h Amendment provides protection against a grand jury subpoena duces tecum too sweeping in its terms `to be regarded as reasonable.' United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1973) (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906), abrogated in part on other grounds by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New

442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) passim United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) 6 United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) 6 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) 2, 15 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) 9, 10 United States v. Oshatz, 700 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 16 United

from the courts, over whose functioning the courts do not preside." United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 45-46 (1992); see also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I, 17-18 (1973) (holding that the grand jury must remain "free to pursue its investigations unhindered by external influence or supervisi

nited States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1979) 13, 14 United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972) 10 United States v. Dionisio, 503 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2007) 12 United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2002) 6, 7, 10 United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268 (2d Ci

ccordingly, it is a well-recognized principle that courts should not intervene in the grand jury process absent compelling reason. United States v. Dionisio , 410 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1973). A district court also should be mindful of a target's attempts to "saddle a grand jury with mini-trials and preliminary

R. Crim. P. Rule 17(c). See, e.g., R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 299 (Rule 17(c) requires that grand jury subpoenas be reasonable); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973) ("[tjhe Fourth Amendment provides protection against a grand jury subpoena duces tecum too sweeping in its terms to be regar

R. Crim. P. Rule 17(c). See, e.g., R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 299 (Rule 17(c) requires that grand jury subpoenas be reasonable); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973) ("[t]he Fourth Amendment provides protection against a grand jury subpoena duces tecum too sweeping in its terms to be regar

cation of grand jury interests is hot ‘some talisman that dissolves all constitutional protections."'Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 630—31 (quoting U.S, v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973)); see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S, 829, 838 (1978) (balancing state’s interest in preserving confi

Accordingly, it is a well-recognized principle that courts should not intervene in the grand jury process absent compelling reason. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1973). A district court also should be mindful of a target's attempts to "saddle a grand jury with mini-trials and preliminary