Epstein Secrets

e Sinai to the Euphrates, encompassing Damascus. It occupied some, but relatively little, of the coastal region, an area beginning at what today is Haifa and running south to Jaffa, just north of today's Tel Aviv. The coastal area to the north was held by Phoenicia, the area to the south by Philisti

uous control) to EFTA_R1_02029175 EFTA02689634 27 the north, Israel's territory never stretched as far as Damascus, although it frequently held the Golan Heights. Israel extended many times to both sides of the Jordan but never deep into the Jordanian Desert. It never extended southeast into the Arabian Peni

across Romania 19 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011490 to the grand old Black Sea port of Constanta, and by ship through the Bosphorus, past Istanbul, and on to Haifa on the Palestinian coast, from where they were taken by truck to their bunk-bed rooms in one of a dozen prefab structures on the recently established

ldiers crossed the border on an intelligence mission. It had happened in 1954, and it ended in a failure even more serious than Rotem. The target was the Golan Heights, inside Syria. The special technology unit attached to military intelligence had developed a bugging device designed to be placed on a telephone pole

ura, on ours as Rosh Hanirkra, where the Mediterranean coastline rose dramatically to a ridge and, once into Israel, sloped steeply down again toward Haifa. I took in two main assault teams, one led by Mookie, the other by Uzi Dayan. We hid in a tangle of bushes about halfway along the road which climbe

urprise attacks by Syria and Egypt — armies we’d not just defeated, but humiliated, six years earlier — had pinned down and pushed back our forces on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai. Without any advance call-up, many reservists were only now reaching the front lines. As hundreds of people pressed for seats on th

ward Tel Aviv. It still took half-an-hour. Misha and Dan, who lived closer to the kirva, were already in the bunker. Ten Scuds hit near Tel Aviv and Haifa that night. It was not until shortly before dawn that our tracker units got back to us with formal confirmation that there had been no chemical warhe

ade with him. The substance in any agreement, though politically difficult, was also more straightforward. We knew what Assad wanted: the recovery of the Golan Heights, in return for the absolute minimum level of political normalization with Israel. We knew what we wanted: security guarantees and assurances regardin

Sabbath. It turned out that Israel’s state electric company had been transporting a huge steam- condensation machine from the manufacturing site near Haifa to a power plant in Ashdod. The unit was the size of a small apartment. It weighed 100 tons. It couldn’t be driven across the country without bringin

so wanted my assessment about whether the army could work out arrangements to safeguard the country’s security if we handed back most, if not all, of the Golan Heights. If so, what kind of security arrangements, with what timeline? We met through the summer, as the 301 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011772 / BARAK / 16 talks wi

across Romania 19 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_027867 to the grand old Black Sea port of Constanta, and by ship through the Bosphorus, past Istanbul, and on to Haifa on the Palestinian coast, from where they were taken by truck to their bunk-bed rooms in one of a dozen prefab structures on the recently established

ldiers crossed the border on an intelligence mission. It had happened in 1954, and it ended in a failure even more serious than Rotem. The target was the Golan Heights, inside Syria. The special technology unit attached to military intelligence had developed a bugging device designed to be placed on a telephone pole

ura, on ours as Rosh Hanirkra, where the Mediterranean coastline rose dramatically to a ridge and, once into Israel, sloped steeply down again toward Haifa. I took in two main assault teams, one led by Mookie, the other by Uzi Dayan. We hid in a tangle of bushes about halfway along the road which climbed

urprise attacks by Syria and Egypt - armies we'd not just defeated, but humiliated, six years earlier - had pinned down and pushed back our forces on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai. Without any advance call-up, many reservists were only now reaching the front lines. As hundreds of people pressed for seats on the

oward Tel Aviv. It still took half-an-hour. Misha and Dan, who lived closer to the kirya, were already in the bunker. Ten Scuds hit near Tel Aviv and Haifa that night. It was not until shortly before dawn that our tracker units got back to us with formal confirmation that there had been no chemical warhe

ade with him. The substance in any agreement, though politically difficult, was also more straightforward. We knew what Assad wanted: the recovery of the Golan Heights, in return for the absolute minimum level of political normalization with Israel. We knew what we wanted: security guarantees and assurances regardin

Sabbath. It turned out that Israel's state electric company had been transporting a huge steam- condensation machine from the manufacturing site near Haifa to a power plant in Ashdod. The unit was the size of a small apartment. It weighed 100 tons. It couldn't be driven across the country without bringin

so wanted my assessment about whether the army could work out arrangements to safeguard the country's security if we handed back most, if not all, of the Golan Heights. If so, what kind of security arrangements, with what timeline? We met through the summer, as the 301 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028149 / BARAK / 16 talks with

the Sinai peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and about 1,150 square kilometres of Syrian territory on the Golan Heights. 1 September 1967 Khartoum Resolution of the three ‘Noes’. 22 November 1967 UN Security Council Resolution 242. 21 March 1968 The battle of Karame

for Palestinian National Unity Government. Palestinian Government of Unity sworn in. Program of Palestinian Unity Government. Riyadh Declaration. Haifa Declaration. UN Security Council Resolution 1757 establishes Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). Violent confrontations between Hamas and Fatah in

KES-PICOT AGREEMENT (191 6) . ad Direct French control Under French influence (area A) Y Direct British control {including = —40°—4 ; the ports of Haifa and Acre} Under British influence (area B) International administration * Tabriz PERSIA Damascus | Syrian |Dejsert ae ees A bi Pp . ! “\. Per