ists. The problem was that a full call-up of the reserves would require something like 48 hours. That meant some form of early warning was critical. Rotem erupted in February 1960, about halfway through my fironut, and began almost farcically. The Chief of Military Intelligence, Chaim Herzog, was at a d

under the command of a future Israeli chief-of-staff, Dado Elazar. His vision for Sayeret Matkal became Israel’s answer to the dangers identified by Rotem. But it had its origins in his experiences in the years after 1948, when he joined a military intelligence group running a loose network of Arab agen

ists. The problem was that a full call-up of the reserves would require something like 48 hours. That meant some form of early warning was critical. Rotem erupted in February 1960, about halfway through my fironut, and began almost farcically. The Chief of Military Intelligence, Chaim Herzog, was at a d

under the command of a future Israeli chief-of-staff, Dado Elazar. His vision for Sayeret Matkal became Israel’s answer to the dangers identified by Rotem. But it had its origins in his experiences in the years after 1948, when he joined a military intelligence group running a loose network of Arab agen