ly retroactively. Congress may prescribe the temporal reach of a statute by stating that it applies to pre-enactment conduct, the first step in the Landgraf analysis, or a statute may be silent regarding temporal reach, in which case courts apply the judicial presumption against retroactivity. This pres

ng on or commenced after the date of enactment of this Act,' " "might possibly have qualified as a clear statement for retroactive effect" (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 260, 114 S.Ct. at 1494)); Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 307-08, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 1517, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994) (noting

d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has set out a two-step framework to determine whether a federal statute applies to past conduct. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). Courts look first to the language of the statute. If the statute states that it applies to past cond

imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.'" Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 56 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 290). Thus, applying a new statute of limitations to previously time- barred claims has an impermissible retroactive effect. Enter. Mort

d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has set out a two-step framework to determine whether a federal statute applies to past conduct. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). Courts look first to the language of the statute. If the statute states that it applies to past cond

imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.'" Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 56 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 290). Thus, applying a new statute of limitations to previously time- barred claims has an impermissible retroactive effect. Enter. Mort

., 391 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2004) 6, 9 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990) 3 Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478 (2012) Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994) Leocal v. Ashcroft, 11 passim 543 U.S. 1 (2004) 11 Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999) 6 Nijhawa

ejection of a retroactivity provision ends the inquiry at step one in Ms. Maxwell's favor. "[W]here the congressional intent is clear, it governs." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 264 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Cap. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 837 (1990)). As Ms. Maxwell's opening memorandum demonstrated, co

ly retroactively. Congress may prescribe the temporal reach of a statute by stating that it applies to pre-enactment conduct, the first step in the Landgraf analysis, or a statute may be silent regarding temporal reach, in which case courts apply tho judicial presumption against retroactivity. This pres

ng on or commenced after the date of enactment of this Act,' " "might possibly have qualified as a clear statement for retroactive effect" (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 260, 114 S.Ct. at 1494)); Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 307-08, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 1517, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994) (noting

Timely 23 A. Statutory Background 24 B. The 2003 Amendment to Section 3283 Applies Retroactively 26 1. The 2003 Amendment Satisfies Step One of Landgraf 28 2. The 2003 Amendment Satisfies Step Two of Landgraf 32 C. The Defendant's Crimes Involved the Sexual Abuse of Minors 36 III. The Defendant'

new duties with respect to transactions already completed." Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. School Dist, 49 F.3d 886, 890 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280). Applying Section 3283 here would have none of those effects. Maxwell's rights, liabilities, and duties were governed by the subst

Timely 23 A. Statutory Background 24 B. The 2003 Amendment to Section 3283 Applies Retroactively 26 1. The 2003 Amendment Satisfies Step One of Landgraf 28 2. The 2003 Amendment Satisfies Step Two of Landgraf 32 C. The Defendant's Crimes Involved the Sexual Abuse of Minors 36 III. The Defendant'

new duties with respect to transactions already completed." Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. School Dist, 49 F.3d 886, 890 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280). Applying Section 3283 here would have none of those effects. Maxwell's rights, liabilities, and duties were governed by the subst

new duties with respect to transactions already completed." Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. School Dist, 49 F.3d 886, 890 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280). Applying Section 3283 here would have none of those effects. Maxwell's rights, liabilities, and duties were governed by the subst

Timely 23 A. Statutory Background 24 B. The 2003 Amendment to Section 3283 Applies Retroactively 26 1. The 2003 Amendment Satisfies Step One of Landgraf 28 2. The 2003 Amendment Satisfies Step Two of Landgraf 32 C. The Defendant's Crimes Involved the Sexual Abuse of Minors 36 III. The Defendant'

d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has set out a two-step framework to determine whether a federal statute applies to past conduct. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). Courts look first to the language of the statute. If the statute states that it applies to past cond

imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.'" Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 56 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 290). Thus, applying a new statute of limitations to previously time- barred claims has an impermissible retroactive effect. Enter. Mort

.3d at 54. Otherwise, the statute applies to past conduct unless doing so would create impermissible retroactive effects. Id. The Court begins with Landgraf s first step. To assess a statute's meaning here, courts must consider the text of the statute along with other indicia of congressional intent, inc

ecome obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past." Id. at 114-15. In Landgraf, the Supreme Court articulated a two-step framework to evaluate the proposed retroactive application of a statute to a particular case: [T]he court

.3d at 54. Otherwise, the statute applies to past conduct unless doing so would create impermissible retroactive effects. Id. The Court begins with Landgraf s first step. To assess a statute's meaning here, courts must consider the text of the statute along with other indicia of congressional intent, inc

.3d at 54. Otherwise, the statute applies to past conduct unless doing so would create impermissible retroactive effects. Id. The Court begins with Landgraf s first step. To assess a statute's meaning here, courts must consider the text of the statute along with other indicia of congressional intent, inc

.3d at 54. Otherwise, the statute applies to past conduct unless doing so would create impermissible retroactive effects. Id. The Court begins with Landgraf s first step. To assess a statute's meaning here, courts must consider the text of the statute along with other indicia of congressional intent, inc

n. It is an axiom of law that "retroactivity is not favored in the law." Bowen, 488 U.S., at 208, 109 S.Ct., at 471 (1988). As eloquently stated in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1497, 511 U.S. 244, 265-66 (1994): ... the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in ou

n. It is an axiom of law that "retroactivity is not favored in the law." Bowen, 488 U.S., at 208, 109 S.Ct., at 471 (1988). As eloquently stated in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1497, 511 U.S. 244, 265-66 (1994): ... the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in ou

t has already occurred versus creating a new cause of action or a new civil remedy. The support for that, your Honor, is the U.S. Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, which I cited in my papers for a different proposition, but it's found at 511 U.S. 244. In that case, your Honor, the U.S. S

it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). The Court in Landgraf cited the Hastings court for the proposition that "[rjetroactive modification" of damages remedies may "normally harbo[r] much less potential for m

ional principles against retroactivity. Further supporting the argument set forth by Defendant, Plaintiff describes the following language from the Landgraf decision as "a two step process for resolving retroactivity issues," (Response, p. 13): When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the

th by Defendant, Plaintiff describes EFTA00611594 Jane Doe v. Epstein Case No. 08-CV-80893-Marra-Johnson Page 6 the following language from the Landgraf decision as "a two step process for resolving retroactivity issues," (Response, p. 13): When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the