Cfiesel.2O-Mq028O4O41t Dbeinik$90 9102Fril a Et2713e2Baql,ay& Zfi U45 The government argued to the Court that defense counsel's contact with the prosecutors in the months leading up to Ms. Maxwell's arrest prove little about her intent to stay in this country simply because she never disclosed her location. (Tr. 26). While Ms. Maxwell was understandably not in the habit of volunteering her whereabouts given the intensity of the press attention, her counsel would have provided that information had the government asked for it. The government never did. 3. Ms. Maxwell Did Not Try to Avoid Arrest, Nor Was She "Good At" Hiding Similarly, had the government reached out to defense counsel before Ms. Maxwell's arrest, we would have willingly arranged for her self-surrender. We were never given that chance. Instead, the government arrested her in a totally unnecessary early morning raid with multiple federal agents at her residence in New Hampshire, on the eve of the one-year anniversary of the arrest of Jeffrey Epstein, creating the misimpression that Ms. Maxwell was hiding from them. That is simply not the case. The government argued that the events of Ms. Maxwell's arrest—in particular, that she moved herself into an interior room when the officers approached the house and that they found a cell phone wrapped in tin foil—evidence an attempt to evade law enforcement. (Tr. 32-34). As we previously explained to the Court, Ms. Maxwell was protecting herself from the press, not trying to avoid arrest. (Tr. 54-57). Since the hearing, we have obtained the accompanying statement from the head of the security company guarding Ms. Maxwell at the time of her arrest, which was not available at the time of the initial hearing. (Ex. S). statement demonstrates that Ms. Maxwell was not avoiding arrest, but was following an agreed-upon procedure to protect herself in the event of a potential threat to her safety or security. 23 EFTA00093244

CfiseeL2D-MOCESIGNAMit Medit9007102Fril aid61213412Bagze 303545 According to , the security guard on duty that day had seen helicopters flying over the house, which he assumed to be the press. (Id.). When the guard saw the FBI agents walking up the driveway to the house, he again assumed that they were members of the press. (Id.). Accordingly, he radioed Ms. Maxwell to alert her that the press was on the grounds and approaching the house. (Id.). In accordance with the procedure that Ms. Maxwell's security personnel had put in place for such an event, Ms. Maxwell moved away from the windows and into a safe room inside the house. (Id.). Ms. Maxwell was not trying to avoid arrest; she was simply following the established security protocols to protect herself from what had been informed was an ambush by the press. Regarding the cellphone wrapped in tin foil, we explained to the Court at the initial bail hearing that Ms. Maxwell took this step to prevent the press from accessing her phone after the Second Circuit inadvertently unsealed certain court records with the phone number unredacted. (Tr. 55-56). Having now reviewed the discovery produced by the government, it is clear that Ms. Maxwell was not at all the "master spy" the government makes her out to be and was not wrapping the phone in order to evade detection by law enforcement. First, the cellphone in question was subscribed in the name of "Terramar Project, Inc.," which is easily identifiable through a simple Google search as Ms. Maxwell's charity. Second, Ms. Maxwell used the phone to make calls as late as May 2020, just before her arrest. She would never have used the phone if she had been concerned that the authorities were using it to track her. Third, Ms. Maxwell had another phone subscribed in the name of "G Max" that she was using as her primary phone, which was not covered. It would make no sense for her to try to wrap one phone in tin foil to avoid detection and not the other. 24 EFTA00093245

C6ssel.20-ThiaCOONAlltilit meuthoitite02Fril EWA/204We al 35 45 Indeed, the discovery reflects that it was not hard at all for the government to locate Ms. Maxwell when they wanted to find her by tracking her primary phone. In sum, the cellphone clearly shows that Ms. Maxwell was not "good at" hiding or that she was avoiding arrest, as the government claimed. (Tr. 31-32). She was trying to protect herself as best as she could from harassment by the press, not capture by law enforcement. Moreover, this should not be a bar to granting bail. The proposed conditions ensure her presence at home in plain sight of (and the security guards), GPS- monitored, and under strict Pretrial supervision. D. Ms. Maxwell Has Waived Her Extradition Rights and Could Not Seek Refuge in the United Kingdom or France At the initial hearing, the government argued that Ms. Maxwell, a naturalized U.S. citizen who has lived in the United States for almost 30 years, might flee to the United Kingdom or France if granted bail, despite the fact that she did not leave the country for nearly a year after Epstein's arrest. (Dkt. 22 at 6.) The government asserted in its reply brief that France "does not extradite its citizens to the United States pursuant to French law." (Id.) At the bail hearing, the government represented that "France will not extradite a French citizen to the United States as a matter of law, even if the defendant is a dual citizen of the United States," and that extradition by the United Kingdom would be "lengthy" and "uncertain" with bail "very likely" pending the extradition proceeding. (Tr. 27.) These assertions are incorrect, particularly given Ms. Maxwell's irrevocable waiver of her extradition rights with respect to both the United Kingdom and France. As we noted for the Court at the initial hearing, the concern that Ms. Maxwell would attempt to flee the United States is entirely unfounded given that Ms. Maxwell had every motive and opportunity to flee after the arrest and death of Jeffrey Epstein, but chose to remain in this 25 EFTA00093246

C6esel.20-Z74)02804Alltilit tlb fititfit192/02Fr Et 27134/2Bagtip 32 2k 45 country. (Dkt. 18 at 12-14, Tr. 52-53). It is even more unfounded in light of the daily avalanche of media coverage of Ms. Maxwell. She is now one of the most recognizable and infamous people in the world. She is being pursued relentlessly by the press, which would no doubt be camped out by her front door every day if she were granted bail. The notion that Ms. Maxwell could somehow flee to a foreign country during a worldwide pandemic (presumably, by plane), while being supervised and monitored 24 hours a day and with the eyes of the global press corps on her every minute, without being caught, is absurd. To the extent the Court is concerned that her calculus may have changed since her arrest because the threat of prosecution has now crystallized into concrete charges (Tr. 85-86), Ms. Maxwell has addressed that concern head-on—she will execute irrevocable waivers of her right to contest extradition in both the United Kingdom and France. (Ex. T). These waivers demonstrate Ms. Maxwell's firm commitment to remain in this country to face the charges against her. Moreover, as discussed more fully in the attached expert reports, because of these waivers and other factors, it is highly unlikely that Ms. Maxwell would be able to successfully resist an extradition request from the United States to either country, in the extremely unlikely event she were to violate her bail conditions. (Exs. U-V). Moreover, any extradition proceedings in either country would be resolved promptly. (Id.). Courts have addressed concerns about a defendant's ties to a foreign state that enforces extradition waivers by requiring the defendant to execute such a waiver as a condition of release—including in cases where the defendants, unlike Ms. Maxwell, were not U.S. citizens. See, e.g., United States v. Cirillo, No. 99-1514, 1999 WL 1456536, at *2 (3d Cir. July 13, 1999) (vacating district court's detention order and reinstating magistrate's release order, which required foreign citizen and resident to sign an "irrevocable waiver of extradition" as a condition 26 EFTA00093247

C6geel.20-ThinKINAlltilit Medititl 2FriJ 01724/2Bardgel 31 35 45 of release); United States v. Salvagno, 314 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (ordering each of two defendants to "execute and file with the Clerk of the Court a waiver of extradition applicable to any nation or foreign territory in which he may be found as a condition of his continued release"); United States v. Karni, 298 F. Supp. 2d 129, 132-33 (D.D.C. 2004) (requiring Israeli citizen who lived in South Africa and had "no ties to the United States" to sign waiver of rights not to be extradited under Israeli and South African extradition treaties with United States); United States v. Chen, 820 F. Supp. 1205, 1212 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (ordering as a condition of release that defendants "execute waivers of challenges to extradition from any nation where they may be found"). Moreover, a defendant's waiver of the right to appeal an extradition order has been recognized as an indication of the defendant's intent not to flee. See, e.g., United States v. Khashoggi, 717 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Judge Keenan found defendant's extradition appeal waiver "manifests an intention to remain here and face the charges against him"). In response to the government's assertions, Ms. Maxwell has obtained the accompanying reports of experts in United Kingdom and French extradition law, who have analyzed the likelihood that Ms. Maxwell, in the event she were to flee to the United Kingdom or France, would be able to resist extradition to the United States after having executed a waiver of her right to do so. Both have concluded that it is highly unlikely that she would be able to resist extradition successfully. United Kingdom. With respect to the United Kingdom, submitted herewith is a report from David Perry ("Perry Rep."), a U.K. barrister who is widely considered one of the United Kingdom's preeminent extradition practitioners. (Perry Rep. Annex B ¶ 2.1) (attached as Exhibit U). Mr. Perry has acted on behalf of many overseas governments in extradition proceedings; has 27 EFTA00093248

Cfissel211-Z744O3O4A2dit nbeuthMstl 91O2Fr i9822412Bag&lgea4a545 appeared in the High Court, House of Lords and Supreme Court in leading extradition cases; and has acted as an expert consultant to the Commonwealth Secretariat on international cooperation. (Id.). In 2011 and 2012, Mr. Perry was part of a select team appointed by the U.K. government to conduct a review of the United Kingdom's extradition arrangements, a review that formed the basis of changes to the 2003 Extradition Act. (Id. Annex B ¶ 3.1). In Mr. Perry's opinion, it is "highly unlikely that Ghislaine Maxwell would be able successfully to resist extradition to the United States" in connection with this case. (Perry Rep. 12(e)). After concluding that none of the potentially applicable bars to extradition or human rights objections would prevent Ms. Maxwell's extradition, Mr. Perry explains that Ms. Maxwell's waiver of her extradition rights "would be admissible in any extradition proceedings and, in cases, such as this one, where the requested person consents to their extradition, the extradition process is likely to take between one and three months to complete." (Id. 11 24-39). Mr. Perry's report also undercuts the government's representation at the initial hearing regarding likelihood of bail (see Tr. 27), opining that "a person who absconded from [a] US criminal proceeding in breach of bail... is extremely unlikely to be granted bail" in a subsequent U.K. extradition proceeding. (Perry Rep. 1 23). France. The accompanying report of William Julie ("Julie Rep.") reviews the French extradition process as it would likely be applied to Ms. Maxwell. Mr. Julie is an expert on French extradition law who has handled extradition cases both within and outside the European Union and regularly appears as an extradition expert in French courts. (Julie Rep.) (attached as Exhibit V). Mr. Julie explains that, contrary to the government's representation, "the extradition of a French national to the USA is legally permissible under French law." (Id. at 1). 28 EFTA00093249

C6.3120-Z740304AStilit Meu cao2Fru le224213agb#6 36 3545 Mr. Julie opines that the French entity with jurisdiction over the legality of extradition requests would not oppose Ms. Maxwell's extradition on the ground that she is a French citizen, and that it is "highly unlikely that the French government would refuse to issue and execute an extradition decree" against her. (Id. at 2). Mr. Julie bases his opinion largely on (i) Ms. Maxwell's U.S. citizenship; (ii) her irrevocable waiver of her extradition rights with respect to the United States; (iii) the fact that the issue would arise only if Ms. Maxwell had fled to France in violation of strict bail conditions in the United States; (iv) the fact that a failure to extradite would obligate French authorities to try Ms. Maxwell in French courts for the same 25-year-old conduct alleged in the indictment, which did not take place in France; and (v) France's diplomatic interest in accommodating an extradition request from the United States. (Id.). Mr. Julie adds that the extradition process would likely be "disposed of expediently"; where the requesting state emphasizes the urgent nature of the extradition request, "the extradition decree is generally issued in only a few weeks." (Id. at 2-3). And in any event, while the extradition proceedings are pending, "the French judicial authorities would most certainly decide that [Ms. Maxwell] has to remain in custody given her flight from the USA and the violation of her bail terms and conditions in this requesting State." (Id. at 12). Ms. Maxwell has no intention of fleeing the country and has relinquished her rights to contest extradition. She has always maintained her innocence and will continue to fight the allegations against her here in the United States, as she has in the past. Even if she were to flee after being granted bail (which she will not), it is likely that Ms. Maxwell would be extradited expeditiously from France or the United Kingdom. Accordingly, the Court should give no weight in the bail analysis to the fact that Ms. Maxwell is a dual citizen of these countries.* 8 Ms. Maxwell would also have very little incentive to flee to France. According to recent press reports, French authorities recently broadened their existing criminal investigation into Jeffrey Epstein to include Ms. Maxwell. See 29 EFTA00093250

c6setIlt-MMentastot 1:33eu MUM ON 2Fril a Ete2242eagzdjd 36 3645 E. The Discovery Contains No Meaningful Documentary Corroboration of the Government's Allegations Against Ms. Maxwell At the initial bail hearing, the government represented to the Court that "the evidence in this case is strong" and that the allegations of the alleged victims were "backed up [by] contemporaneous documents .. [including] flight records, diary entries, business records, and other evidence." (Dkt. 4 at 5.) The Court credited those representations and accepted the government's proffer that the witness testimony would be "corroborated by significant contemporaneous documentary evidence." (Tr. 82) (emphasis added). The defense, of course, could not rebut the government's representations at the hearing because the government had not yet produced discovery. Since then, the government has produced, and the defense has reviewed, hundreds of thousands of pages of discovery, including the entire initial tranche of discovery that the government represented was the core of its case against Ms. Maxwell.9 The discovery contains no meaningful documentary corroboration of the allegations whatsoever, much less "significant" corroboration that the Court was led to believe existed. The vast majority of the discovery that the defense has reviewed relates to the time period in the 2O0Os and the 201Os, well after the conspiracy charged in the indictment (1994-1997). These documents include In fact, only Daily Mail, "French prosecutors probing Jeffrey Epstein over rape and abuse of children in Paris widen probe to include Ghislaine Maxwell to see if British socialite was involved in his offending," (Oct. 25, 2020), https://www.dailymail.co.uldnews/article-8878825/Frenchrosecutors-probing-Jeffrey-Epstein-widen-probe- include-Ghislaine-Maxwell html. 9 The defense has not yet completed its review of the over 1.2 million documents produced on November 9, 2020 and November 18, 2020. This production includes documents and images seized from electronic devices found at Epstein's residences in searches of his residences in 2019. Our initial review, however, shows that the documents are from the 2000s and 2010s, well after the charged conspiracy. 30 EFTA00093251

Ccosel.211-MOCEIGNAlltilit MeakfitlEa02Fril afe21,2Bardge a545 a very small fraction of the discovery pertains in any way to the individuals we believe to be the three complainants named in the indictment, and none of it corroborates any allegations of "grooming" or sexual assault or a conspiracy with Epstein involving Ms. Maxwell. For example, the government represented to the Court that it had "diary entries" that corroborated the witness testimony, suggesting that more than one of the complainants had kept contemporaneous diaries that implicated Ms. Maxwell. (Dkt. 4 at 5). The discovery produced thus far contains only IC In addition, the flight records that the government touted at the bail hearing, which include 10 31 EFTA00093252

Cem El 20-Z7441130.4Mtdit tibeu thew 9132Fr LI aidltBfl,2Bapelp 311 35 45 The discovery also does not contain any police reports in which the people we believe to be the complainants reported the alleged crimes to law enforcement. To the contrary, the only police reports provided are exculpatory. In sum, the discovery contains not a single contemporaneous email, text message, phone record, diary entry, police report, or recording that implicates Ms. Maxwell in the 1994-1997 conduct underlying the conspiracy charged in the indictment. The few documents in the discovery that pertain to the people we believe to be the three complainants referenced in the indictment do little, if anything, to support the government's case against Ms. Maxwell: 32 EFTA00093253

C6950.20-M06300401tillt Dbent9ki€092/02Fril 01122.62BagRA 39ib45 In addition. the discovery appears to show that, the government did not issue subpoenas for documents related to Ms. Maxwell until after Epstein's death. Although the discovery does not include the grand jury subpoenas themselves, the subpoena returns appear to indicate that the government began issuing subpoenas for Ms. Maxwell's financial information on August 16, 2019, six days after Epstein's death, and issued additional subpoenas in the months that followed. The facts strongly imply that government only chose to pursue a case against Ms. Maxwell—who was not named in the Epstein indictment—because the main target, Jeffrey Epstein, had died in their custody. The lack of corroboration in the discovery confirms that the case against Ms. Maxwell was an afterthought and was reverse engineered based on allegations of 25-year- old conduct from a small number of alleged victims. Thus, notwithstanding the statement in the government's bail submission, we have been provided with no meaningful documentary corroboration in this case. It appears that the evidence in this case boils down to witness testimony about events that allegedly took place over 25 years ago. Far from creating a flight risk, the lack of corroboration only reinforces Ms. Maxwell's conviction that she has been falsely accused and strengthens her long-standing desire to face the allegations against her and clear her name in court. This factor should weigh heavily in favor of granting Ms. Maxwell bail. 33 EFTA00093254

avaseut-mixosomstint Abed 2Fril aifl224/213alzel (1' 40 35 45 F. The Proposed Bail Package Is Expansive and Far Exceeds What Is Necessary to Reasonably Assure Ms. Maxwell's Presence in Court In light of the additional information that Ms. Maxwell has provided in connection with this submission, which responds to each of the concerns raised by the government at the initial bail hearing, the government cannot meet its burden to establish that no set of bail conditions would reasonably assure Ms. Maxwell's appearance in court. The proposed bail package is exceptional in its scope, addresses all of the factors that the Court considered in evaluating risk of flight, and is more than sufficient to warrant her release from BOP custody and transfer to restricted home detention. Courts in this Circuit have ordered release of high-profile defendants with financial means and foreign citizenship on bonds in lower amounts with less or no security with similar or less restrictive conditions: DEFENDANT SADR KNASNOGGI waste: to" toNmemd SABHNAN I 14,434"1 BOOMER Arrir4iiicI.Tauhroee KARNI No uf. To: RANSON HANSEN tHArl to INrenark MAXWELL EIOND $32.6M &mom', MOM S1OM S1OM $9.6M SECURED 0 NO 0 Ci 0 0 CI $7.sm C/ NOT REPORTED - 55OOK I NO S2 MOMTIm I CI 0 O Cl Cd NO 6 -1 0 6 HOME DETENTION Nightly Curfew ELECTRONIC MONITORING O- a a a Cd 0 Cl NO PRNATF SECURITY U.S.CfRZEN FOREIGN CI71ZENSHiP NO NO Iran I St Katz-Newt O 0 NO NO O NO NO O Saudi Arabia VidTmOnly 0 NO NO CF Indonesia NO 0 India NO NO Switzerland NO NO knell South Africa NO CI China NO NO Denmark UK I Franc* The Court should also not give any weight to the government's speculative assertions that others might provide money and other support to Ms. Maxwell if she were to flee. (Dkt. 22 at 34 EFTA00093255

CfisseL211-ZWAStilit Meutit909102Fril al7194/2641td cot 41 ?545 11-12). Ms. Maxwell is not obligated to rebut every theoretical possibility that the government might raise that may contribute to a potential flight risk in order to be granted bail. That is not the standard. Cl United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 888 n.4, 892-93 (8th Cir. 1985) ("The legal standard required by the [Bail Reform] Act is one of reasonable assurances, not absolute guarantees."). Ms. Maxwell has no intention of fleeing. If she did, then under the proposed bail conditions she would lose everything and destroy the family she has been fighting so hard to protect since Epstein's arrest. Ms. Maxwell will not do that, and should be granted bail. G. The Alternative to Bail Is Confinement Under Oppressive Conditions that Impact Ms. Maxwell's Health and Ability to Prepare Her Defense Granting bail to Ms. Maxwell is all the more appropriate and necessary because the past few months have shown that Ms. Maxwell cannot adequately participate in her defense and prepare for trial from the inside the MDC. The alternative to release is her continued confinement under extraordinarily onerous conditions that are not only unjust and punitive, but also meaningfully impair Ms. Maxwell's ability to review the voluminous discovery produced by the government and to communicate effectively with counsel to prepare her defense. Ms. Maxwell has spent the entirety of her detention—now over five months—in de facto solitary confinement, under conditions that rival those used at USP Florence ADMAX to supervise the most dangerous inmates in the federal system and are tantamount to imprisonment as a defendant convicted of capital murder and incarcerated on death row. In fact, multiple wardens and interim wardens have remarked that in their collective years of experience they have never seen anything like her current regime. The restrictive regulations to which Ms. Maxwell is subjected are not reasonably related to a legitimate goal to ensure the security of Ms. Maxwell or the MDC. Instead, it seems clear that the overly restrictive conditions are an 35 EFTA00093256

Caget1211-Z74030gAlltdit Medikfitl9102Fril aiflZ f242Balzel 42 3545 exaggerated response to Epstein's death, effectively punishing Ms. Maxwell for the BOP's own negligence with respect to Epstein." Counsel has attempted to address the restrictions in numerous letters, emails and calls to the MDC warden, the MDC legal department, and the prosecutors, but to no avail. Rather than repeating these points here at length, we refer the Court to our letter to the MDC warden, dated October 29, 2020, which details the most serious and extraordinarily restrictive conditions of confinement. 12 These include: • De Facto Solitary Confinement • Excessive Surveillance • Excessive Scanning and Strip Searching • Deprivation of Food • Deprivation of Sleep • Deprivation of Communication with Family and Friends • Compromised Communication with Legal Counsel The conditions of Ms. Maxwell's detention are utterly inappropriate, and totally disproportionate for a non-violent pretrial detainee with no prior criminal history facing non-violent charges a quarter-century old. Moreover, they adversely impact her ability to prepare her defense and compromise her physical health and psychological wellbeing. In addition to these intolerable conditions, Ms. Maxwell has had to contend with numerous unacceptable delays and technical problems with the discovery that the government has produced to her thus far. We have raised these issues with the prosecutors on numerous occasions. As we advised the Court in our letter of October 23, 2020, defense counsel first II These conditions are especially inappropriate because Ms. Maxwell has been an exemplary inmate and has not received any disciplinary infractions since her arrest. In fact, she has been made a suicide watch inmate, which is the highest and most trusted responsibility that an inmate can have. It is the height of irony that Ms. Maxwell is being constantly surveilled as if she were a suicide risk when she, herself, is trusted enough (if she were ever released from isolation) to monitor inmates who are truly at risk of suicide. 12 The Warden never responded to the letter. In our response to the government's 90-day status report concerning MDC conditions, counsel requested that the Warden provide a first-hand report to the Court and counsel. Following Court directive for a report from the MDC, MDC Legal submitted a letter that recited BOP policy but failed to address a number of concerns. 36 EFTA00093257

Ccosel.211-ZMICERWlit Meutiskfit19302Frii di 817134/20aFd o545 alerted the government on August 27, 2020 that there were significant portions of the first three discovery productions that Ms. Maxwell could not read. (Dkt. 66). Despite numerous attempts to fix these problems over the succeeding weeks, including producing a replacement hard drive containing these productions, the problems were not resolved and the replacement hard drive was broken. In addition, the fourth and fifth productions, which were produced after the defense alerted the government to these problems, contained some of the same technical problems and included a significant number of unreadable documents. Most recently, the hard drives for the sixth and seventh productions have stopped functioning properly. As a result, Ms. Maxwell has not had access to a complete set of readable discovery for over four months. to Ms. Maxwell cannot defend herself if she cannot review the discovery. Most recently, Ms. Maxwell has had to endure the added burdens of quarantine. On November 18, 2020, Ms. Maxwell was given a COVID test and placed in 14-day quarantine due to contact with a staffer who tested positive. The revolving team of guards assigned to Ms. Maxwell, some coming from other BOP institutions confronting their own COVID outbreaks, heightens her exposure to the virus. As reported by the associate warden to the Criminal Justice Advisory Board on December 2, MDC does not mandate testing among its staff. A temperature check and response to a few questions does little to detect an asymptomic carrier. The constant strip searching, touch wanding, and in-mouth checking of Ms. Maxwell heightens her risk for exposure to COVID-19. 13 On November 18, 2020, the government, at our request, provided a laptop computer to Ms. Maxwell in the MDC, which it believed would remedy the issues with unreadable documents, and has agreed to provide a new hard drive containing all of the discovery. It is too early to tell whether the new laptop and hard drive will solve all of the technical problems. We note, however, that now that Ms. Maxwell has been released from quarantine, she only has access to the laptop from 8am•5pm, five days a week, which will effectively limit her review time to that time slot because of compatibility issues between the recently produced hard drives and the prison computer. 37 EFTA00093258

C6gecl.211-M0CEIGNAllt4it t)betiatiitl$3302Fril ait38P,84126alzd 44 ot 45 Ms. Maxwell's quarantine period also resulted in cancellation of weekly in-person legal visits. This is likely to continue in light of the spike in COVID infection within and outside the MDC. Within a two-day period from December 1 to December 3, 55 inmates tested positive, compared with 25 from March to December 1. As of the date of this filing, the BOP reports 80 MDC inmates and staff with COVID.14 If legal visits are suspended, it will further limit our ability to review the voluminous discovery (well in excess of one million documents) with Ms. Maxwell and will further compromise her ability to prepare her defense. Moreover, as this Court observed in United States v. Stephens, if an outbreak occurs "substantial medical and security challenges would almost certainly arise." Stephens, 447 F. Supp. 3d at 65. We urge the Court to weigh the threat of COVID as a factor favoring release in this case, as it did in Stephens. CONCLUSION Ghislaine Maxwell is committed to defending herself and wants nothing more than to remain in this country, with her family and friends by her side, so that she can fight the allegations against her and clear her name. She is determined to ensure that her sureties and her family do not suffer because of any breach of the terms of her bond. We have presented a substantial bail package that satisfies the concerns of the Court and the government, which contains more than ample security and safeguards to reasonably assure that Ms. Maxwell remains in New York and appears in court. The Court has the obligation to ensure that a defendant's constitutional right to prepare a defense is safeguarded. The correct—and only legitimate—decision is to grant Ms. Maxwell bail on the proposed strict conditions. I4 See httpdAvvow.bop.govicoronavirus/. 38 EFTA00093259

C€a?lb-7743O3Oa44t Dbeu ifit19?02ftilaai9&2136,2Balzelp 46 3545 For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Maxwell respectfully requests that the Court order her release on bail pursuant to the conditions she has proposed. Dated: December 4, 2020 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Mark S. Cohen Mark S. Cohen Christian R. Everdell COHEN & GRESSER LLP 800 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 Phone: Jeffrey S. Pagliuca Laura A. Menninger HADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C. 150 East 10th Avenue Denver, CO 80203 Phone: Bobbi C. Stemheim Law Offices of Bobbi C. Stemheim 33 West 19th Street - 4th Floor New York, NY 10011 Phone: Attorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell 39 EFTA00093260

Case 21-770, Document 17-2, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page187 of 351 Exhibit F Doc. 100 The Government's Memorandum in Support to the Defendant's Renewed Motion for Release EFTA00093261

C68250.20-Z74142404A0tilit Mew/4)6011221F 82 eg1 eof.3586 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA GHISLAINE MAXWELL, Defendant. -x ---------------------------- --------- ----- x 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) THE GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION FOR RELEASE Acting United States Attorney Southern District of New York Attorney for the United States of America Assistant United States Attorneys - Of Counsel - EFTA00093262

Cassel.20-Z74030ASNII Mai OM& WV 1FMSZEZ9B3/20gell gyec2 ?of 56 TABLE OF CONTENTS THE GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION FOR RELEASE 1 BACKGROUND 2 APPLICABLE LAW 6 DISCUSSION 8 A. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense 8 B. The Strength of the Evidence 9 C. The Characteristics of the Defendant 12 D. Conditions of Confinement 29 CONCLUSION 33 EFTA00093263

Cfiese.20-MOCO:304,Agnit 1:WDeu 6443111 JBE2 1 F I i t 8.255B3Reg EFISSeat 35 56 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Jackson v. Goon!, 664 F. Supp. 2d 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 27 United States v. Abdullahu, 488 F. Supp. 2d 433 (D.N.J. 2007) 19 United States v. Bank!, 10 Cr. 008 (JFK), Dkt. 7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2010), aff'd, 369 F. App'x 152 (2d Cir. 2010) 26 United States v. Benatar, No. 02 Cr. 099 (JO), 2002 WL 31410262 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002) 26 United States v. Bodmer, No. 03 Cr. 947 (SAS), 2004 WL 169790 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2004) 28 United States v. Bohn, 330 F. Supp. 2d 960 (W.D. Tenn. 2004) 15 United States v. Bolero, 604 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Fla. 1985) 15 United States v. Boustani, 356 F. Supp. 3d 246 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, No. 19-344, 2019 WL 2070656 (2d Cir. Mar. 7, 2019) 28 United States v. Boustani, 932 F.3d 79 (2d Or. 2019) 6, 25, 26 United States v. Chen, 820 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (N.D. Cal. 1992) 15 United States v. Cilins, No. 13 Cr. 315 (WHP), 2013 WL 3802012 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2013) 16, 19 United States v. Cirillo, No. 99-1514, 1999 WL 1456536 (3d Cir. July 13, 1999) 15 United States v. Cohen, No. C 10-00547, 2010 WL 5387757 n.11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2010) 15 United States v. Dreier, 596 F. Supp. 2d 831 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 27 United States v. English, 629 F.3d 311 (2d Cir. 2011) 7 United States v. Epstein, 155 F. Supp. 2d 323 (E.D. Pa. 2001) 28 United States v. Epstein, 425 F. Supp. 3d 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 15, 29 United States v. Esposito, 309 F. Supp. 3d 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 27 United States v. Georgiou, No. 08-1220-M, 2008 WL 4306750 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2008) 15 United States v. Karni, 298 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D.D.C. 2004) 15 United States v. Kazeem, No. 15 Cr. 172, 2015 WL 4645357 (D. Or. Aug. 3, 2015) 15 United States v. Khashoggi, 717 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 15, 28 United States v. Madoff 586 F. Supp. 2d 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 27 United States V. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433 (2d Cir. 2001) 7, 29 United States v. Morrison, No. 16-MR-I18, 2016 WL 7421924 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2016) 15 United States v. Namer, 238 F.3d 425, 2000 WL 1872012 (6th Cir. Dec. 12, 2000) 19 United States v. Patrick Ho, 17 Cr. 779 (KBF), Dkt. 49 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2018) 28 United States v. Petrov, 15 Cr. 66 (LTS), 2015 WL 11022886 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015) 7, 8 United States v. Rowe, 02 Cr. 756 (LMM), 2003 WL 21196846 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2003) United States v. Sabhani, 493 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2007) 6 United States v. Salvagno, 314 F. Supp. 2d 115 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) 15 United States v. Stanton, No. 91 Cr. 889 (CHS), 1992 WL 27130 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1992) 18 United States v. Stroh, No. 396 Cr. 139, 2000 WL 1832956 (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2000) 15 United States v. Young, Nos. 12 Cr. 502, 12 Cr. 645, 2013 WL 12131300 (D. Utah Aug. 27, 2013) 15 United States v. Zarger, No. 00 Cr. 773 (JG), 2000 WL 1134364 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2000) 26 EFTA00093264

C6gese1.20-MIKEKINAMM Meu 04)60 2021F I i t 8.2$5B3/E0g EFISjeoi 3586 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA GHISLAINE MAXWELL, Defendant. x 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) THE GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION FOR RELEASE The Government respectfully submits this memorandum in opposition to the defendant's renewed motion for release on bail, dated December 8, 2020 (the "Renewed Bail Motion"). Five months ago, after thorough briefing and a nearly two-hour hearing, this Court concluded that the defendant posed a serious flight risk and that no condition or combination of conditions could ensure her appearance in court. The defense now asks this Court to reverse that finding by essentially repackaging its prior arguments and presenting a more specific bail package. However, at the July 14, 2020 bail hearing in this case, this Court rejected the defendant's request to keep the record open to allow the defendant to do precisely what she has done here—namely, present more detailed information about her finances and a more concrete package—determining that further information about her financial picture would be irrelevant because no combination of conditions could ensure this defendant's appearance. The Court's conclusion was plainly correct, and the Renewed Bail Motion does nothing to undermine it. The offense conduct outlined in the Indictment remains incredibly serious, the evidence against the defendant remains strong, and the defendant continues to have extensive financial resources and foreign ties, as well as the EFTA00093265

C68SEL2D-Z74163004‘1334111 eu 6%6026121F J i /1259B3/egg SS WM demonstrated ability to live in hiding for the long term. In short, the defendant poses an extreme flight risk, no condition or combination of conditions can reasonably ensure her appearance in this District, and the Court should not alter its prior finding to that effect. BACKGROUND As detailed in the Indictment, the defendant is charged with facilitating the sexual abuse of multiple minor victims by Jeffrey Epstein between approximately 1994 and 1997. The defendant played a critical role in the scheme by helping to identify, entice, and groom minor girls to engage in sex acts with Epstein. The defendant's presence as an adult woman normalized Epstein's abusive behavior, and she even took part in at least some acts of sexual abuse. Together, the defendant and Epstein conspired to entice and cause minor victims to travel to Epstein's residences in different states, which the defendant knew and intended would result in their grooming for and subjection to sexual abuse. Then, in an effort to cover up her crimes, the defendant lied under oath during a civil deposition, including when asked about her interactions with minor girls. Based on that conduct, the Indictment charges the defendant in six counts. Count One charges the defendant with conspiring with Epstein and others to entice minors to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Two charges the defendant with enticing a minor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 and 2. Count Three charges the defendant with conspiring with Epstein and others to transport minors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Four charges the defendant with transporting minors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423 and 2. Counts Five and Six charge the defendant with perjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. 2 EFTA00093266

Caged 20-ZNEOGNAMit Dbeu ftki6t1 2I112 1F 822033/e0gEFIgec6 On July 2, 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") arrested the defendant. Following extensive briefing, on July 14, 2020, the Court held a lengthy bail hearing. In its written and oral submissions, the defense urged the Court to release the defendant on bail. Among other things, the defense emphasized the defendant's family ties and residence in the United States (Dkt. 18 at 2, 3, 12), offered to hire a private security company to monitor the defendant (Id. at 20), noted that the defendant remained in the country and was in touch with the Government through counsel following Epstein's arrest (Dkt. 18 at 12-13; Tr. 49, 52-55), argued that the defendant went into hiding to avoid a media frenzy (Dkt. 18 at 14-16; Tr. 55-56), and argued that detention would hamper the ability to prepare a defense (Tr. 42, 67-69). Responding to the Government's concerns about the lack of transparency about the defendant's finances and six proposed co-signers, the defense specifically asked the Court to keep the proceedings open if the Court believed additional information or a more fulsome bond would be useful to the bail determination. (Tr. 52 ("And if the court determines that the conditions that we have proffered are insufficient or need further verification, as long as we can have some assurance of safety and confidentiality, we would recommend that the court keep the proceeding open, and we should be able to get whatever the court needs to satisfy it."); Tr. 59 ("Even if the court were to assume for purposes of today's proceeding that she has the means that the government claims she does, it does not affect the analysis. That is to be addressed in conditions, to be addressed if the court requires it, through verifications and further proceedings before the court."); Tr. 66 ("If the court desires to leave the proceeding open for a week and allow us to come back, if the court has concerns about the number of suretors, for example, verification information, information about financial issues, we think that, now that we have some ability to breathe a little bit, that we should be able to pull this together for the court's consideration."); Tr. 70 ("And if the court needs more information 3 EFTA00093267

Ce9SEL 20-Z741)6340Agtilit 1flufr t1321F Ii, 829B3/e0g EFISjecl at 86 from us, we would respectfully request that the court leave the proceeding open for a week so that we can try to satisfy the court because we want to.")). The Court declined the defense's request and instead concluded that the defendant posed a serious flight risk and that no combination of conditions could ensure her appearance. First, the Court found that "the nature and circumstances of the offense here weigh in favor of detention," given the statutory presumption of detention triggered by charges involving minor victims and the potential penalties those charges carry. (Tr. 82). Second, the Court determined that "[t]he government's evidence at this early juncture of the case appears strong" based on the "multiple victims who provided detailed accounts of Ms. Maxwell's involvement in serious crimes," as well as corroboration in the form of "significant contemporaneous documentary evidence." (Id.). Third, the Court found that the defendant's history and characteristics demonstrate that the defendant poses a risk of flight. (Tr. 83). In addressing that third factor, the Court emphasized the defendant's "substantial international ties," which "could facilitate living abroad," including "multiple foreign citizenships," "familial and personal connections abroad," and "at least one foreign property of significant value." (Tr. 83). The Court also noted that the defendant "is a citizen of France, a nation that does not appear to extradite its citizens." (Id.). The Court further found that the defendant "possesses extraordinary financial resources" and that "the representations made to Pretrial Services regarding the defendant's finances likely do not provide a complete and candid picture of the resources available." (Tr. 83-84). Although the Court recognized that the defendant "does have some family and personal connections to the United States," the Court highlighted "the absence of any dependents, significant family ties or employment in the United States" in support of the conclusion that "flight 4 EFTA00093268

C6OZEL 20-Z7416380gA13341t nbeu fitittitl 211121 f ft219E8REIg EP aijeca aS S6 would not pose an insurmountable burden for her." (Tr. 84). The Court recognized the defense arguments that the defendant did not leave the United States after Epstein's arrest and was in contact with the Government through counsel, but emphasized that the defendant may have expected that she would not be prosecuted. (Tr. 84-85). The Court also noted that the defendant "did not provide the government with her whereabouts," and that the "[c]ircumstances of her arrest . . . may cast some doubt on the claim that she was not hiding from the government, a claim that she makes throughout the papers and here today, but even if true, the reality that Ms. Maxwell may face such serious charges herself may not have set in until she was actually indicted." (Tr. 85). Based on all of those factors, the Court found that the Government had carried its burden of demonstrating that the defendant "poses a substantial actual risk of flight." (Tr. 86). The Court then concluded that "even the most restrictive conditions of release would be insufficient" to ensure the defendant's appearance. (Id.). Acknowledging that the defense's initial bail package represented only a fraction of the defendant's assets, the Court found that "even a substantially larger package would be insufficient." (Id.). Although the defendant "apparently failed to submit a full accounting or even close to full accounting of her financial situation," the Court implicitly rejected the defense's offer to provide additional information by determining that "[elven if the picture of her financial resources were not opaque, as it is, detention would still be appropriate." (Tr. 86-87 (emphasis added)). That conclusion was informed not only by the defendant's "significant financial resources," but also her "demonstrated sophistication in hiding those resources and herself." (Tr. 87). "Even assuming that Ms. Maxwell only wanted to hide from the press and the public," the Court emphasized that the defendant's "recent conduct underscores her extraordinary capacity to evade detection, even in the face of what the defense has acknowledged to be extreme and unusual efforts to locate her." (Id.). Given that sophistication, 5 EFTA00093269

Cfistillt-Z740C030gAlltilit tg)eu itibfit11n12 1F EI.MBROgEFIgeoli at 86 the Court concluded that electronic monitoring and home security guards "would be insufficient" because the defendant could remove the monitor and evade security guards. (Tr. 87-88). Finally, the Court rejected the defense's arguments about the risks of COVID-19 and the difficulty of preparing a defense with an incarcerated client. In so doing, the Court noted that the defendant has no underlying conditions that place her at heightened risk of complications from COVID-19 and emphasized that the defendant had many months to prepare for trial. (Tr. 89-90). Viewing all of these factors together, the Court ordered the defendant detained pending trial. (Tr. 91). APPLICABLE LAW Under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141 et seq., federal courts are empowered to order a defendant detained pending trial upon a determination that the defendant poses a risk of flight. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). When seeking detention on this ground, "[t]he Government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence both that the defendant `presents an actual risk of flight' and that `no condition or combination of conditions could be imposed on the defendant that would reasonably assure his presence in court." United States v. Boustani, 932 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Sabhani, 493 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2007)). The Bail Reform Act lists three factors to be considered in the detention analysis when the Government seeks detention based on flight risk: (1) the nature and circumstances of the crimes charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; and (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant, including the person's "character . . . [and] financial resources." See 18 U.S.C. § 3I42(g). If a judicial officer concludes that "no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required . . . such judicial officer shall order the detention of the person before trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). 6 EFTA00093270

Cagistr.20-00023EVADIstit D3c2mitiltd Eiliiiikl32/16/212AginiS0 032136 Additionally, where, as here, a defendant is charged with committing an offense involving a minor victim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 or 2423, it shall be presumed, subject to rebuttal, that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required and the safety of the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E). In such a case, "the defendant `bears a limited burden of production—not a burden of persuasion—to rebut that presumption by coming forward with evidence that he does not pose . . . a risk of flight.'" United States v. English, 629 F.3d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)). The act of producing such evidence, however, "does not eliminate the presumption favoring detention." Id. Rather, the presumption "remains a factor to be considered among those weighed by the district court," while the Government retains the ultimate burden of demonstrating that the defendant presents a risk of flight. Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436. When the Court has already issued a detention order, the Bail Reform Act provides that the detention hearing "may be reopened . . . if the judicial officer finds that information exists that was not known to the movant at the time of the hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue of whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance" of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). Accordingly, "[a] court may properly reject an attempt to reopen a detention hearing where the new information presented is immaterial to the issue of flight risk." United States v. Petrov, 15 Cr. 66 (LTS), 2015 WL 11022886, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015). Although courts in this Circuit have recognized that "a release order may be reconsidered even where the evidence proffered on reconsideration was known to the movant at the time of the original hearing," United States v. Rowe, 02 Cr. 756 (LMM), 2003 WL 21196846, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2003), generally the moving party must establish that its arguments "warrant 7 EFTA00093271

Calask:20-dr700Pattallsint Egebratitit 1002 Fikeel6129.6atag Pt* 011.35f136 reconsideration" by, for example, demonstrating "that the court overlooked information or incorrectly applied the law," or that failure to reconsider "would constitute manifest injustice." Petrov, 2015 WL 1102286 at *3. DISCUSSION Having already raised numerous arguments in its briefing and oral argument at the initial bail hearing in this case, the defense now asks this Court to reverse itself based on virtually the same arguments it already rejected. The Renewed Bail Application largely reiterates the same claims regarding the defendant's ties to the United States and her behavior after Epstein's arrest that the Court already found unpersuasive. To the extent the Renewed Bail Application presents new information, it consists primarily of financial data that was certainly known to the defendant at the time of her initial bail application and that the Court already assumed could be made available (and thus rejected as immaterial) when ordering detention. Ultimately, nothing in the Renewed Bail Application alters the analysis that led this Court to conclude that the defendant "poses a substantial actual risk of flight," and that no combination of conditions could assure her appearance. (Tr. 86). All three of the relevant Bail Reform Act factors still weigh heavily in favor of detention, and the defense claims to the contrary do not warrant a revisiting of this Court's well- reasoned and thorough prior decision. A. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense The first Bail Reform Act factor indisputably weighs in favor of detention in this case. The egregious conduct charged in the Indictment gives rise to a statutory presumption of detention, and the Renewed Bail Motion makes no effort to challenge this Court's prior conclusion that the nature and circumstances of the offense support detention. The charges in the Indictment describe horrendous conduct involving the sexual abuse of multiple minor victims. If convicted, the EFTA00093272

Cgilastr20-0002312Milstit Maralie WW2 Eililibl329.11/15ig Phifit at232136 defendant faces up to 35 years of incarceration, and may very well spend the remainder of her natural life in prison. The seriousness of the offenses make such a steep penalty a real possibility upon conviction, thereby giving the defendant an overwhelming incentive to flee if given the chance. In light of that strong incentive to flee, all three of the victims listed in the Indictment have asked the Government to convey to the Court that they continue to seek the defendant's detention. Additionally, pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act, one of the victims has provided a written statement urging the Court to deny bail, which is attached as Exhibit A hereto. That unanimous view of the victims reflects three related reasons that this factor weighs so heavily in favor of detention. First, the victims sincerely fear that if the defendant is released, she will be able to evade justice. Second, the pain that the victims still feel to this day as a result of the defendant's conduct supports the conclusion that this offense is especially serious and may result in a lengthy sentence. Third, as discussed further below, the victims' attention to this case and willingness to convey their views reflects their commitment to take the stand and testify at the defendant's trial, demonstrating the strength of the Government's case. In short, this factor offers no reason to reverse the prior detention order. B. The Strength of the Evidence Further incentivizing the defendant to flee, the Government's evidence remains strong. As the Court recognized when analyzing this factor at the July 14, 2020 hearing, the central evidence in the Government's case will come from the detailed testimony of three different victims, who will each independently describe how the defendant groomed and enticed them to engage in sexual activity with Jeffrey Epstein. (Tr. 82). The Indictment itself contains a description of the accounts these victims have provided law enforcement, which corroborate each other in meaningful part. 9 EFTA00093273

Can 20-00023ENADIstit Mcietritt91011AXI2 Eilii€032)9.6/2bag rap 01332136 Further, and as set forth below, those victims' accounts are corroborated by other evidence, including contemporary documents and other witnesses. In challenging this factor, the defense essentially restates its prior arguments on this score. At the original hearing, the defense argued that the Government's case was weak because it rested heavily on witness testimony regarding events from 25 years ago. (See Dkt. 18 at 19; Tr. 64-65). Having received and reviewed the discovery, the defense now contends the Government's corroborating evidence—some of which the Motion itself identifies-is insufficient and reiterates defense complaints that the discovery does not include other types of evidence.' (See Mot. at 30- 33). None of the defense arguments on this score changes the calculus for this factor. Three different victims are prepared to provide detailed testimony describing the defendant's role in Epstein's criminal scheme to sexually abuse them as minors. As demonstrated by the information outlined in the Indictment, these accounts corroborate each other by independently describing the same techniques used by the defendant and Epstein to groom and entice minor girls to engage in sex acts. Each victim will describe how the defendant befriended her, asked detailed questions about her life, and then normalized sexual activity around Epstein. Each victim will describe the use of massage as a technique to transition into sexual activity. Each victim will describe how the presence of an adult woman manipulated her into entering an abusive situation. In other words, this is a case that involves multiple witnesses describing the same course of conduct, substantially corroborating each other. At the initial bail hearing, the defendant also raised a series of legal challenges she intended to make on the face of the Indictment, all of which she contended weighed in favor of granting bail. After receiving discovery, the defense now appears to have abandoned those arguments, at least insofar as they pertain to the issue of bail. 10 EFTA00093274

Caask.20-000MAMIstit D3dirfidifitt302 Filile32/1.6/B2AgErage 01432136 In addition to corroborating each other, these victims' accounts are further corroborated by other witnesses and by documentary evidence, which has been produced in discovery. That evidence will make it virtually indisputable that these victims in fact met and interacted with both the defendant and Jeffrey Epstein at the times and locations they describe. Beyond this documentary evidence, additional witnesses will confirm that both the defendant and Epstein knew and interacted with certain minor victims when those victims were minors. In other words, the Government's evidence strongly corroborates the victims' testimony that they met and interacted with the defendant and Epstein at particular times and in particular places. In the instant motion, the defendant complains that the documentary evidence relevant to the three victims identified in the Indictment and produced to date is not sufficiently voluminous 2 In its Renewed Bail Motion the defense co i lams 11 EFTA00093275

Caest:20-er70083INADIstIt liOdartififii11002 Fila€0129.Et/ItigPaCft 0.632136 and that certain of the corroborating documentary evidence does not specifically name Maxwell. Leaving aside the fact that volume is not a reliable proxy for quality, by its very nature, abusive sexual contact is not the type of crime that leaves extensive documentary evidence. But, as described above, . To the extent other corroborative documents refer only to Epstein, they still support these victims' testimony, which will detail their interactions with both the defendant and her co-conspirator, Epstein. In other words, documentary evidence does exist, and as the Court has already found, the combination of multiple victims describing the same scheme, together with documents and other witnesses confirming that those victims did indeed interact with the defendant and Epstein at the times and places they say they did, makes this a strong case. (Tr. 82). Taken together, this evidence confirms that the Government's case remains as strong as it was at the time of the defendant's arrest. Accordingly, this factor continues to weigh heavily in favor of detention. C. The Characteristics of the Defendant The defendant's history and characteristics include significant foreign ties, millions of dollars in cash that she largely transferred to her spouse in the last five years, among other assets, and a demonstrated willingness and sophisticated ability to live in hiding. The bulk of the arguments in the Renewed Bail Motion focus on this factor in a manner that largely rehashes claims that this Court already considered at the July 14, 2020 hearing. Any new information provided was either known by the defense at the time of the initial hearing, assumed to be the case when the Court analyzed this factor at the initial hearing, or, in the case of the defense report regarding 12 EFTA00093276

Caest:20-er700gt3CraaPsint Da airalit 11002 Eita66129.6/2tag Pap cit3lif136 French law, is simply incorrect. Accordingly, the defendant's foreign ties, wealth, and skill at avoiding detection continue to weigh in favor of detention. First, there can be no serious dispute that the defendant has foreign ties. She is a citizen of three countries and holds three passports. As was already noted at the original hearing and is again evidenced in the Renewed Bail Application, the defendant has close relatives and friends who live abroad, as well as a multi-million dollar foreign property and at least one foreign bank account. (Tr. 83). In an attempt to minimize the defendant's foreign ties, the defense emphasizes the defendant's relatives and friends in the United States, history of residence in the United States, and United States citizenship. But the Court was already aware of those factors when making its original detention decision. (See Tr. 84; Dkt. 18 at 2, 12). The letters and documentation included in the Renewed Bail Motion simply prove points that were not in dispute. What that documentation does not do, however, is suggest that the defendant has the kind of ties to this country that come with any employment in the United States or any dependents living here. Indeed, as noted in the Pretrial Services Report, the defendant stated in July that she has no children and has no current employment. (Pretrial Services Report at 3). The Renewed Bail Motion fails to establish sufficiently strong ties to the United States that would prevent her from fleeing. Although the defendant now claims her marriage would keep her in the United States, her motion does not address the plainly inconsistent statements she made to Pretrial Services at the time of her arrest, when, as documented in the Pretrial Services Report, the defendant said she was "in the process of divorcing her husband." (Id.). On this point, it bears noting that the defendant's motion asks that she be permitted to live with if granted bail, not her spouse. Moreover, the fact that the defendant's spouse has only now come forward to support the defendant should be afforded little weight given that he refused to come forward at the 13 EFTA00093277

Caatist-20-427001MA0 Etaietrfit tC102F1006229.6/ItagEritfie 01732136 time of her arrest. While a friend's desire to avoid publicity may be understandable, a spouse's desire to distance himself in that manner—particularly when coupled with the defendant's inconsistent statements about the state of their relationship—undermine her assertion that her marriage is a tie that would keep her in the United States.' As for the defendant's asserted relationships with and other relatives in the United States, the defendant did not appear to have an issue living alone without these relatives while she was in hiding in New Hampshire, which undercuts any suggestion that these ties would keep her in the United States. In any event, the defendant could easily receive visits from her family members while living abroad, and, as noted, the defendant has multiple family members and friends who live abroad. In addition to those foreign connections and ample means to flee discussed further below, the defendant will have the ability, once gone, to frustrate any potential extradition. Attempting to downplay that concern, the defense relies on two legal opinions to claim that the defendant can irrevocably waive her extradition rights with respect to both the United Kingdom and France. (Mot. at 25; Def. Ex. U; Def. Ex. V). But the defendant's offer to sign a so-called "irrevocable waiver of her extradition rights" is ultimately meaningless: it provides no additional reassurance whatsoever and, with respect to France, is based on an erroneous assessment of France's position on the extradition of its nationals. (Mot. at 25). As an initial matter, the Government would need to seek the arrest of the defendant before such a waiver would even come into play. Even assuming the defendant could be located and apprehended—which is quite an assumption given the defendant's access to substantial wealth and 3 Adding to this confusion, bank records reflect that when the defendant and her spouse established a trust account in or about 2018, they filled out forms in which they were required to provide personal information, including marital status. On those forms, both the defendant and her spouse listed their marital status as "single." It is unclear why the defendant did not disclose her marital status to the bank, but that lack of candor on a bank form mirrors her lack of candor with Pretrial Services in this case, discussed further below. 14 EFTA00093278

Catest:20-er700ZealadNnt Oadtr0thlt121O2 Filae612/9.6/2tagPaefie O32136 demonstrated ability to live in hiding—numerous courts have recognized that purported waivers of extradition are unenforceable and effectively meaningless. See, e.g., United States v. Epstein, 425 F. Supp. 3d 306, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ("The Defense proposal to give advance consent to extradition and waiver of extradition rights is, in the Court's view, an empty gesture. And, it comes into [play] only after [the defendant] has fled the Court's jurisdiction."); United States v. Morrison, No. 16-MR-118, 2016 WL 7421924, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2016); United States v. Kazeem, No. 15 Cr. 172, 2015 WL 4645357, at *3 (D. Or. Aug. 3, 2015); United States v. Young, Nos. 12 Cr. 502, 12 Cr. 645, 2013 WL 12131300, at *7 (D. Utah Aug. 27, 2013); United States v. Cohen, No. C 10-00547, 2010 WL 5387757, at *9 n.11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2010); United States v. Bohn, 330 F. Supp. 2d 960, 961 (W.D. Tenn. 2004); United States v. Stroh, No. 396 Cr. 139, 2000 WL 1832956, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2000); United States v. Botero, 604 F. Supp. 1028, 1035 (S.D. Fla. 1985).4 For very good reason: Any defendant who signs such a purported waiver and then flees will assuredly contest the validity and/or voluntariness of the waiver, and will get to do so in 4 The defense argues that several courts "have addressed concerns about a defendant's ties to a foreign state that enforces extradition waiver by requiring the defendant to execute such a waiver as a condition of release." (Mot. at 26). In the cases cited by the defendant, the courts approved the release of the defendants based on the particular facts, but did not address at all the question of whether a waiver of extradition is enforceable. See United States v. Khashoggi, 717 F. Supp. 1048, 1050-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting, among other things, that the Government's case was "novel," and presented an "untried theory of liability" and that the defendant not only waived his right to appeal extradition in Switzerland but that he traveled immediately to the United States for arraignment, and that his country's government committed to ensuring his appearance at trial); United States v. Salvagno, 314 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying Government motion to remand after trial where court found defendant not likely to flee); United States v. Chen, 820 F. Supp. 1205, 1209, 1212 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (reconsidering pretrial release where case had "taken a number of surprising turns," including the "suppression of video evidence, the indeterminate stay of proceedings, the overall uncertainty of the government's evidence"); United States v. Karni, 298 F. Supp. 2d 129, 133 (D.D.C. 2004); United States v. Grillo, No. 99-1514, 1999 WL 1456536, at *2 (3d Cir. July 13, 1999); see also United States v. Georgiou, No. 08-1220- M, 2008 WL 4306750, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2008) (distinguishing Cirillo on the facts and noting that "defense counsel concedes that a waiver of extradition may not be enforceable in Canada, a fact the court in Cirillo did not mention in its opinion"). 15 EFTA00093279

Cakast:20-47I70023e4MIstit lacietriterillati2 Eila€16132)96/15%g 0.f932136 the jurisdiction of her choosing (i.e., the one to which she chose to flee). The Department of Justice's Office of International Affairs ("OIA") is unaware of any country anywhere in the world that would consider an anticipatory extradition waiver binding. Indeed, the defendant's own experts' conclusion—that "because of these waivers and other factors, it is highly unlikely that she would be able to resist extradition successfully," (Mot. at 27)—leaves open the possibility that she could avoid extradition. Such an outcome is virtually a certainty as to France, a country of which the defendant is a citizen and which does not extradite its citizens to the United States. To confirm this fact, after receiving the Renewed Bail Motion, the Government, through OIA, contacted the French Ministry of Justice ("MOJ") to clarify whether there is any circumstance under which France would extradite a French citizen to the United States. In response, the MOJ provided the Government with a letter setting forth the relevant law and conclusively stating that France does not extradite its citizens to the United States. That letter in its original French, as well as an English translation of the letter, are attached hereto as Exhibit B. In that letter, the MOJ makes clear that France does not extradite its nationals outside the European Union (regardless of the existence of dual citizenship), including to the United States, and has never derogated from that principle outside the European Union. See Ex. B; see also United States v. Cilins, No. 13 Cr. 315 (WHP), 2013 WL 3802012, at '2 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2013) ("Because France refuses to extradite its citizens, Cilins can avoid prosecution on this Indictment if he can reach French soil."). In other words, even assuming the Government could locate the defendant, if she flees to France, her citizenship in that country will completely bar her extradition. Any purported waiver of extradition executed in the United States would not be enforceable against the defendant in France because French law embodies an inflexible principle that its citizens will not be extradited 16 EFTA00093280

Caika:20-00023GrAMIstit DOdentklia WO 2 HINCB219.6/2-tag Pap C335fl36 to other countries outside of the European Union, including the United States. As set forth in Exhibit B, according to the MOJ, the French Code of Criminal Procedure "absolutely prohibits the extradition of a person who had French nationality at the time of the commission of the acts for which extradition is requested." (Ex. B at 3). That the defendant is a citizen of multiple countries is of no moment. (See id.). In applying the Bilateral Extradition Treaty between the United States and France and the "general principle of non-extradition of nationals under French law, France systematically refuses to grant the extradition of French nationals to the American judicial authorities." (Id. at 4). Thus, contrary to the suggestion of the defense submission, any anticipatory waiver of extradition would not be effective under French law, and would not be recognizable by French courts in any extradition process, or otherwise enforceable. The defendant's expert writes that "[i]n the recent past," he is "not aware that the French authorities would have had to address the situation in which the United States sought extradition of a French citizen who was also a United States citizen. Thus, there is no precedent to draw from in that regard." (Def. Ex. V. at 2). That is not so. France has previously rejected such a request. For example, in 2006, Hans Peterson, an American citizen and French national, turned himself in to French authorities in Guadeloupe and confessed to committing a murder in the United States. Despite turning himself in to French authorities, Peterson remained beyond the reach of U.S. law enforcement despite the repeated requests of OIA and U.S. officials. See Durbin, Schakowsky, Emanuel (bye French Justice Minister To Ensure Justice Is Done During Hans Peterson Retrial (Nov. 16, 2012), https://www.durbin.senate.govinewsroorn/press-releases/durbin-schakowsky- emanuel-urge-french-justice-minister-to-ensure-justice-is-done-during-hans-peterson-retrial; see also Senators' letter to French government (Mar. 14, 2008), https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna23601583 (citing a letter from the MOJ to the Department of 17 EFTA00093281

Cabiste.20-00023INAD Oddirfithit WW2 Filit€613218/B/Igfreeje Q1132136 Justice on August 22, 2007 which provides that the "Ministry of Justice considers the American- born, U.S. citizen Peterson to also be a French national and that the extradition request has been denied"). Indeed, the Government is unaware of any instance in which France has ever extradited a French citizen to the United States. (See Ex. B at 4 ("[T]he principle of non-extradition of nationals is a principle of extradition law from which France has never deviated outside the framework of the European Union.")). Simply put, the Court was correct when it determined at the initial bail hearing that France does not appear to extradite its own citizens. (Tr. 83). The defendant's supposed waiver of her extradition rights with respect to the United Kingdom should similarly be afforded no weight. Although an anticipatory waiver of extradition may be admissible in extradition proceedings in the United Kingdom, such a waiver is by no means binding, authoritative, or enforceable. See United States v. Stanton, No. 91 Cr. 889 (CHS), 1992 WL 27130, at *2 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1992) (denying modification of defendant's bail where defendant indicated willingness to waive extradition proceeding by providing extradition waivers, as British authorities advised that extradition waivers were possible only in cases where the fugitive actually appeared before a British magistrate after the filing of an extradition request, and concluding that such a waiver was not an "enforceable undertaking"). Under the United Kingdom's Extradition Act of 2003, consent to extradition is permitted, "if (and only if) [a person] has the assistance of counsel or a solicitor to represent him in the proceedings before the appropriate judge." Extradition Act 2003, § 127(9), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ulcpga/ 2003/41. As such, a judge in the United Kingdom must independently evaluate any waiver of extradition in real time, thereby necessarily rendering any anticipatory waiver executed before the defendant is found in the United Kingdom meaningless. Id. at §127. In other words, consent given 18 EFTA00093282

Caast:20-00OgnAtaThrt Nanfidril teri2 Eila€61329.6/Rag IMO 0232036 to authorities in the United States would not be binding in the United Kingdom, and the defendant could easily decide not to consent to extradition once found abroad. Further, a judge in the United Kingdom must make an independent decision on extradition based on the circumstances at the time the defendant is before the court, including the passage of time, forum, and considerations of the individual's mental or physical condition. See, e.g., id. at §§ 82, 83A, & 91. Even if a final order of extradition has been entered by a court, the Secretary of State still has the discretion to deny extradition. See id. at § 93. The Government understands from OIA that extradition from the United Kingdom is frequently extensively litigated, uncertain, and subject to multiple levels of appeal. Moreover, even where the process is ultimately successful, it is lengthy and time-consuming. Ultimately, although the defendant purports to be willing to waive her right to challenge being extradited to the United States, she simply cannot do so under the laws of France and the United Kingdom, and she would be free to fight extradition once in those countries. And, of course, the defendant could choose to flee to another jurisdiction altogether, including one with which the United States does not have an extradition treaty. The defendant's written waivers of extradition from France and the United Kingdom certainly provide no guarantee that the defendant will not flee to a third country from which, even if she can be located, extradition may be impossible. Courts have recognized that lack of an effective means of extradition can increase a defendant's flight risk, and have cited such facts as a relevant consideration in detaining defendants pending trial. See, e.g., United States v. Namer, 238 F.3d 425, 2000 WL 1872012, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 12, 2000); Cilins, 2013 WL 3802012 at *2; United States v. Abdullahit, 488 F. Supp. 2d 433, 443 (D.N.J. 2007) ("The inability to extradite defendant should he flee weighs in favor of detention."). Beyond being impossible to guarantee, extradition is typically a lengthy, 19 EFTA00093283

Gawk 20-00023a4ADIsit DO& dile ti20 2 El Glib-132)16/2th g Witye 2t33a 36 complicated, and expensive process, which would provide no measure of justice to the victims who would be forced to wait years for the defendant's return. The strong possibility that the defendant could successfully resist extradition only heightens the defendant's incentive to flee. Second, the defendant's behavior in the year leading up to her arrest demonstrates her sophistication in hiding and her ability to avoid detection. The Court noted as much in denying bail, and the Renewed Bail Application also does nothing to change that conclusion. (Tr. 87). Indeed, the defendant's time in isolation in the year leading up to her arrest makes clear that, even to the extent she has loved ones and property in this country, she has proven her willingness to cut herself off entirely from them and her ability to live in hiding. She did so by purchasing a home using a trust in another name and introducing herself to the real estate agent under an alias, placing her assets into accounts held under other names, registering cellphones and at least one credit card under other names, and living in near total isolation away from her loved ones. The Renewed Bail Application again tries to cast those steps as efforts to avoid the media frenzy that followed Epstein's death. (Tr. 44, 56-57). However, as the Court already recognized, regardless of the defendant's reasons for taking these steps, that course of conduct clearly establishes her expertise at remaining hidden and her willingness to cut herself off from her family and friends in order to avoid detection. (Tr. 87). Rare is the case when a defendant has already demonstrated an aptitude for assuming another identity and concealing her assets, including when purchasing property, registering cellphones, and managing finances. Here, the defendant has indisputably taken all of those steps. She was able to do so because of both her finances and her willingness to take extreme measures and to experience social isolation away from her loved ones. And she was so good at assuming another identity that she was able to avoid notice by locals and 20 EFTA00093284

Cakitstr.20-000ftistAMIstit D3c2tn9ebil WW2 Eilar?CB2)9.11/15%gtritte 0432136 the media even when a bounty was offered for her location and when numerous media outlets were searching for her. The charts, graphs, and affidavits proffered by the defense do not undercut the defendant's skill at evading detection, and do nothing more than restate the justification for those actions that the defense already made at the prior hearing. (See Dkt. 18 at 14-16). That said, there is still reason to believe that the defendant was hiding not just from the press, but also from law enforcement. It is undisputed that defense counsel, even while in contact with the Government, never disclosed the defendant's location or offered her surrender if she were to be charged. (Tr. 53-54). The Court already inquired about defense counsel's interactions with the Government in the year leading up to the defendant's arrest, and the Renewed Bail Application offers nothing new on that score. (Id.). Defense counsel contacted the Government when the FBI attempted to serve the defendant with a subpoena, but were unable to locate her, on July 7, 2019. Prior to her arrest, the Government and defense counsel communicated on multiple occasions between July and October of 2019, and communicated briefly on two additional occasions, most recently in March of 2020. At no point did defense counsel disclose the defendant's location, offer to surrender the defendant, or offer to bring the defendant in to be interviewed. Moreover it is undisputed that when the FBI located the defendant, she ignored their directives and ran away from the arresting agents. Although the defense has submitted an affidavit from the defendant's private security team, nothing in that affidavit should alter the Court's determination that detention is appropriate here. The defense already informed the Court at the July 14, 2020 bail hearing that the defendant's security protocol was to move to an inner room if her security was breached. (Tr. 55). Even still, the new affidavit makes clear that the agents who entered the defendant's property were wearing clothing that clearly identified them as FBI agents. 21 EFTA00093285

Caleask.20-a700MitatAMIstit nadeirtithl11002 Eilii€6132911/Itag Pa& (26215f136 (Def. Ex. S ¶ 12). Moreover, the FBI announced themselves as federal agents to the defendant when they first approached her. Thus, even if the defendant was following her private security's protocol when she fled, she did so knowing that she was disobeying the directives of FBI agents, not members of the media or general public. Those actions raise the very real concern, particularly in light of the terms of her proposed package, that the defendant would prioritize the directives of her private security guards over the directives of federal law enforcement. Further, the act of wrapping a cellphone in tin foil has no conceivable relevance to concerns about the press. The defense argues that the defendant only took those measures because that particular phone number had been released to the public, but that just suggests the defendant believed that was the only number of which law enforcement was aware. In other words, there is still reason to believe, as the Court previously found, that in the year leading up to her arrest, the defendant sought to evade not only the press, but also law enforcement. (Tr. 87). Third, the defendant has access to significant wealth. At the initial bail hearing, the Government expressed doubt that the defendant's assets were limited to the approximately $3.8 million she reported to Pretrial Services, and noted that it appeared the defendant was less than candid with Pretrial Services regarding the assets in her control. (Tr. 28-30, 72-73). The finances outlined in the defense submission confirm the Government's suspicion that the defendant has access to far more than $3.8 million, confirm that the defendant was less than candid with Pretrial Services (and, by extension, the Court) during her interview, and confirm that the defendant is a person of substantial means with vast resources.' The defendant's apparent willingness to deceive 5 As noted above, the Court effectively assumed the defendant had considerably more assets than those disclosed to Pretrial Services in rejecting defense counsel's repeated offer to provide a more fulsome picture of the defendant's finances and concluding that even assuming the defense could provide a clearer description of the defendant's assets, detention was still warranted. (See Tr. 87). 22 EFTA00093286

Caest:20-dr700gal7tAAilNnt Dadir&141 11.002 EiGiel3B2/9.6/2O3g MO 2&35f136 this Court already weighed in favor of detention, and confirmation of that deception only reemphasizes that this defendant cannot be trusted to comply with bail conditions. Now, the defense has submitted a financial report that reflects the defendant has approximately $22 million in assets-far more than the figure she initially reported to Pretrial Services. (Def. Ex. O). Accepting the financial report at face value, it is clear that the defense's proposed bail package would leave the defendant with substantial resources to flee the country. Not only would she have millions of dollars in unrestrained assets at her disposal,' but she would also have a $2 million townhouse in London, which she could live in or sell to support herself. In other words, even with the proposed bond—which is only partially secured—the defendant would still have millions of dollars at her disposal. She could absolutely afford to leave her friends and family to lose whatever they may pledge to support her bond, and then repay them much of their losses. In fact, the defendant could transfer money to her proposed co-signers immediately following her release,7 given the large sums of money that would be left unrestrained by her proposed bail package. Moreover, the schedule provided by the defense is notably silent regarding any future revenue streams to which the defendant may have access. The financial report only addresses the defendant's assets without detailing her income at all. The defendant has similarly provided the Court with no information about what resources her spouse might have access to on a prospective In particular, according to the report, the defendant would have more than $4 million in unrestrained funds in accounts, in addition to hundreds of thousands of dollars of jewelry and other items. Moreover, the Government presumes the defendant has not yet spent all $7 million of the retainer paid to her attorneys, which would still belong to the defendant if she fled. 7 The Government notes that two of the defendant's proposed co-signers are citizens and residents of the United Kingdom, against whom the Government could not realistically recover a bond amount. These co-signers have not offered to secure this bond with any cash or property, and as a result, such a bond would effectively be worthless if the defendant were to flee. 23 EFTA00093287

CeRsest:20-000 gaGrAMIstit136€21646111202 Fili103B218/231ig paw 2732136 basis, in addition to their substantial assets. The financial report submitted by the defense is also careful to note that it does not account for any possible income from inheritances. (Def. Ex. O at 5). The financial report further shows that the defendant apparently spent the last five years moving the majority of her assets out of her name by funneling them through trusts to her spouse. That pattern suggests the defendant has used the process of transferring assets as a means to hide her true wealth. As the Renewed Bail Application points out, the defendant currently has approximately $3.4 million worth of assets held in her own name, which is close to the amount of wealth she told Pretrial Services she possessed in July 2020. Importantly, though, that number omits the millions of dollars of assets that she has transferred from her name through trust accounts to her spouse, including funds that were used to purchase the New Hampshire property where the defendant was residing when she was affested.8 This confirms that the Government was right to be concerned that the defendant had refused to identify her spouse or his assets to Pretrial Services. That practice further demonstrates the defendant's sophistication in hiding her assets and maintaining assets that are under her control in other names. In this vein, the fmancial report suggests that the defendant originally brought more than $20 million to her marriage, but that her husband brought only $200,000.9 (See Def. Ex. O at 10). 8 On this score, it bears noting that that defendant told Pretrial Services that the property was owned by a corporation, and that she was "just able to stay there." (Pretrial Services Report at 2). The defendant's lack of candor does not inspire confidence that she can be trusted to comply with bail conditions. 9 The Government has not been able to verify this financial information—in part because the defense has declined to provide the Government with the spouse's current banking information— but 24 EFTA00093288

CRask.20-8700231sAMIstit Odecarit416 tt202 tilaftB216aragErWe 0332/136 Setting aside whether the defendant's spouse has additional assets beyond those included in the fmancial report, the vast majority of the assets contained in the report itself apparently originated with the defendant. (See Def. Ex. O at 10). Based on the report, it seems clear that the defendant slowly funneled the majority of her wealth to trusts and into her husband's name over the last five years. As a result, if the Court were to grant the defendant's proposed bail package and the defendant were to flee, her spouse would primarily lose the money that the defendant gave him rather than his own independent assets. In other words, were the defendant to flee, she would largely be sacrificing her own money and assets, thereby limiting the moral suasion of her spouse co-signing the bond. In sum, the defendant's submission does not change the Government's position at the original bail hearing that the defendant has considerable fmancial resources, and could live a comfortable life as a fugitive. The combination of all these factors, including the defendant's foreign ties, demonstrated ability to live in hiding, and financial resources, confirm that the defendant's characteristics continue to weigh in favor of detention. Given the multiplicity of factors supporting detention, this is not one of the rare cases in which a private security company could conceivably be considered as a bail condition. See United States v. Boustani, 932 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2019). The Second Circuit has squarely held that "the Bail Reform Act does not permit a two-tiered bail system in which defendants of lesser means are detained pending trial while wealthy defendants are released to self-funded private jails," and that "a defendant may be released on such a condition e Court need not resolve this question, however, because regardless of whether the defendant's husband may have additional undisclosed assets, as discussed herein, the key takeaway from the fmancial report is that the vast majority of the spouse's reported assets, upon which the proposed bond is based, originated with the defendant, meaning he would not be losing his own money if the defendant fled. 25 EFTA00093289

Caate.20-00023a4ailstit Cladeutielietta02 EilatkB2)9.11/20agrityi (2032136 only where, but for his wealth, he would not have been detained." Id. Here, detention is warranted not only because of the defendant's financial means, but also her foreign ties, her skill at and willingness to live in hiding, the nature of the offense resulting in a presumption of detention, and the strength of the evidence, among other factors. The defense suggestion that the defendant's private security guards should post cash in support of a bond does not change this calculus. There is no reason to believe that the defendant would be at all troubled by a security company in which she has no personal stake losing $1 million, especially if that sacrifice meant she could escape conviction and sentencing. Accordingly, release to the equivalent of a "privately funded jail" is not warranted here. Id. at 83. Belatedly, as the Court previously recognized (Tr. 87-88), a GPS monitoring bracelet offers little value for a defendant who poses such a significant flight risk because it is does nothing to prevent the defendant's flight once it has been removed. At best, home confinement and electronic monitoring would reduce a defendant's head start after cutting the bracelet. See United States v. Banki, 10 Cr. 008 (JFK), Dkt. 7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2010) (denying bail to a naturalized citizen who was native to Iran, who was single and childless and who faced a statutory maximum of 20 years' imprisonment, and noting that electronic monitoring is "hardly foolproof."), aff'd, 369 F. App'x 152 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Zarger, No. 00 Cr. 773 (JG), 2000 WL 1134364, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2000) (rejecting defendant's application for bail in part because home detention with electronic monitoring "at best . . . limits a fleeing defendant's head start"); United States v. Benatar,No. 02 Cr. 099 (JG), 2002 WL 31410262, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002) (same). Simply put, no bail conditions, including those proposed in the Renewed Bail Motion, would be sufficient to ensure that this defendant appears in court. 26 EFTA00093290

Caest:20-dr700031NAONntrbadtrnWt1 11002 FilaC16132316/2tag (3026f136 In urging a different conclusion, the defense again cites the same cases discussed in its initial briefing and at the July 14, 2020 hearing to argue that the proposed bail conditions are consistent with or exceed those approved by courts in this Circuit for "high-profile defendants with financial means and foreign citizenship." (Mot. at 34; see Dkt. 18 at 16, 21; Tr. 48-51). The Court should reject the defense's efforts to raise the same precedent that the Court already took into consideration when denying bail. "A motion for reconsideration may not be used ... as a vehicle for relitigating issues already decided by the Court." Jackson v. Goord, 664 F. Supp. 2d 307, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court already considered and rejected the defendant's efforts to liken her case to other "serious and high-profile prosecutions where the courts, over the government's objection, granted bail to defendants with significant financial resources." (Tr. 88). Noting "crucial factual differences," the Court described those cases, including United States v. Esposito, 309 F. Supp. 3d 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), United States v. Dreier, 596 F. Supp. 2d 831 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), and United States v. Madoff, 586 F. Supp. 2d 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), as "not on point and not persuasive," and distinguished the defendant for a number of reasons, including the defendant's "significant foreign connections." (Tr. 88; see id. (distinguishing Esposito where the risk of flight appeared to "have been based on the resources available to defendant, not foreign connections or experience and a record of hiding from being found"); id. (distinguishing Madoff where "the defendant had already been released on a bail package agreed to by the parties for a considerable period of time before the government sought detention")). The Court already engaged in a fact-specific analysis in ordering the defendant detained. Among the reasons provided, the Court found that the "the defendant not only has significant financial resources, but has demonstrated sophistication in hiding those resources and herself." 27 EFTA00093291

Caest:20-er700MtA0Nnt D adtrairtit 11.002 Filie1652/18/103gEritii (11.32i136 (Tr. 87). Following the analysis the Court has already conducted, several of the cases cited by the defendant are readily distinguishable. See, e.g., United States v. Khashoggi, 717 F. Supp. 1048, 1050-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (in ordering defendant released pending trial, noting, among other things, that the defendant not only waived his right to appeal extradition in Switzerland, but that he traveled immediately to the United States for arraignment, and that his country's Government committed to ensuring his appearance at trial); United States v. Bodmer, No. 03 Cr. 947 (SAS), 2004 WL 169790, at *I, *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2004) (setting conditions of bail where defendant arrested abroad had already consented to extradition to the United States and finding that the Government—whose argument was "based, in large part, on speculation" as to the defendant's financial resources—had "failed to meet its burden"). And there is support in the case law for detaining individuals in comparable situations to the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Boustani, 356 F. Supp. 3d 246, 252-55 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, No. 19-344, 2019 WL 2070656 (2d Cir. Mar. 7, 2019) (ordering defendant detained pending trial and finding that defendant posed a risk of flight based on several factors, including seriousness of the charged offenses, lengthy possible sentence, strength of Government's evidence, access to substantial financial resources, frequent international travel, "minimal" ties to the United States, and "extensive ties to foreign countries without extradition"); United States v. Patrick Ho, 17 Cr. 779 (KBF), Dkt. 49 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2018) (ordering defendant detained based on defendant's risk of flight and citing the strength of the Government's evidence, lack of meaningful community ties, and "potential ties in foreign jurisdictions"); United States v. Epstein, 155 F. Supp. 2d 323, 324-326 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding that defendant's dual citizenship in Germany and Brazil, lucrative employment and property interests, and lack of an extradition treaty with Brazil weighed in favor of detention despite the fact that defendant and his wife owned "substantial" property and other significant assets in the 28 EFTA00093292

Caest:20-dr700aterailstIt EDOcietrfitIfil tith02 Eilae6B29.6/211igErao 0235136 United States). Further, unlike those cases and the cases cited by the defendant, the crimes charged here involving minor victims trigger a statutory presumption in favor of detention, weighing further in favor of detention. See Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436. "Each bail package in each case is considered and evaluated on its individual merits by the Court." Epstein, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 326. Unlike the cases cited by the defense, the Government seeks detention not solely on the basis that the defendant is of financial means and has foreign citizenship. Rather, detention is warranted because the defendant is a citizen of multiple foreign countries, including one that does not extradite its nationals, with "substantial international ties," "familial and personal connections abroad," and "substantial financial resources," (Tr. 83-84), with a demonstrated sophistication in hiding herself and her assets, who, for the myriad reasons discussed herein and identified at the original hearing—including the seriousness of the offense, the strength of the Government's evidence, and the potential length of sentence—presents a substantial flight risk. (Tr. 82-91). The defendant continues to pose an extreme risk of flight, and the defense has not offered any new information sufficient to justify reversal of the Court's prior finding that no combination of conditions could ensure her appearance. D. Conditions of Confinement Finally, the Renewed Bail Application reiterates the same argument about the potential harms of detention on the defendant that this Court rejected at the initial bail hearing. (Tr. 42, 68- 69). As was the case in July, these complaints do not warrant the defendant's release. The defendant continues to have more time than any other inmate at the MDC to review her discovery and as much, if not more, time to communicate with her attorneys. Specifically, the defendant currently has thirteen hours per day, seven days per week to review electronic discovery. Also during that time, the defendant has access to email with defense counsel, calls with defense 29 EFTA00093293

Calast:20-0003:12Milstit CliOdariterilt002Eilii06132/9.6/232agMje G32136 counsel, and when visiting is available depending on pandemic-related conditions, the defendant has access to legal visits. Due to the recently implemented lockdown at the MDC, visitation is not currently available, but MDC legal counsel is arranging for the defendant to receive a VTC call with legal counsel three hours per day every weekday, starting this Friday. Defense counsel will also be able to schedule legal calls on weekends as needed. Given those facts, the defense argument essentially suggests that no defendant could prepare for trial while housed at the MDC— a patently incorrect claim. The defendant is able to review her discovery using hard drives provided by the Government, discs that defense counsel can send containing any copies of discovery material defense counsel chooses within the confines of the protective order, or hard copy documents provided by defense counsel. The Government has taken multiple steps to address technical difficulties the defendant has encountered when reviewing her hard drives. These steps included modifying and reproducing productions in new formats, asking MDC IT staff to assist the defendant in viewing her hard drives on the MDC computer, and then purchasing and providing a laptop for the defendant's exclusive use.10 Even when the defendant was temporarily unable to review some files from some hard drives, she was always able to review other portions of her discovery. 10 The Government understands from MDC legal counsel that the defendant has access to the laptop thirteen hours per day during weekdays and has access to the MDC desktop computer thirteen hours per day seven days per week. The use of the laptop is limited to weekdays because the MDC restricts the number of employees who carry the key to the secure location where the laptop is kept, and the employees with that key do not work regularly on weekends. The MDC previously accommodated an exception to this rule while the defendant was in quarantine and arranged for her to use the laptop in her isolation cell on weekends because otherwise she would not have had access to a computer during weekends while in quarantine. Now that she is out of quarantine, the defendant will have access to the MDC desktop computer on weekends. 30 EFTA00093294

Cgaesk.20-00093INAVIsint liBantithill1A302 Firieb12,16/1baglabb Gf435f136 As to the defense's most recent complaints, the malfunctioning of the sixth production that the defense complains of resulted from the defendant herself dropping the hard drive onto the ground, and that drive has been replaced. When the defense informed the Government that the drive containing the seventh production may be malfunctioning, the Government offered to have IT staff review the drive. In response, the defense indicated the drive was in fact still viewable and declined to have IT staff review it. Accordingly, it is the Government's understanding that the defendant currently has a full, readable set of discovery at the MDC. At the defense's request, the Government is preparing yet another copy containing all productions to date on a single drive so that the defendant will have a backup copy of discovery materials at the MDC." Throughout the defendant's pretrial detention, the Government has been responsive to the defense's concerns regarding access to discovery and counsel. The Government will continue to work with MDC legal counsel to ensure that the defendant is able to review her discovery and to communicate with defense counsel over the seven months still remaining before trial. As to the defense complaints regarding the defendant's conditions of confinement, the defense notably does not suggest that the defendant should be housed in general population. Indeed, the defense appears to agree that the best way to ensure the defendant's safety while detained is to be away from general population. Unlike other inmates in protective custody, however, the defendant is released from her isolation cell for thirteen hours per day, has her own shower, has exclusive use of two different computers, has her own phone to use, and has her own television. Those conditions set her far apart from general population inmates, not to mention " On this score, the Government notes the tension between the defense claim that the discovery produced to date contains little of value or relevant to the charges set forth in the Indictment, and the simultaneous claim that the defendant has been prejudiced by technical difficulties that have temporarily delayed her ability to review portions of those productions, productions which, according to the defense, counsel have already been able to conclude are essentially unimportant. 31 EFTA00093295

Caast:20-a7002311AADIstit Nciet AIM 1100 2 Eile€0B2)9.6/232agre* 0/332136 other inmates in protective custody. Additionally, psychology and medical staff check on the defendant daily, MDC legal staff are highly attuned to any complaints the defendant has raised, and following initial complaints about the defendant's diet early in her incarceration, the MDC has ensured that the defendant receives three full meals per day and has access to commissary from which she can supplement her diet. The MDC has taken numerous steps to strike the balance between the security of the institution and providing the defendant with adequate time and resources to prepare her defense. In that vein, many of the searches the defendant complains of-such as searches after every visit, searches of her cell, pat downs when she is moved, and directing her to open her mouth for visual inspection (while the searching staff member is wearing a mask)—are the same searches to which every other inmate is subjected for the security of the institution. MDC legal counsel has assured the Government that MDC staff does not record or listen to the substance of the defendant's calls and visits with legal counsel. To the extent MDC staff conducts additional searches or monitoring of the defendant, MDC legal counsel has indicated that those steps are necessary to maintain the security of the institution and the defendant. With respect to the defense concerns regarding COVID-I9, the Government recognizes, as it did in its initial bail briefing, that the virus presents a challenge at any jail facility. At least for this defendant, the MDC's precautionary measures appear to have worked. When the defendant was potentially exposed to the virus, she was placed in quarantine, remained asymptomatic, tested negative, and then was released from quarantine. As the Court found at the initial bail hearing, the defendant has no underlying health conditions that would place her at greater risk of complications from COVID-I9. (Tr. 89). For that same reason, the Court should again reject the suggestion that the pandemic warrants the defendant's release. 32 EFTA00093296

Cate. 20-00082SAIM DOcietritilla ttXI2 Eiliiit129.6/2thg Peite341 (1635f136 CONCLUSION As this Court previously found, the defendant "poses a substantial actual risk of flight." (Tr. 86). Nothing in the defense submission justifies altering the Court's prior conclusion that there are no conditions of bail that would assure the defendant's presence in court proceedings in this case. Accordingly, the Renewed Bail Motion should be denied. Dated: New York, New York December 16, 2020 Respectfully submitted, Acting United States Attorney By: Assistant United States Attorneys 33 EFTA00093297

CaRisfk:20-ZFOOD11001:10111024tirflthilif00211, 791/61329111B 2Prigri MI 2 BSF BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER December 15, 2020 The Honorable Alison J. Nathan United States District Court Southern District of New York United States Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, New York 10007 Sigrid S. McCawle Tele hone: Email: Re: United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (A.JN) Dear Judge Nathan: motion for bail. submits the following statement in opposition to the Defendant's renewed *** I appreciate the opportunity to again be heard by the Court in this matter and once more request that Ghislaine Maxwell not be released prior to her trial. I write this not only on behalf of myself, but all of the other girls and young women who were victimized by Maxwell. Ghislaine Maxwell sexually abused me as a child and the government has the responsibility to make sure that she stands trial for her crimes. I do not believe that will happen or that any of the women she exploited will see justice if she is released on bail. She has lived a life of privilege, abusing her position of power to live beyond the rules. Fleeing the country in order to escape once more would fit with her long history of anti-social behavior. Drawing on my personal experience with Maxwell and what I have learned of how she has lived since that time, I believe that she is a psychopath. Her abuse of me and many other children and young women is evidence of her disregard for and violation of the rights of others. She has demonstrated a complete failure to accept to responsibility in any way for her actions and demonstrated a complete lack of remorse for her central role in procuring girls for Epstein to abuse. She was both charming and manipulative with me during the grooming process, consistent with what many of the women she abused have described. She has frequently lied to others, including repeatedly lying about me and my family. Maxwell has for decades lived a parasitic lifestyle relying on Epstein and others to fund her lavish existence. Maxwell has repeatedly demonstrated that her primary concern is her own welfare, and that she is willing to harm others if it benefits her. She is quite capable of doing so once more. She will not hesitate to leave the country irrespective of whether others will be on the hook financially for her actions because she lacks empathy, and therefore simply does not care about hurting others. She would in fact be highly motivated to flee in order to reduce the possibility of continued imprisonment, the conditions of which she has continuously complained. Her actions over the last several years and choice to live in isolation for long periods suggest that being comfortable is more BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 401 Cost Las Olas Boulevard. Suite 1200. Fort Lauderdale. FL 333011(t) 954 356 00111 (0 954 356 0022 I wwwtsflIptom EFTA00093298

Cl.ast:20-e?-00DBOokiNlt Itiodueadtt11100211. FQ682J2331& 41 212agi 25d1 2 important to her than being connected. Even more concerning, is if she is let out she has the ability to once again abuse children and the painful consequences of that type of trauma can last a lifetime. I implore the Court to make sure that Ghislaine Maxwell does not escape justice by keeping her incarcerated until her trial. *** Respectfully submitted, /s/ Sigrid S. McCawlev Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. EFTA00093299

CiilaSt:20-ÎF-000B6Mblit neXtrfitita110022 130682B1712/ee2Pâgf 1501 4 MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE Liberté ïgarté Fraternité Direction des affaires criminelles et des grâces Sous-direction de la justice pénale spécialisée Bureau de l'entraide pénale internationale Paris, le 11 décembre 2020 Monsieur le garde des Sceaux, ministre de la Justice à Department of Justice (D.O.J) Par l'intermédiaire d'And:me aNiKELMAAN, magistrat de liaison Ambassade des Etats-Unis t'Amérique d Paris J'ai l'honneur de vous informer de ce que l'article 696-2 du code de procédure pénale français prévoit que la France peut extrader « toute personne n'ayant pas la nationalité française », étant précisé que la nationalité s'apprécie au jour de la commission des faits pour lesquels l'extradition est demandée (article 696-4 1°). Le code de procédure pénale français proscrit donc de manière absolue l'extradition l'extradition d'une personne qui avait la nationalité française au moment de la commission des faits pour lesquels l'extradition est demandée. La loi pénale étant d'interprétation stricte, il n'y a pas lieu de discriminer entre les nationaux et les binationaux. A partir du moment où elle était française au moment des faits, la personne réclamée est inextradablc, peu importe qu'elle soit titulaire d'une ou de plusieurs autres nationalités. Lorsque le refus d'extrader est fondé sur la nationalité de la personne réclamée, la France applique le principe « aut traderc, aut judicare » selon lequel l'Etat qui refuse la remise doit juger la personne. Ainsi, l'article 113-6 du code pénal donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour juger des faits commis à l'étranger par un auteur de nationalité française. Certains Etats, en général de droit anglo-saxon, acceptent d'extrader leurs nationaux et n'ont en revanche pas compétence pour juger les faits commis par leurs ressortissants sur un territoire étranger. C'est notamment le cas des Etats-Unis d'Amérique. 13, place Vendôme - 75042 Paris Cedex 01 Téléphone : 01 44 77 60 60 www.lustice.gouv.tr EFTA00093300

Cialast:20-igOODIMMINit ttedinflätittf00221, esa682316113e22ägel 2514 L'article 3 du Traité bilatéral d'extradition signé le 23 avril 1996 entre les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et la France stipule que ,r/Etat requis n'est pas tenu d'accorder ixtradition de l'un de ses ressortissants, mais k Pouvoir exécutif des Etats-Unis a la faculté de le faire, disciitionnairement, le juge approprié A En application de ce Traité er du principe général de non-extradition des nationaux en droit français, la France refuse systématiquement d'accorder l'extradition de ressortissants français aux autorités judiciaires américaines tandis que les autorités américaines acceptent régulièrement d'extrader leurs ressortissants vers la France. Il convient de faire observer que le principe de non-extradition des nationaux vaut non seulement à l'égard des Etats-Unis mais également de tous les autres Etats à l'exception des Etats- membres de l'Union européenne, aux termes de la loi du 9 mars 2004 transposant la décision-cadre du 13 juin 2002 sur le mandat d'arrêt européen qui prévoit que la remise de la personne réclamée ne pourra pas être refusée au seul motif de sa nationalité française. Ce tempérament au principe de non-extradition des nationaux s'inscrit dans le contexte particulier de la construction de l'espace judiciaire européen qui s'inscrit lui-même dans un processus d'intégration politique très spécifique entre les Etats-membres de l'Union européenne. Ce haut niveau d'intégration politique existant entre les Etats membres de l'Union européenne va de pair avec une certaine homogénéité, au sein de ces Etats, en matière d'échelle des peines ainsi qu'en ce qui concerne les modalités d'aménagement de peine, les Etats membres étant liés par les mimes obligations internationales (notamment les obligations découlant de la convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales et de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne dés droits de l'homme). En tout état de cause, le principe de non-extradition des nationaux est un principe du droit de l'extradition auquel la France n'a jamais dérogé en dehors du cadre de l'Union européenne. Le Chef du Bureau d e Intenationale EFTA00093301

Celast:20a003B0MNit thodulithiltt00221, 7506829B113e212110 351 4 [logo' MINISTRY OF JUSTICE Liberty Equality Fraternity Directorate of Criminal Affairs and Pardons Specialized Criminal Justice Sub-Directorate Office for the International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Paris, December 11, 2020 Mr. Keeper of the Seals, Minister of Justice to Department of Justice (DOJ) Through Andrew FINKELMAN, Liaison Magistrate Embassy of the United States of America in Paris I have the honor to inform you that Article 696-2 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure provides that France can extradite "any person not having French nationality," it being specified that nationality is assessed on the day of the commission of the acts for which extradition is requested (Article 696-4 1°). The French Code of Criminal Procedure therefore absolutely prohibits the extradition of a person who had French nationality at the time of the commission of the acts for which extradition is requested. The penal law being of strict interpretation, there is no reason to discriminate between nationals and binationals. From the moment they were French at the time of the facts, the person claimed is inextradible, regardless of whether they hold one or more nationalities. When the refusal to extradite is based on the nationality of the requested person, France applies the principle "aut tradere, autjudicar" according to which the State which refuses the surrender must judge the person. Thus, Article 113-6 of the Penal Code gives competence to the French courts to judge acts committed abroad by a person of French nationality. Some countries, generally under Anglo-Saxon law, agree to extradite their nationals and, at the same time, have no jurisdiction to judge acts committed by their nationals on foreign territory. This is particularly the case of the United States of America. 13, place Vendome - 75042 Paris Cedex 01 Telephone: 01 44 77 60 60 www.justice-gouv.fr EFTA00093302

Ciiiiiest:20-?gOODBOAMt Itibtfinfldift1100221, $0611293180p2Pigel 351 4 Article 3 of the Bilateral Extradition Treaty signed on April 23, 1996 between the United States of America and France stipulates that "The requested State is not bound to grant the extradition of any of its nationals, but the Executive Power of the United States has the right to do so at its discretion if it deems it appropriate." In application of this Treaty and of the general principle of non-extradition of nationals under French law, France systematically refuses to grant the extradition of French nationals to the American judicial authorities, while the American authorities regularly agree to extradite their nationals to France. It should be noted that the principle of non-extradition of nationals applies not only to the United States but also to all other States except the Member States of the European Union under the terms of the Law of March 9, 2004 transposing the framework decision of June 13, 2002 on the European arrest warrant, which provides that the surrender of the requested person may not be refused on the sole ground of his French nationality. This principle of non-extradition of nationals fits into the context of the construction of the European judicial area which itself is part of a very specific process of political integration between the Member States of the European Union. This high level of political integration existing between the Member States of the European Union goes hand in hand with a certain homogeneity within these States in terms of the scale of penalties as well as in terms of adjustment of penalty methods; the member states being bound by the same international obligations (in particular the obligations arising from the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights). In any event, the principle of non-extradition of nationals is a principle of extradition law from which France has never deviated outside the framework of the European Union. Office for the International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Philippe JAEGLE [signature] EFTA00093303

Case 21-770, Document 17-2, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page230 of 351 Exhibit G Doc. 103 Reply Memorandum of Ghislaine Maxwell in Support of Her Renewed Motion for Bail EFTA00093304

Cagest2D-Z7401410gAgnt Dbeu IzaelF 82513Reig 422geol 5515 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. GHISLAINE MAXWELL, Defendant. 20 Cr. 330 (MN) REPLY MEMORANDUM OF GHISLAINE MAXWELL IN SUPPORT OF HER RENEWED MOTION FOR BAH. Mark S. Cohen Christian R. Everdell COHEN & GRESSER LLP 800 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 Phone: Jeffrey S. Pagliuca Laura A. Menninger HADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C. 150 East 10th Avenue Denver, CO 80203 Phone: Bobbi C. Sternheim Law Offices of Bobbi C. Stemheim 33 West 19th Street - 4th Floor New York, NY 10011 Phone: Attorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell EFTA00093305

Cgase120-Z7416240atlit tibanfitk1 2IM 1F J i 8.2%2E3R0g Eintibat 3515 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1 ARGUMENT 2 I. The Government Concedes that Its Case Relies Almost Exclusively on the Testimony of Three Witnesses 2 II. The Government Has Not Carried Its Burden 4 A. The Government Asks the Court to Ignore Ms. Maxwell's Substantial Ties to the United States, Including Her Spouse-4 B. Ms. Maxwell Has Thoroughly Disclosed Her Finances and Pledged All of Her and Her Spouse's Assets in Support of Her Bond 5 C. The Government's Assertion that Ms. Maxwell Is "Adept" at Hiding and Therefore a Flight Risk Is Specious 7 D. Refusal of Extradition from France or the United Kingdom Is Highly Unlikely 8 E. The Recent COVID Surge at MDC Further Justifies Bail 10 CONCLUSION 10 EFTA00093306

ceas 20-zTagsacupogra tibeutAttIt11MQ1F 82i/i3/26g424eal 3515 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Page(s) United States v. Chen. 820 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. Cal. 1992) 10 United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887 (8th Cir. 1985) EFTA00093307

C603EL2II-MIEKIZONAInt DI:Wu0143M 2Qe 1F 3.25923REIgattejecot 3515 TABLE OF EXHIBITS Exhibit A. Julie Addendum Opinion (France) Exhibit B. Perry Addendum Opinion (U.K.) EFTA00093308

CgSe€120-Z74Dan0rtealtiM nbeufratizzeiF 8.25928/eGg422trtecES 3515 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The only issue before the Court is whether conditions exist that can reasonably assure Ms. Maxwell's appearance during this case. On this renewed application, Ms. Maxwell has put before the Court a significant bail package, supported by detailed submissions, which warrant her release on strict conditions. She and her spouse have committed to signing a bond in the full amount of their net worth, regardless of the ownership of the underlying assets. She has proffered seven additional sureties, consisting of her family and close friends, many of whom are U.S. citizens and long-time residents, who have come forward at great personal risk and have pledged meaningful assets. The government does not challenge the good faith and bona fides of these proposed sureties. She has provided a detailed report from a respected accounting firm, which was further reviewed by a former IRS special agent, setting forth a statement of her financial condition, supported by voluminous documentation. The government does not challenge the report's findings, nor its underlying documentation. She has agreed, in writing, to give up any right she has or could have to contest extradition and submit to all other standard travel restrictions. And she has noted that a key representation made by the government at the initial bail hearing as to the strength of its evidence is simply not accurate -- and there is no "significant contemporaneous documentary evidence" that corroborates its case. With regard to any other defendant, this record would readily support release on strict bail conditions, perhaps even on consent. But this is Ghislaine Maxwell, the apparent substitute for Jeffrey Epstein. So, instead, in its response the government urges the Court to disregard the significant additional evidence proffered to the Court and further argues that a defendant cannot be eligible for bail (apparently on any conditions), unless she can provide an absolute guarantee against all risks. But this is not the legal standard. United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 888 n.4, EFTA00093309

Cgasel.21)-ZWILIGIGOAAVilit Obeli6100 izae 1F a.,2592803g422Csteat 3515 892-93 (8th Cir. 1985) ("The legal standard required by the [Bail Reform] Act is one of reasonable assurances, not absolute guarantees."). Under, the Bail Reform Act, a defendant must be released unless there are "no conditions" that would reasonably assure her presence. Here, the proposed package satisfies the actual governing standard, and the Court should grant bail. ARGUMENT I. The Government Concedes that Its Case Relies Almost Exclusively on the Testimony of Three Witnesses In evaluating the strength of the government's case in its prior ruling, the Court relied on the government's proffer that the testimony of the three accusers would be corroborated by "significant contemporaneous documentary evidence." (Tr. 82 (emphasis added)). The government now expressly retreats from this position. It is abundantly clear from the government's response that it has no "significant contemporaneous documentary evidence"—in fact, it has virtually no documentary corroboration at all—and that its case against Ms. Maxwell is based almost exclusively on the recollections of the three accusers, who remain unidentified, concerning events that took place over 25 years ago. Moreover, the government offers no specificity about when within the four-year period of the charged conspiracy the alleged incidents of abuse took place. This, alone, is grounds for the Court to reconsider its prior ruling. The few examples of documentary corroboration referenced by the government—which are the same examples that the government touted at the initial bail hearing—pertain to Epstein, not Ms. Maxwell. The government concedes that government further states that (Gov. Mem. at I I (emphasis added)). The (Id. (emphasis added)). The strength of the government's case against Jeffrey Epstein is not at issue 2 EFTA00093310

Ccosei.20-?71QalWiit b€u IWO izae if aDieReg EIncjecl 3515 here. Whether or not the accusers' recollections as to Epstein are corroborated is irrelevant to the strength of the evidence against Ms. Maxwell. The only purported corroboration that pertains in any way to Ms. Maxwell is of marginal value. The government references ■ (Id. at II). But even the government concedes that, at best, It is clear that the only evidence that Ms. Maxwell allegedly "groomed" the accusers or knowingly facilitated or participated in Epstein's sexual abuse of minors will come solely from the testimony of the three accusers. The government's case against Ms. Maxwell therefore rests entirely on the credibility and reliability of these three witnesses.2 Moreover, the substantive counts (Counts Two and Four) are based on the testimony of only one witness, Minor Victim-I. It is also telling that the government does not even attempt to rebut the defense's assertion that it did not begin issuing subpoenas for documents related to Ms. Maxwell until just after the death of Jeffrey Epstein. This confirms that the case against Ms. Maxwell was assembled after the fact I The government also proffers that they will have "additional witnesses." (Gov. Mem at 11). But these are not "outcry" witnesses who will corroborate a contemporaneous account of abuse from one or more of the accusers. Instead, they will testify only that "both [Ms. Maxwell] and Epstein knew and interacted with certain minor victims when those victims were minors." (Id.). Again, the fact that Ms. Maxwell may have "met and interacted with" someone when they were a minor proves absolutely nothing. 2 One of the witnesses has submitted a letter to the Court. While the CVRA permits the right to be heard, the letter should be given no legal weight in the Court's bail analysis. See United Staley v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 331- 32 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 3 EFTA00093311

Ccasel.20-ZIGKOONAVIM Dbetialttitl1722 1F ff a2M3/20g • S3Ito".•• x515 as a substitute for its prosecution of Epstein.; The government's case is not what it represented to the Court at the initial bail hearing, which should weigh heavily in favor of granting bail.4 II. The Government Has Not Carried Its Burden A. The Government Asks the Court to Ignore Ms. Maxwell's Substantial Ties to the United States, Including Her Spouse The government incorrectly argues that the renewed bail application offers no new information and that the Court was "already aware of the defendant's friends and family in the United States. (Gov. Mem. at 13). The government ignores that, since the initial bail hearing, Ms. Maxwell's spouse has come forward as a co-signor and has submitted a detailed letter describing his committed relationship with Ms. Maxwell for over four years and the important role she has played, and continues to play, It also ignores that several of Ms. Maxwell's closest friends and family, many of whom are U.S. citizens and residents, have also come forward, at considerable personal risk, to support her bond with pledges of assets or letters of support. This information, which was not available to the Court at the time of the initial hearing, demonstrates Ms. Maxwell's strong ties to this country and weighs heavily in favor of bail. Rather than address the merits, the government attempts to dismiss the significance of Ms. Maxwell's relationship with her spouse, noting that Ms. Maxwell told Pretrial Services that she was in the process of getting a divorce and that her spouse did not step forward as a co-signer at the initial bail hearing. (Id. at 13-14). The government is entirely 3 Moreover, the government failure to requestilL regardless of whether it was legally obligated to do so. shows that the government has accept accusers accounts without serious scrutiny. Given the ovenunent's ongoitut Brady obligations. it is unsettling that the government would simply acce I Contrary to the government's assertion. the defense has not abandoned our legal challenges to the indictment. (Croy. Mem. at 10 n.1). We believe we have strong arguments that have only gotten stronger with the production of discovery. We will be making those arguments to the Court in our pretrial motions to be filed next month. 4 EFTA00093312

Cgsed. aro-uroCe3GWAStiM nbeuaktitl=21F I i t a2i9i3ROgEF226tot 3515 mistaken. Prior to her arrest, Ms. Maxwell and her spouse had discussed the idea of getting a divorce as an additional way to create distance between Ms. Maxwell and her spouse to protect him from the terrible consequences of being associated with her. Nevertheless, in the weeks following the initial bail hearing, She and her spouse therefore had no reason to continue discussing divorce, which neither of them wanted in the first place. Nor was there any reason for her spouse to refrain from stepping forward as a co-signer. In sum, the government has offered nothing but unsupported innuendo to suggest that Ms. Maxwell's relationship with her spouse is not a powerful tie to this country. The government's assertion that Ms. Maxwell must not have a close relationship with is particularly callous and belied by the facts. (Gov. Mem. at 14). As her spouse explains, (Ex. A 1 12). B. Ms. Maxwell Has Thoroughly Disclosed Her Finances and Pledged All of Her and Her Spouse's Assets in Support of Her Bond The government's attempts to rebut the financial condition report are unavailing. Significantly, the government does not contest the accuracy of the report, nor the voluminous supporting documentation. In fact, the government has proffered nothing that calls into question the report's detailed account of Ms. Maxwell and her spouse's assets for the last five years, which addresses one of the Court's principal reasons for denying bail. Rather than question the report itself, the government attempts to argue that Ms. Maxwell deceived the Court and Pretrial Services about her assets. (Gov. Mem. at 22-23). 5 EFTA00093313

Caitestr.20-000SMADIstit Dbe2it'fidift t 2 FiliMB228/261gPlifit at332115 The report shows nothing of the son. Ms. Maxwell, who was sitting in a jail cell at the time, was asked by Pretrial Services to estimate her assets. Accordingly, she gave her best estimate of the assets she held in her own name, which the government concedes she did with remarkable accuracy considering that she had not reviewed her financial statements.5 The government's arguments further confirm that it has lost all objectivity and will view at any fact involving Ms. Maxwell in the worst possible light. For example, the government asserts that Ms. Maxwell has demonstrated "sophistication in hiding her assets" and characterizes her transfers to a trust as "funneling" assets to her spouse to "hide her true wealth." (Id. at 24). There is nothing unusual, let alone nefarious or even particularly sophisticated about transferring assets into a trust or a spouse. Indeed, Ms. Maxwell fully disclosed these transactions on her joint tax returns. More importantly, all of the assets disclosed in the financial report, whether they are owned by Ms. Maxwell or her spouse, are included in the bond amount and are subject to forfeiture if she flees. The government further argues that the financial condition report shows that Ms. Maxwell has access to millions of dollars of "unrestrained funds" that she could use to flee the country and reimburse any of her sureties for the loss of their security. (Id. at 23). That characterization is simply untrue. First, as disclosed in the financial report, Ms. Maxwell has procured significant loans on the basis of a negative pledge over her London property. Second, the $4 million controlled by her spouse could only be liquidated with considerable difficulty. The government also faults Ms. Maxwell for not including a valuation of future contingent assets and income that may never materialize. (Id. at 23-24). For example,. s Moreover, for the reasons discussed in our initial memorandum. Ms. Maxwell was reluctant to discuss anything about her spouse and clearly expressed her reluctance to Pretrial Services early on in the interview. 6 EFTA00093314

Cfiesk.20-000Stiffai Istit 1:160.tradie 11=2 Eirit03132261/ItagEritte 01135f115 Similarly, the financial report does not include a future income stream for Ms. Maxwell or her spouse because it presents only historical and current assets. Even so, Ms. Maxwell has no certain future income stream. Her spouse and has had to liquidate his existing investments to help Ms. Maxwell. Finally, the reference to is gratuitous. Ms. Maxwell had no knowledge of But the larger point is this: Ms. Maxwell has proposed a substantial bail package with multiple co-signers and significant security. She and her spouse have pledged all of their assets in support of the bond. Ms. Maxwell's wealth is not a reason to deny her bail. It is a reason to set appropriately strict conditions that will result in significant financial consequences to Ms. Maxwell and her friends and family if she leaves the country. The proposed bail package does exactly that.° C. The Government's Assertion that Ms. Maxwell Is "Adept" at Hiding and Therefore a Flight Risk Is Specious The government continues to assert the sinister narrative that Ms. Maxwell had "an expertise at remaining hidden," and that it would therefore be easy for her to become a fugitive. 6 The government's argument that her spouse's moral suasion is diminished because Ms. Maxwell brought the majority of assns to the relationship is nonsensical. (Id. at 24-25). Regardless of whose mono it was to begin with, all of the assets of Ms. Maxwell and her spouse will be forfeited if she flees and her spouse will be left with nothing. Furthermore, the government's assertion that they could not verify the spouses mania information because Ms. Maxwell did not provide his current banking information is false. (Id. at 24 n.9). The defense provided the spouse's current banking records and only redacted the name of the bank. 7 EFTA00093315

Caask20-0001;23tAilstitNartitifil t lut 2 EiliNEB2)26/21tag P&p af232115 (Gov. Mem. at 20). The government suggests that purchasing a home using a trust and providing a pseudonym to a real estate broker are indicative of her willingness and ability to live in hiding and somehow forecast Ms. Maxwell's intention to flee. (Id.). These arguments are just further evidence that the government will frame every fact about Ms. Maxwell in the worst possible light. As the defense has already argued extensively in its initial brief, these steps were borne out of necessity to protect Ms. Maxwell and her family from harassment and physical threats. Moreover, they are not predictive of flight. There is simply no basis to conclude, based on the measures that Ms. Maxwell was forced to take to protect herself and her family, that she would then willingly abandon that family to become a fugitive from justice. To the contrary, she remained in the country precisely to remain close to them and to defend her case. D. Refusal of Extradition from France or the United Kingdom Is Highly Unlikely The government dismisses Ms. Maxwell's willingness to waive her extradition rights as to France and the United Kingdom as "meaningless" because Ms. Maxwell cannot guarantee with absolute certainty that either country will enforce the waiver. (Gov. Mem. at 14). The government misses the point: Ms. Maxwell's willingness to do everything she can to eliminate her ability to refuse extradition to the fullest extent possible demonstrates her firm commitment to remain in this country to face the charges against her and, as Ms. Maxwell's French and U.K. experts confirm, there is every reason to believe that both authorities would consider the waiver as part of any extradition request. In an attempt to counter William Julie's expert report stating it is "highly unlikely" that the French government would refuse to extradite Ms. Maxwell (Def. Mem., Ex. V at 2), the government attaches a letter from the French Ministry of Justice ("MOJ") that references neither Mr. Julie's report nor Ms. Maxwell, but states generally that the French Code of Criminal Procedure "absolutely prohibits" the extradition of a French national. (Gov. Mem., Ex. B). But 8 EFTA00093316

Canstr.20-000MAMIstit Dbarfidift t 2 Eirde6B2)28/1bagfrittge411335f115 as Mr. Julie's accompanying rebuttal report explains (see Ex. A), the MOJ letter ignores that the extradition provisions in French Code of Criminal Procedure apply only in the absence of an international agreement providing otherwise. (Id. at 1). This rule is necessitated by the French Constitution, which requires that international agreements prevail over national legislation. (Id.). Thus, extradition of a French national to the United States is legally permissible if the extradition treaty between the United States and France provides for it—which it does. (Id. at 3). The government's reliance on a 2006 case—in which France refused to extradite a French national who was also a U.S. citizen—provides no precedent as to how a French court would rule on an extradition request regarding Ms. Maxwell because, as Mr. Julie notes, the United States did not challenge the refusal in the French courts. (Id. at 2-3). Nor does it undermine Mr. Julie's opinion that, in the unusual circumstance where a citizen of both countries has executed an extradition waiver and then fled to France in violation of bail conditions set by a U.S. court, it is "highly unlikely" that an extradition decree would not be issued. (Id. at 3). The government offers no rebuttal to the opinion of Ms. Maxwell's U.K. extradition expert, David Perry. Nor does it dispute Mr. Perry's opinion that Ms. Maxwell would be "highly unlikely" to successfully resist extradition from the United Kingdom, that her waiver would be admissible in any extradition proceeding, and that—contrary to the government's representation at the initial bail hearing (Tr. 27)—bail would be "extremely unlikely." (See Def. Mem. Ex. U at ¶ 39). Mr. Perry's addendum opinion (attached as Ex. B) reiterates these points, opining that the waiver would be "a highly relevant factor" in the U.K. proceeding, both to the likelihood of extradition and to the likelihood of bail while the proceeding is pending. (Id. ¶ 3).7 7 Nor. as the government suggests. does the Secretary of State have general "discretion to deny extradition" after a court has entered a final extradition order. (See Gov. Mem. at 19). That discretion is limited to a handful of exceptional circumstances that would likely be inapplicable to Ms. Maxwell's case. (Id. 4.5). 9 EFTA00093317

Cakast:20-a700824tAMIstit nOdentithillIAM tilii€6132261/1tagP4+ 0.1432115 Finally, the government's argument that Ms. Maxwell could always flee to some country other than the United Kingdom and France holds her—and any defendant—to an impossible standard, which is not the standard under the Bail Reform Act. (See Gov. Mem. at 19). By the government's reasoning, no defendant with financial means to travel could be granted bail, because there would always be a possibility that they could flee to another country (even if they had no ties there), and there could never be an assurance that any extradition waiver would be enforced. However, "Section 3142 does not seek ironclad guarantees." United States v. Chen, 820 F. Supp. 1205, 1208 (N.D. Cal. 1992). To the extent that Ms. Maxwell's ties to France and the United Kingdom—where she has not lived for nearly 30 years—create a flight risk, her extradition waivers along with the substantial bail package proposed reasonably cure it.8 E. The Recent COVID Surge at MDC Further Justifies Bail The government suggests that the Court ignore COVID concerns because Ms. Maxwell, though quarantined because of contact with an officer who tested positive, did not become infected. This ignores the daily (sometimes multiple) inspections of Ms. Maxwell's mouth, which heightens her risk of contracting the deadly virus, which has now surged to 113 positive cases in the MDC. Further, Deputy Captain B. Houtz recently issued a memo stating that "[i]t has not been determined whether legal calls and legal visits will continue." As the Court is well aware, legal visits with Ms. Maxwell already have been suspended. Should legal calls also be discontinued, her constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel will be further eroded. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Maxwell respectfully requests that the Court order her release on bail pursuant to the strict conditions she has proposed. " Any incentive Ms. Maxwell might have to flee to Fiance has been greatly diminished by the recent arrest in France of Jean-Luc Brunel. who reportedly is under investigation for alleged sexual assaults by Jeffrey Epstein. See. e.g.. France Derails Modeling Agent in Jeffrey Epstein Inquiry. buos://www.thettuardian.comiworld/2020/dee/17/france- detains-modelling-agent-jcan-lue-bruncl-in-jefftey-cpstein-inquiry. 10 EFTA00093318

Calask.20-t7i7002312tAMIstit Marti ►`(dtn 2 Filii0613226/ItagEraft 01332i115 Dated: December IA, 2020 Respectfully submitted, /s/Mark Mark S. Cohen Christian R. Everdell COHEN & GRESSER LLP 800 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 Phone: Jeffrey S. Pagliuca Laura A. Menninger HADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C. 150 East 10th Avenue Denver, CO 80203 Phone: Bobbi C. Sternheim Law Offices of Bobbi C. Stemheim 33 West 19th Street - 4th Floor New York, NY 10011 Phone: Attorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell II EFTA00093319

cailase:20-agloDacument ntlinfiAtIllf0891, 806E128B2Blage34figrl 3tI 4 Exhibit A EFTA00093320

Ckast.20-U-0003.00dblit DOditrehleiltt00211 $18682O2g WILLIAM JULIE AVOCAT A LA CO U R 49-2/4age 2501 4 December 18, 2020, Paris. Response to the government's memorandum in opposition to the defendant's renewed motion for release. I was asked to review the United States government's memorandum and notably pages 15 to 17 alongside the French Minister of Justice's letter dated 11 December 2020 produced as Exhibit B to this memorandum. 1 The French Minister of Justice's letter (Exhibit B) The letter of the French Minister of Justice, on which the US government relies to argue that the French government does not extradite its citizens outside the European Union and thus to the United States, quotes Article 696-2 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that France can extradite "any person not having French nationality". It remains unclear whether the author of such letter had actually access to my opinion which is not even quoted, and more generally it seems the letter responds to a question which unexpectedly was not disclosed. The letter fails to mention, however, that Article 6% of the same Code provides that provisions of the French Code of Criminal Procedure on the conditions of extradition apply in the absence of an international agreement providing otherwise (Article 696 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure: "In the absence of an international agreement stipulating otherwise, the conditions, procedure and effects of extradition shall be determined by the provisions of this chapter!. These provisions shall also apply to matters which would not have been regulated by international conventions"). The provisions of Article 696 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure are a reminder that under Article 55 of the French Constitution, international agreements prevail over national legislation (Article 55 of the French Constitution: "Treaties or agreements that have been duly ratified or approved have, upon their publication, an authority superior to that of laws. subject, for each agreement or treaty, to its application by the other party"). It follows from these provisions that the key question is whether France may extradite a French national under the Extradition Treaty between the USA and France and/or under the Extradition Treaty between the European Union and the USA, not whether France extradites its citizens under French legislation. In accordance with this French constitutional rule, the administrative circular of I I March 2004, published by the French Ministry of Justice, which aims at specifying how the then recently amended legal provisions regarding extradition should apply and be understood, states the following: "Article 696 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reaffirms this principle of ' The relevant chapter includes Articles 696-I to Article 696-47-I of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, and thus includes Article 696-2. 51, RUE AMIstRE - 75O17 PARIS - Tt L. 01 88 33 51 80 - FAX. 01 88 33 51 81 evjavOCalli.COM - www.wjavocats.com - PALAIS C 1652 EFTA00093321

Cataast:20-?1-00030tAdetit atinflulift1100211. 16ft2115'2g WILLIAM JULIE AVOCAT A LA COUR vIttla 2Fttilgil 3514 subsidiarity of domestic law in relation to international instruments as stated by the aforementioned law of 10 March 1927: the legislative provisions on extradition are applicable only in the silence or in the absence of international conventions."' It follows from the provisions of Article 696 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure that the key question is whether France may extradite a French national under the Extradition Treaty between the USA and France and/or under the Extradition Treaty between the European Union and the USA, not whether France may extradite its citizens under French legislation. As previously outlined, the Extradition Treaty between the USA and France does not preclude the French government from extraditing a French national and must therefore be distinguished from a number of other international agreements signed by France which contain a clear prohibition to that extent. The Treaty between the USA and France gives the French government discretion as to whether or not to extradite its own citizens to the USA. It is noted that the letter of the French Minister does not provide any answer on this issue. 2 The DOJ Memorandum and the Peterson Case In support of its argument that the French government would not extradite Ms Ghislaine Maxwell to the USA, the government relies on the case of Mr Hans Peterson, a dual French American citizen whose extradition to the US was denied by France in 2007. The Peterson precedent should only be cited with great caution. First, I am not aware that this case has given rise to a published judicial decision, therefore it should not be interpreted as the support of any legal rule or principle. In addition, in regards to the documents that the DOJ has referred to in its memorandum, I doubt that a judicial decision has ever occurred in this case: as mentioned by the 2007 letter of US Senators Richard J. Durbin and Barack Obama to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, the French Minister of Justice communicated its decision refusing extradition on August 22nd 2007, only a few days after the suspect was arrested (at the beginning of August 2007). This decision is not a Court decision but a discretionary decision from the French Ministry of Justice. It actually seems very unlikely that a court decision could have been rendered in this timeframe. This indicates that the case must not have been handed on to the court by the Ministry of Justice in the earliest stage of the extradition process. A refusal to extradite may possibly be challenged by the requesting government before the French Conseil d'Etat, which is the French Supreme Court for administrative matters, as for example the United Kingdom and Hong Kong successfully challenged a decision from the French authorities not to extradite an individual whose extradition they had requested (Conseil d'Etat, 15 October1993, no. 142578). In the Peterson case, the American government did not 2 Circulairc Mandat d'arret curopecn ct Extradition n° CRIM-04-2/CAB-I 1.03.2004 du I I mars 2004 51, RUC AMP5RE - 75017 PARIS - TEL. 01 88 33 51 80 - FAX. 01 88 33 51 81 wjCht vjavocats.com - www.wjavocats.com - PALAIS C 1652 EFTA00093322

Calasl:20-F-0033041/41N-it rTharfideil t1.08Z R6821;2328 WILLIAM JULIE AVOCAT A LA COUR 214ilgri 351 4 challenge the refusal before French courts, while such challenge could have led to a judicial review of the request, in accordance with the ordinary extradition procedure. Secondly, in the absence of a published judicial decision, it is impossible to determine what the outcome of this case would have been if it had come before the courts. Third, as was rightly pointed out by US Senators Richard J. Durbin and Barack Obama in their aforementioned letter to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which the government cites in its memorandum: "Article 3 of the Extradition Treaty between the United States and France provides in pertinent part that "There is no obligation upon the Requested State to grant the extradition of a person who is a national of the Requested State". While this Ankle does not require the extradition of a national to a requesting state, it also does not appear to preclude extradition. To the extent there is discretion available in such extradition decisions, we urge the French government to exercise that discretion in favor of extradition". I am satisfied that this is the right interpretation of Article 3, as this is exactly the conclusion I came to in my rust report. To the extent that there is a discretion, there can be no absolute rule against the extradition of nationals under French law. A discretionary power is not a legal rule. Indeed, there is no constitutional principle against the extradition of nationals. For these reasons, the Peterson case does not alter my view that under the specific and unique facts of this case, it is highly unlikely that the French government would refine to issue and execute an extradition decree against Ms. Maxwell, particularly if Ms. Maxwell has signed an irrevocable waiver in the USA. Finally, if an extradition request were to be issued against a French citizen today, the obligations of the French government under the Extradition Treaty between the USA and France would also need to be read in light of the Agreement on extradition between the European Union and the United States of America, which came into force on February 1", 2010, several years after the Peterson case. Article 1 of this Agreement, which enhances cooperation between Contracting Parties, provides that: "The Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, to provide for enhancements to cooperation in the context of applicable extradition relations between the Member States and the United States of America governing extradition of offenders". The existence of this Agreement would need to be taken into account by the French government in the exercise of its discretion as to whether or not to grant the extradition of a French national to the USA. William JULIE 51, RUC AMPERE -75017 PARIS - TEL. 01 88 33 51 80 - FAX. 01 88 33 51 81 LevjavOCals.Com - www.wjavocats.com - PALAIS C 1652 EFTA00093323

CE4.420-EV00080.1.[Marfietilla023, N6B2292B/24.1311O 3tI 4 Exhibit B EFTA00093324

Caluast:20-M00304.A3Mt Eliodinfiettftlt0022I , Nefl2123213/ageallivi 2514 IN THE MATTER OF AN OPINION ON THE EXTRADITION LAW OF ENGLAND AND WALES RE GHISLAINE MAXWELL ADDENDUM OPINION I This Addendum Opinion is provided in response to the Government's Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant's Renewed Motion to Release dated 16 December 2020, insofar as it pertains to matters of English extradition law and practice. 2. The primary conclusions of the Opinion dated 8 October 2020 ('the Opinion') remain unchanged, namely: (a) in the majority of cases, proceedings in England and Wales in relation to US extradition requests are concluded in under two years; (b) it is virtually certain that bail would be refused in an extradition case in circumstances where the requested person had absconded from criminal proceedings in the United States prior to trial and in breach of bail; and (c) on the basis of the information currently known, it is highly unlikely' that Ghislaine Maxwell would be able successfully to resist extradition to the United States in relation to the charges in the superseding indictment dated 7 July 2020. In addition to those conclusions, the following three points may be made. 3. First, as noted in the Opinion2, Ms Maxwell's waiver of extradition would be admissible in any extradition proceedings in England and Wales. While such a document cannot compel a requested person to consent to their extradition once in the United Kingdom, the document would be a highly relevant factor in any contested extradition proceedings. In particular: (a) If Ms Maxwell were to rely on such a waiver to secure bail in the United States and then, having absconded, renege on the undertakings in that I The Government observes, at p.16 of the Motion, that this leaves open a "possibility" that extradition could be resisted. Absolute certainty in any legal context is rare but the practical effect of the conclusion in the Opinion is that, at this stage and on the basis of the information currently known, it is difficult to conceive of circumstances in which Ms Maxwell could successfully resist extradition, and her extradition would be a virtual foregone conclusion. 2 Opinion. para. 39. EFTA00093325

Calast:20-U-00D3Oalat Indbrfithilt1.00221. WM120213 eV' 2fgagid 35314 document to seek to resist her extradition, bail would almost certainly be refused for the duration of the extradition proceedings. (b) The majority of the bars that might be relied upon by Ms Maxwells require the extradition judge to make a finding that extradition would be oppressive. Quite apart from the other factors rendering those bars unavailable to Ms Maxwell, as set out in the Opinion, it is difficult to conceive of circumstances in which a finding of oppression could be made in relation to the serious charges faced by Ms Maxwell in circumstances where she had absconded from the United States and was contesting her extradition in breach of good faith undertakings relied upon to secure her bail. Similar considerations apply to the balancing exercise required in assessing whether extradition would breach the right to family life under Article 8 of the ECHR. The remaining bars to extradition and human rights bars are unlikely to be available to Ms Maxwell for the reasons given in the Opinion's. (c) A breach of the undertakings in the waiver of extradition would be highly likely to be viewed as a sign of bad faith and cause the extradition judge to treat any evidence given by Ms Maxwell with scepticism. 4. Second, it is not correct that section 93 of the Extradition Act 2003 (`the 2003 Act') confers a general discretion on the Secretary of State to refuse extradition if a case is sent to her by the extradition judges. The ambit of the power in section 93 is described at paragraph 8 of the Opinion. The Secretary of State may only refuse extradition on the grounds provided for in that section, namely: (a) if an applicable bar to extraditions is found to exist; (b) the Secretary of State is informed that the request has been withdrawn7; (c) there is a competing claim for extradition from 3 Opinion, para. 26. Those bars arc passage of time; forum; and mental and physical condition. Opinion, pans. 27-29 and 36-37. s As appears to be submitted by the Government at p.19 of the Memorandum. ` The bars to extradition that the Secretary of State must consider are: (a) the death penalty (s. 94); (b) speciality (s. 95); (c) earlier extradition to the United Kingdom from another territory (s. 96); and (d) earlier transfer to the United Kingdom from the International Criminal Court (s. 96A). 7 Extradition Act 2003, s. 93(4Xa). EFTA00093326

Cianst:20-?1-0130304/430/1 Ebbdinfitill100221, 80682BB213 213agil 351 4 another states; (d) the person has been granted asylum or humanitarian protection in the United Kingdom9; or (e) extradition would be against the interests of UK national security1s. On the information currently known, none of these bars or exceptions would arise in the case of Ms Maxwell. 5. The exceptional nature of the Secretary of State's power is illustrated by the fact that it has been exercised in the favour of a requested person on only one occasion since the enactment of the 2003 Act, and that that single exercise of the power was based on grounds on which reliance may not now be placed." 6. Third, as to the timescales of extradition proceedings arising from requests for extradition made by the Government of the United States, it is to be noted that the purpose of the 2003 Act to streamline extradition procedures'2 and, in practice, the legislation works to facilitate extradition. As noted in the Opinion" the majority of extradition cases conclude within two years, or three months in cases where consent to extradition is given. David Perry QC 6KBW College Hill 17 December 2020 k Extradition Act 2003, ss. 93(4 Xb), 126(2) and 179(2). 9 Extradition Act 2003, s. 93(4Xc) and (6A). I° Extradition Act 2003, s. 208. II viz. in the case of Gary McKinnon, whose extradition was refined by the Secretary of State in 2012 on the basis that he was seriously mentally ill and that there was a high risk of suicide were he to be extradited; since that decision, the Secretary of State has been barred from refusing extradition on the basis of human rights grounds: Extradition Act 2003, s. 70(11) (as inserted by the Crime and Courts Act 2013 with effect from 29 July 2013). 12 Welsh v United States [2007) 1 WLR 156 (Admin) para. 26. 13 Opinion, para. 13. EFTA00093327

Case 21-770, Document 17-2, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page254 of 351 Exhibit H Doc. 106 Opinion & Order EFTA00093328

Cass alb-Z1471CielocIADtin t OtteupWitl 17232 1 F 3.291160/2 0 g UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK United States of America, Ghislaine Maxwell, Defendant. 1SDC SONY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC 0: DATE FILED: 12/28/20 20-CR-330 (MN) OPINION AND ORDER ALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge: Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell has been indicted by a grand jury on charges of conspiracy to entice minors to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; enticing a minor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 and 2; conspiracy to transport minors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; transporting minors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423 and 2; and two charges of perjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The Court held a lengthy bail hearing on July 14, 2020. After extensive briefing and argument at the hearing, the Court concluded that the Defendant was a clear risk of flight and that no conditions or combination of conditions would ensure her appearance. Bail was therefore denied. The Defendant has now tiled a renewed motion for release on bail pending trial, which the Government opposes. In her renewed motion, the Defendant attempts to respond to the reasons that the Court provided in denying bail and proposes a substantially larger bail package. But by and large, the arguments presented either were made at the initial bail hearing or could have been made then. In any event, the new information provided in the renewed application only solidifies the Court's view that the Defendant plainly poses a risk of flight and that no 1 EFTA00093329

Cfiseetat-N4D6330att tteutittbffliZielaii63255/020gEratijeat at 22 combination of conditions can ensure her appearance. This is so because: the charges, which carry a presumption of detention. are serious and carry lengthy terms of imprisonment if convicted; the evidence proffered by the Government. including multiple corroborating and corroborated witnesses, is strong; the Defendant has substantial resources and foreign ties (including citizenship in a country that does not extradite its citizens); and the Defendant, who lived in hiding and apart from the family to whom she now asserts important ties, has not been fully candid about her financial situation. Thus, for substantially the same reasons that the Court denied the Defendant's first motion for release on July 14. 2020. the Court DENIES the Defendant's renewed motion for release on bail.' I. Background On June 29, 2020. a grand jury in the Southern District of New York returned a six-count Indictment against the Defendant, charging her with facilitating Jeffrey Epstein's sexual abuse of multiple minor victims between approximately 1994 and 1997. See Dkt. No. 1. On July 2, 2020, the Indictment was unsealed, and that same day, the Defendant was arrested in New Hampshire. On July 8, 2020, the Government tiled a Superseding Indictment, which contained only small ministerial corrections. Dkt. No. 17. On July 14, 2020, this Court held a hearing regarding the Defendant's request for bail. After a thorough consideration of all of the Defendant's arguments and of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), the Court concluded that no conditions or combination of conditions could reasonably assure the Defendant's appearance, determining as a result that the Defendant was a flight risk and that detention without bail was warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). The This Opinion & Order will be temporarily sealed in order to allow the parties to propose redactions to sensitive or confidential information. 2 EFTA00093330

Cdas 20-Zi4LIMEICIADNit obeumbizoriF I; 3,. a.2710/20g flaftgeali 4642 Defendant did not appeal the Court's determination that detention was required, and she has been incarcerated at the Metropolitan Detention Center since that time. II. Legal Standard Pretrial detainees have a right to bail under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits the imposition of "kprcessive bail," and under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141, et seq. The Bail Reform Act requires the Court to release a defendant "subject to the least restrictive further condition, or combination of conditions, that tit] determines will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). Only if, after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), the Court concludes that "no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community," may the Court order that the defendant be held without bail. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). If there is probable cause to fmd that the defendant committed an offense specifically enumerated in § 3142(eX3), a rebuttable presumption arises "that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure" the defendant's appearance or the safety of the community or others. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(eX3). In such circumstances, "the defendant 'bears a limited burden of production . . . to rebut that presumption by coming forward with evidence that he does not pose a danger to the community or a risk of flight."' United States v. English, 629 F.3d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1991) ("IA] defendant must introduce some evidence contrary to the presumed fact in order to rebut the presumption."). Nonetheless, "'the government retains the ultimate burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence that the 3 EFTA00093331

Cdascl.Z1I-ZTCOCIa30.4AiltiPt tbeutivthiet121/2105668.2i1OMEMBESI304 of 22 defendant presents a danger to the community,' and 'by the lesser standard of a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant presents a risk of flight:" English, 629 F.3d at 319 (quoting Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436); see also United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986) ("The government retains the burden of persuasion tin a presumption case]."). Even when "a defendant has met his burden of production," however, "the presumption favoring detention does not disappear entirely, but remains a factor to be considered among those weighed by the district court." United States v. Mattis, 963 F.3d 285, 290 91 (2d Cir. 2020). After a court has made an initial determination that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the appearance of the Defendant as required, the Court may reopen the bail hearing if "information exists that was not known to the movant at the time of the hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue" of whether pretrial detention is warranted. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(1). But the Court is not required to reopen the hearing or to conduct another hearing if it determines that any new information would not have a material bearing on the issue. See United States v. Raniere, No. 18-CR-2041 (NGG) (VMS), 2018 WL 6344202, at *2 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2018) (noting that lais the court has already held one detention hearing, it need not hold another' the standards set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2) are met); United States v. Havens, 487 F. Supp. 2d 335, 339 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (electing not to reopen a detention hearing because the new information would not have changed the court's decision to detain the defendant until trial). III. Discussion The Defendant bases her renewed motion for bail on both 18 U.S.C. § 3142(1) and the Court's inherent powers to review its own bail decisions. See Del. Mot. at 7 9. As already noted, § 3142(f) provides that a bail hearing "may be reopened ... at any time before trial if the judicial officer finds that information exists that was not known to the movant at the time of the 4 EFTA00093332

Cfises 21)Z7410:230.41t4it 2flE21F MI5 UM/20g Ecastftc6 44522 hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other person and the community." A court may also revisit its own decision pursuant to its inherent authority, even where the circumstances do not match § 3142(0's statutory text. See, e.g., United States v. Rowe, No. 02-CR-756 (LMM), 2003 WL 21196846, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2003) (noting that "a release order may be reconsidered even where the evidence proffered on reconsideration was known to the movant at the time of the original hearing."); United States v. Petrov, No. 15-CR-66 (LTS), 2015 WL 11022886, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015) (noting the "Court's inherent authority for reconsideration of the Court's previous bail decision"). In line with this, the Defendant's new motion aims to address the reasons that the Court provided when it originally determined that no conditions could reasonably assure her appearance and that pretrial detention was warranted. First, the Defendant proposes a more expansive set of bail conditions that she claims addresses any concerns regarding risk of flight. The newly proposed conditions include a $28.5 million bail package, which consists of a $22.5 million personal recognizance bond co-signed by the Defendant and her spouse and secured by approximately $8 million in property and $500,000 in cash, along with six additional bonds— five co-signed by the Defendant's friends and family members and the sixth posted by the security company that would provide security services to the Defendant if she were granted bail and transferred to home confinement. See Def. Mot. at 2. The proposed conditions also provide that the Defendant would be released to the custody of a family member, who would serve as her third-party custodian under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1XBXi); that she would be placed in home confinement with GPS monitoring and that her travel would be restricted to the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York and would be limited to appearances in Court, meetings with 5 EFTA00093333

cSis ztrzerocuacbmtint bbewittill121€21F00582910/i2Og afaject x522 counsel, medical visits, and upon approval by the Court or Pretrial Services. Id at 2 3. Furthermore, the Defendant would have on-premises security guards that she would pay for who would prevent her from leaving the residence at any time without prior approval by the Court or Pretrial Services and who would escort her when she is authorized to leave. Id. at 3. The motion also presents new information that, according to the Defendant, addresses the concerns that the Court articulated when it determined that detention was warranted. This newly presented information, most of which was available to the Defendant at the time of the initial bail hearing, includes evidence of the Defendant's family ties in the United States, see Def. Mot. at 10 14; a detailed financial report that provides a more comprehensive outlook on the Defendant's financial conditions and assets, see id. at 15-18; evidence that according to her rebuts the Government's original contention that she attempted to evade law enforcement prior to her arrest, see id. at 18-25; waivers of her right to contest extradition from the United Kingdom and France, along with expert opinions claiming that the Defendant would not be able to resist extradition if she were to execute the waivers, see id. at 25-29; and evidence that she argues lays bare the weakness of the Government's case against her, see id. at 30-34. Finally, the Defendant argues that the conditions of her confinement, including as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, present an additional factor favoring release. She claims that the conditions imposed are punitive and that those conditions interfere with her ability to participate in her defense, and she asserts that these factors further militate in favor of release. See id. at 34 38. Having carefully considered all of the Defendant's arguments, the Court again concludes that no conditions or combination of conditions could reasonably assure her appearance and that 6 EFTA00093334

cSzsan-tiggliect4Asnit Meaning° 211/21FM58.29Z60/20g Oiled? 35 22 detention without bail is warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(eX1). The Court accordingly denies Defendant's request to reopen the original bail hearing and denies her renewed motion for bail. A. The presumption In favor of detention applies The Court is required to presume that no condition or combination of conditions of pretrial release will reasonably assure the Defendant's appearance. The Bail Reform Act provides that if a defendant is charged with committing an offense involving a minor victim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 or 2423, "it shall be presumed that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the community if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the person committed." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(eX3XE). The Defendant's indictment by a grand jury suffices to establish that there is probable cause to believe that she committed the offenses charged in the indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that that an indictment returned by a properly constituted grand jury "conclusively determines the existence of probable cause" and that "the return of an indictment eliminates the need for a preliminary examination at which a probable cause finding is made by a judicial officer pursuant to Rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." (citations omitted)). In light of the crimes charged in the indictment, the Court begins with the presumption that no condition or combination of conditions of pretrial release will reasonably assure the Defendant's appearance. When the presumption applies, the Defendant bears a limited burden of production "tending to counter the § 3142(e) presumption of flight," Contreras, 776 F.2d at 53 n.1. The Defendant's burden of production only requires that she "introduce a certain amount of evidence contrary to the presumed fact." United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 380 (1st Cir. 1985), 7 EFTA00093335

C€aaaAO-NALICII304124It tibeu610012221FROSa2M/f20g fart as522 abrogated on other grounds by United States v. O'Brien, 895 F.2d 810 (1st Cir. 1990). That burden is "limited." United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001). The Defendant's proffer of evidence and information including information relating to her financial conditions and her family ties to the United States, among other things—satisfies this limited burden. As the Court discussed at the July 14, 2020 hearing, these factors bear on the question of whether the Defendant poses a flight risk. And the evidence she advances in her renewed motion for bail reasonably disputes the presumption that she poses a flight risk. In that sense, this evidence is relevant to the ultimate determination and satisfies the relatively low threshold imposed by the burden of production. The presumption of flight does not disappear entirely, however, and it "remains a factor to be considered among those weighed by the district court." United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Martir, 782 F.2d at 1144). As a result, "ial judicial officer conducting a detention hearing should, even after a defendant has come forward with rebuttal evidence, continue to give the presumption of flight some weight by keeping in mind that Congress has found that these offenders pose special risks of flight, and that 'a strong probability arises' that no form of conditional release will be adequate to secure their appearance." Mortar, 782 F.2d at 1144 (citation omitted). B. The new information does not alter the Court's initial determination When determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as requited, courts are required to consider the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Thus, the Court considers (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense involves a minor victim, (2) the weight of the evidence, (3) the defendant's history and characteristics, and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to 8 EFTA00093336

Catel.21}Z.7411allatitailit tibeuilitolt1121621F MS &M0/2 Og Efacajectli 46 22 any person or the community posed by pre-trial release. See Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). At the July 14, 2020 bail hearing, the Court considered these factors before concluding that no conditions of release could reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required. And the first and fourth factors remain unchanged. As already noted, the Defendant is charged with offenses involving minor victims, and it is undisputed that the nature and circumstances of the offenses charged in the Superseding Indictment weighs in favor of continued detention. On the other hand, the Government has not advanced any evidence that the Defendant poses a danger to any person or to the community, a factor that weighs against detention. The Defendant's arguments therefore focus on the second and third factors. As explained below, neither the arguments put forth in the Defendant's renewed motion for bail nor the evidence she submitted in conjunction with her motion rebut the Court's conclusions, and the Court continues to find, after again applying these factors, that no conditions of release will reasonably assure the Defendant's appearance at future proceedings. 1. The Weight of the Evidence The Court will address the strength of the Government's case first. The Defendant argues that the Government lacks any meaningful documentary corroboration of the witness testimony and that the discovery produced to date has included only a "small number of documents from the time period of the conspiracy." Def. Mot. at 5. And she claims, as a result, that the Government overstated the strength of its case in advance of the July 14, 2020 bail hearing. See id. at 30 33. So she argues that the second § 3142(g) factor supports release. The Court disagrees. Arguing that the case against her "is based almost exclusively on the recollections of the three accusers, who remain unidentified," the Defendant contends that the 9 EFTA00093337

C &est: 20-c7r70011aCkAltsin t addiratiol 11262 i lated1980/ftlig Pargt (1032122 weight of the evidence is weak. Def. Reply at 2. But she too easily discredits the witness testimony. According to the Government, and as reflected in the indictment, it is anticipated that the three witnesses will provide detailed and corroborating accounts of the Defendant's alleged role in enticing minors to engage in sex acts. See Gov't Opp'n at 10; see also Dkt. No. 17, SI Superseding Indictment, ¶¶ 7, 11, 13, 17. Moreover, the Government proffers that additional evidence, including flight records and other witnesses' corroborating testimony, will further support the main witnesses' testimony and link the Defendant to Epstein's conduct. Gov't Opp'n at 10-11. And while the Defendant contends that much of this evidence focuses on Epstein, not the Defendant, the nature of the conspiracy charge (along with the evidence linking the Defendant to Epstein) renders this evidence relevant to the Government's charges against her. As the Court stated in the July 14, 2020 hearing, although the Court does not prejudge the merits of the Government's case or of the Defendant's defenses, for purposes of the bail determination stage, the Government's proffered case against the Defendant remains strong. See Dkt. No. 93 ("Tr.") at 83:4-83:10. The Court again concludes that the Defendant's awareness of the potential strength of the government's case against her creates a risk of flight, and none of the Defendant's new arguments meaningfully alter that conclusion. As a result, the second factor supports detention. 2. The Defendant's History and Characteristics At the July 14, 2020 bail hearing, the Court determined that the Defendant was a flight risk in part because of her substantial international ties, including multiple foreign citizenships and familial and personal connections abroad and her ownership of at least one foreign property of significant value. See Tr. at 83:13-83:18. And the Court further noted that the Defendant's extraordinary financial resources could provide her the means to flee the country even despite 10 EFTA00093338

Calesk:20-000Mtta1Istlt im&td11262Ei WW2 Q11351122 COVID-19 related travel restrictions. Id. at 83:21 83:25. The Court also observed that the Defendant had family and personal connections to the United States but concluded that the absence of any dependents, significant family ties, or employment in the United States also supported the conclusion that flight would not pose an insurmountable burden for her. Id. at 84:4 84:9. While the Defendant's renewed motion for bail addresses some of these factors, it does not alter the Court's conclusion. The first few considerations remain relatively unchanged. The Defendant continues to have substantial international ties and multiple foreign citizenships, and she continues to have familial and personal connections abroad. None of the evidence presented in support of the present motion fundamentally alters those conclusions. To address the Court's concern that the Defendant's French citizenship presented the opportunity that she could flee to France and that she would be able to resist extradition on that basis, see Tr. at 83:18-83:20, the Defendant now offers to waive her right to extradition from both the United Kingdom and France, along with expert opinions reports claiming that such waivers would likely make it possible to resist an extradition request from the United States to either country. See Def Mot., Exs. T, U, V. As the Government points out in its brief, however, the legal weight of the waivers is, at best, contested. The French Ministry of Justice, for instance, indicated in a letter submitted in conjunction to the Government's opposition that the French Code of Criminal Procedure "absolutely prohibits" the extradition of a French national. See Gov't Opp'n, Ex. B. And while the Defendant's own expert attempts to rebut the Ministry of Justice's letter, see Def. Reply, Ex. A, even the Defendant's own experts use probabilistic, rather than absolute, language, leaving open the possibility that extradition would be blocked. See, e.g., Def. Mot., Ex. U at 2 ("On the basis of the information currently known, it is highly unlikely that Ghislaine Maxwell would be able 11 EFTA00093339

Caesk:20-000TaCtAAMInt 06€2.1r6Firtt 11262 Filatkeir36/faig Witgje 0.02122 successfully to resist extradition to the United States in relation to the charges in the superseding indictment dated 7 July 2020."); Def. Mot., Ex. V ¶ 76 ("It would .. . become a matter for the French government to decide on whether or not to issue an extradition decree against Ms. Ghislaine Maxwell."); id ¶ 77 ("Mt is highly unlikely that the French government would refuse to issue and execute an extradition decree against Ms Maxwell. . . ."). Nor has the Defendant presented any cases where courts addressed the question of whether an anticipatory waiver of extradition is enforceable; while she cites cases where defendants offered to waive extradition, the reasoning in those cases turned on other factors and the courts did not dwell on the enforceability of such waivers. See, e.g., United States v. Orilla, No. 99-1514, 1999 WL 1456536, at *2 (3d Cir. July 13, 1999); United States v. Salvagno, 314 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (N.D.N.Y. 2004); United States v. Karin, 298 F. Supp. 2d 129, 132 33 (D.D.C. 2004); United States v. Chen, 820 F. Supp. 1205, 1212 (N.D. Cal. 1992). In those cases, the courts included such waivers as one among several conditions of release, but they did not make any express determination that such waivers are enforceable. On the other hand, some courts have expressly opined that such waivers are unenforceable. See, e.g., United States v. Epstein, 425 F. Supp. 3d 306, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (describing the "Defense proposal to give advance consent to extradition and waiver of extradition rights" as "an empty gesture."); United States v. Morrison, No. 16-MR-118, 2016 WL 7421924, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2016) ("Although the defendants have signed a waiver of extradition, such a waiver may not become valid until an extradition request is pending in Canada and may be subject to withdrawal."); United States v. Stroh, No. 396-CR-139 (AHN), 2000 WL 1832956, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2000) ("Pit appears that there is a substantial legal question as to whether any country to which he fled would enforce any waiver of extradition signed under the circumstances presented in this case. At any event, 12 EFTA00093340

Calest:20-dr700812mAltsint OdelitAidtke62 ilaticaMO/ftag pate cit335f122 extradition from Israel (or any other country) would be, at best, a difficult and lengthy process and, at worst, impossible."). Having carefully reviewed the experts' reports and the cases cited by the Defendant,2 the Court's analysis of the relationship between the Defendant's French citizenship and the risk of flight remains fundamentally unchanged. Its reasoning is guided in part by the substantial legal questions regarding the legal weight of anticipatory extradition waivers and the likelihood that any extradition would be a difficult and lengthy process (including, for instance, the likelihood that the Defendant would contest the validity of those waivers and the duration it would take to resolve those legal disputes). The likelihood that the Defendant would be able to frustrate any extradition requests—even if she were correct that she would be unable to stop extradition entirely weighs strongly in favor of detention. In addition, the Defendant's extraordinary financial resources also continue to provide her the means to flee the country and to do so undetected. To be sure, this factor alone does not by itself justify continued detention. But as the Court noted at the initial bail hearing, the Defendant's financial resources, in combination with her substantial international ties and foreign connections and her experience avoiding detection (whether from the government, the press, or otherwise), do bear significantly on the flight risk analysis. See Tr. at 88:6 88:23 (distinguishing this case from United States v. Esposito, 309 F. Supp. 3d 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), 2 The Defendant also argues that "a defendant's waiver of the right to appeal an extradition order has been recognized as an indication of the defendant's intent not to flee." Def. Mot. at 27 (citing United States v. Khashoggi, 717 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). The Court places little weight on this argument. Under the Defendant's theory, a defendant could strategically offer to waive the right to extradition while intending to resist any subsequent extradition that might result. The Court is unpersuaded. 13 EFTA00093341

Calesk: 20 -000ttailitallsint 0dditradrit 11,062 FilitifilM0/RAg PAO C6432122 United States v. Dreier, 596 F. Supp. 2d 831 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), and United States v. Madoff 586 F. Supp. 2d 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)). The Court's concerns regarding the absence of any dependents, significant family ties, or employment in the United States, meanwhile, apply with somewhat less force in light of the evidence submitted in support of this motion. See id at 84:4 84:9. The Defendant has submitted a litany of letters of support written by friends and family members. See Def. Mot., Exs. A N, W X. These letters, according to the Defendant, support her claim that she has significant ties to the United States and attest to the Defendant's character. The Defendant places particular emphasis on the letter written by her spouse, whose identity and connection to the Defendant was withheld from the Court at the initial bail hearing. See Def. Mot. at 11-13. In that letter, her spouse expounds on the lives they led before her arrest, noting in particular that the Government's characterization of the Defendant's "transient" lifestyle, Dkt. No. 4 at 9, was belied by the "quiet family life" that they had enjoyed. Def. Mot. at 11; see also Del. Mot, Ex. A 11 4-5. Other letters similarly highlight that the Defendant's family and affective ties in the United States are stronger than was originally presented to the Court in the initial bail hearing. These letters substantiate the Defendant's claim that she has important ties to people in the United States, but they leave unaltered the Court's conclusion that flight would not pose an insurmountable burden for the Defendant. Among other things, the Defendant now argues that her newly revealed relationship with her spouse signals her deep affective ties in the country, but at the time she was arrested, she was not living with him and claimed to be getting divorced. See Pretrial Services Report at 3. Indeed, she does not propose to live with him were she to be released on bail, undercutting her argument that that relationship would create an insurmountable burden to her fleeing. Furthermore, the fact that she has friends and family in the United States 14 EFTA00093342

Caesk:204:71.700012kAilsInt 0deltiradisit 11C/62 nrcifi 053M122 does not mean that those people would be unable to visit her were she to flee to another country. In addition, the Defendant continues to lack any employment ties to the United States—another factor weighing in favor of detention. Furthermore, it is apparent from the letters that the Defendant has significant ties to family and friends abroad. In light of this, nothing in the renewed motion for bail alters the Court's fimdamental conclusion that flight would not pose an insurmountable burden to the Defendant. Other factors that similarly speak to the Defendant's history and characteristics weigh in favor of detention. Most notably, the Defendant's pattern of providing incomplete or erroneous information to the Court or to Pretrial Services bears significantly on the Court's application of the third factor to the present case. Among other things, in July 2020 the Defendant represented to Pretrial Services that she possessed around $3.5 million worth of assets (while leaving out her spouse's assets and assets that had been transferred to trust accounts) and the representation that the New Hampshire property was owned by a corporation and that she was "just able to stay there." See Pretrial Services Report at 2. The Defendant now claims that she 'Vas detained at the time and had no access to her financial records and was trying to piece together these numbers from memory. According to the Macalvins report, [the financial figures.' are a close approximation of the value of the assets that Ms. Maxwell held in her own name at the time of her arrest.... For the reasons already discussed, Ms. Maxwell was reluctant to discuss anything about her [spouse) and expressed that to Pretrial Services." Def. Mot. at 16 n.5. Even if the Defendant was unable to provide an exact number, however, the difference between the number she originally reported to Pretrial Services and the number now presented to the Court in the Macalvins report, a report on the Defendant's finances prepared by a prominent accounting firm for purposes of this motion, see Def. Mot., Ex. O, makes it unlikely that the misrepresentation 15 EFTA00093343