Epstein Secrets

en brought in as the core of a peacekeeping force. But in the summer of 1981, new US President Ronald Reagan’s Mideast envoy, Undersecretary of State Philip Habib, had 193 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011664 brokered a cease-fire to halt Palestinian Katyusha rocket fire into Israel. It was generally holding. But fundamen

d take whatever action necessary. But the decisive moment came on the eighteenth of March. A school bus near Eilat, in the far south of Israel, hit a Fatah landmine, killing the driver and a teacher, and injuring 10 of the children. I was called up the night before the Israeli attack, as part of a small

itical fortune, the mere prospect of Arik further expanding the 202 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011673 invasion had the effect of persuading Washington to send Philip Habib back into the diplomatic fray. With no early sign, however, of Arafat agreeing to leave, Arik now steadily tightened what amounted to a siege on west

n closer friend of mine: Dan Shomron. I had first got to know Dan well in the late sixties after Karameh, Israel’s costly standoff with Arafat, when Fatah’s influence was in its infancy. We exchanged impressions on what had gone wrong, and why? When I became commander of Sayeret Matkal, we remained in t

en brought in as the core of a peacekeeping force. But in the summer of 1981, new US President Ronald Reagan's Mideast envoy, Undersecretary of State Philip Habib, had 193 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028041 brokered a cease-fire to halt Palestinian Katyusha rocket fire into Israel. It was generally holding. But fundament

d take whatever action necessary. But the decisive moment came on the eighteenth of March. A school bus near Eilat, in the far south of Israel, hit a Fatah landmine, killing the driver and a teacher, and injuring 10 of the children. I was called up the night before the Israeli attack, as part of a small

itical fortune, the mere prospect of Arik further expanding the 202 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028050 invasion had the effect of persuading Washington to send Philip Habib back into the diplomatic fray. With no early sign, however, of Arafat agreeing to leave, Arik now steadily tightened what amounted to a siege on west

en closer friend of mine: Dan Shomron. I had first got to know Dan well in the late sixties after Karameh, Israel's costly standoff with Arafat, when Fatah's influence was in its infancy. We exchanged impressions on what had gone wrong, and why? When I became commander of Sayeret Matkal, we remained in t