de on the information to obtain a cash profit, the result should be the same. Importantly, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that it was narrowing the Second Circuit’s land- mark Newman decision. It stated, “[t]o the extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper must also receive something of a ‘pecuniary or simila

l immediately at the first hint of a government insider trading investigation. | Salman v. U.S., No. 15-628, 580 U.S. 6, 2016). 2773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014). 3 Salman, Slip Op. at 9-10. "Id. at 10. ., Slip op. (Dec. Samuel J. Lieberman is a Partner in the Securities Litigation Group of Sadis & Gol

to prove a “pecuniary” or similar quid pro quo. the Second Circuit (a lower appellate court) held that a tipper must

t grant victims any rights against individuals who have not been convicted of a crime.”” (quoting In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 2005))). '3 Of course, a defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution as part of his sentence until he has been found guilty. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664

bstantive discussion of whether CVRA rights apply in criminal cases before the filing of charges. Instead, the courts simply cited to language from a Second Circuit decision that stated that the CVRA does not give victims any rights against defendants until those defendants have been convicted'!’—a holding clearl

stead, the courts simply cited to language from a Second Circuit decision that stated that the CVRA does not give

bstantive discussion of whether CVRA rights apply in criminal cases before the filing of charges. Instead, the courts simply cited to language from a Second Circuit decision that stated that the CVRA does not give victims any rights against defendants until those defendants have been convicted !!* - a holding cle

stead, the courts simply cited to language from a Second Circuit decision that stated that the CVRA does not give

"the CVRA does not grant victims any rights against individuals who have not been convicted of a crime. W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 2005))). (quoting Jn re 3 Of course, a defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution as part of his sentence until he has been found guilty. See /

that 'implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence.'" United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 789 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting McNabb, 318 U.S. at 340). As the Supreme Court held in United States v. Payner, "Federal courts may use their supervisory power in s

Cir. 2019) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2). So, too, has Judge Preska redacted substantial material from the documents she has released on remand from the Second Circuit, again reflecting that Maxwell reasonably relied on the Protective Order. 20 EFTA00028953 --- PAGE BREAK --- reports were replete with misrepre

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

to discuss. Thanks! Begin forwarded message: From: David Oscar Markus <[email protected]> Date: Ma 17 2021 at 10:47:46 AM EDT To: Subject: 2nd Circuit Hi M. I hope this note finds you well. Based on the court's ruling on Friday, I will be Sling a renewed motion for bond in the Second Circuit. I

: Subject: 2nd Circuit Hi M. I hope this note finds you well. Based on the court's ruling on Friday, I will be Sling a renewed motion for bond in the Second Circuit. I will note the government's opposition unless you inform me that I am mistaken. Thanks, David --David Oscar Markus Markus/Moss markuslasucom

[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2020 8:07 PM To: Sigrid McCawley <1 ); Deborah Knowlton Subject: New document v. Maxwell (Doctl -, 2d Cir. ca; CAUTION: External email. Please do not respond to or click on links/attachments unless you recognize the sender. v. Maxwell Docket entry numb

e001.jpg FYI. In this brief, Maxwell's attorneys state that if Judge Nathan denies their motion to modify the protective order, they will appeal to the Second Circuit and seek consolidation of that appeal with the appeal from Judge Preska's order. From: Sigrid McCawley Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2020 8:27 PM To:

ed provides the motive for him do so and is another significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1987). So too is the strength of the evidence, detailed above and in the Government's Detention Memo. Indeed, that evidence, already robust less th

n to dozens of victims who were abused in Florida. 2 While beyond the scope of a bail hearing, as discussed further below, it is well-established in the Second Circuit that absent an express provision to the contrary in the agreement, one District is not bound by the terms of an agreement entered into between a def

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

s, 511 F.3d 289, 301 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 984 (2d Cir. 1968) and United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1997)). All types of bias can properly form the basis to excuse a juror for cause. See id. Thus, the jury selection process should screen for each

98 --- PAGE BREAK --- ARGUMENT I. THE APPLICABLE LAW A prospective juror may be excused for cause based on many forms of bias or partiality. As the Second Circuit has explained, juror partiality can be actual, implied, or inferred: Actual bias is "bias in fact," generally evidenced by "express proof," such as

mandatory a presumption of bias." United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 301 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 984 (2d Cir. 1968) and United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1997)). All types of bias can properly form the basis to excuse a juror for cause. See i

d 10/13/21 Page 4 of 17 ARGUMENT I. THE APPLICABLE LAW A prospective juror may be excused for cause based on many forms of bias or partiality. As the Second Circuit has explained, juror partiality can be actual, implied, or inferred: Actual bias is "bias in fact," generally evidenced by "express proof," such as

an, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019), for the proposition that "plea agreements differ from commercial contracts" (Opp. 18), the "differ[ence]" to which the Second Circuit was referring was that in construing a plea agreement, 3 Accuser-2 is identified in the Indictment as Minor Victim-2. 5 EFTA00028888 --- PAGE BR

ns omitted), and the government is held "responsible for imprecisions or ambiguities in the agreement." United States v. Padilla, 186 F.3d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1999). While the government argues that Annabi relieves it of this responsibility where the "imprecisions or ambiguities" relate to the geographic

" in the common law framework or "higher values" in the First Amendment framework so demand. Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onandaga, 435 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Unites States v. Wey, 256 F. Supp. 3d 355, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (Nathan, J.) (granting motion to seal evidentiary exhibits and findi

ut redaction. The court may later unseal the filing or order the person who made the filing to file a redacted version for the public record." While the Second Circuit has recognized a presumption of access under both common law and the First Amendment, it is appropriate to permit the filing of documents under sea

x, 527 U.S. 343, 355-57 (1999) (examining "structure and legislative history" as part of first Landgraf step). And as the government acknowledges, "the Second Circuit has considered both the text of the statute and the legislative history" at the first Landgraf step. Opp. 28 (citing In re Enterprise Mortgage Acce

uit's acknowledgment that the retroactivity of the 2003 Amendment must be analyzed under Landgraf. Weingarten v. United States, 865 F.3d 48, 54-58 (2d Cir. 2017). 3 No Landgraf analysis was performed, nor was Congress' rejection of the retroactivity provision discussed, in United States v. Brown, 800 F

bia’s relationship to NCB. The Supreme Court and Second Circuit agree that there are certain circumstances in whi

Accordingly, the only dispute regarding SHC’s status is whether it is an organ of the Kingdom. In Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213 (2d Cir.2004), the Second Circuit considered various factors to determine whether an entity could be considered an organ of a foreign sovereign. Jd. at 217. The factors include: (1)

community"). A finding of risk of flight must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 5 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1985). A finding of dangerousness must be supported by clear and convincing evidence

n to dozens of victims who were abused in Florida. 2 While beyond the scope of a bail hearing, as discussed further below, it is well-established in the Second Circuit that absent an express provision to the contrary in the agreement, one District is not bound by the terms of an agreement entered into between a def

tion for tax returns – as the magistrate judge specifically noted in rejecting Epstein’s argument. See, e.g., Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 442 (2nd Cir. 2008) (“. . . a taxpayer’s W-2 forms are required records not subject to the Fifth Amendment because they are a mandatory part of a civil regulatory

his claim is said to be Trudeau v. New York State Consumer Protection Bd., 237 F.R.D. 325 (N.D.N.Y. 2006), which reviews some decisions from within the Second Circuit and Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 485 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/10/2010 Page 15 of 27 CASE NO: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSO

is ‘older than our Nation itself,’ that proceedings before a grand jury shall generally remain secret.” In re Petition of Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). The rule of secrecy, however, is not without exceptions. Those exceptions have developed historically alongside th

in which release of grand jury records is appropriate even outside of the boundaries of the rule. Id. at 102 (citations omitted). In Craig, the Second Circuit held the district court had authority to release grand jury materials based on special circumstances that went beyond the six exceptions listed in

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

as noted, the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness

n to dozens of victims who were abused in Florida. 2 While beyond the scope of a bail hearing, as discussed further below, it is well-established in the Second Circuit that absent an express provision to the contrary in the agreement, one District is not bound by the terms of an agreement entered into between a def