Epstein Secrets

Talik, he was the commander of Israel’s armored corps, and Avraham knew him well. His wartime division consisted of the country’s premier tank unit, the Seventh Armored Brigade, and a reserve brigade. We accompanied them the next day to an abandoned Egyptian camp not far from El Arish, in the northern Sinai. At least, we’d a

but arming and training them and helping organize cross-border attacks. Then, in 38 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011509 the summer of 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which had been owned by the British and French. Ben-Gurion was emboldened to go war by the fact that both Britain and France wanted to retake the c

upposed to play a support role. An enormous pincer operation was mounted around the Fatah camp and Karameh itself: including a full infantry brigade, the Seventh Armored Brigade and the paratroopers’ sayeret. But the resistance they met, both from Fatah and Jordanian troops, was much fiercer than expected. One of the paratroo

t of the intelligence base our military engineers had built after the war into a 2,400-feet-high mountain called Gebel Um-Hashiba, 20 miles back from the Suez Canal. When I radioed in to tell him I’d decided to abandon the operation, I could hear the surprise in his voice, and what seemed reluctance as well. “If

Talik, he was the commander of Israel's armored corps, and Avraham knew him well. His wartime division consisted of the country's premier tank unit, the Seventh Armored Brigade, and a reserve brigade. We accompanied them the next day to an abandoned Egyptian camp not far from El Arish, in the northern Sinai. At least, we'd a

but arming and training them and helping organize cross-border attacks. Then, in 38 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_027886 the summer of 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which had been owned by the British and French. Ben-Gurion was emboldened to go war by the fact that both Britain and France wanted to retake the c

upposed to play a support role. An enormous pincer operation was mounted around the Fatah camp and Karameh itself: including a full infantry brigade, the Seventh Armored Brigade and the paratroopers' sayeret. But the resistance they met, both from Fatah and Jordanian troops, was much fiercer than expected. One of the paratroo

t of the intelligence base our military engineers had built after the war into a 2,400-feet-high mountain called Gebel Um-Hashiba, 20 miles back from the Suez Canal. When I radioed in to tell him I'd decided to abandon the operation, I could hear the surprise in his voice, and what seemed reluctance as well. "If