stead, the courts simply cited to language from a Second Circuit decision that stated that the CVRA does not give

bstantive discussion of whether CVRA rights apply in criminal cases before the filing of charges. Instead, the courts simply cited to language from a Second Circuit decision that stated that the CVRA does not give victims any rights against defendants until those defendants have been convicted'!’—a holding clearl

t grant victims any rights against individuals who have not been convicted of a crime.”” (quoting In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 2005))). '3 Of course, a defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution as part of his sentence until he has been found guilty. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664

de on the information to obtain a cash profit, the result should be the same. Importantly, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that it was narrowing the Second Circuit’s land- mark Newman decision. It stated, “[t]o the extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper must also receive something of a ‘pecuniary or simila

l immediately at the first hint of a government insider trading investigation. | Salman v. U.S., No. 15-628, 580 U.S. 6, 2016). 2773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014). 3 Salman, Slip Op. at 9-10. "Id. at 10. ., Slip op. (Dec. Samuel J. Lieberman is a Partner in the Securities Litigation Group of Sadis & Gol

to prove a “pecuniary” or similar quid pro quo. the Second Circuit (a lower appellate court) held that a tipper must

"the CVRA does not grant victims any rights against individuals who have not been convicted of a crime. W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 2005))). (quoting Jn re 3 Of course, a defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution as part of his sentence until he has been found guilty. See /

bstantive discussion of whether CVRA rights apply in criminal cases before the filing of charges. Instead, the courts simply cited to language from a Second Circuit decision that stated that the CVRA does not give victims any rights against defendants until those defendants have been convicted !!* - a holding cle

stead, the courts simply cited to language from a Second Circuit decision that stated that the CVRA does not give

ed provides the motive for him do so and is another significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1987). So too is the strength of the evidence, detailed above and in the Government's Detention Memo. Indeed, that evidence, already robust less th

n to dozens of victims who were abused in Florida. 2 While beyond the scope of a bail hearing, as discussed further below, it is well-established in the Second Circuit that absent an express provision to the contrary in the agreement, one District is not bound by the terms of an agreement entered into between a def

t of the Princes’ ac- tions. [22-24] Pursuant to the Second Cir- cuit’s instruction, the Court must first de- termine whe

very least, discovery should be ordered circumspectly and only to verify allega- tions of specific facts crucial to an immuni- ty determination.”)). The Second Circuit has instructed “that generally a plaintiff may be allowed limited discovery with re- spect to the jurisdictional issue; but until [plaintiff] has sho

ant presents a risk of flight.' English, 629 F.3d at 319 (quoting Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436); see also United States v. Manly., 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986) ("The government retains the burden of persuasion [in a presumption case]."). Even when "a defendant has met his burden of production," howev

y, the Defendant's argument that private security guards could ensure her appearance at future proceedings runs afoul of the Bail Reform Act, which the Second Circuit has held "does not permit a two-tiered bail system in which defendants of lesser means are detained pending trial while wealthy defendants are rele

d 10/13/21 Page 4 of 17 ARGUMENT I. THE APPLICABLE LAW A prospective juror may be excused for cause based on many forms of bias or partiality. As the Second Circuit has explained, juror partiality can be actual, implied, or inferred: Actual bias is "bias in fact," generally evidenced by "express proof," such as

mandatory a presumption of bias." United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 301 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 984 (2d Cir. 1968) and United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1997)). All types of bias can properly form the basis to excuse a juror for cause. See i

s proposed redactions are consistent with the three-part test articulated by the Second Circuit in Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). Although this letter is a judicial document subject to the common law presumption of access, the proposed redactions are narrowly tailored t

nty to these witnesses in advance of their testimony. ' The Government's proposed redactions are consistent with the three-part test articulated by the Second Circuit in Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). Although this letter is a judicial document subject to the common law presumptio

proposed redactions are consistent with the three-part test articulated by the Second Circuit in Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). Although this letter motion is a judicial document subject to the common law presumption of access, the proposed redactions are narrowly tail

' The Government moves to file a redacted version this letter motion. The proposed redactions are consistent with the three-part test articulated by the Second Circuit in Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). Although this letter motion is a judicial document subject to the common law pr

s, 511 F.3d 289, 301 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 984 (2d Cir. 1968) and United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1997)). All types of bias can properly form the basis to excuse a juror for cause. See id. Thus, the jury selection process should screen for each

98 --- PAGE BREAK --- ARGUMENT I. THE APPLICABLE LAW A prospective juror may be excused for cause based on many forms of bias or partiality. As the Second Circuit has explained, juror partiality can be actual, implied, or inferred: Actual bias is "bias in fact," generally evidenced by "express proof," such as

in which release of grand jury records is appropriate even outside of the boundaries of the rule. Id. at 102 (citations omitted). In Craig, the Second Circuit held the district court had authority to release grand jury materials based on special circumstances that went beyond the six exceptions listed in

is ‘older than our Nation itself,’ that proceedings before a grand jury shall generally remain secret.” In re Petition of Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). The rule of secrecy, however, is not without exceptions. Those exceptions have developed historically alongside th

Plaintiff's claims against defendant Maxwell—the only actively litigated claims against her currently—to proceed in full public view. Courts in the Second Circuit recognize that the public benefits from civil litigation not only when it advances the justifiable interests of the Plaintiff, but also when the lit

a related criminal prosecution has been characterized as an "extraordinary remedy." Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 98 (2d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). As a result, a civil defendant urging a stay pending a parallel criminal prosecution bears the burden of establishing its n

Accordingly, the only dispute regarding SHC’s status is whether it is an organ of the Kingdom. In Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213 (2d Cir.2004), the Second Circuit considered various factors to determine whether an entity could be considered an organ of a foreign sovereign. Jd. at 217. The factors include: (1)

bia’s relationship to NCB. The Supreme Court and Second Circuit agree that there are certain circumstances in whi

has discretion to award costs to the defendant.”); see also Carter v. Inc. Vill. of Ocean Beach, 759 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2014) (disclaiming prior Second Circuit dicta which stated that “generally the defendant is not considered the prevailing party when, as here, there is a voluntary dismissal of the action

natively, that a district court has discretion to award costs to the defendant.”); see also Carter v. Inc. Vill. of Ocean Beach, 759 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2014) (disclaiming prior Second Circuit dicta which stated that “generally the defendant is not considered the prevailing party when, as here, there

he orders dismissing those defendants should be vacated so that the district court can apply current law to defendants’ motions. Standard of Review The Second Circuit “review[s] de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual a

favor.” Amaker v. N.Y. State Dep’t of *63 Corr. Servs., 435 F. App’x 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002)). WESTLAW HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023384 --- PAGE BREAK --- In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001., 2012 WL 257568 (2012) Argument I. Th

' The Government moves to file a redacted version this letter motion. The proposed redactions are consistent with the three-part test articulated by the Second Circuit in Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). Although this letter motion is a judicial document subject to the common law pr

proposed redactions are consistent with the three-part test articulated by the Second Circuit in Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). Although this letter motion is a judicial document subject to the common law presumption of access, the proposed redactions are narrowly tail

es, and thirty-some depositions, including depositions of and Maxwell as well as several third parties. See Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 46, 51 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining that discovery was "hard-fought" and "extensive" and noting that the court file, which includes only some of the documents created

rs, and courts strictly enforce them. See, e.g., Stewart v. Hudson Hall LLC, 20 Civ. 885 (SLC), 2020 WL 7239676, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2020) ("In the Second Circuit, there is a strict standard for modification of a protective order entered by a district court." (citation and quotation marks omitted)). This case

tion for tax returns – as the magistrate judge specifically noted in rejecting Epstein’s argument. See, e.g., Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 442 (2nd Cir. 2008) (“. . . a taxpayer’s W-2 forms are required records not subject to the Fifth Amendment because they are a mandatory part of a civil regulatory

his claim is said to be Trudeau v. New York State Consumer Protection Bd., 237 F.R.D. 325 (N.D.N.Y. 2006), which reviews some decisions from within the Second Circuit and Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 485 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/10/2010 Page 15 of 27 CASE NO: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSO

onal nature, and identification of Plaintiff would pose a risk of retaliatory physical harm to her and to others. Exh. A. All of the ten factors that the Second Circuit articulated as relevant to this analysis favor anonymity, especially factors 1-4, 7, and 10 (e.g., factors one and two: “whether the litigation invol

tweighs the public’s interest in knowing their identity and any prejudice to the defendants. Sealed Plaintiff-v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 189 (2d Cir. 2008). This litigation involves matters that are highly sensitive and of a personal nature, and identification of Plaintiff would pose a risk of reta

"during a conversation with an agent or a witness is no less discoverable than if that same information were contained in an email." Id. Similarly, the Second Circuit has recognized that attorney proffers are equally subject to Brady obligations as witness proffers. States V. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 544 F.3d

that attorney proffers are equally subject to Brady obligations as witness proffers. States V. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 544 F.3d 149, 157, 165 (2d Cir. 2008) (recognizing that "[a]n attorney proffer apprises the government of what the client would be able to provide by way of testimony" and finding