pation in al Qaida's jihadist campaign." Id. 11425. Specifical- ly, the Kingdom allegedly maintained and controlled several of the charities within al Qaeda's infrastructure. Id. 11399. The Federal Plaintiffs claim Saudi Arabia knew the threat that these charities posed par- ticularly to the United State

e Sultan and Prince Turki both move to dismiss the complaints against them in Ashton v. Al Qaeda Islamic Army. 02 Civ. 6977 (S.D.N.Y.); Barrera v. AI Qaeda Islamic Army, 03 Civ. 7036 (S.D.N.Y.); Burnett v. AI Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 02 Civ. 1616 (D.D.C.); Burnett v. Al Baraka hrv. & Dev. § 2331 et

began a company in the 1940s that now supplies automobiles, soft drinks, construction equipment, and other related to any alleged conspiracy or to al Gaeda's activities. EFTA00795081 IN RE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 Cut as 349 F.Supp-20 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) goods and services to large port

Sudan airport.” JA3843. Saudi American Bank is also alleged to have “knowingly provided financial services and other forms of material support to al Qaida.” JA3844. It did this by “maintain[ing] accounts for many of the ostensible charities that operate within al Qaida’s infrastructure, including MWL, W

aeessreeenseeeseseaess 24 The Role of Ostensible Charities in al-Qaeda’s Growth and Development 2.00... cccceescceesseeeeteeceeeseeeeeteeeeteneeee 28 Al-Qaeda’s Collaborators in the Financial Industry cee eecsssssseesseessseeesneeceseceseeesneeenseceseeesneeseseceseeeaeeeeneeeateeeatersneess 42 Al-Qaeda’s Add

§ 2333, knew that or recklessly disregarded whether al-Qaeda was the recipient of the financial and other support each defendant was providing to al-Qaeda. 2. Whether, for purposes of claims asserting violations of “the law of nations” under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, such violations inc

with whom he is alleged to have ties. Jd. 1914, 16, 17. 3. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia The Federal Plaintiffs claim that “[mlore than any other factor, al Qaida’s phenome- nal growth and development into a sophis- ticated global terrorist network were made possible by the massive financial, logistical and other

m- HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017830 --- PAGE BREAK --- 766 ber 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, as well as insurance carriers, brought actions against al Qaeda, al Qaeda’s members and associ- ates, alleged state sponsors of terrorism, and individuals and entities who allegedly provided support to Al Qaeda, asserting cau

with the Ashton case on Decem- ber 6, 2004. Prince Sultan and Prince Turki have each also filed a separate motion to dismiss in Federal Insurance v. Al Qaida, 03 Civ. 6978 (S.D.N.Y.), both of which are fully submitted and are resolved in this opinion. The Federal Insurance Plaintiffs are forty-one insuranc

59; see also Ashton Compl. § 452; Burnett Compl. J 398.) The Federal Plaintiffs claim that the SHC “has long acted as a fully integrated component of al Qaida’s logistical and financial support infrastructure ... [and that the attacks of September 11 were] a direct, intended and foreseeable product of [its] p

upp. Mot. to Dismiss at 2 (stating Prince Naif urged the Kingdom to strip bin Laden of his Saudi citizenship in 1994), and thus became a target of al Qaeda himself (see, e.g., Bierstein Aff. in Opp’n to Prince Sultan’s Mot. to Dismiss (fatwa issued by Osama bin Laden expressing extreme bitterness toward

laintiffs’ injuries.” Jd. at 809.° The Court does not require direct WESTLAW participation in the attacks themselves, but at least participation im al Qaeda’s terrorist agenda. 181 Tn analyzing a defendant’s minimum contacts, courts distinguish between specific and general jurisdiction. “Specific jurisdict

owed. Yemen's protests were galvanised by the drama in Cairo's Tahrir Square but they also involved tribalism, elite rivalry and a small but alarming al-Qaida presence against a background of resource depletion and fear of state HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018086 --- PAGE BREAK --- 3 failure. Sectarian tensions wer

taboo in Islam against the taking of one’s own life. He also introduced the propaganda ploy of the martyrdom video, which would become a signature of Al Qaeda. Bin Laden needed Zawahiri, not least because of his physical ailments. Although bin Laden did not have kidney disease, as was widely thought, he was

The New Yorker Zawahiri at the Helm Lawrence Wright June 16, 2011 -- Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian surgeon, has come into his inheritance—A1] Qaeda—at a time when the organization is at its nadir. Osama bin Laden, its charismatic founder, is dead, and after some internal debate his No. 2 man, Zaw

manner which deludes us with the sense that we are in control. 1. The statement essentially reduces the threat we face to that of terrorism caused by al-Qaeda. By defining and limiting the threat to a band of "radical extremists" who have distorted the doctrine of a great religion, we buy into the sense tha

National Security Adviser Denis McDonough stated the following: "President Obama recognizes that through our words and deeds we can either play into al Qaeda's narrative and messaging or we can challenge it and thereby undermine it. We're determined to undermine it. For example, we know there are many differ

e; it is the one most familiar to most Westerners and almost all of the Koranic references to Jihad are based in violence. The Violent Jihad includes al-Qaeda and its offshoots as well as other groups that formed around the globe independent of al-Qaeda. It also obviously includes the violence from Islamic

d are based in violence. The Violent Jihad includes al-Qaeda and its offshoots as well as other groups that formed around the globe independent of al-Qaeda. It also obviously includes the violence from Islamic nations such as the Islamic Republic of Iran whose constitution specifies such vision. It also

hanistan and actually preceded 9/11." The remark seemed to be an indirect confirmation, for the first time, that the government saw the hand of AI-Qaeda in the latest con- spiracy. echoing stronger assertions by Pakistani offf cials. Reid did not give details about the purported con- spiracy in 20

rican- owned airplanes as they flew across the Atlantic Ocean to the US. Officials and experts have said that the plot had the "hallmarks" of an AL Qaeda/Osama bin Laden plan. The cable networks breathlessly reported new rules: For now, limited car- ry-on luggage. Passengers may not bring on boa

version of al Qaeda," a statement greeted with resounding applause from the assembled members of Congress. But hold on a minute. Yes, Hamas, like al Qaeda, is an Islamist group that uses terrorism as a strategic tool to achieve political aims. Yes, Hamas, like al Qaeda, rejects Israel and has opposed th

rrorism officials know that one of the biggest differences is HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023525 --- PAGE BREAK --- 10 that Hamas has a regional focus, while al Qaeda's is global. Hamas bears no love for the United States, but it has not deliberately targeted Americans. Al Qaeda, of course, sees the United States as

nroads. The broader Sahel and Maghreb regions, meanwhile, are becoming more and more fragile and southern Libya verges on becoming a safe haven for al Qaeda-linked groups recently chased from Mali by French military forces. The right international approach to Libya could nevertheless still help avert a

nt will result in some kind of blowback on Russia's southern fringe. Already Moscow knows there are a considerable number of Chechens fighting with al-Qaida-linked jihadist groups against the Assad regime, and the Russians are naturally concerned about these individuals returning to Russia if Assad is o

rs from mistrust between his Egyptian faction of al-Qaeda and other operatives, such as Atiyah. • Bin Laden was suffering badly from drone attacks on al-Qaeda's base in the tribal areas of Pakistan. He called this the "intelligence war," and said it was "the only weapon that's hurting us." His cadres complain

as killed. With the anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks a few weeks away, it's possible to use this evidence to sketch a vivid portrait of al- Qaeda, drawing on material contained in more than 100 computer storage devices, including thumb drives, DVDs and CDs, and more than a dozen computers or ha

Louise him sign the out a ament. The sudden withdrawal of government forces from the city of Zinjibar, in the Abyan province, made it possible for al-Qaida fighters to occupy the city and to take over government offices. Military commanders who defected from the regime have issued a communiqué accusing t

and to take over government offices. Military commanders who defected from the regime have issued a communiqué accusing the President of facilitating al-Qaida's takeover of Zinjibar. They see this as an attempt to scare the West into supporting President Saleh by convincing them that al-Qaida will take over i

ws/world/articles/2020-11-14/us-israel-worked-together-to-track-and-kill- al-qaida-no-2> (11/14, Lee, LaPorta) reports Al-Masri's death "is a blow to al-Qaida" and "comes amid rumors in the Middle East about the fate of the group's leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. The officials could not confirm those reports b

-qaedaleader-killed.html> (11/14, Fassihi, 18.6IM) reports Iran's Foreign Ministry on Saturday "denied a report that Israeli agents had fatally shot Al Qaeda's second-ranking leader on the streets of Tehran, likening it to a `Hollywood' scenario manufactured by `American and Zionist' officials." EFTA001371

agency EgyNews said authorities are targeting 15 more people who participated in attacks at the el-Arish police station, including members of the al Qaeda-affiliated Palestinian group Jaish al-Islam. These extremist rumblings have frayed nerves in the Israeli government, which had already been skeptical

g the revolution and that only 7,300 had been rearrested or turned themselves in as of May. The prison breaks also freed some men allegedly linked to al Qaeda, who appear to be attempting to establish a foothold in Sinai's ungoverned spaces. Maj. Yaser Atia of Egypt's General Security confirmed that Ramzi M

ch and to whom. The administration could change course and decide that living with Assad is better than the danger of a fragmented Syria overrun by Al Qaeda- backed jihadists. (Former CIA Director Michael Hayden endorsed that option last week, telling a Washington audience that it might be "the best ...

again dashing the hopes of pro-U.S. factions in the opposition. Meanwhile, other forces were competing for influence in the Syrian snake pit, too. Al Qaeda and its allies sponsored jihadist groups that imported aspiring terrorists from Iraq and other countries. Saudi Arabia and other wealthy Persian Gu

ased democracy’s promise and seemed to leave Al Qaeda behind. Indeed, the pristine spirit of the Arab Spring does represent an existential threat to Al Qaeda’s extremist ideology. But Al Qaeda’s leaders also know that this is a strategic moment. They are banking on the disillusionment that inevitably follows

IGHT_023506 --- PAGE BREAK --- 21 Article 4. NYT Al Qaeda Stirs Again Juan C. Zarate April 17, 2011 -- MANY in the West had taken comfort in Al Qaeda’s silence in the wake of the uprisings in the Muslim world this year, as secular, nonviolent protests, led by educated youth focused on redressing lo

e; it is the one most familiar to most Westerners and almost all of the Koranic references to Jihad are based in violence. The Violent Jihad includes al-Qaeda and its offshoots as well as other groups that formed around the globe independent of al-Qaeda. It also obviously includes the violence from Islamic

story -anda brief spell of optimism - that is now a distant memory. With so much of the modern-day Middle East consumed by turmoil and conflict, it’s al-Qaeda, so-called Islamic State, Iraq, Syria and Libya that are dominating the headlines, not the peace process. Even as we approach the 100th anniversary

e; it is the one most familiar to most Westerners and almost all of the Koranic references to Jihad are based in violence. The Violent Jihad includes al-Qaeda and its offshoots as well as other groups that formed around the globe independent of al-Qaeda. It also obviously includes the violence from Islamic

the September 11, 2001 attack on the WTC: (Writes Scott) "For indeed it is certain that on various occasions U.S. agencies have intervened, letting al-Qaeda terrorists proceed with their plots. This alarming statement will be dismissed by some as "conspiracy theory." Yet in this chapter, | will show that