ia, there is now a risk of a dangerous moment of western triumphalism. This must be resisted, especially given that the odds of overthrowing dictator Bashar al- Assad are so small. After months of holding his nerve, US president Barack Obama last week succumbed to calls from commentators and Syrian opposition leade

on- based Shiite organization. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031932 --- PAGE BREAK --- 21 So despite their many faults and deplorable record on human rights, the Assads have treated their chemical arsenal with considerable care. But as the country potentially descends into chaos, will that hold true? Let's start with

addafi's fate Ed Husain Article 4. The Christian Science Monitor Libya endgame: Lessons for Syria's protesters Bilal Y. Saab Article 5 Foreign Policy Assad's Chemical Romance Leonard Spector Article 6. Washington Post 10 years after 9/11, al-Qaeda is down but not out David Ignatius Article 7. Hurriyet Wh

plot behind every popular democratic uprising. Artick 2. The Daily Beast Syria: The Lost Bequest of Hafez Assad Fouad Ajami January 23, 2012 -- Bashar, son of Hafez Assad, has a son by the name of Hafez. But as the defiance and bloodletting in £yria would seem to suggest, Bashar needn't worry abou

dispatched to prisons. The young inheritor was his father's son. A year ago, when the political hurricane known as the Arab Spring hit the region, Bashar al-Assad proclaimed his country's immunity to the troubles. He was young, the rulers challenged by their people were old, he was anti- American and anti-Isra

reign Minister Sergei Lavrov last week rejected any talk of new U.N. sanctions or arms embargo on Syria. He even defended Moscow's right to arm Mr. Assad as he kills more civilians. The business daily Kommersant reported yesterday that Russia has signed a $550 million contract to sell Syria 36 combat

with Secretary of State John Kerry here this week, the =ussian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, hinted that Moscow might finally pressure President Bashir al-Assad of Syria to l=ave office. 2 EFTA_R1_00107015 EFTA01785153 "We are not interested in the fate =f certain individuals," Mr. Lavrov said at a late

y furt=er. Jerusalem, ultimately, has little interest in actively hastening the f=ll of Bashar al-Assad. Israel knows one important thin= about the Assads: for the past 40 years, they have managed to preserve so=e form of calm along the border. Technically, the two countries have always been at war --

e, the Alawite regime in Damascus and Hezbol=ah in Lebanon) is hell-bent on robbing them of their historic place in Iraq, their government's tilt to=ard Bashar al-Assad provided it. 5 EFTA_R1_00107018 EFTA01785156 It was a matter of time before =hese millennial conflicts were given new life by the Syrian civil w

ng different. There simply is no reform option, and there never was. Genuine reform means dislodging the bricks holding up Assad- Makhlouf authority. Bashar Assad's open-ended presidency, the crony capitalism practiced by his cousin and other members of Syria's elite, the abuse practiced by the all-powerful secur

regimes lying between the Atlas Mountains and the Persian Gulf. Yet unlike the Muslim Brotherhood's rebellion in Hama, which shook the government of Bashar al-Assad's father Hafez in 1982, the Facebook rebellion seems curiously faceless. There are some signs of opposition violence with "plausible reports of securit

oratory, you couldn't have done much better. Syria presents a profoundly different situation. U.S. policy has always been driven by the hope that the Assads would change and the fear of what might replace them if they fell. Three additional realities ensured a U.S. response quite different from the one fo

simply Hafez al-Assad's son. David W. Lesch, a professor of Middle East history at Trinity University, is the author of "The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al- Asad and Modern Syria." SONY_GM_00078427 JPM-SDNY-00001554 EFTA_00188894 Confidential Treatment Requested by JPMorgan Chase EFTA01301050 9

conference at 6 pm on Thursday evening, in response to violent demonstrations in the southern town of Daraa near the border with Jordan. President Bashar al-Assad, she stressed, had given strict orders not to fire at demonstrators with live ammunition - and expressed his sorrow for the senseless loss of life

minority of the Alawite sect is Syria's equivalent to Saddam Hussein's clan of Tikriti Sunnis, both having ruled cruelly and bloodily. Indeed, the Assads have nursed a particular grudge against the Palestinians, almost all of them. They had little truck with Arafat and sided in the intra-Palestinian

A government spokeswoman has hinted that coming reforms will include greater freedom for the press and the right to form political parties. President Bashar al-Assad is due to address the country in the next 48 hours. His speech is eagerly awaited, but it remains to be seen whether it will be enough to defuse the

llenged the fundamentals of Syria's security state, a harsh system of controls over every aspect of society, put in place by the late Hafez al-Assad, Bashar's father, who ruled for 30 years from 1970 to his death in 2000. By all accounts, the debate HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_030032 --- PAGE BREAK --- 4 about how

es been far from neutral, favoring one community over another in cynical power plays. Many Sunni Muslims in Syria and throughout the region feel that Assad's Syria has unduly favored the Alawites, a sect of Shiite Islam, who constitute some 12 percent of the population but control a vastly greater percen

e rebels with weapons. The Obama administration claimed that the US would not intervene unless it had strong evidence of chemical weapons used by the Assad regime. In June 2013, Washington concluded that chemical weapons, including nerve agent sarin, classified by The United Nations as a weapon of mass d

demonstrators took to the streets in Syria. The protestors were demanding political reforms, dissatisfied with the cruel and authoritarian regime of Bashar al-Assad, who has been in power for more than ten years, succeeding his father after a 30-year rule. The government responded by opening fire. Within a few mo

d strong evidence of chemical weapons used by the Assad regime. In June 2013, Washington concluded that c

about Obama's flip-flopping on Syria —particularly the President's failure to rapidly arm Syrian rebels and conduct air strikes in retaliation for Assad's use of chemical weapons. Prince Bandar also worried about America entering a slippery slope in negotiations with Iran. Shiite Iran is enemy No. 1

Intelligence Chief and former Ambassador to the U.S., added his complaints on Tuesday. He said, "the current charade of international control over Bashar's chemical arsenal would be funny if it were not so blatantly perfidious." Perhaps the silence towards Prince Bandar's leaks reflects the mood of

al issues — the Syrian and Iranian crises. In recent months, Turkey's government has adopted an increasingly tougher stance toward Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime, convinced that it can only fall. The agreement recently reached by the United States and Russia is, from this standpoint, frustrating new

nd air, and as an American tank was parked close by him, when he told reporters: "Look, we have surrounded the infidels". We could even mention the Bashar al-Assad regime, which has never tired of repeating the mantra of resistance and opposition, even though its forces have ended up fighting the Syrian people

pport. The Obama administration has even actively discouraged its allies from giving rebels the very weapons they say they need to defeat President Bashar al-Assad's regime. As a member of one town's revolutionary council said: "We read in the media that we are receiving things. But we haven't seen it. We only

a greater willingness to consider arming the rebels — together with the fact that some of his advisers have expressed more hawkish policies toward Assad and his regime's key backers, Iran and Russia — may give many in the rebel camp reason to hope the Republican candidate prevails on Tuesday. 2. Isr

a key position in the region. What happens there has a direct impact on Lebanon and Iraq. In addition, Gadhafi used heavy weapons from the start, but Assad hasn't. SPIEGEL: Yet tanks have been deployed in Hama, Homs and Latakia for some time. Elaraby: When I flew to Syria 10 days after taking office, t

feat in a subsequent round of fighting in 2006. In a poll of Arab public opinion taken in 2008, the three most popular leaders were Hassan Nasrallah, Bashar al-Assad and Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, in that order. But this sense of inexorable ascendancy in which the Iran-led bloc liked to cloak itself has fallen victim to

n, Gadhafi used heavy weapons from the start, but Assad hasn't. SPIEGEL: Yet tanks have been deployed in

y, as Alawite supporters of the regime retreat to their ancestral homeland in the northwestern region around Latakia. And there’s no sign that either Assad or his Russian patrons are paying any more than lip service to a political settlement. One potential game-changer is a request for U.S. help in trai

making significant gains on the battlefield this week, following an offer by their top political leader for negotiations with the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_025056 --- PAGE BREAK --- This military and diplomatic news may appear positive. But Syrian sources caution that the battlefield

n around Latakia. And there’s no sign that either Assad or his Russian patrons are paying any more than l

nsider whether a transgression was committed (did Assad use chemical weapons?), rather than focus- ing en

We say that the norm against chemical weapons is a categorical norm because those who abide by it consider whether a transgression was committed (did Assad use chemical weapons?), rather than focus- ing entirely on how much harm was done (how many civilians did Assad kill?). Other norms are similarly cat

not always true for continuous variables. Consider the longstanding norm against the use of chemical weapons. This norm recently made headlines when Bashar al-Assad was alleged to have used chemical weapons to kill about a thousand Syrian civilians, outraging world leaders who had HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_015514 --- PAG

Resolu- tions 425 and 426. 18 June 2000 The UN Security Council confirms Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in a Presidential Statement. 10 July 2000 Bashar al-Assad is elected President of Syria in a nationwide referendum. 11-25 July 2000 Camp David II negotiations between Ehud Barak and Yasir Arafat. 25 July 2

rian peace deal that was not to come. Despite Barak offering Syrian President Hafez al-Assad 99 per cent of the Golan Heights, it still fell short of Assad’s demand for a return to the 4 June 1967 lines, and the Syria track subsequently crumbled. This put Arafat on the spot: how could he now, in front of

cent of the Golan Heights, it still fell short of Assad’s demand for a return to the 4 June 1967 lines, a

present evidence, a bloody stalemate that further destabilizes the region. It's distasteful to contemplate dialogue with leaders such as Gaddafi and Assad who, to put it bluntly, have blood on their hands. But this approach is worth exploring if it can foster a transition to a democratic government - wh

cases, the insurgents are seen in the West as the "good guys," battling corrupt, autocratic leaders. Personally, I wish that both Moammar Gaddafi and Bashar al-Assad would give up power tomorrow. But that doesn't seem in the cards: Both leaders have shown they're willing to kill thousands of their citizens to hang

emplate dialogue with leaders such as Gaddafi and Assad who, to put it bluntly, have blood on their hands

Arab autocrats, each apparently determined to be a président-a-vie. In no other part of the world have so many rulers clung so assiduously to power. Bashar appears genuinely to have believed that the Arab nationalist ideology he inherited, his opposition to Israel and his support for resistance movements

cal life and for that of the regime put in place in 1970 by his father, the late President Hafez al-Assad. Forty-one years in power The rule of the Assads, father and son, has now lasted 41 years, a score comparable to that of other long-lasting Arab autocrats, each apparently determined to be a préside

tly financed a London-based network of Bashar’s opponents to the tune of $12m between 2005 and 2010. A continuous whole It is probably fair to view Bashar al-Assad’s term of office and that of his father as a single continuous whole. Not only did Hafez al-Assad decide that Bashar should succeed him, but he also be

source of instability in the troubled Middle East. Is there any compromise that might appeal to all sides? The Assad government seems adamant that Bashar will not step down. The opposition is fragmented but united in demanding that the Assad regime be replaced. How would a "transition" government be

gh for this crisis to become a major source of instability in the troubled Middle East. Is there any compromise that might appeal to all sides? The Assad government seems adamant that Bashar will not step down. The opposition is fragmented but united in demanding that the Assad regime be replaced. H

w the parties to begin to discuss tradeoffs and approaches for a framework of political transition that will involve hard compromises. For example, Bashar al-Assad has consistently indicated that presidential elections scheduled for June 2014 should be adhered to. Of course, he can be expected to rig those ele

e terrifying scale of Libya's Qaddafi and Syria's Assad nor stifled economic progress with such alacrity.

he state together. To be sure, Egypt's Mubarak and Tunisia's Ben Ali neither ran police states on the terrifying scale of Libya's Qaddafi and Syria's Assad nor stifled economic progress with such alacrity. But while Mubarak and Ben Ali left their countries in conditions suitable for the emergence of stab

other bureaucracies, and thus had no legitimacy. Marcus Aurelius was one thing; Tunisia's Zine el- Abidine Ben Ali, Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Syria's Bashar al- Assad, quite another. Certainly, the Arab Spring has proved much: that there is no otherness to Arab civilization, that Arabs yearn for universal values ju

A attacked the headquarters of the Air Force Intelligence Agency at Harasta near the capital Damascus. Since Hafez al-Assad, an air-force officer and Bashar's father, seized power in a coup in 1970, the AIA has been the nerve center of the regime's security system. Also this week, reports surfaced of atta

e of the facts on the ground suggest so. With more than 350 killed so far, November has been the bloodiest month since the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad began last spring. Defections from the army, which started as a trickle, now look like a torrent. In October, the number was around 800. The best tot

cent of the population. Thus, Syria's is a nationwide revolution against a minority regime. Almost all Syrians agree that the situation is untenable. Assad's policy of rule by massacre has few supporters outside his clan. Judging by the revolution's most popular slogan — "Assad Get Out!" — a majority may

y, as Alawite supporters of the regime retreat to their ancestral homeland in the northwestern region around Latakia. And there's no sign that either Assad or his Russian patrons are paying any more than lip service to a political settlement. One potential game-changer is a request for U.S. help in train

n around Latakia. And there's no sign that either Assad or his Russian patrons are paying any more than l

making significant gains on the battlefield this week, following an offer by their top political leader for negotiations with the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028690 --- PAGE BREAK --- This military and diplomatic news may appear positive. But Syrian sources caution that the battlefield a

e Israeli concerns surrounding the collapse of Syria's Ba'athist party are legitimate. Washington should also consider the security consequences of Assad's ouster and avoid intervention in Syria. U.S. Intentions in Syria Following Syria's independence from French colonial rule, relations with the Un

rotherhood has resurrected itself to become the dominant group in the fragmented opposition movement pursuing a 14-month uprising against President Bashar al-Assad." The U.S. alliance with an Islamist organization that espouses anti-Western views may appear strange. However, this relationship is far from hist

that could make common cause with like-minded elements in Iraq and Lebanon. This is certainly not in anyone's interest ... Many in Syria, including Bashar, see the regime, more specifically the Baath party, as the last bastion of secularity against a seething rising tide of radical Islamic in Syria ..