aeessreeenseeeseseaess 24 The Role of Ostensible Charities in al-Qaeda’s Growth and Development 2.00... cccceescceesseeeeteeceeeseeeeeteeeeteneeee 28 Al-Qaeda’s Collaborators in the Financial Industry cee eecsssssseesseessseeesneeceseceseeesneeenseceseeesneeseseceseeeaeeeeneeeateeeatersneess 42 Al-Qaeda’s Add

other forms of material support to al Qaida.” JA3844. It did this by “maintain[ing] accounts for many of the ostensible charities that operate within al Qaida’s infrastructure, including MWL, WAMY, IRO and al Haramain” with “know[ledge] that [these] accounts ... were being used to solicit and transfer funds t

§ 2333, knew that or recklessly disregarded whether al-Qaeda was the recipient of the financial and other support each defendant was providing to al-Qaeda. 2. Whether, for purposes of claims asserting violations of “the law of nations” under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, such violations inc

laintiffs’ injuries.” Jd. at 809.° The Court does not require direct WESTLAW participation in the attacks themselves, but at least participation im al Qaeda’s terrorist agenda. 181 Tn analyzing a defendant’s minimum contacts, courts distinguish between specific and general jurisdiction. “Specific jurisdict

59; see also Ashton Compl. § 452; Burnett Compl. J 398.) The Federal Plaintiffs claim that the SHC “has long acted as a fully integrated component of al Qaida’s logistical and financial support infrastructure ... [and that the attacks of September 11 were] a direct, intended and foreseeable product of [its] p

upp. Mot. to Dismiss at 2 (stating Prince Naif urged the Kingdom to strip bin Laden of his Saudi citizenship in 1994), and thus became a target of al Qaeda himself (see, e.g., Bierstein Aff. in Opp’n to Prince Sultan’s Mot. to Dismiss (fatwa issued by Osama bin Laden expressing extreme bitterness toward

with whom he is alleged to have ties. Jd. 1914, 16, 17. 3. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia The Federal Plaintiffs claim that “[mlore than any other factor, al Qaida’s phenome- nal growth and development into a sophis- ticated global terrorist network were made possible by the massive financial, logistical and other

with the Ashton case on Decem- ber 6, 2004. Prince Sultan and Prince Turki have each also filed a separate motion to dismiss in Federal Insurance v. Al Qaida, 03 Civ. 6978 (S.D.N.Y.), both of which are fully submitted and are resolved in this opinion. The Federal Insurance Plaintiffs are forty-one insuranc

m- HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017830 --- PAGE BREAK --- 766 ber 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, as well as insurance carriers, brought actions against al Qaeda, al Qaeda’s members and associ- ates, alleged state sponsors of terrorism, and individuals and entities who allegedly provided support to Al Qaeda, asserting cau

taboo in Islam against the taking of one’s own life. He also introduced the propaganda ploy of the martyrdom video, which would become a signature of Al Qaeda. Bin Laden needed Zawahiri, not least because of his physical ailments. Although bin Laden did not have kidney disease, as was widely thought, he was

The New Yorker Zawahiri at the Helm Lawrence Wright June 16, 2011 -- Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian surgeon, has come into his inheritance—A1] Qaeda—at a time when the organization is at its nadir. Osama bin Laden, its charismatic founder, is dead, and after some internal debate his No. 2 man, Zaw

owed. Yemen's protests were galvanised by the drama in Cairo's Tahrir Square but they also involved tribalism, elite rivalry and a small but alarming al-Qaida presence against a background of resource depletion and fear of state HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018086 --- PAGE BREAK --- 3 failure. Sectarian tensions wer

g the revolution and that only 7,300 had been rearrested or turned themselves in as of May. The prison breaks also freed some men allegedly linked to al Qaeda, who appear to be attempting to establish a foothold in Sinai's ungoverned spaces. Maj. Yaser Atia of Egypt's General Security confirmed that Ramzi M

agency EgyNews said authorities are targeting 15 more people who participated in attacks at the el-Arish police station, including members of the al Qaeda-affiliated Palestinian group Jaish al-Islam. These extremist rumblings have frayed nerves in the Israeli government, which had already been skeptical

as killed. With the anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks a few weeks away, it's possible to use this evidence to sketch a vivid portrait of al- Qaeda, drawing on material contained in more than 100 computer storage devices, including thumb drives, DVDs and CDs, and more than a dozen computers or ha

rs from mistrust between his Egyptian faction of al-Qaeda and other operatives, such as Atiyah. • Bin Laden was suffering badly from drone attacks on al-Qaeda's base in the tribal areas of Pakistan. He called this the "intelligence war," and said it was "the only weapon that's hurting us." His cadres complain

d are based in violence. The Violent Jihad includes al-Qaeda and its offshoots as well as other groups that formed around the globe independent of al-Qaeda. It also obviously includes the violence from Islamic nations such as the Islamic Republic of Iran whose constitution specifies such vision. It also

e; it is the one most familiar to most Westerners and almost all of the Koranic references to Jihad are based in violence. The Violent Jihad includes al-Qaeda and its offshoots as well as other groups that formed around the globe independent of al-Qaeda. It also obviously includes the violence from Islamic

manner which deludes us with the sense that we are in control. 1. The statement essentially reduces the threat we face to that of terrorism caused by al-Qaeda. By defining and limiting the threat to a band of "radical extremists" who have distorted the doctrine of a great religion, we buy into the sense tha

National Security Adviser Denis McDonough stated the following: "President Obama recognizes that through our words and deeds we can either play into al Qaeda's narrative and messaging or we can challenge it and thereby undermine it. We're determined to undermine it. For example, we know there are many differ

ased democracy’s promise and seemed to leave Al Qaeda behind. Indeed, the pristine spirit of the Arab Spring does represent an existential threat to Al Qaeda’s extremist ideology. But Al Qaeda’s leaders also know that this is a strategic moment. They are banking on the disillusionment that inevitably follows

IGHT_023506 --- PAGE BREAK --- 21 Article 4. NYT Al Qaeda Stirs Again Juan C. Zarate April 17, 2011 -- MANY in the West had taken comfort in Al Qaeda’s silence in the wake of the uprisings in the Muslim world this year, as secular, nonviolent protests, led by educated youth focused on redressing lo

rrorism officials know that one of the biggest differences is HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023525 --- PAGE BREAK --- 10 that Hamas has a regional focus, while al Qaeda's is global. Hamas bears no love for the United States, but it has not deliberately targeted Americans. Al Qaeda, of course, sees the United States as

version of al Qaeda," a statement greeted with resounding applause from the assembled members of Congress. But hold on a minute. Yes, Hamas, like al Qaeda, is an Islamist group that uses terrorism as a strategic tool to achieve political aims. Yes, Hamas, like al Qaeda, rejects Israel and has opposed th

and to take over government offices. Military commanders who defected from the regime have issued a communiqué accusing the President of facilitating al-Qaida's takeover of Zinjibar. They see this as an attempt to scare the West into supporting President Saleh by convincing them that al-Qaida will take over i

Louise him sign the out a ament. The sudden withdrawal of government forces from the city of Zinjibar, in the Abyan province, made it possible for al-Qaida fighters to occupy the city and to take over government offices. Military commanders who defected from the regime have issued a communiqué accusing t

a half-billion Arabs, as long as it can shout louder than increasingly sophisticated bunk merchants like El Aschkar. Ask about basic political facts—al Qaeda’s responsibility for 9/11, or the death of Osama bin Laden—and even the most educated will start popping off inanities. I’ve been dealing with this fr

e; it is the one most familiar to most Westerners and almost all of the Koranic references to Jihad are based in violence. The Violent Jihad includes al-Qaeda and its offshoots as well as other groups that formed around the globe independent of al-Qaeda. It also obviously includes the violence from Islamic

t arranged for a $46 billion investment in pipelines from one end of Pakistan to the coastal city of Gwadar. - India is not happy we suspect al-Qaeda and ISIS in the northern region are not happy about this, either. - Will China build a naval port, too? We believe so. Deutsche Bank Global Public

of sophistication and effort. As a result, European countries and the US are likely to see an increase in incidents and threats that harken back to Al Qaeda's early agenda or are comparable to the Black September and early Hezbollah attacks of the '70s. What are the consequences? e ISIS can be expected to

llujah on Jan. 25, after a month of anti-government protests in Anbar, Nineveh and Salahuddin provinces and elsewhere for which thousands turned out. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Iranian-backed Shiite militias are re-mobilizing. Iraq teeters on the brink of renewed insurgency and, potentially, civil war. This cris

llujah on Jan. 25, after a month of anti-government protests in Anbar, Nineveh and Salahuddin provinces and elsewhere for which thousands turned out. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Iranian-backed Shiite militias are re-mobilizing. Iraq teeters on the brink of renewed insurgency and, potentially, civil war. This crisi

president who referred to the Iran nuclear agreement as the "worst deal ever," surrounded himself with people who either make no distinction between al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood or are simply outright Islamophobes, and has forthrightly declared that the United States supports its friends in the figh

billion and suffering several hundred allied deaths annually — 500 Americans dead last year, thousands more injured. All this to deal with 100 or so Al Qaeda fighters now in Afghanistan; and prevent the Afghan Taliban from controlling the Pashtun Afghan homeland- which was not the reason we went there afte

s. Take your pick of scary scenarios: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_030075 --- PAGE BREAK --- 17 civil war, a Sunni fundamentalist takeover, or a new base for al Qaeda. Of course, there would also be an upside to Assad's demise. A brutal regime would have fallen; Iran would be denied an Arab patron and a critical wi