a civil remedy for "a minor who is a victim of a violation of section 22411, 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation ... ." The statute speaks in terms of the recovery of the "actual damages such minor sustains and the cost of suit, including attorney's fees." See 18 . §2255(a) (2002). See Smith'. Husband, 428 F.Supp.2d 432 (ED. Va. 2006); Smith Husband. 376 F.Supp.2d 603 (ED. Va. 2006); Doe,. Liberatore, 478 F.Supp.2d 742, 754 (M.D. Pa. 2007); and the recent cases in front of this court on Defendant's Motions to Dismiss and For More Definite Statement — Doe No. 2 I. Epstein, 2009 WL 383332 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); Doe No. 3'. Epstein 2009 WL 383330 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); Doe No. 4'. Epstein 2009 WL 383286 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); and Poe No. 51. Epstein 2009 WL 383383 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); see also U.S. I. Scheidt, Slip Copy, 2010 WL 144837, fn. 1 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 11, 2010); U.S. I. Rain, 2009 WL 2579103, fn. 1 (ED. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009); U.S. I. Ferenci, 2009 WL 2579102, fn. 1 (ED. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009); U.S. I. Monk, 2009 WL 2567831, fn. I (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009); U.S. I. Zane, 2009 WL 2567832, fn.1 (ED. Cal. Aug. 18 2009). As to the meaning of "actual damages," the Eleventh Circuit in McMillian,. a, 81 F.3d 1041, 1055 (11th Cir.1996)3, succinctly explained: 3 In McMillian, the 11111 Circuit was faced with the task of the interpretation of the statutory term "actual direct compensatory damages" under FIRREA, 12 §1821(s)(3)(i). In doing so, the Court began with the plain meaning of the phrase. See Perrin'. United States 444 U.S. 37, 42-43, 100 S.Ct. 311, 314, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979) ("A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary common meaning."); United States. McLvmont. 45 F.3d 400, 401 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1077, 115 S.Ct. 5 EFTA00183845

... "Compensatory damages" are defined as those damages that "will compensate the injured party for the injury sustained, and nothing more; such as will simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury." Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1991). "Actual damages," roughly synonymous with compensatory damages, are defined as "Meal, substantial and just damages, or the amount awarded to a complainant in compensation for his actual and real loss or injury, as opposed ... to `nominal' damages [andj 'punitive' damages." hi.thm's Finally, "[d]irect damages are such as follow immediately upon the act done." Id. Thus, "actual direct compensatory damages" appear to include those damages, flowing directly from the repudiation, which make one whole, as opposed to those which go farther by including future contingencies such as lost profits and opportunities or damages based on speculation. [Citation omitted]. ... FN I5. According to Corpus Juris Secundum, " 'Compensatory damages' and 'actual damages' are synonymous terms ... and include' all damages other than punitive or exemplary damages." 25 Damages § 2 (1966). (Emphasis added). See also, Fanin I. U.S. Dept. of Veteran Affairs, 2009 WL 1677233 (11th Cir. June 17, 2009), citing Fitzpatrick'. IRS 665 F.2d 327, 331 (I Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Doe'. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 124 S.Ct. 1204 (2004k"Actual damages" recoverable under the Privacy Act are "proven pecuniary losses and not for generalized mental injuries, loss of reputation, embarrassment or other non-qualified injuries;" and the statutory minimum of $1,000 under the Privacy Act is not available unless the plaintiff suffered some amount of "actual damages."). Considering the plain meaning of "actual damages" and the purpose of such damages is to "make one whole," to allow a duplication or multiplication of the actual damages sustained is in direct conflict with the well entrenched legal principle against duplicative damages recovery. See generally, Waffle House. Inc. 534 U.S. 1723, 131 L.Ed.2d 581 (1995) ("Mhe plain meaning of this statute controls unless the language is ambiguous or leads to absurd results."). 6 EFTA00183846

\ 279, 297, 122 S.Ct. 754, 766 (2002 'As we have noted, it 'goes without saying that the courts can and should preclude double recovery by an individual."'), citing General Telephone, 446 U.S., at 333, 100 S.Ct. 1698. The purpose of damages recovery where a Plaintiff has suffered personal injury as a result of Defendant's misconduct is to make the plaintiff whole, not to enrich the plaintiff. See 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages §36, stating the settled legal principle that — The law abhors duplicative recoveries, and a plaintiff who is injured by a defendant's misconduct is, for the most part, entitled to be made whole, not enriched. Hence, for one injury, there should be one recovery, irrespective of the availability of multiple remedies and actions. Stated otherwise, a party cannot recover the same damages twice, even if recovery is based on different theories. , a plaintiff who alleges separate causes of action is not permitted to recover more than the amount of damages actually suffered. There cannot be a double recovery for the same loss, even though different theories of liability are alleged in the complaint. .... See also, 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 28 — The law abhors duplicative recoveries; in other words, a plaintiff who is injured by reason of a defendant's behavior is, for the most part, entitled to be made whole, not to be enriched. The sole object of compensatory damages is to make the injured party whole for losses actually suffered; the plaintiff cannot be made more than whole, make a profit, or receive more than one recovery for the same harm. Thus, a plaintiff in a civil action for damages cannot, in the absence of punitive or statutory treble damages, recover more than the loss actually suffered. The plaintiff is not entitled to a windfall, and the law will not put him in a better position than he would be in had the wrong not been done or the contract not been broken. See also recent case of U.S. Baker. 2009 WL 4572, at *8, (E.D. Tx. Dec. 7, 2009), wherein the Court was inclined to agree with the defendant's interpretation of §2255(a) of allowing for a single recovery of the statutory minimum damages amount as opposed to the government's argument that "the minimum amount of damages mandated by 18 §2255(a) applies to each of (pornographic) image produced by 7 EFTA00183847

[defendant]." The government attempted to argue that restitution should be equal to the statutory minimum amount times the 55 photos produced by defendant. In rejecting the government's argument, the Court reiterated that the statutory minimum is a floor for damages — in other words, a mandated minimum. Nothing prevents a plaintiff from proving that he or she suffered damages in a greater amount. In attempting to bring six counts pursuant to §2255, Plaintiff's complaint alleges in part that "Plaintiff was merely a seventeen year old high school student when she was first lured into Defendant's sexually exploitive world in or about January 2004." Complaint, ¶17. According to the allegations, Plaintiff "was recruited while at work by a co-worker, one of the minor victims Defendant paid to procure underage females." Id. The Complaint further alleges, ¶¶17-26, that Defendant "sexually abused and/or battered and/or exploited Plaintiff at least 100 times between January 2004 and May 2005." If Plaintiff were 17 in January, 2004, she was at least 18 (the age of majority) in January 2005, if not sooner.° Plaintiff alleges identical damages in each of the six counts. Complaint, ¶¶30, 34, 38, 43, 48, and 52. See endnote 2 hereto for Complaint allegations.2 In other words, Plaintiff is alleging and seeking recovery of duplicative damages in each of the six counts. To the extent Plaintiff is seeking to duplicate her "actual damages" on a per incident or per violation or per count basis, Plaintiff's action is required to be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. 4 Defendant is moving for more definite statement requiring Plaintiff to specifically state her date of birth because her age and when she reached the age of majority may impact her ability to even pursue a §2255 claim. 8 EFTA00183848

Had Congress wanted to write in a multiplier of actual damages recoverable it could have easily done so. For an example of a statute wherein the legislature included the language "for each violation" in assessing a "civil penalty," see 18 . §216, entitled "Penalties and injunctions," of Chapter 11 — "Bribery, Graft, and Conflict of Interests," also contained in Title 18 — "Crimes and Criminal Procedure." Subsection (b) of §216 gives the United States Attorney General the power to bring a "civil action ... against any person who engages in conduct constituting an offense under" specified sections of the bribery, graft, and conflicts of interest statutes. The statute further provides in relevant part that "upon proof of such conduct by a preponderance of the evidence, such person shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 %r each violation or the amount of compensation which the person received or offered for the prohibited conduct, which ever amount is greater." As noted, 18 §2255 does not include such language. B. Constitutional Considerations? As set forth above, it is Defendant's position that the text of 18 §2255 does not allow a Plaintiff to pursue the recovery of actual damages or the minimum afforded under the statute on a "per violation" or "per incident" basis by attempting to allege multiple counts thereunder. In the alternative, if one were to assume that the language of §2255 were vague or ambiguous, under the constitutional based protections of due process, judicial restraint, and the rule of lenity applied in construing a statute, Defendant's position as to the meaning of the statute would prevail. See United Statcs I. Santos, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008). As summarized by the United States Supreme Court in Santos, supra, at 2025: See argument in sections (2) and (3) that follow which represent the predicate for the rule of lenity issue discussed in B. 9 EFTA00183849

. The rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them. See United States I Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485, 37 S.Ct. 407, 61 L.Ed. 857 (1917); McBoyle United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931); United Stalest Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-349, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). This venerable rule not only vindicates the fundamental principle that no citizen should be held accountable for a violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain, or subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed. It also places the weight of inertia upon the party that can best induce Congress to speak more clearly and keeps courts from making criminal law in Congress's stead. ... In Santos. the Court was faced with the interpretation of the term "proceeds" in the federal money laundering statute, 18 . §1956. "The federal money-laundering statute prohibits a number of activities involving criminal 'proceeds.'" Id, at 2023. Noting that the term "proceeds" was not defined in the statute, the Supreme Court stated the well settled principle that "when a term is undefined, we give it its ordinary meaning." a at 2024. Under the ordinary meaning principle, the government's position was that proceeds meant "receipts," while the defendant's position was that proceeds meant "profits." The Supreme Court recognized that under either of the proffered "ordinary meanings," the provisions of the federal money-laundering statute were still coherent, not redundant, and the statute was not rendered "utterly absurd." Under such a situation, citing to a long line of cases and the established rule of lenity, "the tie must go to the defendant." Id, at 2025. See portion of Court's opinion quoted above. "Because the `profits' definition of `proceeds' is always more defendant friendly that the `receipts' definition, the rule of lenity dictates that it should be adopted." N. The recent case of United States'. Berdeal 595 F.Supp.2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2009), further supports Defendant's argument that the "rule of lenity" requires that the Court resolve any statutory interpretation conflict in favor of Defendant. Assuming for the sake of argument that Plaintiff's multiple counts, leading to a multiplication of the statutory 10 EFTA00183850

damages amount, is a reasonable interpretation, like Defendant's reasonable interpretation, under the "rule of lenity," any ambiguity is resolved in favor of the least draconian measure. In Berdeal, applying the rule of lenity, the Court sided with the Defendants' interpretation of the Lacey Act which makes illegal the possession of snook caught in specified jurisdictions. The snook had been caught in Nicaraguan waters. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss asserting the statute did not encompass snook caught in foreign waters. The United States disagreed. Both sides presented reasonable interpretations regarding the reach of the statute. In dismissing the indictment, the Court determined that the rule of lenity required it to accept defendants' interpretation. To allow a duplication or multiplication would subject Defendant EPSTEIN to a punishment that is not clearly prescribed — an unwritten multiplier of the "actual damages" or the presumptive minimum damages. The rule of lenity requires that Defendant's interpretation of the remedy afforded under §2255 be adopted. In addition, under the Due Process Clause's basic principle of fair warning - ... a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime ... . As was said in United States'. I larriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989, 'The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.' Thus we have struck down a [state] criminal statute under the Due Process Clause where it was not 'sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.' Connally I. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.F.d. 322. We have recognized in such cases that 'a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law,' ibid., and that 11 EFTA00183851

'No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.' Lanzetta I. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 59 S.Ct. 618, 619, 83 L.Ed. 888. Thus, applying the statutory analysis, in A. and these well-entrenched constitutional principles of statutory interpretation and application in B., Plaintiff's cause of action — Counts One through Six — to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to multiply actual damages or the presumptive amount of damages, is required to be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. 12) In addition, if Plaintiff is relying on the amended version of 18 62255, such reliance is improper and re wires dismissal of the entire action. It is Defendant's position that 18 . 62255 in effect prior to the 2006 amendments applies to this action. (3) Further, Count Six is also required to be dismissed as it relies on a predicate act that was not in effect at the time of the alleged conduct.' Plaintiff does not specifically allege in her Complaint on which version of 18 . §2255 she is relying. However, in the purported Count Six of her Complaint, 150, she alleges that Defendant "knowingly engaged in a child exploitation enterprise, as defined in 18 §2252A(g)(2), in violation of 18 . §2252A(g)(1)." §2252A is one of the specified predicate acts under 18 . §2255. However, subsection (g) of §2252 was not added to the statute until 2006. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff is relying on the amended version, such reliance is improper and the entire action is required to be dismissed. Further, in the alternative, Count Six is required to be dismissed as it relies on a statutory predicate act that did not exist at the time of the alleged conduct. The statute in effect during the time the alleged conduct occurred is 18 §2255 (2005) the version in effect prior to the 2006 amendment, eff. Jul. 27, 2006, Points (2) and (3) arc addressed together as the legal arguments overlap. 12 EFTA00183852

(quoted above), and having an effective date of 1999 through July 26, 2006. See endnote 1 hereto. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Defendant's conduct occurred during the time period from the age of 17, January 2004 until approximately May 2005. Complaint, 1117, 18. Thus, the version in effect in 2004-2005 of 18 §2255 applies. Under applicable law, the statute in effect at the time of the alleged conduct applies. See U.S. I. Scheidt, Slip Copy, 2010 WL 144837, fn. 1 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 11, 2010); U.S. I. Renga 2009 WL 2579103, fn. 1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009)• U.S. . Ferenci 2009 WL 2579102, fn. 1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009); U.S. I. Monk, 2009 WL 2567831, fn. 1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009); U.S. I. Zane 2009 WL 2567832, fn.1 (ED. Cal. Aug. 18 2009). In each of these cases, the referenced footnote states — Prior to July 27, 2006, the last sentence in Section §2255(a) read "Any person as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $50,000 in value." Under the civil statute, the minimum restitution amount for any violation of Section 2252 (the predicate act at issue) is $150,000 for violations occurring after July 27, 2006 and $50,000 for violations occurring prior to $50,000. Even with the typo (the extra "$50,000") at the end of the quoted sentence, it is clear that the Court applied the statute in effect at the time of the alleged criminal conduct constituting one of the statutorily enumerated predicate acts, which is consistent with applicable law discussed more fully below herein. It is an axiom of law that "retroactivity is not favored in the law." Bowen, 488 U.S., at 208, 109 S.Ct., at 471 (1988). As eloquently stated in Landgraf I. USI Film Products, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1497, 511 U.S. 244, 265-66 (1994): ... the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled 13 EFTA00183853

expectations should not be lightly disrupted.F1115 For that reason, the "principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal." Kaiser, 494 U.S., at 855, 110 S.Ct., at 1586 (SCALIA, J., concurring). In a free, dynamic society, creativity in both commercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that gives people confidence about the legal consequences of their actions. FN18. See General Motors Corp.'. Romeln, 503 U.S. 181, 191, 112 S.Ct. 1105, 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 328 (1992) ("Retroactive legislation presents problems of unfairness that are more serious than those posed by prospective legislation, because it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions"); [Further citations omitted]. It is therefore not surprising that the antiretroactivity principle finds expression in several provisions of our Constitution. The Ex Post Facto Clause flatly prohibits retroactive application of penal legislation.m9 Article I, § 10, cl. 1, prohibits States from passing another type of retroactive legislation, laws "impairing the Obligation of Contracts," The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause prevents the Legislature (and other government actors) from depriving private persons of vested property rights except for a "public use" and upon payment of "just compensation." The prohibitions on "Bills of Attainder" in Art. 1, §§ 9-10, prohibit legislatures from singling out disfavored persons and meting out summary punishment for past conduct. See, e.g., United States Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 456-462, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 1719-1722, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965). The Due Process Clause also protects the interests in fair notice and repose that may be compromised by retroactive legislation; a justification sufficient to validate a statute's prospective application under the Clause "may not suffice" to warrant its retroactive application. Useryl. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2893, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). FN19. Article 1 contains two Ex Post Facto Clauses, one directed to Congress (§ 9, cl. 3), the other to the States (§ 10, cl. 1). We have construed the Clauses as applicable only to penal legislation. See Calder'. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390-391, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). These provisions demonstrate that retroactive statutes raise particular concerns. The Legislature's unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled expectations suddenly and without individualized consideration. Its responsivity to political pressures poses a risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals. As Justice Marshall observed in his opinion for "1498 the Court in Weaver' Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), the Ex Post Facto Clause not only ensures that individuals have "fair warning" about the effect of criminal statutes, but also "restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Id., at 28-29, 101 S.Ct., at 963-964 (citations omitted). Fm° FN20. See Richmond'. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-514, 109 S.Ct. 706, 732, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) ("Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that promulgate rules to govern future conduct. The constitutional prohibitions against the enactment of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder reflect a valid concern about. the use of the political process to punish or characterize past conduct of 14 EFTA00183854

private citizens. It is the judicial system, rather than the legislative process, that is best equipped to identify past wrongdoers and to fashion remedies that will create the conditions that presumably would have existed had no wrong been cowmitted") (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); James. United Stales, 366 U.S. 213, 247, n. 3, 81 S.Ct. 1052, 1052, n. 3, 6 L.Ed.2d 246 (1961) (retroactive punitive measures may reflect "a purpose not to prevent dangerous conduct generally but to impose by legislation a penalty against specific persons or classes of persons"). These well entrenched constitutional protections and presumptions against retroactive application of legislation establish that 18 . §2255 (2005) in effect at the time of the alleged conduct applies to the instant action, and not the amended version. B. Not only is there no clear express intent stating that the statute is to apply retroactively, but applying the current version of the statute, as amended in 2006, would be in clear violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution as it would be applied to events occurring before its enactment and would increase the penalty or punishment for the alleged crime. U.S. Const. Art. 1, §9, cl. 3, §10, cl. 1. U.S. I. Seigel, 153 F.3d 1256 (1 l'h Cir. 1998); U.S... Edwards 162 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 1998); and generally, Calder Bull 3 U.S. 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648, 1798 WL 587 (Calder) (1798). The United States Constitution provides that In], Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed" by Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. A law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it " `appli[es] to events occurring before its enactment ... [and] disadvantage[s] the offender affected by it' by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime." Lvnce %Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997) (quoting Weaver . Graham 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)). Siegel,153 F.3d 1256, 1259 (1 1 th Cir. 1998). §2255 is contained in Title 18 of the United States Codes - "Crimes and Criminal Procedure, Part I. Crimes, Chap. 110. Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children." 18 . §2255 (2005), is entitled Civil remedy for personal injuries, and imposes a presumptive minimum of damages in the amount of $50,000, should Plaintiff prove any 15 EFTA00183855

violation of the specified criminal statutes and that she suffered personal injury and sustained actual damages. Thus, the effect of the 2006 amendments, effective July 27, 2006, would be to triple the amount of the statutory minimum previously in effect during the time of the alleged acts. The statute, as amended in 2006, contains no language stating that the application is to be retroactive. Thus, there is no manifest intent that the statute is to apply retroactively, and, accordingly, the statute in effect during the time of the alleged conduct is to apply. landgraf USI Film Products supra, at 1493, ("A statement that a statute will become effective on a certain date does not even arguably suggest that it has any application to conduct that occurred at an earlier date."). This statute was enacted as part of the Federal Criminal Statutes targeting sexual predators and sex crimes against children. II.R. 3494, "Child Protection and Sexual Predator Punishment Act of 1998;" House Report No. 105-557, 11, 1998 678, 679 (1998). Quoting from the "Background and Need For Legislation" portion of the House Report No. 105-557, 11-16, H.R. 3494, of which 18 §2255 is included, is described as "the most comprehensive package of new crimes and increased penalties ever developed in response to crimes against children, particularly assaults facilitated by computers." Further showing that §2255 was enacted as a criminal penalty or punishment, "Title II — Punishing Sexual Predators," Sec. 206, from House Report No. 105-557, 5-6, specifically includes reference to the remedy created under §2255 as an additional means of punishing sexual predators, along with other penalties and punishments. Senatorial Comments in amending §2255 in 2006 confirm that the creation of the presumptive minimum damage amount is meant as an additional penalty against 16 EFTA00183856

those who sexually exploit or abuse children. 2006 WL, 2034118, 152 Cong. Rec. S8012- 02. Senator Kerry refers to the statutorily imposed damage amount as "penalties." Id. The cases of U.S. I. Siegel, supra (I i th Cir. 1998), and U.S. Edwards, supra (3d Cir. 1998), also support Defendant's position that application of the current version of 18 §2255 would be in clear violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. In Siegel, the Eleventh Circuit found that the Ex Post Facto Clause barred application of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) to the defendant whose criminal conduct occurred before the effective date of the statute, 18 §3664(f)(1)(A), even though the guilty plea and sentencing proceeding occurred after the effective date of the statute. On July 19, 1996, the defendant Siegel pleaded guilty to various charges under 18 §371 and §1956(a)(1)(A), (conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, bank fraud, and laundering of money instruments; and money laundering). He was sentenced on March 7, 1997. As part of his sentence, Siegel was ordered to pay $1,207,000.00 in restitution under the MVRA which became effective on April 24, 1996. Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1229-1236. The 1996 amendments to MVRA required that the district court must order restitution in the full amount of the victim's loss without consideration of the defendant's ability to pay. Prior to the enactment of the MVRA and under the former 18 . §3664(a) of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA), Pub.l. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248, the court was required to consider, among other factors, the defendant's ability to pay in determining the amount of restitution. When the MVRA was enacted in 1996, Congress stated that the amendments to the VWPA "shall, to the extent constitutionally permissible, be effective for sentencing proceedings in cases in which the defendant is convicted on or after the date of enactment 17 EFTA00183857

of this Act [Apr. 24, 1996]." Siegel, supra at 1258. The alleged crimes occurred between February, 1988 to May, 1990. The Court agreed with the defendant's position that 1996 MVRA "should not be applied in reviewing the validity of the court's restitution order because to do so would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. art I, §9, cl. 3." The Ex Post Facto analysis made by the Eleventh Circuit in Siegel is applicable to this action. In resolving the issue in favor of the defendant, the Court first considered whether a restitution order is a punishment. Id, at 1259. In determining that restitution was a punishment, the Court noted that §3663A(a)(1) of Title 18 expressly describes restitution as a "penalty." In addition, the Court also noted that "[a]lthough not in the context of an ex post facto determination, ... restitution is a `criminal penalty meant to have strong deterrent and rehabilitative effect.' United States'. Twitty, 107 F.3d 1482, 1493 n. 12 (11th Cir.1997)." Second, the Court considered "whether the imposition of restitution under the MVRA is an increased penalty as prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause." Id, at 1259. In determining that the application of the 1996 MVRA would indeed run afoul of the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court agreed with the majority of the Circuits that restitution under the 1996 MVRA was an increased penalty? "The effect of the MVRA can be detrimental to a defendant. Previously, after considering the defendant's financial condition, the court had the discretion to order restitution in an amount less than the loss sustained by the victim. Under the MVRA, however, the court 7 The Eleventh Circuit, in holding that "the MVRA cannot be applied to a person whose criminal conduct occurred prior to April 24, 1996," was "persuaded by the majority of districts on this issue." "Restitution is a criminal penalty carrying with it characteristics of criminal punishment." Siegel, supra at 1260. The Eleventh Circuit is in agreement with the Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth, and ■. Circuits. See U.S. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289-90 (11ih Cir. 2000). 18 EFTA00183858

must order restitution to each victim in the full amount." Id, at 1260. Scc also U.S. I. Edwards 162 F.2d 87 (3`d Circuit 1998). In the instant case, in answering the first question, it is clear that that imposition of a minimum amount of damages, regardless of the amount of actual damages suffered by a minor victim, is meant to be a penalty or punishment. See statutory text and House Bill Reports, cited above herein, consistently referring to the presumptive minimum damages amount under §2255 as "punishment" or "penalties." According to the Ex Post Facto doctrine, although §2255 is labeled a "civil remedy," such label is not dispositive; "if the effect of the statute is to impose punishment that is criminal in nature, the cx post facto clause is implicated." See generally, Roman Catholic Bishop of Oakland'. Superior Court, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 355, at 360, citing Kansas'. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360-61 (1997). The effect of applying the 2006 version of §2255 would be to triple the amount of the presumptive minimum damages to a minor who proves the elements of her §2255 claim. The fact that a plaintiff proceeding under §2255 has to prove a violation of a criminal statute and suffer personal injury to recover damages thereunder, further supports that the imposition of a minimum amount, regardless of a victim's actual damages sustained, is meant and was enacted as additional punishment or penalty for violation of criminal sexual exploitation and abuse of minors. Accordingly, this Court is required to apply the statute in effect at the time of the alleged criminal acts. Not only is there no language in the 2006 statute stating that it is to apply retroactively, but further, such application of the 2006 version of 18 §2255 to acts that occurred prior to its effective date would have a detrimental and punitive 19 EFTA00183859

effect on Defendant by tripling the presumptive minimum of damages available to a plaintiff, regardless of the actual damages suffered.8 t As discussed above, 18 §2255 was enacted as part of the criminal statutory scheme to punish and penalize those who sexually exploit and abuse minors, and thus, the Ex Post Fact Clause prohibits a retroactive application of the 2006 amended version. Even if one were to argue that the statute is "civil" and the damages thereunder are "civil" in nature, under the analysis provided by the United States Supreme Court in Landgraf USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994), pertaining to civil statutes, not only is there no express intent by Congress to apply the new statute to past conduct, but also, the clear effect of retroactive application of the statute would be to increase the potential liability for past conduct from a minimum of $50,000 to $150,000, and thus in violation of the constitutional prohibitions against such application. As noted, 18 . §2255 is entitled "Civil remedy for personal injuries." Notwithstanding this label, the statute was enacted as part of the criminal statutory scheme to punish those who sexually exploit and abuse minors. Regardless of the actual damages suffered or proven by a minor, as long as a minor proves violation of a specified statutory criminal act under §2255 and personal injury, the defendant is held liable for the statutory imposed minimum. Notwithstanding the above legal analysis, in the recent case of Individual Known to Defendant As 08M1ST096.JPG and 08mist067.jpg Falso, 2009 WL 4807537 (N.D. N.Y. Dec. 9, 2009), United States District Court for the Northern District of New York Plaintiff has attempted to allege 6 counts pursuant to 18 §2255. If it is Plaintiff's position that she is entitled to the minimum damage amount on each count, regardless of her actual damages, the absurdity of a retroactive application is more magnified. Clearly, the result is an unconstitutional increase in either a penalty or civil liability. 20 EFTA00183860

addressed the issue of whether §2255 is a civil or criminal statute for purposes of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The New York Court stated that "looking to the plain language of §2255(a), it is clear that the statutory intent was to provide a civil remedy. This is exemplified by the title ... and the fact that the statute aims to provide compensation to individuals who suffered personal injury as a result of criminal conduct against them." The New York Court in analyzing whether §2255 violated the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, concluded that although the behavior to which §2255 is criminal, it did not find that the "primary aim" was "retribution and deterrence." "The statute serves civil goals." The "primary aim" is "the compensation for personal injuries sustained as a result of criminal conduct." Therefore, because ■ Doe 103 has invoked the provisions of the criminal Non- Prosecution Agreement (NPA) between EPSTEIN and USAO (see paragraphs 25 and 26 of complaint), plaintiff cannot avoid the full protection of the rule of lenity and due process to which EPSTEIN is entitled in the context of these unique factual circumstances. Although there does not exist any definitive ruling of whether the damages awarded under §2255 arc meant as criminal punishment or a civil damages award, Defendant is still entitled to a determination as a matter of law that the statute in effect at the time of the alleged criminal conduct applies. As explained by the Landgraf court, supra at 280, and at 1505,9 9 In Landaraf, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and refused to apply new provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to conduct occurring before the effective date of the Act. The Court determined that statutory text in question, §102, was subject to the presumption against statutory retroactivity. 21 EFTA00183861

When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court's first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result. Here, there is no clear expression of intent regarding the 2006 Act's application to conduct occurring well before its enactment. Clearly, however, as discussed in part B herein, the presumptive minimum amount of damages of $150,000 was enacted as a punishment or penalty upon those who sexually exploit and abuse minors. See discussion of House Bill Reports and Congressional background above herein. The amount triples the previous amount for which a defendant might be found liable, regardless of the amount of actual damages a plaintiff has suffered and proven. The new statute imposes a substantial increase in the monetary liability for past conduct. As stated in Landgraf, "the extent of a party's liability, in the civil context as well as the criminal, is an important legal consequence that cannot be ignored." Courts have consistently refused to apply a statute which substantially increases a party's liability to conduct occurring before the statute's enactment. Landgraf, supra at 284-85. Even if plaintiff were to argue that retroactive application of the new statute "would vindicate its purpose more fully," even that consideration is not enough to rebut the presumption against retroactivity. Id, at 285-86. "The presumption against statutory retroactivity is founded upon sound considerations of general policy and practice, and accords with long held and widely shared expectations about the usual operation of legislation." Id. Thus, Plaintiff's action should be dismissed and she should be required to plead her action under the applicable version of 18 §2255. 22 EFTA00183862

Motion For More Definite Statement and To Strike, Rule 12(e) and (f), As noted above, Plaintiff alleges that she was 17 year old high school student as of January, 2004, and that the alleged conduct involving EPSTEIN. occurred "between approximately January 2004 and May 2005. Thus, Plaintiff had to be 18 (no longer a minor) by January of 2005. Under the principles of statutory construction, the language of §2255(a) is clear — "Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section ...of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $50,000 in value." As Plaintiff's date of birth is significant to her §2255 claim, she should be required to more definitely state her date of birth so that Defendant and this Court are able to determine precisely when she reached the age of majority. (The age of majority under both federal and state law is 18 years old. See 18 . §2256(1), defining a "minor" as "any person under the age of eighteen years;" and §1.01, Definitions, Fla. Stat., defining "minor" to include "any person who has not attained the age of 18 years.") In addition, when Plaintiff reached the age of majority may impact her ability to even assert a §2255 claim. See §2255(b). To the extent that Plaintiff is relying on any alleged conduct that occurred after her 18 birthday as an element of her §2255 claim, such allegations should be stricken as immaterial and she should be required to more definitely state the dates of the alleged conduct. See Rule 12(f). Defendant also seeks to strike ¶¶10, II, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16, 23 EFTA00183863

of Plaintiff's Complaint as immaterial and impertinent. None of the allegations in those paragraphs specifically pertain to the Plaintiff Not until ¶17 does Plaintiff assert allegations pertaining to her and the conduct of Defendant directly involving her. What EPSTEIN may or may not have allegedly done with respect to other alleged girls does not effect Plaintiff's claim brought pursuant to §2255. The allegations in ¶¶10-16 arc not related to the elements of Plaintiff's §2255 claim and, thus, are required to be stricken. Conclusion Pursuant to the above, Plaintiff entire action is required to be dismissed. IS §2255 allows for a single recovery of the actual damages sustained in proven; neither the "actual damages" sustained not the statutory minimum is subject to duplication or multiplication on a per violation or per count or per incident basis. Also, the statute in effect during the time of the alleged conduct applies, not the version as amended, effective July 27, 2006. Count VI is also required to be dismissed as it relies on a statutory predicate act that did not take effect until 2006. In addition, Plaintiff should be required to more definitely state her date of birth, and any conduct occurring after her lir birthday should be stricken, and ¶¶l0 - 16 of the Complaint should also be stricken. WHEREFORE, Defendant requests that this Court dismiss the entire action against him, and further grant his motion for more definite statement and to strike. Robert D. Critton, Esq. Attorney for Defendant Certificate of Service I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is 24 EFTA00183864

being served this day on all counsel of record identified on the following Service List in the manner specified by CM/ECF on this day of , 2010. Robert,. Josefsberg, Esq. Katherine W. Ezell, Esq. Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800 Miami, FL 33130 305 358-2800 Fax: 305 358-2382 Counsel for Plaintiff Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq. Atterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A. 250 Australian Avenue South Suite 1400 West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012 561-659-8300 Fax: 561-835-8691 jagesqlabellsouth.net Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein Respectfully submitted, By: ROBERT D. CRITTON, JR., ESQ. Florida Bar No. 224162 [email protected] MICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ. Florida Bar #617296 maikealbelclaw.com BURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER & COLEMAN 515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 561/842-2820 Phone 561/515-3148 Fax (Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein) 18 USCA 62255 (1999-July 26, 2006): PART I-CRIMES CHAPTER 110--SEXUAL EXPLOITATION CHILDREN § 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries (a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 22416, 2242, 2243 2251, 225IA 2252, 2252A. 2260 2421 2422, or 2423 of this title 25 AND OTHER ABUSE OF EFTA00183865

and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $50,000 in value. (b) Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues or in the case of a person under a legal disability, not later than three years after the disability. CREDIT(S) (Added pub.L. 99-500. Title I. 6 101(b) [Title VII, § 703(a)], Oct. 18, 1986, 100 Stat. 1783-75, and amended Pub.L. 99-591. Title I, 6 101(bl [Title VII, § 703(a)], Oct. 30, 1986, 100 Stat. 3341-75; Pub.L. 105-314, Title VI.6 605, Oct. 30, 1998, 112 Stat. 2984.) 18 M, $2255, as amended 2006, Effective July 27, 2006: PART I—CRIMES CHAPTER 110--SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF CHILDREN § 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries (a) In general.--Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation of section 22416, 2242, 2243. 2251, 2251A, 7252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422 or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation, regardless of whether the injury occurred while such person was a minor, may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such person sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any person as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $150,000 in value. (b) Statute of limitations.--Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues or in the case of a person under a legal disability, not later than three years after the disability. CREDIT(S) (Added Pub.L. 99-500. Title I. 6 101(b) [Title VII, § 703(a)], Oct. 18, 1986, 100 Stat. 1783-75, and amended Pub.L. 99-591. Title 1. 4 101(b' [Title VII, § 703(a)], Oct. 30, 1986, 100 Stat. 3341-75; Pub.L. 105-314. Title VI. 6 605, 26 EFTA00183866

Oct. 30, 1998, 112 Stat. 2984; Pub.L. 109-248. Title VII. 6 707(3). (1), July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 650.) 2 Paragraphs 30, 34, 38, 43, 48, and 52 of Plaintiff's Complaint alleges: 30. As a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 . §2255 being committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaint, in the past suffered, and will in the future continue to suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, psychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, loss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, separation from her family, and other damages associated with Defendant manipulating and leading her into a perverse and unhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical and psychological expenses, and Plaintiff will in the future suffer additional medical and psychological expenses. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the capacity to enjoy life. These injuries are permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to suffer these losses in the future. The "Wherefore" clauses in each of the six counts are also identical — WHEREFORE Plah emands judgment against Defendant for all damages available under 18 =. §2255, including, without limitation, actual and compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other relief this Court deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by a jury. 27 EFTA00183867