"remains a factor to be considered among those weighed by the district court." United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Martir, 782 F.2d at 1144). As a result, "[a] judicial officer conducting a detention hearing should, even after a defendant has come forward with rebuttal

.3d 125, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2000) (government entitled to proceed by proffer in detention hearings); Ferranti, 66 F.3d at 542 (same); United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1145 (2d Cir. 1986) (same). Where a judicial officer concludes after a hearing that "no condition or combination of conditions will

.3d 125, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2000) (government entitled to proceed by proffer in detention hearings); Ferranti, 66 F.3d at 542 (same); United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1145 (2d Cir. 1986) (same). Where a judicial officer concludes after a hearing that "no condition or combination of conditions will

den of production, the presumption "remains a factor to be considered among those weighed by the district court." Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436 (quoting Martir, 782 F.2d at 1144). The Court is mindful "that Congress has found that these offenders pose special risks of flight, and that `a strong probability

.3d 125, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2000) (government entitled to proceed by proffer in detention hearings); Ferranti, 66 F.3d at 542 (same); United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1145 (2d Cir. 1986) (same). Where a judicial officer concludes after a hearing that "no condition or combination of conditions will

.3d 125, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2000) (government entitled to proceed by proffer in detention hearings); Ferranti, 66 F.3d at 542 (same); United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1145 (2d Cir. 1986) (same). Where a judicial officer concludes after a hearing that "no condition or combination of conditions will

.3d 125, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2000) (government entitled to proceed by proffer in detention hearings); Ferranti, 66 F.3d at 542 (same); United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1145 (2d Cir. 1986) (same). Where a judicial officer concludes after a hearing that "no condition or combination of conditions will

nably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the community." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(eX3XE) (emphasis added); United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986). The Indictment in this case was returned by a grand jury thus establishing probable cause that the defendant c

smit Information About a Mi- nor (18 U.S.C. § 2425). 18 U.S.C. 3142(e)(3XE). (121 The presumption of remand does not disappear even when rebutted. Martir, EFTA00066200 316 425 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES 782 F.2d at 1144. If the defendant comes forward with evidence that he will not endanger t

"remains a factor to be considered among those weighed by the district court." United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Martir, 782 F.2d at 1144). As a result, "[a] judicial officer conducting a detention hearing should, even after a defendant has come forward with rebuttal

nably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the community." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(eX3XE) (emphasis added); United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986). The Indictment in this case was returned by a grand jury thus establishing probable cause that the defendant c

nably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the community." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(eX3XE) (emphasis added); United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986). The Indictment in this case was returned by a grand jury thus establishing probable cause that the defendant c

ption in favor of detention based on the crimes charged, the presumption shifts only the burden of production, not persuasion. See United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the statutory demand on defendants "is fairly easily met." United States v. Conway, No. 4-11-70756

smit Information About a Mi- nor (18 U.S.C. § 2425). 18 U.S.C. 3142(e)(3XE). (121 The presumption of remand does not disappear even when rebutted. Martir, EFTA00076824 316 425 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES 782 F.2d at 1144. If the defendant comes forward with evidence that he will not endanger t

nably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the community." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(eX3XE) (emphasis added); United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986). The Indictment in this case was returned by a grand jury thus establishing probable cause that the defendant c

"remains a factor to be considered among those weighed by the district court." United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Martir, 782 F.2d at 1144). As a result, "[a] judicial officer conducting a detention hearing should, even after a defendant has come forward with rebuttal

"remains a factor to be considered among those weighed by the district court." United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Martir, 782 F.2d at 1144). As a result, "[a] judicial officer conducting a detention hearing should, even after a defendant has come forward with rebuttal

"remains a factor to be considered among those weighed by the district court." United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Martir, 782 F.2d at 1144). As a result, "[a] judicial officer conducting a detention hearing should, even after a defendant has come forward with rebuttal

ption in favor of detention based on the crimes charged, the presumption shifts only the burden of production, not persuasion. See United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the statutory demand on defendants "is fairly easily met." United States v. Conway, No. 4-11-70756

"remains a factor to be considered among those weighed by the district court." United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Martir, 782 F.2d at 1144). As a result, "[a] judicial officer conducting a detention hearing should, even after a defendant has come forward with rebuttal