addafi's fate Ed Husain Article 4. The Christian Science Monitor Libya endgame: Lessons for Syria's protesters Bilal Y. Saab Article 5 Foreign Policy Assad's Chemical Romance Leonard Spector Article 6. Washington Post 10 years after 9/11, al-Qaeda is down but not out David Ignatius Article 7. Hurriyet Wh

of poisonous liquids would remain, with the potential to cause large-scale casualties. The Obama administration needs to start planning now to manage Assad's chemical weapons legacy. If a new government replaces Assad -- or even if different groups compete for international recognition -- a U.S.-led coal

ia, there is now a risk of a dangerous moment of western triumphalism. This must be resisted, especially given that the odds of overthrowing dictator Bashar al- Assad are so small. After months of holding his nerve, US president Barack Obama last week succumbed to calls from commentators and Syrian opposition leade

feat in a subsequent round of fighting in 2006. In a poll of Arab public opinion taken in 2008, the three most popular leaders were Hassan Nasrallah, Bashar al-Assad and Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, in that order. But this sense of inexorable ascendancy in which the Iran-led bloc liked to cloak itself has fallen victim to

a key position in the region. What happens there has a direct impact on Lebanon and Iraq. In addition, Gadhafi used heavy weapons from the start, but Assad hasn't. SPIEGEL: Yet tanks have been deployed in Hama, Homs and Latakia for some time. Elaraby: When I flew to Syria 10 days after taking office, t

n, Gadhafi used heavy weapons from the start, but Assad hasn't. SPIEGEL: Yet tanks have been deployed in

circle saw the bombing of Khan Sheikhoun as a straightforward opportunity to register an absolute moral objection. The circumstance was unequivocal: Bashar al-Assad’s government, once again defying international law, had used chemical weapons. There was video documenting the attack and substantial agreement among i

ntial agreement among intelligence agencies about Assad’s responsibility. The politics were right: Barack

ying international law, had used chemical weapons. There was video documenting the attack and substantial agreement among intelligence agencies about Assad’s responsibility. The politics were right: Barack Obama failed to act when confronted with a Syrian chemical attack, and now Trump could. The downsid

rian peace deal that was not to come. Despite Barak offering Syrian President Hafez al-Assad 99 per cent of the Golan Heights, it still fell short of Assad’s demand for a return to the 4 June 1967 lines, and the Syria track subsequently crumbled. This put Arafat on the spot: how could he now, in front of

Resolu- tions 425 and 426. 18 June 2000 The UN Security Council confirms Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in a Presidential Statement. 10 July 2000 Bashar al-Assad is elected President of Syria in a nationwide referendum. 11-25 July 2000 Camp David II negotiations between Ehud Barak and Yasir Arafat. 25 July 2

cent of the Golan Heights, it still fell short of Assad’s demand for a return to the 4 June 1967 lines, a

cases, the insurgents are seen in the West as the "good guys," battling corrupt, autocratic leaders. Personally, I wish that both Moammar Gaddafi and Bashar al-Assad would give up power tomorrow. But that doesn't seem in the cards: Both leaders have shown they're willing to kill thousands of their citizens to hang

emplate dialogue with leaders such as Gaddafi and Assad who, to put it bluntly, have blood on their hands

present evidence, a bloody stalemate that further destabilizes the region. It's distasteful to contemplate dialogue with leaders such as Gaddafi and Assad who, to put it bluntly, have blood on their hands. But this approach is worth exploring if it can foster a transition to a democratic government - wh

regimes lying between the Atlas Mountains and the Persian Gulf. Yet unlike the Muslim Brotherhood's rebellion in Hama, which shook the government of Bashar al-Assad's father Hafez in 1982, the Facebook rebellion seems curiously faceless. There are some signs of opposition violence with "plausible reports of securit

oratory, you couldn't have done much better. Syria presents a profoundly different situation. U.S. policy has always been driven by the hope that the Assads would change and the fear of what might replace them if they fell. Three additional realities ensured a U.S. response quite different from the one fo

ng different. There simply is no reform option, and there never was. Genuine reform means dislodging the bricks holding up Assad- Makhlouf authority. Bashar Assad's open-ended presidency, the crony capitalism practiced by his cousin and other members of Syria's elite, the abuse practiced by the all-powerful secur

other bureaucracies, and thus had no legitimacy. Marcus Aurelius was one thing; Tunisia's Zine el- Abidine Ben Ali, Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Syria's Bashar al- Assad, quite another. Certainly, the Arab Spring has proved much: that there is no otherness to Arab civilization, that Arabs yearn for universal values ju

he state together. To be sure, Egypt's Mubarak and Tunisia's Ben Ali neither ran police states on the terrifying scale of Libya's Qaddafi and Syria's Assad nor stifled economic progress with such alacrity. But while Mubarak and Ben Ali left their countries in conditions suitable for the emergence of stab

e terrifying scale of Libya's Qaddafi and Syria's Assad nor stifled economic progress with such alacrity.

n around Latakia. And there's no sign that either Assad or his Russian patrons are paying any more than l

making significant gains on the battlefield this week, following an offer by their top political leader for negotiations with the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028690 --- PAGE BREAK --- This military and diplomatic news may appear positive. But Syrian sources caution that the battlefield a

y, as Alawite supporters of the regime retreat to their ancestral homeland in the northwestern region around Latakia. And there's no sign that either Assad or his Russian patrons are paying any more than lip service to a political settlement. One potential game-changer is a request for U.S. help in train

making significant gains on the battlefield this week, following an offer by their top political leader for negotiations with the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_025056 --- PAGE BREAK --- This military and diplomatic news may appear positive. But Syrian sources caution that the battlefield

y, as Alawite supporters of the regime retreat to their ancestral homeland in the northwestern region around Latakia. And there’s no sign that either Assad or his Russian patrons are paying any more than lip service to a political settlement. One potential game-changer is a request for U.S. help in trai

n around Latakia. And there’s no sign that either Assad or his Russian patrons are paying any more than l

d strong evidence of chemical weapons used by the Assad regime. In June 2013, Washington concluded that c

e rebels with weapons. The Obama administration claimed that the US would not intervene unless it had strong evidence of chemical weapons used by the Assad regime. In June 2013, Washington concluded that chemical weapons, including nerve agent sarin, classified by The United Nations as a weapon of mass d

demonstrators took to the streets in Syria. The protestors were demanding political reforms, dissatisfied with the cruel and authoritarian regime of Bashar al-Assad, who has been in power for more than ten years, succeeding his father after a 30-year rule. The government responded by opening fire. Within a few mo

We say that the norm against chemical weapons is a categorical norm because those who abide by it consider whether a transgression was committed (did Assad use chemical weapons?), rather than focus- ing entirely on how much harm was done (how many civilians did Assad kill?). Other norms are similarly cat

nsider whether a transgression was committed (did Assad use chemical weapons?), rather than focus- ing en

not always true for continuous variables. Consider the longstanding norm against the use of chemical weapons. This norm recently made headlines when Bashar al-Assad was alleged to have used chemical weapons to kill about a thousand Syrian civilians, outraging world leaders who had HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_015514 --- PAG

es been far from neutral, favoring one community over another in cynical power plays. Many Sunni Muslims in Syria and throughout the region feel that Assad's Syria has unduly favored the Alawites, a sect of Shiite Islam, who constitute some 12 percent of the population but control a vastly greater percen

A government spokeswoman has hinted that coming reforms will include greater freedom for the press and the right to form political parties. President Bashar al-Assad is due to address the country in the next 48 hours. His speech is eagerly awaited, but it remains to be seen whether it will be enough to defuse the

lims in Syria and throughout the region feel that Assad's Syria has unduly favored the Alawites, a sect o

cal life and for that of the regime put in place in 1970 by his father, the late President Hafez al-Assad. Forty-one years in power The rule of the Assads, father and son, has now lasted 41 years, a score comparable to that of other long-lasting Arab autocrats, each apparently determined to be a préside

tly financed a London-based network of Bashar’s opponents to the tune of $12m between 2005 and 2010. A continuous whole It is probably fair to view Bashar al-Assad’s term of office and that of his father as a single continuous whole. Not only did Hafez al-Assad decide that Bashar should succeed him, but he also be

-- Article 2. The New York Post The storm in Syria Amir Taheri April 16, 2011 -- Yesterday was supposed to be the first day of what Syrian despot Ba shar al-Assad had dubbed "social calm"; he hoped his mixture of promises and repressive measures would silence the pro-democracy uprising that has shaken the Ba'at

t regime. Instead, the opposition mounted a "Friday of Resolution," with fresh nationwide marches against tyranny. In addition to other empty moves, Assad had ordered the release of protesters arrested in the past four weeks provided they had not done "anything that might undermine the interests of the

something really grave happens (Iran for example) - the US will not stand by. The world will take action!" And I say: Don't bet on it. Look at Syria. Assad has massacred 200,000 of his own people - with tanks, artillery, fighter jets, even chemical weapons - and the world did not lift a finger. HOUSE _OV

tion!" And I say: Don't bet on it. Look at Syria. Assad has massacred 200,000 of his own people - with ta

IGHT_028748 --- PAGE BREAK --- states, such as Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. I think it is likely to happen before too long. TB: What about Syria? DP: Assad's power is steadily diminishing and I cannot see how his regime will remain long in power. TB: Should the United States get involved there? DP: No, A

happen before too long. TB: What about Syria? DP: Assad's power is steadily diminishing and I cannot see

bout an Israeli raid in Syria on August 1, 2008. It revealed that in it a group of Israeli commandos killed General Suleiman, a top aide to President Assad who had been working with North Korea to build a nuclear facility in Syria. Israel had destroyed that facility in Operation Orchard nearly a year ear

killed General Suleiman, a top aide to President Assad who had been working with North Korea to build a

tion!" And I say: Don't bet on it. Look at Syria. Assad has massacred 200,000 of his own people - with ta

something really grave happens (Iran for example) - the US will not stand by. The world will take action!" And I say: Don't bet on it. Look at Syria. Assad has massacred 200,000 of his own people - with tanks, artillery, fighter jets, even chemical weapons - and the world did not lift a finger. And the o

enough to help Iraq. Iraqi’s are worried that an Assad exit will push Iran to double down on Iraq. JS:

untry together. MO: Iraq is most vulnerable to Iran when it is weak and divided and we haven’t done enough to help Iraq. Iraqi’s are worried that an Assad exit will push Iran to double down on Iraq. JS: limit Iran’s influence on Iraq by isolating Iran in region. Reducing Iran’s incluence in region 1s k

ven into the tapestry of everyday life, a new project finds. MORE... Seth Moulton on Syriastrikes: Trump does not care enough to ‘et the victims of Assad find refuge & freedom here’ Representative Seth Moulton has some choice words for President Donald Trump following the US assault in Syria. MORE...

Trump does not care enough to ‘et the victims of Assad find refuge & freedom here’ Representative Seth