Epstein Secrets

d take whatever action necessary. But the decisive moment came on the eighteenth of March. A school bus near Eilat, in the far south of Israel, hit a Fatah landmine, killing the driver and a teacher, and injuring 10 of the children. I was called up the night before the Israeli attack, as part of a small

tercepted the convoy. We chose a spot across from the Israeli 131 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011602 moshav of Za’arit. We equipped Yoni’s force with a pair of Land Rovers in Lebanese army colors and had them hide overnight in the moshav’s orchards, a hundred yards from the road on the Lebanese side of the frontier. The

n closer friend of mine: Dan Shomron. I had first got to know Dan well in the late sixties after Karameh, Israel’s costly standoff with Arafat, when Fatah’s influence was in its infancy. We exchanged impressions on what had gone wrong, and why? When I became commander of Sayeret Matkal, we remained in t

lmost exactly the same as the one we’d planned. A force of nearly 700 commandos was helicoptered in to Iraq’s western desert, equipped with Jeeps and Land Rovers, and anti-tank missiles and laser targeting capability. They were also able to call on attack helicopters and F-15 jets if necessary. The operation d

d take whatever action necessary. But the decisive moment came on the eighteenth of March. A school bus near Eilat, in the far south of Israel, hit a Fatah landmine, killing the driver and a teacher, and injuring 10 of the children. I was called up the night before the Israeli attack, as part of a small

tercepted the convoy. We chose a spot across from the Israeli 131 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_027979 moshav of Za'arit. We equipped Yoni's force with a pair of Land Rovers in Lebanese army colors and had them hide overnight in the moshav's orchards, a hundred yards from the road on the Lebanese side of the frontier. The

en closer friend of mine: Dan Shomron. I had first got to know Dan well in the late sixties after Karameh, Israel's costly standoff with Arafat, when Fatah's influence was in its infancy. We exchanged impressions on what had gone wrong, and why? When I became commander of Sayeret Matkal, we remained in t

lmost exactly the same as the one we'd planned. A force of nearly 700 commandos was helicoptered in to Iraq's western desert, equipped with Jeeps and Land Rovers, and anti-tank missiles and laser targeting capability. They were also able to call on attack helicopters and F-15 jets if necessary. The operation d