OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023133

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023134

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi The Search for Peace in the Arab-Israeli Conflict A Compendium of Documents and Analysis Edited by TERJE ROD-LARSEN NUR LAIQ AND FABRICE AIDAN OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023135

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Commentary: Terje Red-Larsen, Nur Laig, and Fabrice Aidan 2014 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted First Edition published in 2014 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2014939580 ISBN 978-0-19-921610-9 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CRO 4YY INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023136

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi Foreword and Acknowledgements The idea of compiling an Oxford companion to the Arab-Israeli conflict was first presented to me in 2005 by Markus Bouillon, who served for me both in my UN capacity in Jerusalem and at the International Peace Institute (IPI) in New York. Nur Laiq laboriously and faithfully collected most of the relevant documents and contrib- uted to the organization of the book and the drafting of the introduction and com- ments. Fabrice Aidan, a French diplomat, who served for ten years as my special assistant and political adviser in my different United Nations capacities played an instrumental role for the production of this volume. He made essential substantive inputs to the organization and compilation of the documents and the composition of the comments, throughout the book, as well as to the introduction. David Makovsky and Marwan Muasher deserve thanks for reviewing the book and for providing insightful comments. I would like also to thank my staff at the International Peace Institute (IPI), Walter Kemp and Adam Lupel, for their editing contribution. Miklos Pinther, former chief UN cartographer, who in 2000 oversaw the delineation of the Blue Line between Israel, Lebanon and Syria, compiled and produced the maps in this volume. Finally, my executive assistant, Jilla Moazami, gave invaluable administrative support. Without these colleagues, the book would have never come to print. I am delighted that the volume came to its conclusion on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords of 1993. I am grateful to the Government of Norway for generous support to the Inter- national Peace Institute’s (IPI) Middle East program over many years. I dedicate the book to my beloved wife, Ambassador Mona Juul, my companion in war and peace, without whom I would never have become involved in the imbroglio of the Middle East. Terje Rod-Larsen Paris 16 September 2013 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023137

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023138

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi Contents About the Editors xiv List of Maps xvi List of Abbreviations xvii A Chronology of the Arab-Israeli Conflict xviii The Crooked Course: Step by Step on the Path to Peace xxix Maps xlii Part I. Peace Agreements and the Disengagement from Gaza Arafat-Rabin-Holst Exchange of Letters (Israel-PLO Recognition) (9 September 1993) 3 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (13 September 1993) 6 Letter from Israel’s Foreign Minister to Norway’s Foreign Minister on the Status of East Jerusalem (11 October 1993) 18 Establishment of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) (5 November 1993) 19 Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O., representing the Palestinian people (Paris Protocol) (Paris, 29 April 1994) 21 Gaza-Jericho Agreement (4 May 1994) 45 Gaza-Jericho Agreement Letters (4 May 1994) 107 Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (29 August 1994) 111 Oslo Declaration (13 September 1994) 139 Establishment of the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC) and the Joint Liaison Committee (JLC) (30 November 1994) 142 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II Agreement) (28 September 1995) 145 Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH Agreement) (9 May 1996) 324 Declaration by PM Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat following their first meeting (4 September 1996) 327 Hebron Protocol (17 January 1997) 329 Note for the Record (17 January 1997) 336 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023139

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi viii Contents Temporary International Presence in Hebron II (TIPH I] Agreement) (21 January 1997) 342 Wye River Agreement (23 October 1998) 348 Letters of Assurance from United States to Israel (October 1998) 356 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum (4 September 1999) 358 Protocol Concerning Safe Passage between West Bank and Gaza Strip (5 October 1999) 363 Sharon Address at Fourth Herzliya Conference (18 December 2003) 371 Exchange of Letters between PM Sharon and President Bush (14 April 2004) 376 Disengagement Plan: General Outline (18 April 2004) 381 Rice-Weisglass Letter of Understanding (18 April 2004) 387 Letters from President Bush to King Abdullah II of Jordan (19 May 2004) 390 The Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan (6 June 2004) 394 Agreement on Movement and Access and Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing (15 November 2005) 404 Gaza War I: Israel and Hamas Cease-Fires (18 January 2009) 410 Gaza War II: Cease-Fire Agreement (21 November 2012) 416 Part II. Peace Proposals and Ideas Prime Minister Begin’s Knesset Speech on Home Rule (28 December 1977) 419 Fahd Plan (7 August 1981) 422 Reagan Plan (1 September 1982) 423 Fez Peace Initiative (9 September 1982) 429 Madrid Conference: Invitation and Letters of Assurances (18 October 1991) 433 Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement (31 October 1995) 441 Sharm el-Sheikh Summit of Peacemakers Final Statement (13 March 1996) 454 Camp David Statement (25 July 2000) 456 Remarks by US President Bill Clinton and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in Delivery of Joint Statements at the Conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit (17 October 2000) 458 Clinton Parameters (23 December 2000) 461 Taba Statement (27 January 2001) 466 EU Moratinos Non-Paper on Taba Negotiations (27 January 2001) 468 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023140

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi Contents ix Report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (Mitchell Report) (30 April 2001) 476 The Jordanian-Egyptian Proposal (19 April 2001) 479 Palestinian-Israeli Security Implementation Work Plan (Tenet Cease-Fire Plan) (14 June 2001) 481 Arab Peace Initiative (28 March 2002) 484 The Rose Garden Speech of President George W. Bush (24 June 2002) 486 Ayalon-Nusseibeh Statement of Principles (27 July 2002) 490 A Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Road Map) (30 April 2003) 492 Israel’s Response to the Road Map (14 Reservations) (25 May 2003) 499 Geneva Accord: A Model Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement (1 December 2003) 502 Olga Document (12 July 2004) 530 Quartet Statements following Palestinian Elections of 2006, or the Three Conditions to Hamas (30 January 2006) 534 Riyadh Declaration (29 March 2007) 537 Annapolis Joint Understanding (27 November 2007) 539 Olmert-Abbas Peace Talks (December 2008) 541 US President Barack Obama’s Speech on a New Beginning (Cairo Speech) (4 June 2009) 542 Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Speech at Bar Ilan University (14 June 2009) 553 Chair’s Summary of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee on Palestinian Institutions’ Readiness for Statehood (AHLC) (18 September 2011) 559 President Abbas’s Speech to UN General Assembly on Palestine’s Membership (23 September 2011) 562 President Abbas’s Speech to UN General Assembly on Palestinian Non-Member Observer State Status (29 November 2012) 570 Part III. UN Documents on the Question of Palestine UN General Assembly Resolution 181(II) or the UN Partition Plan (29 November 1947) 577 UN Security Council Resolution 50 (1948) and the Establishment of UNTSO (29 May 1948) 599 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023141

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi x Contents UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (IH) (11 December 1948) 601 UN General Assembly Resolution 273 (II): Admission of Israel to Membership in the United Nations (11 May 1949) 605 UN General Assembly Resolution 303 (IV) (9 December 1949) 606 UN General Assembly Resolutions 1000 (ES-I) and 1001 (ES-I) (5 and 7 November 1956) 608 UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) (22 November 1967) 611 UN Security Council Resolution 338 (1973) (22 October 1973) 613 UN General Assembly Resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX) (22 November 1974) 614 UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 (XXX) (10 November 1975) 617 UN Security Council Resolutions 476 (1980) and 478 (1980) (30 June and 20 August 1980) 619 UN General Assembly Resolution 46/86 (16 December 1991) 623 UN Security Council Resolution 904 (1994) (18 March 1994) 624 UN Security Council Resolution 1073 (1996) (28 September 1996) 626 UN Security Council Resolution 1322 (2000) (7 October 2000) 628 UN Security Council Resolution 1397 (2002) (12 March 2002) 630 UN Security Council Resolution 1402 (2002) (30 March 2002) 632 UN Security Council Resolution 1405 (2002) (19 April 2002) 633 Report of UN Secretary-General prepared pursuant to UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/10 (Jenin Report) (31 July 2002) 634 UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13 (21 October 2003) 679 Report of UN Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13 (24 November 2003) 681 UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/14 (8 December 2003) 691 UN Security Council Resolution 1515 (2003) (19 November 2003) 694 UN Security Council Resolution 1544 (2004) (19 May 2004) 695 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Barrier (July 2004) 697 UN General Assembly Resolution on ICJ Ruling on the Barrier (2 August 2004) 759 UN Security Council Resolution 1850 (2008) (16 December 2008) 763 UN Security Council Resolution 1860 (2009) (8 January 2009) 765 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023142

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi Contents Xi Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (led by Judge Richard Goldstone) (25 September 2009) 767 Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident (2 September 2011) 797 UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19: Status of Palestine in the United Nations (4 December 2012) 802 Part IV. Regional Documents Sykes—Picot Agreement (16 May 1916) 809 Balfour Declaration (2 November 1917) 812 Churchill White Paper (3 June 1922) 813 Peel Commission (7 July 1937) 817 MacDonald White Paper (17 May 1939) 843 Biltmore Program (11 May 1942) 854 Arab League Charter (22 March 1945) 856 Egypt-Israel General Armistice Agreement (24 February 1949) 863 Lebanon-Israel General Armistice Agreement (23 March 1949) 877 Jordan-Israel General Armistice Agreement (3 April 1949) 884 Syria—Israel General Armistice Agreement (20 July 1949) 894 Khartoum Resolution (1 September 1967) 906 Cairo Agreement (3 November 1969) 908 Rogers Plan (9 December 1969) 911 Egypt-Israel Sinai Disengagement Treaties (18 January 1974) 916 Egypt-Israel Sinai Interim Agreement (4 September 1975) 918 Israel-Syria Separation of Forces Agreement (31 May 1974) 922 Sadat and Begin Speeches to Knesset (20 November 1977) 925 UN Security Council Resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) (19 March 1978) 941 Camp David Accords (17 September 1978) 943 Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel (17 September 1978) 949 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (26 March 1979) 952 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023143

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi Xli Contents Protocol for the Creation of a Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) (3 August 1981) 973 UN Security Council Resolution 497 (1981) (17 December 1981) 975 UN Security Council Resolution 520 (1982) (17 September 1982) 976 London Agreement (11 April 1987) 978 Abrogation of the Cairo Agreement by the Lebanese Parliament (21 May 1987) 980 The Shultz Plan (4 March 1988) 981 King Hussein’s Address on Jordanian Disengagement from the West Bank (31 July 1988) 983 Agreements between Egypt and Israel on Taba (26 February 1989) 988 Ta if Agreement (22 October 1989) 992 Israel-Jordan Common Agenda (14 September 1993) 1002 Washington Declaration (25 July 1994) 1004 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty (26 October 1994) 1007 Casablanca Declaration (1 November 1994) 1036 Israel-Lebanon Cease-Fire Understanding (26 April 1996) 1040 Israel-Jordan Qualifying Industrial Zone Agreement (21 January 1997) 1042 Government of Israel’s Resolution to Withdraw from Lebanon (5 March 2000) 1045 Letter from Israeli Foreign Minister to UN Secretary-General on Israel’s Withdrawal from Lebanon (17 April 2000) 1046 UN Reports on Israel’s Withdrawal from South Lebanon (22 May, 16 June, and 18 June 2000) 1047 Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 (22 May 2000) 1048 Second Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 (16 June 2000) 1059 UN Security Council Presidential Statement on Israel’s Withdrawal from South Lebanon (18 June 2000) 1070 European Parliament Votes to Suspend Euro-Israeli Association Agreement (10 April 2002) 1072 UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004) (2 September 2004) 1075 Agreement between Egypt and Israel on Qualifying Industrial Zones (14 December 2004) 1077 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023144

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi Contents xiii Aleppo Understanding (12 March 2005) 1084 UN Security Council Resolution 1680 (2006) (17 May 2006) 1086 Seven-Point Plan of Prime Minister Siniora (25 July 2006) 1088 UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) (11 August 2006) 1090 UN Provisional Geographical Definition of the Shebaa Farms Area (30 October 2007) 1095 Part V. Israeli and Palestinian Domestic Documents Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel (14 May 1948) 1103 Law of Return (5 July 1950) 1106 Original Palestinian National Charter (28 May 1964) 1110 Palestinian National Charter (17 July 1968) 1114 Arab League Summit Resolution on Palestine Liberation Organization (28 October 1974) 1122 Hamas Charter (18 August 1988) 1124 Palestinian Declaration of Independence (15 November 1988) 1143 Amendment to Palestinian National Charter (4 May 1996) 1147 Palestinian Basic Law (29 May 2002, 18 March 2003, 13 August 2005) 1149 Outcomes of the London Conference on Palestinian Reform (17 January 2003) 1205 Fatah Declaration of Cease-Fire Initiative (29 June 2003) 1209 Hamas and Islamic Jihad Declaration of Cease-Fire Initiative (29 June 2003) 1211 Israeli Cabinet Communiqué Approving the Removal of Arafat (11 September 2003) 1213 Hamas Political Program (17 March 2006) 1215 11 May Prisoners’ Document (11 May 2006) 1217 National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners (28 June 2006) 1222 Mecca Accord for Palestinian National Unity Government (8 February 2007) 1227 Program of Palestinian Unity Government (17 March 2007) 1228 Haifa Declaration (15 May 2007) 1234 Ending Occupation, Establishing the State: Program of the Thirteenth Government of the Palestinian National Authority (Fayyad Plan) (August 2009) 1240 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023145

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi About the Editors TERJE RO@D-LARSEN Terje Red-Larsen became the President of the International Peace Institute (IPI) in 2005. IPI is an independent, international not-for-profit think tank headquartered in New York, with regional offices in Vienna and Manama. IPI is dedicated to the prevention and settlement of conflict. The UN Secretary-General is the honorary chair of the board of the International Peace Institute. Concurrently, Terje Red-Larsen is a UN Under-Secretary-General. He serves as a Special Envoy of the Secretary- General. Terje Red-Larsen began his career as an academic, studying history, philosophy, public administration, and sociology. He taught Sociology, Political Science, and Philosophy at the Universities of Bergen and Oslo, before establishing the Fafo Institute for Applied Sciences in Oslo in 1981. As Director of Fafo, he initiated a research project into the living conditions of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The relationships with both Palestinians and Israelis that he established during the period of preparing and implementing this project led to a request by the PLO in 1992 that he help establish a secret channel for negotiations between the PLO and the Government of Israel. Those negotiations concluded with the Oslo Accords and the signing of the Declaration of Principles at the White House on 13 September 1993. In 1993, Mr Rod-Larsen was appointed Ambassador and Special Adviser for the Middle East Peace process to the Norwegian Foreign Minister. In mid-1994, he was appointed United Nations Under-Secretary-General, Special Coordinator for Gaza and the West Bank. In 1996, he was appointed Norwegian Cabinet Minister for Planning and Cooperation. In 1999, he moved back to the UN as Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liber- ation Organization and the Palestinian Authority at the level of Under-Secretary- General, a post he held until December 2004. In this capacity he negotiated the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000 and established the UN line of withdrawal, the “Blue Line’. On 14 December 2004, he was appointed by the Secretary-General as his Special Envoy for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559, on Lebanon and Syria. In this capacity he negotiated the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005. He also represented the UN Secretary-General in the cease-fire negotiations during the 2006 war in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023146

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi About the Editors xv NUR LAIQ Nur Laiq is the author of Talking to Arab Youth: Revolution and Counterrevolution in Egypt and Tunisia. Nur focuses on the transitions in the Middle East and North Africa, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and issues related to US foreign policy. She has worked as a senior policy analyst at the International Peace Institute in New York, where she headed the Arab Youth Project. She previously worked with Labour Party members of parliament in London on foreign policy and on the European Commission's Middle East desk in Brussels. She has also worked with refugees via United Nations Refugee Agency in New Delhi. Nur has an MPhil in Modern Middle Eastern Studies from Oxford University. FABRICE AIDAN Fabrice Aidan graduated from the Ecoles de Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC), Paris, School of Management in 1998. He also holds a degree in Arabic and Islamic studies from the Sorbonne University (Paris IV). In 2000, he joined the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and became a permanent member of the Foreign Service. He was first assigned to the Department of North Africa and the Middle East. In 2002, he served as a Diplomat at the French Mission to the United Nations in New York. In 2003, the Government of France seconded him to the United Nations. In this capacity, he served first in Gaza/Jerusalem as the special assistant of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle Peace Process. In 2005, he moved to UN headquarters in New York as special assistant and senior political adviser to UN Under-Secretary- General and Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Terje Rod-Larsen, dealing with the Middle East. In 2013, after ten years at the United Nations, he returned to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs as senior adviser to the Director of North Africa and the Middle East. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023147

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi NO NY NY NH NN KR RK RR Re Re Re Re Re eB FH NHN FF OO wON DH F&F WY NH KF OC COND PF WH List of Maps . Middle East Region 2014 . Palestine 1900 Sykes-Picot Agreement 1916 . The Middle East after the San Remo Conference of 1920 Peel Commission 1937 . Partition Plan 1947 . Armistice Agreements 1949 . Israel and the Occupied Territories 1967 . Oslo Accords 1994 . Hebron Protocol 1997 . Wye Memorandum 1998 . Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum 1999 . Camp David 2000 . Clinton Parameters 2000 . Taba Talks 2001 . Geneva Accord 2003 . Gaza Disengagement 2005 . Olmert-Abbas Talks 2007-8 . Autonomous areas 2012 . West Bank Barrier 2012 . Israeli Settlements 2012 . Jerusalem 2012 . Golan Heights 2012 . South Lebanon 2012 xii xliii xliv xlv xlvi xlvii xviii xlix I li lii liii liv lvi Iii lviii lix Ixi Ixii Ixiii Ixiv HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023148

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi List of Abbreviations AHLC Ad Hoc Liaison Committee ICJ International Court of Justice IDF Israel Defense Forces JLC Joint Liaison Committee LACC Local Aid Coordination Committee LAF Lebanese Armed Forces LAS League of Arab States MFO Multinational Force and Observers OAPEC Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries OIC Organization of Islamic Cooperation PA Palestinian Authority PECDAR Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction PFLP Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine PLC Palestinian Legislative Council PLO Palestine Liberation Organization SLA South Lebanon Army TIPH Temporary International Presence in Hebron UN United Nations UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observation Force UNEF United Nations Emergency Force UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon UNRWA __ United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSCO United Nations Special Coordinator UNSCOP United Nations Special Committee on Palestine UNSG United Nations Secretary-General UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023149

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi A Chronology of the Arab-Israeli Conflict The following is a chronology of the main events in, and documents on, the Arab-Israel conflict. Documents which are included in this volume are in italics. 1914-18 24 October 1915 16 May 1916 2 November 1917 4-7 April 1920 19 April 1920 10 August 1920 1-7 May 1921 28 February 1922 3 June 1922 24 July 1922 23 August 1929 24 August 1929 23 September 1932 1936-1939 7 July 1937 17 May 1939 1 September 1939 11 May 1942 22 November 1943 22 March 1945 8 May 1945 26 June 1945 17 April 1946 25 May 1946 29 November 1947 14 May 1948 15 May 1948 29 May 1948 First World War. Letter from British High Commissioner McMahon to Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca. Sykes—Picot Agreement. Balfour Declaration. 4 days of violent rioting against Jews in Jerusalem. Opening of the San Remo Conference. Treaty of Sévres, or the Peace Treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies. Major riots in Jaffa between Jews and Arabs. Great Britain issues the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Egypt. Churchill White Paper. The Council of the League of Nations confirms the British mandate in Palestine. Major riots between Muslims and Jews in Jerusalem. Hebron Massacre. Abdul-Aziz al-Saud founds the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Arab revolt in Palestine. Peel Commission. MacDonald White Paper. Beginning of Second World War. Biltmore Program. Independence of Lebanon. Arab League Charter. End of Second World War in Europe. Signature of the United Nations Charter at the San Francisco Conference. Independence of Syria. The Emirate of Transjordan becomes the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (the partition plan). Israel declares its independence. End of the British Mandate in Palestine. Five Arab states declare war on Israel. UN Security Council Resolution 50 and the establishment of UNTSO. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023150

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi Chronology xix 11 December 1948 UN General Assembly Resolution 194. 24 February 1949 — Egypt-Israel General Armistice Agreement. 23 March 1949 Lebanon-Israel General Armistice Agreement. 3 April 1949 Jordan-Israel General Armistice Agreement. 27 April 1949 Opening of the Lausanne Conference convened by the United Nations’ Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP). 11 May 1949 The UN General Assembly admits Israel as UN member state through Resolution A/RES/273 (IID. 20 July 1949 Syria-Israel General Armistice Agreement. 12 December 1949 UN General Assembly Resolution 303, on the Internationalization of Jerusalem. 24 April 1950 Jordan annexes the West Bank and East Jerusalem. 5 July 1950 Israel votes the Law of Return. 20 July 1951 King Abdullah I of Jordan in assassinated in the vicinity of al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem by a Palestinian gunman. 23 July 1952 Military coup in Egypt by the Free Officers Movement. 18 June 1953 The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) abolishes the monarchy and proclaims the Republic of Egypt. 23 June 1956 Gamal Abdel Nasser is elected President of the Republic of Egypt. 26 July 1956 President Nasser of Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal. 29 October 1956 Suez Crisis. Israel invades Sinai (Operation Kadesh) with the covert assent of France and the UK. 30 October 1956 France and the UK launch military operations against Egypt. 5 November 1956 UN General Assembly Resolution 1000 (Suez Crisis). 7 November 1956 UN General Assembly Resolution 1001 (Suez Crisis). 8 March 1957 Israel withdraws its last forces from the Sinai peninsula, ending the Suez Crisis. 14 July 1958 Military coup against Iraqi monarchy. 3 February 1964 The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) is established by the Arab League in Cairo, with Ahmed Shugeiri as its leader. 16 May 1967 President Nasser asks the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to leave Sinai and the Gaza Strip, where it had been engaged in peacekeeping functions since the 1956 Sinai conflict. 22 May 1967 Egypt announces a blockade against Israeli shipping in the Strait of Tiran. 5 June 1967 ‘Six Day War’: Israel launches military strikes on Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. After six days of fighting, Israel captures the Sinai peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and about 1,150 square kilometres of Syrian territory on the Golan Heights. 1 September 1967 Khartoum Resolution of the three ‘Noes’. 22 November 1967 UN Security Council Resolution 242. 21 March 1968 The battle of Karameh between Israel and Fatah and Jordanian forces. First direct military confrontation between Israeli and Palestinian forces. 17 July 1968 The Palestinian National Charter. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023151

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi xx Chronology 2 February 1969 8 March 1969 25 September 1969 3 November 1969 9 December 1969 7 August 1970 September 1970 28 September 1970 16 November 1970 12 March 1971 6 October 1973 17 October 1973 22 October 1973 18 January 1974 31 May 1974 26-29 October 1974 28 October 1974 13 November 1974 22 November 1974 13 April 1975 4 September 1975 10 November 1975 May 1976 17 May 1977 9 November 1977 20 November 1977 28 December 1977 14 March 1978 19 March 1978 17 September 1978 2-5 November 1978 Yasir Arafat, leader of the Fatah Party, elected chairman of the PLO. President Nasser denounces the 1967 war cease-fire, marking the begin- ning of the War of Attrition against Israel. Creation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Cairo Agreement. Rogers Plan. War of Attrition cease-fire. ‘Black September’ in Jordan. The PLO is expelled from Jordan. President Gamal Abdel Nasser dies and is replaced by Vice President Anwar al-Sadat. Syria’s Minister of Defense, Hafez al-Assad, leads the “Correctionist Movement’ military coup. Hafez al-Assad is elected President of Syria in a referendum. October or Yom Kippur War. Egypt and Syria attack Israeli forces in the Sinai and the Golan Heights. OAPEC decides on an oil embargo. UN Security Council Resolution 338. First Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement of Forces Agreement. Israel-Syria Separation of Forces Agreement. Arab summit at Rabat declares the PLO the ‘sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people’. Arab League Resolution on Palestine Liberation Organization. PLO Chairman Arafat addresses the UN General Assembly in Geneva. UN General Assembly Resolutions 3236 and 3237 (PLO). Beginning of the Lebanese Civil War. Second Egyptian-Israel Disengagement of Forces Agreement. UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 (Zionism-Racism). Lebanese President Suleiman Frangieh invites Syrian troops into the country. Menachem Begin’s Likud Party wins Israeli national elections after 29 years of Labor Party dominance. In a speech in Cairo, President Anwar al-Sadat announces his readiness to travel to Israel. Anwar al-Sadat and Menachem Begin speeches to the Knesset in Jerusalem. Prime Minister Begin’s Knesset speech on Home Rule. Operation Litany—Israel invades South Lebanon. UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 (Lebanon). Camp David Accords. Arab League Summit in Baghdad. Egypt suspended from the Organiza- tion. Its headquarters to be moved to Tunis. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023152

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi Chronology xxi 10 December 1978 President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin are awarded jointly in Oslo the Nobel Peace Prize. 16 January 1979 Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi leaves Iran after months of domestic turmoil. 26 March 1979 Signature of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in the White House. 1 April 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini proclaims the Islamic Republic of Iran after a national referendum. 2 April 1979 Prime Minister Begin visits Cairo. February 1980 Israel and Egypt exchange Ambassadors for the first time. 30 June 1980 UN Security Council Resolution 476 Jerusalem). 30 July 1980 The Knesset votes the Basic Law on Jerusalem. 20 August 1980 UN Security Council Resolution 478 Jerusalem). 3 August 1981 Signature of the Protocol to the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt, establishing the Multilateral Force and Observers (MFO). 7 August 1981 Fahd Plan. 6 October 1981 Assassination of President Sadat. Vice President Mubarak succeeds him. 14 December 1981 The Israel Knesset passes a law annexing the Golan Heights. 17 December 1981 UN Security Council Resolution 497 (Golan Heights). 25 April 1982 Israel completes its pull back from Sinai with the exception of Taba. 6 June 1982 Israel launches Operation “Peace in Galilee’; beginning of the Lebanon war. 1 September 1982 Reagan Peace Plan. 9 September 1982 Fez Peace Initiative. 14 September 1982 Assassination of Lebanese President Beshir Gemayel. 17 September 1982 UN Security Council Resolution 520 (Lebanon). 17 May 1983 Israel and Lebanon sign a peace agreement. 19 February 1986 King Hussein of Jordan severs ties with the PLO. 11 April 1987 London Agreement. 21 May 1987 Lebanon’s parliament abrogates the 1969 Cairo agreement with the PLO and cancels the 17 May 1983 agreement with Israel. 9 December 1987 __ The first Palestinian uprising (intifada) against Israeli rule in the West Bank and Gaza begins. 4 March 1988 Shultz Plan. 31 July 1988 Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank. 18 August 1988 Hamas Charter. 15 November 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Independence. 14 December 1988 The US recognizes the PLO. President Reagan authorizes the State Department to enter into a dialogue with the organization. 26 February 1989 _— Israel and Egypt sign agreement returning Taba to Egypt. 23 May 1989 President Mubarak of Egypt attends the Arab League summit in Casablanca marking the readmission of Egypt to the Arab League. 22 October 1989 Ta’if Agreement. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023153

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi xxii Chronology 9 November 1989 12 March 1990 20 June 1990 2 August 1990 17 January 1991 30 April 1991 26 August 1991 18 October 1991 30 October 1991 16 December 1991 26 December 1991 23 June 1992 January 1993 20 August 1993 9 September 1993 13 September 1993 14 September 1993 11 October 1993 5 November 1993 25 February 1994 18 March 1994 29 April 1994 4 May 1994 18 May 1994 1 July 1994 25 July 1994 29 August 1994 Fall of the Berlin Wall. The Arab League decides to return its headquarters to Cairo. President G.H. Bush suspends dialogue with the PLO. Iraq invades Kuwait. The US launches Operation Desert Storm to liberate Kuwait. The Lebanese parliament orders the disbanding of all militias by this date. Hezbollah remains active and the South Lebanon Army (SLA) refuses to disband. The Lebanese parliament grants an amnesty for all crimes committed during the civil war, 1975-90. Invitation to the Madrid Peace Conference. The US letters of assurance to the Palestinians and Israelis. The Middle East Peace Conference opens in Madrid. Face-to-face bilateral talks for the first time between Israeli and Arab delegations, as well as with a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. UN General Assembly Resolution 46/86 (Zionism-Racism). Formal dissolution of the USSR. Israeli Labor Party wins the elections. Yitzhak Rabin becomes Prime Minister. Secret Israeli-PLO talks begin in Oslo, and develop into full-scale official negotiations in May that year. Secret signing of the Oslo Accords in Oslo by Israeli Foreign Minister Peres, Palestinian Chief Negotiator Qorei and Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst. Israel and the PLO exchange letters of recognition. Signature of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self- Government Agreements in Washington. Israel-Jordan Common Agenda. Letter from Israel's Foreign Minister Peres to Norway's Foreign Minister Holst on the Status of East Jerusalem. Establishment of the AHLC. An Israeli opens fire at the Ibrahimi Mosque or Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, killing 29 Palestinians. UN Security Council Resolution 904 on the Hebron Massacre. Protocol on Economic Relations between the State of Israel and the PLO (Paris Protocol). Gaza-Jericho Agreement. The IDF withdraws from Gaza city and Jericho. Yasir Arafat arrives in Gaza. Washington Declaration (Jordan-Israel peace talks). Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Power and Responsibilities. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023154

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi Chronology xxiii 13 September 1994 Oslo Declaration. 14 October 1994 Prime Minister Rabin, Chairman Yasir Arafat, and Foreign Minister Peres are awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. 26 October 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty. 1 November 1994 — Casablanca Declaration. 30 November 1994 Establishment of the LACC. 10 December 1994 Official ceremony to present Nobel Peace Prize to Yizhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Yasir Arafat. 28 September 1995 — Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Oslo II. 31 October 1995 Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement. 4 November 1995 Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin assassinated. Shimon Peres becomes Prime Minister. 20 January 1996 Yasir Arafat is elected president of the Palestinian Authority (PA). 25 February- 4 March 1996 A series of suicide attacks by Hamas in Israel kill more than 60. 13 March 1996 Sharm el-Sheikh Summit of Peacemakers Final Statement. 11 April 1996 Israel launches Operation Grapes of Wrath in Lebanon. 24 April 1996 The Palestinian National Council (PNC) cancels the clauses of the Palestinian Charter that are contrary to the recognition of Israel. 26 April 1996 Israel-Lebanon cease-fire understandings. 4 May 1996 Letter from Chairman Arafat to Prime Minister Peres on the Amendment to Palestinian National Charter. 9 May 1996 TIPH Agreement I. 29 May 1996 Benjamin Netanyahu elected Prime Minister of Israel. 4 September 1996 _ First meeting of Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat. 28 September 1996 UN Security Council Resolution 1073. 17 January 1997 Hebron Protocol. 21 January 1997 TIPH II agreement. 21 January 1997 Israel-Jordan QIZ agreement. 25 September 1997 _ Israel’s assassination attempt on Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in Amman. 23 October 1998 Wye River Agreement signed by Arafat and Netanyahu. 14 December 1998 The Palestinian National Council convenes in the presence of President Clinton to reaffirm the annulling of clauses of the Palestinian Charter which denied Israel’s right to exist. 7 February 1999 King Hussein of Jordan dies. Abdullah II succeeds him. 17 May 1999 Ehud Barak elected Prime Minister of Israel. 4 September 1999 = Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum. 5 October 1999 Protocol Concerning Safe Passage. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023155

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi xxiv Chronology 15 December 1999 President Clinton hosts summit meeting with Israel’s Prime Minister Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister al-Shara, followed by rounds of peace talks in Shepherdstown, West Virginia, in January 2000. 5 March 2000 Government of Israel’s resolution to withdraw from Lebanon. 26 March 2000 Bill Clinton and Hafez al-Assad summit in Geneva. 17 April 2000 Letter from Israel’s Foreign Minister to UN Secretary-General on Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon. 22 May 2000 Report of the UN Secretary-General on Implementation of Resolutions 425 and 426. 24 May 2000 IDF completes pull-out from Lebanon. 10 June 2000 President Hafez al-Assad dies. 16 June 2000 Second Report of the UN Secretary-General on Implementation of Resolu- tions 425 and 426. 18 June 2000 The UN Security Council confirms Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in a Presidential Statement. 10 July 2000 Bashar al-Assad is elected President of Syria in a nationwide referendum. 11-25 July 2000 Camp David II negotiations between Ehud Barak and Yasir Arafat. 25 July 2000 Camp David Statement. 28 September 2000 Likud leader Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, prompting major Palestinian riots. Second Palestinian uprising (al-Aqsa Intifadah) begins. 7 October 2000 Three Israeli soldiers abducted by Hezbollah along the Blue Line. 17 October 2000 Joint Statements at the Conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit in Sharm el-Sheikh. 10 December 2000 Prime Minister Barak resigns and calls for early elections. 23 December 2000 Clinton Parameters. 21-27 January 2001 Taba Talks. 27 January 2001 Taba Statement. 27 January 2001 Moratinos Non-Paper on Taba Negotiations. 6 February 2001 Ariel Sharon elected Prime Minister of Israel. 19 April 2001 Jordanian-Egyptian Proposal. 30 April 2001 Mitchell Report. 14 June 2001 Palestinian-Israeli Security Implementation Work Plan (Tenet Cease-Fire Plan). 17 October 2001 Assassination of Israel tourism minister Rehavam Zeevi in Jerusalem by militants of the PFLP. 17 February 2002 Thomas Friedman of the New York Times publishes interview with Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia on his peace initiative. 12 March 2002 UN Security Council Resolution 1397. 28 March 2002 Beirut Arab League Summit Declaration on the Arab Peace Initiative. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023156

29 March 2002 30 March 2002 10 April 2002 12 April 2002 19 April 2002 29 May 2002 24 June 2002 27 July 2002 31 July 2002 17 January 2003 19 March 2003 19 March 2003 30 April 2003 25 May 2003 4 June 2003 29 June 2003 6 September 2003 11 September 2003 5 October 2003 21 October 2003 19 November 2003 24 November 2003 1 December 2003 8 December 2003 18 December 2003 14 April 2004 18 April 2004 18 April 2004 19 May 2004 19 May 2004 6 June 2004 9 July 2004 12 July 2004 2 August 2004 OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi Chronology xxv Israel launches operation Defense Shield, placing Arafat under siege in his Ramallah compound, the Mugata. Security Council Resolution 1402. European Parliament votes to suspend Euro-Israeli association agreement. The Battle of Jenin. UN Security Council Resolution 1405 on Jenin. Basic Palestinian Law. President G.W. Bush’s Rose Garden speech. Ayalon-Nusseibeh Statement of Principles. Report of the UN Secretary-General prepared pursuant to UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/10 (Jenin Report). Outcomes of London Conference on Palestinian Reform. US and UK invasion of Iraq. Yasir Arafat appoints Mahmoud Abbas as the first Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority. Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Israel’s response to Road Map. A summit is convened by President Bush in Aqaba, Jordan with Prime Ministers Sharon and Abbas, hosted by King Abdullah II. Palestinian cease-fire statements. Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas resigns. The Israeli cabinet approves removal of Yasir Arafat from the West Bank. Ahmed Qorei appointed Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority. UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13 (Barrier). UN Security Council Resolution 1515 (Quartet’s Road-Map). Report of the UNSG pursuant to Resolution ES-10/13 (Barrier). The Geneva Accord: A Model Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement. UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/14 (Barrier). Prime Minister Sharon’s address at the Fourth Herzliyah Conference. Exchange of letters between Prime Minister Sharon and President Bush. The Disengagement Plan: General Outline. Rice-Weisglass Letter of Understanding. UN Security Council Resolution 1544. Letter from President Bush to King Abdullah I of Jordan. Israeli Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan. Advisory Opinion of the IC] on the Barrier. Olga Document. UN General Assembly Resolution on the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Barrier. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023157

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi xxvi_ Chronology 2 September 2004 11 November 2004 14 December 2004 9 January 2005 14 February 2005 12 March 2005 7 April 2005 26 April 2005 17 August-22 September 2005 15 November 2005 4 January 2006 25 January 2006 30 January 2006 16 February 2006 17 March 2006 28 March 2006 29 March 2006 30 March 2006 11 May 2006 17 May 2006 25 June 2006 28 June 2006 12 July 2006 25 July 2006 11 August 2006 14 August 2006 8 February 2007 17 March 2007 17 March 2007 29 March 2007 15 May 2007 30 May 2007 10 June 2007 UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (Lebanon). Yasir Arafat dies. The Executive Committee of the PLO elects Mahmoud Abbas as its leader. Agreement between Egypt and Israel on Qualifying Industrial Zones. Mahmoud Abbas elected President of the Palestinian Authority. Assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. Aleppo Understandings. UN Security Council Resolution 1595 establishes an International Inde- pendent Inquiry Commission (UNIIC) into the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri. Syria ends its military presence in Lebanon. Israel pulls out of the Gaza Strip. Agreement on Movement and Access. Israeli Prime Minister Sharon is incapacitated. Ehud Olmert becomes interim Prime Minister. Hamas wins Palestinian Legislative Council elections. Quartet Statement on Palestinian Legislative elections. Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas appointed Prime Minister. Hamas Political Program. Kadima leader Ehud Olmert wins Israeli elections. Palestinian Government led by Hamas sworn in. Quartet Statement on Hamas. Palestinian Prisoners’ Document. UN Security Council Resolution 1680 (Lebanon/Syria). Abduction of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Israel launches Operation Summer Rains in the Gaza Strip. National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners. Israel-Hezbollah war starts after Hezbollah attacks an Israeli patrol along the Blue Line, killing three soldiers and kidnapping two. Seven-Point Plan of Prime Minister Siniora. UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Cessation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon. Mecca Accord for Palestinian National Unity Government. Palestinian Government of Unity sworn in. Program of Palestinian Unity Government. Riyadh Declaration. Haifa Declaration. UN Security Council Resolution 1757 establishes Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). Violent confrontations between Hamas and Fatah in the Gaza Strip. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023158

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi Chronology xxvii 13 June 2007 Shimon Peres is elected President of Israel by the Knesset. 14 June 2007 President Abbas dismisses Prime Minister Haniyeh and declares a state of emergency. 15 June 2007 Hamas takes control over the Gaza Strip in a coup, after several days of violent battles with Fatah. 15 June 2007 Salam Fayyad appointed Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority. 30 October 2007 UN Provisional Geographic Definition of the Shebaa Farms Area. 27 November 2007 Annapolis Joint Understanding. 7 May 2008 Hezbollah militants take control of areas of Beirut. 21 May 2008 Doha agreement between Lebanese leaders brokered by Qatar. 21 May 2008 Israel and Syria announce holding indirect talks through Turkish mediation. 30 July 2008 Prime Minister Olmert announces he is not seeking re-election. 15 October 2008 Establishment of diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon. 16 December 2008 Last meeting of Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas. 16 December 2008 UN Security Council Resolution 1850 on Annapolis process. 27 December 2008 Israel launches Operation “Cast Lead’ against Hamas. 8 January 2009 UN Security Council Resolution 1860 on a Gaza cease-fire. 18 January 2009 Gaza cease-fire. 20 February 2009 _— President Peres tasks Netanyahu to form a Cabinet following 10 February elections. 1 March 2009 Opening of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). 31 March 2009 Benjamin Netanyahu is sworn in as Prime Minister. 4 June 2009 President Obama’s Cairo Speech. 14 June 2009 Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Speech at Bar Ilan University. 25 August 2009 Ending Occupation, Establishing the State: Fayyad Plan. 25 September 2009 Report of the United Nations fact finding mission on the Gaza conflict: the Goldstone report. 31 May 2010 Gaza Flotilla Incident. 25 January 2011 Beginning of the Egyptian uprising. 11 February 2011 — President Mubarak of Egypt resigns. 15 March 2011 Beginning of the Syrian uprising. 4 May 2011 In Cairo, Palestinian Authority President Abbas and Hamas leader Meshal sign a reconciliation agreement, which calls, inter alia, for elections in 2012. 29 July 2011 Formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). 2 September 2011 — Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident. 18 September 2011 Chair’s Summary of the AHLC on Palestinian Institutions’ readiness for statehood. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023159

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi XXvViii Chronology 23 September 2011 31 October 2011 6 February 2012 20 June 2012 14 November 2012 21 November 2012 29 November 2012 4 December 2012 22 January 2013 13 April 2013 6 June 2013 20 June 2013 30 June 2013 3 July 2013 30 July 2013 19 September 2013 16 January 2014 23 April 2014 24 April 2014 2 June 2014 3 June 2014 8 June 2014 12 June 2014 2 July 2014 7 July 2014 26 August 2014 President Abbas’s speech to the UN General Assembly on UN membership. Palestine becomes a member of UNESCO. In Doha, Palestinian Authority President Abbas and Hamas leader Meshal sign another reconciliation agreement after the failure to implement the Cairo deal. Mohamed Morsi is sworn in as President of Egypt. Israel launches Operation ‘Pillar of Defense’ in Gaza. Gaza War II: Israel and Hamas unilateral cease-fire. President Abbas’s speech to the UN General Assembly on Palestine’s status at the United Nations. UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19: Status of Palestine in the United Nations. Likud Party leader Netanyahu wins parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Salam Fayyad resigns. Rami Hamdallah is sworn in as Palestinian Prime Minister. Rami Hamdallah resigns from his post. Massive demonstrations in Egypt against President Morsi. Egyptian Army removes President Morsi from power. Resumption of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks in Washington facilitated by President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. Rami Hamdallah forms a new Palestinian Government. Opening in The Hague of the trial of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). Fatah and Hamas announce in Gaza a new reconciliation agreement calling for the formation of a national unity Government and the holding of elections. The Israeli Cabinet suspends peace talks with the Palestinians in protest to the Gaza agreement. Palestinian unity government headed by Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah is sworn in. Bashar al-Assad is re-elected President of Syria in an election whose legitimacy was widely contested. Field Marshall Abdel Fattah a-Sissi is sworn in as President of the Arab Republic of Egypt following presidential elections held 26-28 May. Three Israeli teenagers were abducted in the West Bank. The IDF found their bodies on 30 June in the vicinity of Hebron. In retaliation, Israel launched attacks against targets of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. A Palestinian teenager was abducted and killed in Jerusalem by a group of Israelis. This triggered a series of violent clashes. Israel launches operation ‘Protective Edge’ against Hamas in the Gaza Strip in retaliation to rocket attacks. A ceasefire, brokered by Egypt, was reached to end hostilities between Palestinian factions and Israel in Gaza. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023160

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 10/9/2014, SPi The Crooked Course: Step by Step on the Path to Peace INTRODUCTION As Immanuel Kant observed, “out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made.” And the Middle East peace process is no exception. It runs a crooked course. This work provides a paper trail of the meandering and rocky path of the peace process. Relevant documents related to the Arab-Israeli conflict over the past century (since the Sykes—Picot Agreement of 1916) are compiled in this book. It provides an annotated and chronological overview of attempts to make peace in one of the most difficult and protracted conflicts in the world, and it includes a full set of accompanying maps specially made for this edition. The sheer volume of such a work raises the critical problem of how to present the documents in a way that facilitates their accessibility and understanding. A simple chronological ordering would miss important connections between the documents, which are thus better grouped by common theme. To this end, we have divided the volume into five thematic Parts. Part I compiles documents related to the formal peace agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as those related to Israel’s unilateral disengagement from Gaza. The documents in Part I] relate to the many informal peace proposals and ideas offered over the years that have served to contribute to more official processes at a later date. Part III compiles the many important United Nations documents specifically related to the question of Palestine. Part IV sets the Israeli-Palestinian issue in a broader context, providing regional papers going back a century, up to the latest documents. Finally, Part V compiles Israeli and Palestinian domestic documents relevant to the quest for peace in the Middle East. Grouping the documents by theme highlights the evolution of particular aspects of the conflict and the peace process over time. When examined as a group, these documents provide valuable insights on the events, conditions, and actions that have been most important in influencing the different phases of the peace process. For guidance, the reader will find a chronological overview of all the documents and key events. ON PART I: PEACE AGREEMENTS AND THE DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA Nothing about the quest for peace in the Middle East has been simple or easily attained. Merely bringing Palestinians and Israelis together was a feat that took decades to achieve. Despite all the efforts exerted by not only the principal parties, but also local actors, regional neighbors, and international players, agreements between the two sides HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023161

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 10/9/2014, SPi xxx The Crooked Course have been scarce. This Part chronicles the rare moments when both Israeli and Palestinian negotiators put pen to paper in an effort to resolve a conflict that has seemed intractable. Part I begins with the Oslo peace talks, which in 1993 produced the Declaration of Principles (DoP) and the mutual recognition of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. These two agreements formed the basis for all subsequent talks between the parties. In 1992, as the director of the Norwegian research institute Fafo, I initiated, together with then member of Knesset Yossi Beilin, secret talks between him and local Palestinian leader Faisal Husseini, at the American Colony Hotel in Jerusalem. These talks, which were facilitated by Fafo and the Foreign Ministry of Norway, reached a dead end later that year. The Norwegians realized that without involving the exiled and outlawed Palestinian leadership in Tunis, nothing could be accomplished. At the time, both Israeli and American citizens were forbidden to engage with any member of the PLO. In December 1992, I flew to Tunis to meet for the first time with PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat. In that meeting in his villa, in the darkness of the early morning hours, he authorized the head of Fatah’s financial wing, Ahmed Qorei (alias Abu Ala), to travel to Oslo for secret talks facilitated by Fafo in cooperation with the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. The first meeting took place at Borregaard Manor outside Oslo, in January 1993. From January to May 1993, secret talks were conducted as a pre-negotiation phase, in parallel to the Madrid process taking place in Washington. The goals of pre- negotiations in Oslo were twofold: to build trust between the Palestinian and Israeli representatives; and to explore possible parameters of an agreement. In order to reach the first goal, the exercise was restricted to a small group, willing to engage in secret intense interaction over a lengthy period. Unlike the massive delegations in Washing- ton, the delegations in Oslo were never larger than three to five people on each side, with continued interaction often from dawn to dusk. In Oslo, the Palestinians were represented from day one by a delegation of the PLO, handpicked by its chairman, Yasir Arafat. The rationale behind this unprecedented step was that the Norwegians had discovered that the PLO was already controlling every detail, albeit invisibly, of the bilateral and multilateral talks in Washington. Furthermore we believed that if the PLO and Yasir Arafat were not directly involved in the talks, they still had the ability and the will to block any agreement. Allowing others to reach an agreement would be tantamount to political suicide by the PLO. Therefore, it was necessary to have them at the table. Without them, no agreement could be reached. The pre-negotiation phase ended on 1 May 1993. The talks had reached a point where both parties believed that the other was negotiating in good faith and that an agreement had to take the shape of a declaration of principles. On that date, the head of the Palestinian negotiation team, Ahmed Qorei, invited me for a walk in the hills above Oslo. He made it clear—in the most explicit of words—that the PLO would not continue into a final round of talks unless the Israelis “upgraded” their delegation to high-level officials. Up to this point, the Israelis were represented by two academics (Ron Pundak and Yair Hirschfeld) who did not hold any formal position in the HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023162

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 10/9/2014, SPi The Crooked Course Xxxi government. In the following days, I flew to Israel to convey the request to Yossi Beilin, then Deputy Foreign Minister. Shortly afterwards, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres dispatched the Director General of the ministry, Uri Savir, and the head of the ministry’s legal department, Joel Singer, to Oslo. The Norwegians had, until then, seen the secret talks in Oslo and their potential outcome only as possible inputs to the negotiations in Washington. We were puzzled—and pleasantly surprised—to realize that the parties now wanted to negotiate the full deal under the Oslo framework. Indeed, in the spring of 1993 the parties started to conduct proper negotiations in Oslo—out of the public eye—rather than through the formal process in Washington. Within four months, the Declaration of Principles was initialed in a secret ceremony in the Government Guest House in Oslo. This was followed by a new set of secret negotiations in Paris, facilitated by the Norwegian team (Johan Jorgen Holst, Jan Egeland, Mona Juul, and myself). The outcome was the mutual recognition of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, which paved the way for the formal signing of the Oslo Accords on the White House lawn on 13 September 1993. The Declaration of Principles was based on the approach that the easiest issues should be resolved first, with remaining issues to be addressed later, step-by-step. A Palestinian Authority for self-rule would be established, first gaining control over Gaza and Jericho, and then gradually expanding into the West Bank. The details of the expansion were to be hammered out in the so-called Oslo II Agreement, signed in Cairo on 28 September 1995. As unique and effective as this approach proved to be, the Oslo Accords would not have been possible without the dramatic changes taking place within the international system at the time. The PLO had been financially dependent on the states of the Arab Gulf and the Communist bloc. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Arafat’s support of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War of 1991 resulted in the collapse of funding for the PLO and an end to remittances to Palestinian families in Gaza and the West Bank. Simultaneously, the first Intifada between 1987 and 1993 and the emergence of a new local leadership in Gaza and the West Bank created a threat to the leadership of the PLO in exile in Tunis. The organization needed desperately to regain its financial footing, as well as its political stature. These were major incentives to move the Organization into what was to become the Oslo process. The Israeli leadership also had its reasons to come to the negotiating table. The rise of satellite television channels, such as CNN, beamed live images around the world of Israeli soldiers armed to the teeth combating stone-throwing kids in Gaza and the West Bank. Support for the government of Israel dropped dramatically in Europe and at home. Israelis began to feel that they were losing the moral high ground. Israeli leaders saw that using traditional military means to combat the Intifada came at a high political and moral cost. They too were in search of a political way out. In short, the Oslo channel came precisely at the right time, providing a lifeline for both the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships. The implementation of the Declaration of Principles started in earnest in 1994, with Yasir Arafat’s spectacular arrival in Gaza and the rapid establishment of the Palestinian Authority. I had the pleasure of welcoming him on behalf of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, as his newly appointed Special Coordinator for the Occupied HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023163

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 10/9/2014, SPi xxxii The Crooked Course Territories and Personal Representative to the PLO and the Palestinian Authority at our new headquarters in Gaza city. The PLO had regained its uncontested leadership, and the Palestinian Authority received a massive financial boost with the influx of donor money from across the world. Israel received a moral boost as a large number of countries formally recognized its existence and established diplomatic relations. A hallmark of the Declaration of Principles was the establishment of a gradual approach to resolving the conflict. Gradualism now became the keyword for describing the peace process. By breaking the overall goal of peace into manageable sections that could be addressed in sequence, the Oslo process allowed for progress to be made and trust to develop on less contentious issues before tackling more controversial topics like Jerusalem, borders, security arrangements, and refugees, which could threaten to derail any talks. One of the principal advantages of the step-by-step or gradualist approach was that it enabled the parties to reach compromises through ongoing dialogue and interaction with each other by starting with the easiest issues and leaving the hardest for last. It allowed for an incremental change in perceptions and political positions. Although gradualism allowed success to be achieved in a variety of areas, moving the process forward, at each stage, depended on the parties taking the bold steps necessary to fulfill their respective commitments. The main weakness was slow movement in implemen- tation, with progress falling behind agreed upon timelines. This led to periodic disillusionment and back-sliding. A recurrent problem was that the parties had failed to agree on a mechanism to penalize non-compliance. This critical deficiency undermined progress. As leaders and the political climate changed, so too did the resolve to implement. Successful gradualism required the use of ambiguous language on the most conten- tious issues: Jerusalem, borders, security, and refugees. The successive Israeli govern- ments and the Palestinian leadership had substantially different views on the final status of all four of these issues. The language contained within the Oslo documents, as well as subsequent agreements, provides room for interpretation. Either side could claim that the text represents their interests. This allowed leaders to go home to their respective constituents and retain popular support. Another practice that proved effective was the use of the annexes attached to agree- ments to flesh out disruptive details, or to substantially water down the impact of certain commitments made within the body of the text. In many cases the annexes are exhaustively long and detailed but are rarely read by the public, affording the leaders political space to make agreements that might otherwise face public criticism. The three Israeli Prime Ministers who were in office from 1993 to 1999—Rabin, Peres, and Netanyahu—approached the challenges of peace through a concept of gradualism, postponing the tricky final status issues. Barak, who took office in 1999, was the first Israeli Prime Minister to address the final status head-on with a “totalist” approach (read below). While the Oslo process was based on the concept of gradualism, characterized by bilateral negotiations—facilitated by a third party—and cumulative small steps dem- onstrating good faith, Ariel Sharon eventually took a contrary approach through “uncompromising unilateralism”. The day after he won the election in February 2001, HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023164

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 10/9/2014, SPi The Crooked Course xxxili he invited me to meet him at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. During the course of the conversation, he surprisingly asked what I would do with the peace process if I were him. I had just re-read his autobiography, Warrior, and answered: “Both as a soldier and as a politician, you have a history of being bold, daunting, daring and making surprise moves. In that spirit, 1 would suggest that you dismantle the settlements and pull your troops completely out of Gaza.” For a minute I worried that this would anger him, but he answered very calmly. “I cannot do it.” I asked why. He said: “Because of the harbor.” I replied, rather perplexed: “But there is no harbor in Gaza.” He said: “That’s not the point. They could build one if we left Gaza.” Then I realized that, contrary to common opinion, Sharon had no ideological inhibitions about leaving Gaza. His concerns were only about security. This gave me high hopes that he would eventually do it. Three years of stalemate were to follow. And then in December 2003, out of the blue, Sharon made the sweeping and stunning pronouncement that Israel would leave Gaza and end its occupation of the Strip. Ariel Sharon deserves praise for withdrawing from Gaza. But his unilateral move undermined the possibility of peaceful relations between the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip and Israel. The PLO and the Palestinian Authority were sidelined. They could not claim credit for the move, and thus had scant motivation for supporting it. Instead, militants in Gaza and the West Bank harvested all the benefits. The Disengagement plan undermined those on the Palestinian side who claimed that the negotiating table was a more efficient tool than the barrel of a gun in order to resolve the conflict. ON PART II: PEACE PROPOSALS AND IDEAS The formal agreements covered in Part I represent the conclusions of long and complex diplomatic processes. Part II encompasses proposals and ideas that contributed to breaking taboos and changing opinions that paved the way for precedent-setting agreements. In the late 1970s and 1980s several plans and initiatives were put forward which maintain relevance for the future of the peace process. One idea was a comprehensive and unified Arab approach which was first proposed in the Fahd Plan (1981), and later refined in the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002. The latter peace proposal promoted by then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah al-Saud represented a unified shift in the Arab States’ approach to Israel. Where there was once rejection, the Arab peace initiative created the possibility of universal recognition of the State of Israel. All 57 countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) endorsed the initiative. The aftermath of the Gulf War of 1991 opened new opportunities to address the complex issue of peace in the Middle East. This was the backdrop for the groundbreak- ing Madrid Peace Conference, convened by the United States and the Soviet Union. It raised new hopes for peaceful resolution to the enduring conflicts of the region. The conference created an unprecedented platform for peace talks, based on the principle of “land for peace”. The Israelis would have to cede land to their Arab adversaries in return for peace and security. The Madrid formula for organizing such talks followed a HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023165

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 10/9/2014, SPi xxxiv The Crooked Course two-track approach: bilateral negotiations in Washington; and the formation of several multilateral working groups to address specific issues such as water, refugees, the economy, etc. It is worth noting that the PLO was not accepted at the negotiating table. Instead the Palestinians were represented by a joint delegation of Jordanian officials and prominent Palestinians, who allegedly were not associated with the PLO. In stark contrast to the Oslo process, the Washington talks under the Madrid formula were public and in the constant glare of the media. This resulted in the parties continuously posturing to win the favor of the complex power structures that they reported to, as well as of domestic public constituencies. However, Madrid broke the taboo of direct bilateral talks between Arabs and Israelis. Madrid failed as a process, but succeeded as a spectacular event for creating hope, and formed a springboard for the subsequent secret Oslo talks. As noted in the comments on Part I, Oslo and all subsequent agreements were embraced by the three Israeli Prime Ministers before Ehud Barak took office in 1999. As opposed to the gradualist approach of his predecessors, Barak took the path of totalism, i.e. aiming at solving all remaining issues in one go. Pursuant to this approach, as he put it: “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”. Heroically, he wanted to resolve simultaneously all matters with Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinians, and put a final end to all conflicts. Shortly after his election, I was invited to meet him at his home in the outskirts of Tel Aviv. He described his new approach metaphorically: “In order to resolve a problem, you need to analyze what the problem is, and define your objective. The problem at hand is that we have an ugly dog in front of us. The objective is to beautify the dog. In order to do so, you need to analyze why it is ugly. And then you see that it is the tail that makes the dog ugly. Through this analysis, our task becomes easy: by chopping off the tail we will have a beautiful dog.” And then he added sarcastically: “But I will not chop off the tail of the dog the way you Oslo people have been doing it, painfully slice by slice like a salami. We need to chop it off all in one go.” In this spirit, in the summer of 2000 President Clinton brought the parties to the presidential estate at Camp David for marathon talks behind closed doors. The attempt failed for many reasons. First of all, a few weeks of talks did not provide ample time to address the thorniest issues (Oslo took six months of negotiation to address the least difficult issues). Other reasons were internal Palestinian disagreements and difficult interpersonal relations, in addition to a “take-it-or-leave it” approach by Israel. Although the leaders left Camp David without diplomatic feathers in their cap, President Clinton and his team now had a clear sense of what was needed to bridge the gap between the two parties. In late December 2000, he presented what became known as the Clinton Parameters. They were a comprehensive set of American ideas on how to end the conflict. However, time was not on the side of peace. With his second term coming to an end, Clinton was unable to persuade the parties to conclude an agreement. In addition, Likud Party leader Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount / Haram al-Sharif in September 2000 signaled the second Palestinian uprising. This reduced the room for maneuver for the Palestinian negotiators. Following the election of George W. Bush as President of the United States, and against the backdrop of the new Intifada, Palestinian and Israeli negotiators gathered in HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023166

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 10/9/2014, SPi The Crooked Course XXXvV early 2001 in the small Egyptian seaside town of Taba. They attempted, through bilateral talks, to capitalize on the basic ideas put forward by President Clinton. In spite of high hopes inspired by the Taba talks, hope was dashed by Israeli intransigence, reinforced by the violent uprising across the West Bank and Gaza, as well as internal tensions within the Palestinian leadership. In an attempt to revive the peace process, President George W. Bush, in a speech in the Rose Garden in June 2002, took the bold step of publicly declaring support for an independent Palestinian state. However, he was convinced that Chairman Arafat was an impediment to peace, due to the continuing violence against Israelis emanating from Gaza and the West Bank. The President made further US involvement in peace negotiations contingent upon Arafat’s removal from power, and the implementation of democratic reforms in the Palestinian Authority’s political structure. This was consist- ent with Prime Minister Sharon’s policies. At this time, parts of the Palestinian leadership either passively turned a blind eye to the rise of bombings in Israel, or discreetly encouraged it. Arafat became a pariah for several essential players and was isolated in his Muqata headquarters in Ramallah. Under these dire circumstances, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for a meeting in the conference room of his executive office at United Nations’ Headquarters in New York with the US, Russia, and the European Union. The frustration was deep amongst all parties. Bilateral talks did not happen. Trilateral talks did not work. In response to the breakdown of the peace process, he suggested that the four actors coordinate a position to restart the process. The idea was to combine the political power of the US, Russia’s credibility amongst key Arab states, the European Union’s financial muscle, and the UN’s legitimacy in a potent new international coalition. The UN Secretary-General coined the phrase the “Middle East Quartet” for this informal group. The Quartet met both at principals level and at the level of special envoys. A novel approach to the imbroglio of Middle East peacemaking was launched: multilateral unilateralism. The concept was launched at a Quartet Envoys’ working dinner at the Norwegian Ambassador’s residence in Herzliya (a suburb of Tel Aviv) by US officials William Burns and David Satterfield. The idea was for the Quartet members to collectively produce an operational peace plan to be presented to the parties for implementation, without prior consultation. This resulted in the Quartet peace plan, referred to as the Road Map, which was eventually presented to the parties as an ultimatum in 2003. In other words, a unified position was imposed by a group of third parties upon the disputants—thus, multilateral unilateralism. The Quartet collectively submitted the text to Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas. The US ambassador to Israel presented it to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who refused to meet with the Quartet as a whole. The Palestinian side accepted the proposals in total while the Israeli side came up with fourteen reservations. The Oslo Accords mapped a path towards a possible peace agreement, setting up milestones to be passed along the way, and stipulating that the ride on this bumpy road would take five years. It did not define the end point of the journey, because the parties were not capable of closing the gaps between their positions at the time. The 2003 Performance-Based Road Map of the Quartet was, in many ways, the paper that concluded the Declaration of Principles of 1993, by designating the last milestone, the establishment of a Palestinian state. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023167

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 10/9/2014, SPi xxxvi The Crooked Course However, compromises among the Quartet members led to ambiguities which gave the parties the opportunity to make radically different interpretations of their obligations under the plan. The Israeli side claimed that the Road Map called for security first—a complete end of Palestinian violence—before any negotiations could start. This strategy was called sequentialism. The Palestinian side, and the international community at large, supported a strategy of parallelism that called for progress on both security and political issues to happen in lock-step. The collision of the concepts of parallelism and sequenti- alism made it impossible to reach the final destination envisioned in the Road Map. With gridlock in the formal negotiating process, civil society groups tried to take the initiative. One example of several is the Geneva Accords of December 2003 led by PLO official Yasser Abed Rabbo and former Israeli Minister Yossi Beilin. The stalemate in the process continued until Ehud Olmert’s election as Prime Minister in 2006. Through intense negotiations facilitated by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her team, the parties came close to striking a deal which would have pushed the peace process forward. However, as the end game of this phase of the negotiations, also known as the Annapolis process, unfolded, Prime Minister Olmert had to step down because of an indictment for alleged financial misconduct. At the same time also, a new wave of rockets emanating from Gaza, lead to a military operation in the Strip (Operation “Cast Lead’). The scene and characters changed in early 2009 with the election of Barack Obama as President of the United States, and Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister of Israel for a second time. Shortly after his inauguration, President Obama attempted to resuscitate the peace process with the appointment of a new high-level special envoy, Senator George Mitchell. An absolute freeze on settlements, including in Jerusalem, was made a precondition for bringing the parties to the table. This turned out to be a self-defeating proposal. For any Israeli Prime Minister, such a major move could only be the result of, and not the pre-condition for, negotiations. During this paralysis, the Palestinian leadership looked for alternative ways of moving forward, and shifted their strategy from bilateralism to unilateralism through a bid to upgrade the Palestinian status to be on a par with the Vatican at the United Nations: that of an observer Member State in the General Assembly. This quest reached. its climax during the UN General Assembly sessions of 2011 and 2012. In a speech to the General Assembly in September 2011, President Abbas called for admission of Palestine as a Member State of the United Nations. It reflected the growing frustration among the Palestinian community with the lack of progress since the end of the Annapolis process in 2008. In December 2012, the Palestinians were granted, with a large majority, state observer status at the UN. ON PART III: UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE An accurate picture of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must include an understanding of the role of the United Nations. Part III provides a comprehensive collection of Resolutions and documents which have significantly shaped the context of this seem- ingly intractable issue. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023168

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 10/9/2014, SPi The Crooked Course XXxvii Many of the political battles related to the Arab-Israeli conflict have been fought in the halls of the United Nations. On 29 November 1947, the UN General Assembly voted Resolution 181, also known as the Partition Plan. It called for the creation of two states—one Palestinian and one Jewish. Other key UN Resolutions include General Assembly Resolution 194 (1948), which calls for the return of Palestinian refugees; General Assembly Resolution 303 (1949), which designates Jerusalem to be placed under UN jurisdiction; and, most famously, Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), which calls on Israel to withdraw from all territory seized during the Six Day War of 1967. Paradoxically, some of the Resolutions are seen by both parties as supporting their side of the argument. For example, in Resolution 242 the interpretation of the clause calling for “withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” has been controversially ambiguous, and the object of widely different inter- pretations. The key argument relates to whether the clause requires Israel to withdraw from all territory occupied in the 1967 war, or only from some parts of the territory captured. While many Resolutions have had hardly any effect, they nevertheless continue to be used as points of reference in the different attempts to resolve the conflict. ON PART IV: REGIONAL DOCUMENTS The Israeli-Palestinian issue cannot be seen in isolation: it affects and has been affected. by broader regional dynamics and conflicts for a century. After years of colonial competition, France and the United Kingdom drew lines in the sand through the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. This agreement divided the region into spheres of influence, and eventually led to the creation of new countries. In the subsequent thirty years, several programmatic initiatives were taken in the context of multiple anti- colonial campaigns for national self-determination and political sovereignty, including the quest of the Jewish people for a national homeland. The 1948 war between Arab countries and the newly founded State of Israel resulted in the latter significantly expanding its territory beyond that allotted to it by the UN Partition Plan. This marked the beginning of more than half a century of Israeli-Arab tensions and conflicts. Gradually the focus moved from the legitimacy of the state of Israel to the country’s territorial boundaries. This coincided with broadening support, not only internationally but also in Israel, for the establishment of a Palestinian state living peacefully, side by side, with the state of Israel, within mutually secured borders. Obtaining the regional buy-in to peace with Israel began with the different armistice agreements signed in the wake of the 1948 war. While these agreements ended the war, the fighting continued to flare up as the armistice lines established were not inter- nationally recognized borders. The Arab-Israeli conflict came to a new head with the Six Day War in June 1967, when Israel conquered the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. In the aftermath, Arab nations unified their position against Israel with the Arab League HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023169

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 10/9/2014, SPi XXXvili The Crooked Course Resolution at the Khartoum Summit, which is referred to as the “Three Noes Docu- ment” due to its clause that states: “no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it”. On 6 October 1973, Syria and Egypt launched a war against Israel that ended in a political stand-off between Israel and its Arab adversaries. In November 1977, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat broke Arab unity when he— in a move which stunned the world—flew to Israel and addressed the Knesset in a bid for a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Subsequently, in 1978, he signed the Camp David Accords that established a separate bilateral peace agreement with Israel. Camp David highlighted the importance of a third-party broker. When President Sadat and his counterpart, Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel, reached a stalemate, US President Jimmy Carter invited the parties to his presidential estate for trilateral discussions on 5 September 1978. Three scheduled days of negotiations turned into thirteen days of frustrating and intense talks. Since these tripartite discus- sions were unable to break the impasse, President Carter decided to work separately with both sides. The result was an American proposal which incorporated the require- ments of both parties into a single text. After lengthy negotiations on this document, President Carter’s shuttle diplomacy resulted in the Camp David Accords of 17 September 1978. In 1993, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat followed the precedent of President Sadat and broke ranks with fellow Arab leaders by secretly and bilaterally recognizing the State of Israel and signing the Oslo Accords. The year after, building on the agreements between Israel and the PLO, King Hussein of Jordan followed suit by negotiating a bilateral peace treaty with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel. This culminated in a spectacular signing ceremony at the desert border crossing of Wadi Araba in August 1994. In the agreement, Israel acknowledged Jordan’s historical role over Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem and agreed to recognize this role in future permanent status negotiations with the Palestinians. The two leaders also agreed on steps such as the opening of border crossings and economic cooperation. In 1999, Labor Party leader Ehud Barak defeated incumbent Prime Minister Benja- min Netanyahu. As has been described above, the new Prime Minister broke radically with the concept of gradualism that had been the hallmark of negotiations between Yasir Arafat and three Israeli Prime Ministers, Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Benjamin Netanyahu, favoring a more comprehensive approach to the peace process. For the first half of 2000, Arafat and the Palestinians were left to wait for a Syrian peace deal that was not to come. Despite Barak offering Syrian President Hafez al-Assad 99 per cent of the Golan Heights, it still fell short of Assad’s demand for a return to the 4 June 1967 lines, and the Syria track subsequently crumbled. This put Arafat on the spot: how could he now, in front of the Arab world, accept less for the Palestinians than Assad had demanded for the Syrians? The Lebanon track fared better. It began in late 1999 with a dialogue between Prime Minister Barak and me, as the newly appointed UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East peace process. The Prime Minister confided to me that, as a part of his compre- hensive quest for resolving all the conflicts that Israel had with its neighbors, he wanted to end Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon that had started in 1978. Eventually, he HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023170

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 10/9/2014, SPi The Crooked Course Xxxix conceded that only the United Nations, and not Israel alone, could delineate on a map and demarcate on the ground the line of withdrawal. Such a line had to be, to the best of the United Nations’ knowledge, in conformity with Lebanon’s international boundar- ies. On this basis, and with the consent of the parties, the UN Secretary-General could then report to the Security Council and eventually recommend that it should confirm that Israel had ended its occupation. This understanding led to an agreement for the United Nations to negotiate with the Governments of Lebanon, Syria and Israel. Through intense, difficult, and stormy tripartite negotiations over five months, the UN Secretary-General was in May 2000 able to report to the Security Council that the UN had reached an agreement with Israel, Syria, and Lebanon on a line of withdrawal (the so-called Blue Line). On this basis, it was determined that Israeli troops had left all Lebanese territory. Further, he reported that, consistent with UN requirements, Israel’s Lebanese proxy, the South Lebanese Army (SLA), had been disarmed and disbanded. Subsequently, the UN Security Council confirmed the end of Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon in fulfillment of Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 of 1978. In September 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1559. Secretary- General Kofi Annan appointed me as his special envoy for its implementation. In a nutshell the resolution called for respect for Lebanon’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence; the disbanding and disarming of all Lebanese and non- Lebanese militias; and the withdrawal of all foreign troops. After Israel’s full withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, the only remaining foreign troops were Syrian. Immediately after the resolution was adopted, I engaged in intense negotiations with President Assad, who until the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on 14 February 2005, was consistently resistant to move on the issue. On 12 March 2005, I was airborne with a small UN team, among them Fabrice Aidan, on my way to Damascus for a new round of talks with the President. Midway, the captain informed me that he was requested to change course and land in Aleppo. Afterwards I was told that the reason was to avoid the media who were waiting for the arrival of the UN team in Damascus. I was picked up at Aleppo airport by Walid Muallem, who was then Deputy Foreign Minister. He brought me to Assad’s villa, where a few hours of negotiations resulted in the Aleppo understanding, which outlined Syria’s military withdrawal from Lebanon with specific timelines. Assad honored his word, and ended twenty-nine years of Syrian military presence in Lebanon consistent with Resolution 1559. What is often forgotten in the recurrent doom and gloom in the Middle East, is that the step-by-step approach, which started with the Camp David Accords of 1978, has for more than thirty years led to conflict resolution: peace between Israel and Egypt; the Oslo Accords; the mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO; the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the West Bank, which still functions with its presidency, cabinet, and ministries; peace between Israel and Jordan in 1994, with the recognition of borders and a long-lasting security cooperation; Israel’s withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000; and the subsequent Syrian military withdrawal five years later; as well as Israel’s pull out from the Gaza Strip. All these steps would have been difficult, if not impossible, without the previous ones. In 2000 the attempts to put a final end to the Syrian-Israeli and the Palestinian— Israeli conflicts both failed. This exposes the risks of a totalist approach to solving such HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023171

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 10/9/2014, SPi xl The Crooked Course conflicts. These heroic attempts, facilitated by President Bill Clinton and his team, created a crisis of expectations, leading to the second Intifada and violent confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians, with tragic loss of life on both sides. This illustrates a fundamental dilemma in the choice between a gradualist and a totalist approach. Totalism’s “all or nothing” approach is inherently risky. When it backfires, it easily leads to a relapse into violence. Gradualism is less spectacular and appealing, with its incremental and long-term approach. However, it is precisely these characteristics which make it less risky, and more successful under some circumstances. While totalism failed in 2000, with tragic consequences, it nevertheless broke down a number of taboos, such as addressing explicitly the partition of Jerusalem and the issue of Palestinian refugees. ON PART V: ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN DOMESTIC DOCUMENTS Part V seeks to provide a fuller context to the quest for peace in the Middle East. All politics are local, and the Arab-Israeli conflict typifies this axiom. The ability of negotiators to come to conclusions is only half the story. Documents such as the original Palestinian National Charter or Israel’s Declaration of Independence shaped attitudes, policies, and action on both sides. Furthermore, the Part includes important policy statements that signal revisions of previous policies such as Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s vision for a new Palestinian state. In August 2009, Fayyad introduced the “Program of the Thirteenth Government” (the Fayyad Plan), which established a path to develop a functional Palestinian state within a two-year time frame. The blueprint sought to establish and improve governing institutions, end Palestinian economic dependence on Israel, and enhance overall infrastructure. It was a move to create a de facto Palestinian state within the existing Palestinian territory, regardless of any formal recognition of such an entity. Fayyad sought proactive steps to “end the occupation, despite the occupation”. He stressed it was not meant as a unilateral declaration of statehood. Indeed, substantial developments did take place during Prime Minister Fayyad’s tenure. In 2011, both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund made statements that the Palestinian Authority was capable of running the economy of an independent state, and that it was on track to developing the necessary functions of a state. The Middle East peace process continues to run its crooked course. There is no quick fix. Yet, as this volume demonstrates, many brave attempts have been made to bring peace to this troubled region. By compiling annotated documents related to the quest for peace in the Middle East, a useful record and reference tool are created. Our hope is also that this volume will inspire future students, analysts, policy makers, and negotiators to learn from, and draw on, the experiences of the past. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023172

OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 10/9/2014, SPi The Crooked Course xli As we continue to move on the crooked path, no doubt, this compendium will have to be updated in the future. Hopefully, one of those additions will be a peace agreement that will eventually allow us all to close the book on the protracted conflicts in the Middle East. Terje Rod-Larsen Oslo 13 September 2013 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023173

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi Maps I \ @ SOFIA 30° Black § RUSSIA si YN e BULGARIA § ® Varna a GEORGIA 5 TBILISI” ey amMsun GREECE Istanbul, » . POERERIANGS a 40° 4 . Trabzon BARU Lo aoe @ANKARA ise) S . TURKEY AZERBAUJAN 2 lzmir G o} ATHENS Konya Tabriz ° Antalya, Adana, TEHRAN © Rhodes | = NICOSIA: ia rate 5 Latakia | R A N Y, CYPRUS Tripoli ¢ Hamadan Ai te, BEIRUT ¢, 7aneay Spx LEBANON Esfahan® Haifa I R A Q bs, . ISRAEL AlHillah” Al Kut Ports. Tel Aviv o o Ahwaz @ Alexandria ey yp, Matruh ° ° es Basra® Abadan 30° | 30° carro® — #t& @kuwarr = 'Bushehy Taba KUWAIT _ 8 El Faiyum ag “Rb, EL Minya oles «Hail Sten Cay *Sharm el Sheikh a Asana? ¢, : Dhahran a, © Qena ; SAUDI ARABIA DOU E G Y P T . q Quseir a} it QATAR UxoT ° ae] L e @RIYADH ‘Y SP 2 ‘c e Medina Qe Yanbu MIDDLE EAST REGION Wadi Halfa Jeddah. Mecca 0 100 200 300 KILOMETERS Bess 0 a ; re SUDAN yo aif 0 100 200 +~—- 300 MILES 2 pe I Port Sudan | \ \ e Map 1. Middle East Region 2014 © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther} HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023174

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi 34 i 36° Beirut , i ¢ PALESTINE ° ka oy (1900) a £ . Damascus @ Ss Tyre NV ~ ») e ~ 4 Golan Akko 5, G) Haifa Sea of * e ; Galilee Nazareth “ibid Mediterranean a me Sea g Nablus - © G g ° P32 — Jatta ° i —32—| Jericho | Amman Jerusalem ® co tied Hebron . Deal > Gaza ye s ed & ° * Beersheba » Sarak ~ i 4 El Arish <= 9 e Negev < re ° cS e Ey ° Maan -—30°— —30— Sinai 9 gaba Arabia & BS S > bo > > G Oo 0 25 50 KILOMETERS %, o 0 25 50 MILES Ws, x 28° * S S L— 28° — -29°— 9 | = \ 34° Red Sea 36° © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther) Map 2. Palestine 1900 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023175

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi ~ SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT (191 6) . ad Direct French control Under French influence (area A) Y Direct British control {including = —40°—4 ; the ports of Haifa and Acre} Under British influence (area B) International administration * Tabriz PERSIA Damascus | Syrian |Dejsert ae ees A bi Pp . ! “\. Persian rabla eninsuta 4 SOURCE: Agreement shown on "Map of Eastern oer Turkey in Asia, Syria and Western Persia,” signed 50 100 150 MILES dye Fr. Georges-Picot and Mark Sykes, 8 May 1916. be | | | | © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther} 50 100 150 KILOMETERS Map 3. Sykes—Picot Agreement 1916 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023176

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi 40° 48° Black Sea SOVIET UNION Caspis aspian Sea MIDDLE EAST.AFTER Ps SAN REMO CONFERENCE i % te “te League of Nations armen: mandates 463 (1920) “4 ao French British Under British protection T U R K E Y (1932) Year of independence _Adana oa: ii : Co 14 ee eres san x ~ Mosul . CYPRUS ef gn 111001010) 1110110 1011101) 101) 0011101) ities ese (1943) =: 2} Latakia Log PERSIA SYRIA e. (1946) i 2 LEBANON w . (1943) | Kermanshah. i Beirut ® .-# is Meaesraaucen 2 SDamascus MESOPOTAMIA ~. Acre f* +4 Fela’ ® Baghdad PALESTINE ie (IRAQ) (ISRAEL) Jaffag e948) Ge (1330) x” Jerusalem } oAmman SOhee eee Serey. | oe eee yo" Ey] a eS q Basra, », Abadan EGYPT Ape? | Te i \ weet aw (1922) Aqaba . = : ral eo Kuwait tee NEDJ Meeee eee eetes KUWAIT “a 961), Arabo- te ee een Persian ( SAUDI ARABI A) SOURCE: San Remo resolution (April 1920) Gulf (1932) and Treaty of Sévres (August 1920). 0 50 100 150 KILOMETERS mag HEJAZ abe 0 50 100 = 150 MILES age EI en © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther} Map 4. The Middle East after the San Remo Conference of 1920 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023177

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi | | ai | 3 35° tyre’ LEBANON J\C~ Baniyas 36" Al Qunaytirah PEEL COMMISSION eck’ ce ” an Naqura ake ( | 9 3 7) Hula p33 Safad . ~ 3 Agee SYRIA Partition plan Haifa Ki Arab state ° Tibor) Tiberias t, Under Arab state NEVIS, my administration Ly Megiddo, eAfula ‘ Jewish state i eltbid XN i Mandatory enclave Jenin, Beisan f “| and corridor Z Under Mandator Nazareth 3 ministration i elulkarm t , Jatash e Nablus \ & Ps Tel Aviv, Ss NY Jaffa # as |__ 30 & (Arab), $8 — 320] v Lydday bah } xy Ramal . § Roms . ( Amman Pa Jerichog @ w Ashdod ‘ a Jerusalem, ry ty Bethlehem / » Madaba cS Al Majdal, 4 } {s i wn [xx Gaza, Hebron g s 24 Q | x Khan Yunis Fi 4 Beersheba i Q e \ 4% Karak . & \ ) \ ‘4 a [Si \ { a? —ic| \ ia 4 \EI Auja \ / <= \ / y i / Bs IL ) ail ; / 5 \ \ \ / EGYPT \ j . { \ \ » Maan \ ‘ / \ / _s \ f | \ ( \ | p / \ / 0 10 20 30 KILOMETERS \ } 0 10 20 30 MILES \ | SOURCE: Map no. 8, "Partition: Provisional j / Frontier," of the Palestine Royal Commission ‘ { Report (1937). | 34° \ 2 paahe : - BY © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther) Map 5. Peel Commission 1937 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023178

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi T r ] 0 7 . ae q 34 3° tyre LEBANON PLipePerivas 35 i j Al Qunaytirah UN PARTITION PLAN P; pA Qunay on Lesa ( ] 94 7) Nahariya ¢ { | aeey Ssial} SYRIA Arab state Haifa a drake . Tiberias, g lihantas Jewish state Nacarcte j det. e ea ‘ QD City of Jerusalem = cr ao a Municipali ‘ { nia S, palltyror Beisan . ° \ L, Jerusalem ; and] a Hadera, Janes 4 Netanya 4 e ulkarm i 2 Ry » Nablus 5 ia) *Qalgiliya if $ x Tel Avive 5 < Jaffa { eSalt |— 32°— s (Arab) —32—| Rishon Le Zion® 2 Ramla Ramallah f AMMAN ® . . os Rehovot ® Jericho, 2 es Ashdodg { A FY) Jerusaleny / Madaba » Ashgelon, Bethlehem e / . Cazd Hebron , ! a | z Khan Yunis, / x Rafan® Beersheba 4 Q * \ \ Sh \ \ Karak , a \ E Le \ / a 7 \ 7) c \EI Auja { = \ / x \ | & \ 4 A \ f t I ( » \ EGYPT \ ; \ \ e Maan \ 4 q / [30° — \ / —307— \ f \ } 0 10 20 30 KILOMETERS \ / pt, \ / 0 10 20 30 MILES \ | j} / SOURCE: UN map no. 103 (1947) , ] 0 Aqab. 0 © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther) Map 6. Partition Plan 1947 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023179

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi | i | af P Tyre® as ae 38 LEBANON} } ~~... SYRIA I a ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS - | Al Qunaytirahr~~. a ee a Lake re . Hul | 330 ( ] 94 9) Nahariya, 4 un | ? ate “Baniyas 4 Aces [batad 4 *EIKhalisa : General Armistice Agreements : N Lake t { between Israel and Egypt, Haifa 7 Tiberias| ff 1 . : Tiberias, 1 Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria G i ? Nazareth s / ° f / Armistice demarcation line ae t . Afula , IH ke 1 i Former Palestine Mandate HLA NG g Kafer Looe — International boundary - i Beisan Youud Vianterac® 5 Netab. Demilitarized zone Hadera, f ° /?; i PA ef Mishmar / ol b } HaYarden. Netanya, f,tulkarm ira S] i} gt Rosh Pinna ‘i Pg 7 eNablus (=< \ 2 a Koatcitiya om j > n ° Tel avg H ; @ x Jaffa * 1 3 ‘ | 30 < J , \ “4 < Rishon Le Zion ® Sy, Ramall Sf } \ < Rehovot® Kemet Jericho, 4 . e ake ¢ ES Ashdod SeP sexy ) \ Tiberias jo x no man's land pose erusalem, } ‘ aliberias 4 a : 1 ? = Ashqelor, Pa Bans / \ pe ssier Hareb + / i S . F i? | NX, In , 4 we Ny Hi Hebron I H y a ws Gaza, 7 } ° wu KK ¢ Samakh® ae f FA ” 1g 4 Pied ! Khan Yunis, f oe / 4 i] Z, 0 3 Ml Rafah id Beersheba i a e i \ N Karak , ¥ i \ ‘ \ 7 —31°— f. H 31° ss, J LS a Vw f El Auja’ , 4 \/ / JORDAN i X j 1 Al \ / H f { }} . f I i i 4 NY \ EGYPT \ i 4 i \ \ ¢ Maan \ \ \ / 4 f q { 302 —30°— \ f \ 1 \ 1 ‘ i SOURCES: UN map nos, 219-X (1949) \ i O10 20 BEN IOMETERS and 761 (1955) ry 1 0 10 20 30 MILES \ 7 ( i i 1 I 0 * Aaab 0 34 Tabaly r gaba 36 Map 7. Armistice Agreements 1949 © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther) HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023180

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi 34° He j poe 34a ISRAEL AND ea OCCUPIED TERRITORIES < i (1967) rT © x Jpamascus ~o Tyre V ad Territories occupied by Israel (June 1967) ‘ a \ SYRIA Sinai Peninsula returned to Egypt (April 1982 Cues soln! uiaytiral inal Peninsula returned to Egypt (Apri } ne < A UNEF | deployment (May 1967) Haifa, ssc Armistice demarcation line (1949) 4 d j ‘ Mediterranean Sea wel Aviol ; [— 32° — I © -32— %. Jericho. € AMMAN ISRA EL@ eB prcuisheen ~ i ff Hebron | Dead wo | | Sea Port Said SS ¥ El Arish t * Beersheba K 9 Karak 6 4 \ A a\ \ = 8 ak Auja r ag ie) VS z \V ? Q = . i i Al & l ! fe) ! ¢ Nj \ » \ 4 ° Maan L__ 399 — sues | “a A \ 4 39° 4 / 1 | Aqaba EGYPT Taba ] bw S & > NX Q > a > SAUDI ARABIA oe ie “ a p— 28° — A —23°—J yar (Oa SOURCES: UN map nos. 979 (1957) Sharm el Sheikh ¢! Strait of Tiran and 2902 (1976) 0 25 50 KILOMETERS id 25 50 MILES ale Red Sea ds | | © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther) Map 8. Israel and the Occupied Territories 1967 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023181

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi | 350 Lake "a if Tiberias aifa OSLO | (1994) and OSLO II (1995) j N th. , INTERIM AGREEMENTS on ezane <. Oslo |: Gaza and Jericho (May 1994) t Palestinian autonomy CaN v Israeli civil and security control &. - 4 —_ sail 5. sy coma ? ‘ 3 Israeli settlemen * a Jf Fay Ra + . x oe Israeli security zone “a i po ; Oslo Il: West Bank (September 1995) Tulkarmd ! A: Palestinian autonomy ih B: Palestinian civil jurisdiction Nd bins. Ne A ? S Israeli security control Qalgili Ba a qi vagy Poe C: Israeli civil and security control s wy e i C *% Safe passage route \ = Tel Avi 1 5 el Aviv, t ) oe ! ISRAEL 4-229 Ky Ramla, sg t “te 4 ee - Ve. ‘ Jerusalem 9 sae mi 7 7a Bethileltem : ae, / 8 9 is ° Ie 4 Ls Hebron io Q C] ___ 6 “ | ? ° J rae 4 NO lawn tenn j s/f z t = Beersheba a Q © j \ \ ~ \ Ya 5 % ~ \ EGYPT \ * SOURCES: Maps 1, 2, and 6 of the "Agreement A |__3j0_ \ on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area” (4 May = — 34°] + 1994): "An Atlas of Palestine” (ARI, 2000); "The 0 5 10 15 KILOMETERS qd \ New Atlas of Israel” (Survey of Israel, 2011) - \ 0 5 10 15 MILES { ‘ ) \ 3° a \ | / | © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther} Map 9. Oslo Accords 1994 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023182

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi HEBRON PROTOCOL (1997) H-1: Area transfered to Palestinian civil jurisdiction H-2: Area retained by Israel for security and public order Joint Mobile Unit area i i of operation in H-2 A POIge Station Joint Mobile Unit 106@ Agreed adjacent area special place reference point © Checkpoint x Jewish holy site 103 102 O © 100 Qu sion, e = Ras al Jura @ 104 mx 105 e": ef A . Ss Shaaba i RS * Re * - Nes: 2 < oe fees RS Q, rs : ini Se Israeli Border pasta’ © ey AGoiedt Area H- 1 Harat * al Sheikh .« QO: As we, Ae" ee OLD CITY © Abu . we Sneinah = (©) . 106 oo ® : he HQ 108 107 District Coordination Office Joint Mobile Unit Joint Coordination Center SOURCE: Appendix 1, "Protocol | g RITOMES EH I I 0 1 MILE Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron" (17 January 1997) © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther) Map 10. Hebron Protocol 1997 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023183

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi Lake | wv las:// “Haifa WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM (1998) Partial implementation of redeployment (October 1998) . Nazareth Palestinian autonomy (Result of redeployment from Area B to Area A) Palestinian civil jurisdiction, Israeli security control (Result of redeployment from AreaC to Area B) = / Oslo | and Il Agreements (1994-1995) a A: Palestinian autonomy B: Palestinian civil jurisdiction Israeli security control C: Israeli civil and security control Safe passage route Israeli security zone (Gaza Strip} Tel Avivy, [370 Jerusalem o ents t Bethlehem - & \, Tiberias ’ Z Z ¢ ‘ ae f i rae oe --* No weet tee ail we Beersheba | i \ SOURCE: "An Atlas of Palestine” (ARIJ, 2000) Fg f —31°— . j 314 \ ie) 5 16. 15 KILOMETERS ] \ 0 5 i015 MILES a \ | / a 35° we \ © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther) Map 11. Wye Memorandum 1998 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023184

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi lose ° Haifa SHARM EL SHEIKH MEMORANDUM (1999) . oY Phase | redeployment } Palestinian civil jurisdiction, Israeli security control (Result of redeployment from Area C to Area B) ature reserve gt |__ (Result of redeployment from Area C to Area B) Proposed Phase Il redeployment / i t 7, Palestinian autonomy { f YL (To be redeployed from Area B to Area A) / F ee ature reserve / u“u"u"} (To be redeployed from Area C to Area B) / Tulkarmigp \ Oslo | and Il Agreements (1994-1995) } ; p iS ia A: Palestinian autonomy ] , [ Qalqiliya 4” / q ont Bethlehem %& oo See Beersheba | \ \ SOURCE: "An Atlas of Palestine” (ARIJ, 2000) |_3yo_ \ \ 0 5 10 15 KILOMETERS \ 0 5 10 15 MILES ‘ \ \ 35° oe B: Palestinian civil jurisdiction | x Ss Israeli security control [ 1 ini) "] ’ C: Israeli civil and security control F GY y lel Aviv } ==mmmen Safe passage route ‘ { I [32° _ Israeli security zone (Gaza Strip) / I S RAEL i I vy / v / Ramla, Sgn v1 © / oan, Bs / " Ramallah ate, / entre. & °° L) oe Jerusalem ¥y | Lake Tiberias v, 3 t Nazareth ys 1 ‘ ~.. . ~. 0 Jericho | Map 12. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum 1999 © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther) HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023185

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi CAMP DAVID TALKS (2000) Proposal made by Israel (July 2000) Areas to be annexed to Israel Temporary Israeli security zone (12 to 20 years) Areas intended for Palestinian state i Areas A and B of Oslo Agreements =ummeme Safe passage route eal Israeli settlemet ee se 1967 boundary a . Jerusalem o : 2 “ ee z 7 < ye Beersheba {/ Q ° i é. nw ong Ww 7 Ly Se fo) * SOURCES: Negotiations Affairs Department of the : A E G Y PT \ Palestine Liberation Organization; Foundation for ‘ { oe \ Middle East Peace; "Le Monde Diplomatique” ‘ | on ‘ | \ Fs i ar \ 0 5 10 15 KILOMETERS Noy * p++ 4 Sno \ 0 5 10 15 MILES ~ I \ | / 4 35° Road \ | | / | Lake Tiberias | . Nazareth é UMA: lordan River w S Map 13. Camp David 2000 © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther) HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023186

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi Lake Tiberias CLINTON PARAMETERS (2000) . Nazareth Proposed parameters (December 2000) ia Palestinian state Areas annexed to Israel =a=amnmn_ Safe passage route A International military presence (36 months) we 1967 boundary \ Jerusalem ro} w= Beersheba | SOURCES: D. Ross "The Missing Peace” \ and "An Atlas of Palestine” (ARI, 2000) | 31° \ fog 31 \ Oo 5 10 15 KILOMETERS ‘ ! \ 0 5 10 15 MILES aa | \ ? a 35° os \ | | / | © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther} Map 14. Clinton Parameters 2000 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023187

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi ( N A (Lake | “Haifa \ Tiberias TABA TALKS . (2 001 ) J . Nazareth Proposal made by Israel (January 2001) ) Areas to be annexed to Israel Areas intended for Palestinian state i Areas A and B of Oslo Agreements = mmm m Safe passage route r Israeli early warning station { calf Israeli settlemet / ee se 1967 boundary t—32° — / / / Ramla f . oe wv / 6 / Jerusal t 7s erusalem -_ = aw / ee wy / | a Be en ad Sal Beersheba | \ * SOURCES: Charles Enderlin "Shattered Dreams”, EU EGYPT \ (Moratinos) "Non-Paper”; "Le Monde Diplomatique” \ |—31°— \ # j ar \ ie) 5 16. 15 KILOMETERS 4 : \ 3 5 1015 MILES a \ } J \ 35° Rod \ | | / | © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther) Map 15. Taba Talks 2001 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023188

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi Pa 7 * Nazareth “sJ - GENEVA ACCORDS ¢ (2003) - a [ Palestine Israel y 4 2003 Geneva Accord line q eee 1967 line, where it differs from the Geneva Accord line - Designated road for Israeli civilians NETS > ® r Israeli early warning station Oalqiliya Ren £\ Mountain i sy , $ i aS Tel Aviv, H ‘ West f 1 T Bank % | 32°— 32° Baal oe Ramla Pitesor nN 2 Ramallah av? ° \ yet yo ) Zz met! lg a) / \e Oo Ashgelony im \ \ \ Lge \ EGYPT \ Atlas of Israel” (Survey of Israel, 2011) q 0 P) 10 15 KILOMETERS \ » 0 5 10 15 MILES \ ! 4 . 5° { \ | | d | CORRIDOR Beersheba | Jerusalem East SOURCES: The Geneva Initiative and "The New © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther} Map 16. Geneva Accord 2003 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023189

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi GAZA DISENGAGEMENT PLAN (2005) Israeli settlement Area C: Israeli civil and security control Israeli controlled area Israeli controlled road xX Checkpoint |—31°40'— Deir al Balah 34°30! | 15 miles *s. closed area Me " Ss They Sy ee, ‘ Sy ‘. = ». an a EREZ g $ —31°40'— ISRAEL Post disengagement Israeli security zone —) S Crossing point, open Crossing point, closed Palestinian built-up area SOURCES: Maps 6 of the "Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area” (4 May 1994); "The Gaza Strip" (Miftah, 2004); "Gaza Stip" 5,396] (UN-OCHA, 2005); "Gaza Strip” (UN-OCHA, 2011) MARITIME ACTIVITY ZONE (OSLO 1) 7 nal a 7 = Y e =i A 7 ad LS & i ! 1 f 1 Khan_-Yttnis 1 \ 1 1 4 4 ‘ 1 \ ’ 1 Mediterranean Sea } Ke > Airport * ii # non-operational EGYPT _ 1.5 miles closed area wy Lag Je aie “et ua \ \ . ISRAEL \ 9 as 5 KILOMETERS iI T ij 0 25 5 MILES | \ 34°20! \ | | Map 17. Gaza Disengagement 2005 © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther) HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023190

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi ! alas: / Sake f \. Tiberins Haifa OLMERT-ABBAS TALKS \ 4 Nazareth al (2007-2008) o aZare Oty "Projection of Israeli Proposal for Territory" § presented by Palestinian Chief Negotiator ) Saeb Erakat at the International Peace Institute | nN F on 25 lune 2010 Ses s | ef CD Jenin, 7 Area to be swapped from | ~ Palestine to Israel i ¢ Area to be swaped from | rf Tubas, na on! . oe f Lf <f y Israel to Palestine 1 Tulkarm Area in Jerusalem not } ee presented by the Israeli side - e ; Nablus». a * 98 coed Israeli settlement a: . $a Qalqiliyars 7 5 = g & Israeli settlement to be evacuated 5 eae 5 tf AS 1 A * ss coccc- 1967 boundary PALESTINE a aa 4 Tel Aviv, . “2 _* c ) Salfit =. » £ a a Fs West + % _»—_| Lose oe /ISRAEL : / mg « Bank , - o | gv / Ramla = f a j te Ramallah 6 x en A 4 yer a Ke ah ) we \ Ashgelony z A, < Beersheba | a ri Q \ ° \ \ EGYPT} \ ‘ i |—31°— \ ra } 374 \ 0 5 10 15 KILOMETERS vd \ 0 5 10 15 MILES . | C y) \ 35° — \ | | / © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther} Map 18. Olmert-Abbas Talks 2007-8 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023191

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi (2012) Governorate limit Oslo Agreement Areas A and B Area C and nature reserves Barrier, constructed and planned Israeli settlement area behind barrier Jerusalem municipal area Israeli security zone (Gaza) 1967 Armistice line | 370 Ise Lake "Haifa Tiberias AUTONOMOUS AREAS OF | WEST BANK AND GAZA » Nazareth < « “JERICHO t t f / / ié jo S Q jj z ra iy Beersheba | f Q i ae \ ye \ K EGYPT \ \ i 5 / — 31°— \ ] 31° \ SOURCES: "The Occupied Palestinian Territory” UN- OB i ABRILOMETERS . * OCHA, 2010); "An Atlas of Palestine” (ARIJ, 2000) 6 q 16 +5 MILES I ; ) \ 35° Rat \ | / © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther} Map 19. Autonomous areas 2012 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023192

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi 35% | WEST BANK BARRIER (2012) eas of mid-2011 Completed Under construction Approved Barrier rou Planned 2003 plan (shown where differs from 2011 route) q sraeli settlement 1967 Armistice line ~~ 23 QalqiliyalY é Tel Aviv e |__320_1 Ramla e c. —32°30'— aw To "dan River se | we S ISRAEL JORDAN |__ 3 4039'__ SOURCES: "West Bank - Access and Closure" (UN-OCHA 2011); "Route of the Security Fence" (IDFMU 2005, 2011); "The West Bank, Settlements and the Separation Barrier" (B'TSELEM 201 1) 0 5 10 KILOMETERS 10 MILES ane © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther) Map 20. West Bank Barrier 2012 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023193

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi B59 35°30" | oe) a”, & \ , ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS a “* ; a” ~ae sS, be — 32039: _| (2012) " . \ j ‘a ~ Jenin, . f i . H \ a Built-up area ‘ : . SNatas Municipal area é -s » MI scone Jerusalem municipal ) nl boundary ~ Tubas, o ----- 1967 Armistice line Jolulkarm 4 I w 4 ws \ * Bs if & * y= a > p ~ Nablus, » . ¢ 5 7 ES, es Pane, * a eS an. 5 Qaldiliyafg a P = N wa, ay Gums : e fy » cy ; & \ 5 3 . ~ ty ye West % ? Vv? ip _ = 4 é “ Ps) s Tel Aviv \ 7 Shalit mm i \ + jee e i 4 |-—32°+ i « —322— ! € J tf Ramla, Re za oy ¢ <{ a 4 \ {a o/eticho > ew * : + ° 4 ry 1 ISRAEL ro. " / / ! / s ! of ' Os Sf I r ao i x Q | ¢ Hebror? * | —31°30'— ; el — 3130'— / - 4 v sy 5 / ” \ ¢ es a va a Ca re ! i ® “ / \ . F *, - ec / Fie a y olen : Me “yee sane a f Ne" 7 y, 4 SOURCES: "West Bank - Access and Closure" (UN-OCHA 2011); 2 "The West Bank, Settlements and the Separation Barrier" I (B'TSELEM 2011) { < 0 5 10 KILOMETERS 4 | . | 0 5 10 MILES cha A 58°59) | i | © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther) Map 21. Israeli Settlements 2012 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023194

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi a Ramallah ae | I JERUSALEM , (201 2) ‘ V4 fy Planned E-1 area ¥e. ‘ Approximate built-up areas Kochav © Palestinian “ 7 DA Israeli Binyamin City boundary, 1947 Proposed city limit by the United Nations, 1947 eaa= Municipal boundary, expanded since 1967 eocec-- Armistice demarcation line, 1949 Fr = ©* N Jaba Ar Ram Al Jib Bir Nabala poo initskee v Beit Hizma Hanina —= 31 *50—) e “eas Ramat. French © “sEShkal Hill paw aes” a td ‘ Al, © WJarrah m Al Eizariya aYovel | x Silwan i t anya J Abu Dis ~ a a . East 1 OF aaa r sLalpiott ¢ ¢ Sur Bahir , Fa or oer eweeeee,. ye Har Homa < — ee O Al Ubeidiya e @ * 8 it Jal *e Beit Jala %e Husan e Bethlehem *. *e, ad Beit Sahur e e s O Neve Daniel SOURCES: UN map nos, 101 (1947) and 3640 (1997); "An Atlas of Palestine” 5 (ARI, 2000); "The New Atlas of Isreal” e (Survey of Israel, 2011); "Greater rs Jerusalem” (Ir Amim, 2009) 2 —31°40' . od e 0 | 2 KILOMETERS x : ° . Teqoa | 0 j 2 MILES Me, © a © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther} Map 22. Jerusalem 2012 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023195

OUP CORRECTED PROOF - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi T 35°45" Israeli occupied area ( sseeee+ Line of withdrawal of Israeli = | ii sett! ‘ LEBANON i Forces from Lebanon (2000) sraell settiemen Z 4 = === Armistice demarcation line (1949) UNDOF area of operation (1974—) wy, \ -—— Former Palestine Mandate (1923) . ote A UNTSO observer post = “tage “<< Von International boundary Demilitarized zone (1949) 2 < 5 yy i * Mazra'at Bayt Jinn oe } . i, Riel aa i 4, (Alladar > * aetleae * Majdal g K a so A My - ° RS Shams ¢ << ) UNDOF HO : fe, Gal Ghajar ° “a \ get 4. £ ™~ iy p3etsi— "a Lema ee. ~ \ — 33°15) : — { \ = Dan” df 2 Bepiee 4 A Camp Faouar : : e - A, : Qiryat { ‘4 Meseistlh V//2Jubate’al Khashab : e Shemona \ I D>. Me I Buqjata ° A » 2 Ramin ' ° a Khan Amabah : 1 ° \ yp : 1 y -> i *Ne'ot \ ° Z j *Jaba : U L i % Z ° ot fe °Masharah . ry Qunaitiral® Cumm Batinah see Val I oO “KY \/144 = *Ramot ' oO me i ter Naftali YA / ° VA Nab’ as Sakhr ® 1 Kafr j 1 : . ‘ Naffakh » * ) ~ Alma vane j \ \ Al Harrah® Fad) Golan wo ¢ / i Ayyelet® y oj ° Hei hts \ S YRIA HaShahar ‘\Gadot } g k x L330 —_ y i e e \ — 33? \ \ oo Al Kushniyah \ ze i ° octal eRosh tj {za Pinna | ° fe) ; ¢ i o se Butmiyah® ) pp S ISRAEL [ & ° Af a at 7 ay Uff \ ad Sf 4 > i ; w ° S ‘ Gi 9 Locator map id \ fl w \ ° Vi 1o o Khistin Mi Tee } A co LEBANON ft i, oe 10 ° a { Tiberias 1 oO s yy V4 t. O fo] 3 SA ff oh ns H Ss Vf/a SYRIA eiberias 4 a oe JZ Pane ' \ a . En Gev * Ly Hor Bet Ma'on N o im va b q oO y jf ISRAEL | 32045) bot Kafr Harib fn es oN _| J se cos CISELY sorpan j pe EN, fj wie Aqraba ® os SR » Yavne'el < ral ayant \ & . 4 a & “sh aay’ Hama J ORDAN cae x aso 7 a“ Venn SOURCES: UN map no. 2916 Rew. 75 | ep RLOMETERS aa (2011), CA map no. 724711 (4-92) 4g 1 3 BMILES "Semen, Pema | t © IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther) Map 23. Golan Heights 2012 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023196

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