Epstein Secrets

R. Crim. P. Rule 17(c). See, e.g., R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 299 (Rule 17(c) requires that grand jury subpoenas be reasonable); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973) ("[tjhe Fourth Amendment provides protection against a grand jury subpoena duces tecum too sweeping in its terms to be regar

[defendant] from his files; (c]learly such an act of production is testimonial, and may not be compelled"); United States v. Bell, 217 F.R.D. 335 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (where government lacks knowledge of specific documents, party's production of the subpoenaed documents would testify to their existence and his p

R. Crim. P. Rule 17(c). See, e.g., R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 299 (Rule 17(c) requires that grand jury subpoenas be reasonable); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973) ("[t]he Fourth Amendment provides protection against a grand jury subpoena duces tecum too sweeping in its terms to be regar

[defendant] from his files; [c]learly such an act of production is testimonial, and may not be compelled"); United States v. Bell, 217 F.R.D. 335 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (where government lacks knowledge of specific documents, party's production of the subpoenaed documents would testify to their existence and his p

Accordingly, it is a well-recognized principle that courts should not intervene in the grand jury process absent compelling reason. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1973). A district court also should be mindful of a target's attempts to "saddle a grand jury with mini-trials and preliminary

allow Court to conduct in camera inspection to determine whether act of production privilege applied); United States v. Bell; 217 F.R.D. 335, 339 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (Although voluntarily created documents are not protected by the Fifth Amendment, an act of production privilege can.be asserted, but only when "it