Epstein Secrets

one pole, buried the bulky transmitter and made their way back. And it worked. Israeli intelligence could listen in to military communications on the Heights. The hitch as that the batteries had to be replaced every few weeks. Several more times, Meir and his men sneaked back into Syria to keep the bug wor

1:15 in the morning even if that meant not getting the intercept in place. And it was already past midnight. We began climbing into the heart of the Heights, planning to go around the southern edge of the Syrian base at Banias. The vegetation was sparser but we still ran the risk of making noise from the

524 Under army regulations, training recruits got a five-day leave every few months during fironut. My first one came a bit later than usual, due to Rotem. But in April 1960, shortly before the Passover holiday, I headed back to Mishmar Hasharon. Despite my minor triumph of desert navigation, I still ha

mmon sense on all sides, ensured that a new war with Egypt was averted — at least for a further half- dozen years, until 1967. By then, the lesson of Rotem would be learned: our need to find a realiable way to tap into the battle plans of the hostile Arab states around us. And through another wholly unex

nce of intelligence, and the potential cost of Israel being taken by surprise in a future war, having been part of the top military leadership during Rotem. He was energetic, bright, and exuded an infectious sense of self-confidence and authority. He also had clout at headquarters. If he decided the time

one pole, buried the bulky transmitter and made their way back. And it worked. Israeli intelligence could listen in to military communications on the Heights. The hitch as that the batteries had to be replaced every few weeks. Several more times, Meir and his men sneaked back into Syria to keep the bug wor

1:15 in the morning even if that meant not getting the intercept in place. And it was already past midnight. We began climbing into the heart of the Heights, planning to go around the southern edge of the Syrian base at Banias. The vegetation was sparser but we still ran the risk of making noise from the

901 Under army regulations, training recruits got a five-day leave every few months during fironut. My first one came a bit later than usual, due to Rotem. But in April 1960, shortly before the Passover holiday, I headed back to Mishmar Hasharon. Despite my minor triumph of desert navigation, I still ha

mmon sense on all sides, ensured that a new war with Egypt was averted — at least for a further half- dozen years, until 1967. By then, the lesson of Rotem would be learned: our need to find a realiable way to tap into the battle plans of the hostile Arab states around us. And through another wholly unex

nce of intelligence, and the potential cost of Israel being taken by surprise in a future war, having been part of the top military leadership during Rotem. He was energetic, bright, and exuded an infectious sense of self-confidence and authority. He also had clout at headquarters. If he decided the time

APCs in a massive motorcade from the bottom to the top of the country and back again. We dubbed it Cinerama, from the Hebrew words for Sinai and the Heights, Ramah. If there was an escalation of hostilities, the northern command’s regular division would cross into Lebanon. Our role would be to take their

m’s initial hopes and expectations for the unit had been more than met. Sayeret Matkal had played the key role in erasing the traumas of Uri Ilan and Rotem, and restoring the morale and effectiveness of Israeli military intelligence. Time and again, operations which we said we could do — dismissed as too

entire Golan for peace. With Rabin, Itamar Rabinovich and the rest of the team, we put together a framework limiting Syria’s military presence on the Heights. We envisaged phasing out the restrictions as Syria took steps toward the kind of peace which had proved possible with Egypt and Jordan. But indirect

under a shadow, or been fired. Sometimes this was because of ultimately non-fatal lapses, like a botched mobilization of our reserves in 1959, or the Rotem crisis a few months later. Sometimes, it was due to lethal failures like the Yom Kippur War and Lebanon. I went to see all eight former directors wh

APCs in a massive motorcade from the bottom to the top of the country and back again. We dubbed it Cinerama, from the Hebrew words for Sinai and the Heights, Ramah. If there was an escalation of hostilities, the northern command's regular division would cross into Lebanon. Our role would be to take their

m's initial hopes and expectations for the unit had been more than met. Sayeret Matkal had played the key role in erasing the traumas of Uri Ilan and Rotem, and restoring the morale and effectiveness of Israeli military intelligence. Time and again, operations which we said we could do - dismissed as too

entire Golan for peace. With Rabin, Itamar Rabinovich and the rest of the team, we put together a framework limiting Syria's military presence on the Heights. We envisaged phasing out the restrictions as Syria took steps toward the kind of peace which had proved possible with Egypt and Jordan. But indirect

under a shadow, or been fired. Sometimes this was because of ultimately non-fatal lapses, like a botched mobilization of our reserves in 1959, or the Rotem crisis a few months later. Sometimes, it was due to lethal failures like the Yom Kippur War and Lebanon. I went to see all eight former directors who