Epstein Secrets

not to do so, I decided to return to government in 2007 as Defence Minister. I remained in that role for six years: mostly in the current, right-wing Likud government of my onetime Sayeret Matkal charge, Bibi Netanyahu. Much of what I say in this book about war and peace, security and Israel’s future ch

but arming and training them and helping organize cross-border attacks. Then, in 38 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011509 the summer of 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which had been owned by the British and French. Ben-Gurion was emboldened to go war by the fact that both Britain and France wanted to retake the c

vernment, they must lose power. They wi// lose power.” He was right. Only twice in the four decades that followed would a Labor leader defeat Begin’s Likud party: Rabin’s election victory in 1992, and mine over Bibi Netanyahu in 1999. During the first two years of Begin’s rule, however, I was 7,000 mile

t of the intelligence base our military engineers had built after the war into a 2,400-feet-high mountain called Gebel Um-Hashiba, 20 miles back from the Suez Canal. When I radioed in to tell him I’d decided to abandon the operation, I could hear the surprise in his voice, and what seemed reluctance as well. “If

losing their jobs. Israel’s next election, the first since the Lebanon war, was due in July. Just as the trauma of the 1973 war had helped Begin end Likud’s three decades in opposition, the polls and the pundits were now suggesting that Shimon Peres might bring Labor back to power. There was no prospect

the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sinai. In the Lebanon war, the inquiry suggested, Yehoshua Saguy did try to warn the generals, and the government, about major ris

not to do so, I decided to return to government in 2007 as Defence Minister. I remained in that role for six years: mostly in the current, right-wing Likud government of my onetime Sayeret Matkal charge, Bibi Netanyahu. Much of what I say in this book about war and peace, security and Israel’s future ch

but arming and training them and helping organize cross-border attacks. Then, in 38 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_027886 the summer of 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which had been owned by the British and French. Ben-Gurion was emboldened to go war by the fact that both Britain and France wanted to retake the c

vernment, they must lose power. They will lose power." He was right. Only twice in the four decades that followed would a Labor leader defeat Begin's Likud party: Rabin's election victory in 1992, and mine over Bibi Netanyahu in 1999. During the first two years of Begin's rule, however, I was 7,000 miles

t of the intelligence base our military engineers had built after the war into a 2,400-feet-high mountain called Gebel Um-Hashiba, 20 miles back from the Suez Canal. When I radioed in to tell him I'd decided to abandon the operation, I could hear the surprise in his voice, and what seemed reluctance as well. "If

losing their jobs. Israel's next election, the first since the Lebanon war, was due in July. Just as the trauma of the 1973 war had helped Begin end Likud's three decades in opposition, the polls and the pundits were now suggesting that Shimon Peres might bring Labor back to power. There was no prospect

the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sinai. In the Lebanon war, the inquiry suggested, Yehoshua Saguy did try to warn the generals, and the government, about major risk