Epstein Secrets

diplomacy in the hopes of reducing one of the obvious risks in such an attack: a conflict with Jordan, which we’d have to overfly to reach Iraq. The Mossad had a unit called 7evel, a kind of shadow foreign ministry for states with which we had no formal relations but with which, in both side’s interests,

briefed me on the questions I could expect, not just about the Achille Lauro but the wider issue of Palestinian attacks, as well as Syrian President Hafez al- Assad’s efforts to re-equip his air force after his losses in Lebanon. So I came to the interview prepared. I brought audio tapes of the hijacker

r time, we might manage to extricate ourselves from the escalating violence with Hizbollah; reach a land- for-peace deal with the enigmatic President Hafez al-Assad in Syria; and find some form of coexistence with the Palestinians. He also spoke about international politics. I remember one afternoon in the summe

diplomacy in the hopes of reducing one of the obvious risks in such an attack: a conflict with Jordan, which we'd have to overfly to reach Iraq. The Mossad had a unit called Tevel, a kind of shadow foreign ministry for states with which we had no formal relations but with which, in both side's interests,

briefed me on the questions I could expect, not just about the Achille Lauro but the wider issue of Palestinian attacks, as well as Syrian President Hafez al- Assad's efforts to re-equip his air force after his losses in Lebanon. So I came to the interview prepared. I brought audio tapes of the hijacker

r time, we might manage to extricate ourselves from the escalating violence with Hizbollah; reach a land- for-peace deal with the enigmatic President Hafez al-Assad in Syria; and find some form of coexistence with the Palestinians. He also spoke about international politics. I remember one afternoon in the summer

. The first of about a half-dozen meetings came a few days later at the Prime Minister’s residence in Jerusalem. Then, we shifted venue, meeting at a Mossad-owned villa north of Tel Aviv. I brought along Bougie Herzog, a bright young lawyer, and Labor Party member, who was working in the same law firm and

effective end of the peace process. Even though Arik assured me privately that he understood my determination to reopen peace efforts with Arafat and Hafez al- Assad, I knew Arik. The path toward peace agreements, assuming they were even possible, would be tough. Sooner or later — and certainly if we fac

giously motivated ideologues, were Labor supporters. And almost no Israel, of any political stripe, 331 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011802 / BARAK / 46 viewed Hafez al-Assad as a natural partner for peace. For years, he’d been a constant, sneering presence on our northern border, denouncing not only Sadat but any Arab lea

. The first of about a half-dozen meetings came a few days later at the Prime Minister's residence in Jerusalem. Then, we shifted venue, meeting at a Mossad-owned villa north of Tel Aviv. I brought along Bougie Herzog, a bright young lawyer, and Labor Party member, who was working in the same law firm and

effective end of the peace process. Even though Arik assured me privately that he understood my determination to reopen peace efforts with Arafat and Hafez al- Assad, I knew Arik. The path toward peace agreements, assuming they were even possible, would be tough. Sooner or later - and certainly if we fac

igiously motivated ideologues, were Labor supporters. And almost no Israel, of any political stripe, 331 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028179 / BARAK / 46 viewed Hafez al-Assad as a natural partner for peace. For years, he'd been a constant, sneering presence on our northern border, denouncing not only Sadat but any Arab lea

ple of hunting down enemies abroad. After Yandarbiyev's assassination, one FSB colonel in the elite group Vympel told Soldatov: `Take a look at the Mossad. Why cannot we do the same with our terrorists?'" Of course, what Russia can do with its terrorists, it can also do with its dissidents. Ask Marin

ians do." The Syrian-Russian relationship was always rather complicated, full of mutual suspicion and attempts by Moscow to impose an ideology that Hafez al-Assad didn't much care for, in exchange for military and intelligence assistance that Syria couldn't do without. But Damascus isn't just a resurrected st

r, Hafez al-Assad, a few months earlier. Yet these three dedicated men — Gili, who was by training a lawyer; Shlomo, an academic; and Danny, a former Mossad chief — had just been through dozens of hours of intricately detailed talks with each of Arafat’s top negotiators at Camp David, not to mention the d

ed us. I knew the drill: the same thing had happened when I had come tantalizingly close to finalizing a peace deal with Syria’s then-dying dictator, Hafez al-Assad, a few months earlier. Yet these three dedicated men — Gili, who was by training a lawyer; Shlomo, an academic; and Danny, a former Mossad chief — ha

r, Hafez al-Assad, a few months earlier. Yet these three dedicated men — Gili, who was by training a lawyer; Shlomo, an academic; and Danny, a former Mossad chief — had just been through dozens of hours of intricately detailed talks with each of Arafat’s top negotiators at Camp David, not to mention the d

ed us. I knew the drill: the same thing had happened when I had come tantalizingly close to finalizing a peace deal with Syria’s then-dying dictator, Hafez al-Assad, a few months earlier. Yet these three dedicated men — Gili, who was by training a lawyer; Shlomo, an academic; and Danny, a former Mossad chief — ha