Epstein Secrets

he two of us actually met — shortly after the assassination of my longtime comrade and friend Yitzhak Rabin, when I had become Foreign Minister under Shimon Peres. But in the intervening years, Arafat was rarely off of my radar. By the early 1970s, he and his fighters had been expelled by King Hussein’s army fr

, when I had become Foreign Minister under Shimon Peres. But in the intervening years, Arafat was rarely

point in shooting back. We didn’t need to fight, and it was clear that the Egyptians didn’t really want to. Shortly before dark, Lieutenant-Colonel Eitan brought our column to halt. The road we were on cut through tall sandunes on either side. We knew there 90 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011561 were still Egypti

ssment report. Then, we’d join Motta’s operations meeting with the general staff, often attended by the man who’d followed Dayan as defense minister, Shimon Peres. The analysis of military intelligence included separate teams for Egypt and Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, Iraq and other neighboring states, as well a

chute assault off the Israeli coast in Haifa later in the day, but if that went well, it seemed the only practical alternative. Motta and I went met Peres around 8:30am. Shimon had no first-hand military experience, having played a political role alongside Ben-Gurion from Israel’s early years. So he was

hem agreed Israel needed a specially trained commando force. But not everyone felt Sayeret Matkal could, or should, take on that role. Rafael “Raful” Eitan was perhaps the most strident. He had fought with the Palmach in 1948. He was an officer in Unit 101 and a commander of the parachutists’ Battalion 8

he two of us actually met — shortly after the assassination of my longtime comrade and friend Yitzhak Rabin, when I had become Foreign Minister under Shimon Peres. But in the intervening years, Arafat was rarely off of my radar. By the early 1970s, he and his fighters had been expelled by King Hussein’s army fr

, when I had become Foreign Minister under Shimon Peres. But in the intervening years, Arafat was rarely

e point in shooting back. We didn't need to fight, and it was clear that the Egyptians didn't really want to. Shortly before dark, Lieutenant-Colonel Eitan brought our column to halt. The road we were on cut through tall sandunes on either side. We knew there 90 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_027938 were still Egyptia

ssment report. Then, we'd join Motta's operations meeting with the general staff, often attended by the man who'd followed Dayan as defense minister, Shimon Peres. The analysis of military intelligence included separate teams for Egypt and Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, Iraq and other neighboring states, as well as

achute assault off the Israeli coast in Haifa later in the day, but if that went well, it seemed the only practical alternative. Motta and I went met Peres around 8:30am. Shimon had no first-hand military experience, having played a political role alongside Ben-Gurion from Israel's early years. So he was

hem agreed Israel needed a specially trained commando force. But not everyone felt Sayeret Matkal could, or should, take on that role. Rafael "Raful" Eitan was perhaps the most strident. He had fought with the Palmach in 1948. He was an officer in Unit 101 and a commander of the parachutists' Battalion 8