Epstein Secrets

kers” in Sharm al- Sheikh with the participation not just of an equally concerned King Hussein, and of course Arafat, but leaders of Arab states from North Africa to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. The only significant holdout was Syria’s Hafez al-Assad. He objected because he said the conference was too focused on

be at stake for Damascus, I certainly couldn’t see the Phalangists being able to drive them out by force. The more immediate, open question involved Arafat and the Palestinians. Our other two invasion forces had driven almost all the PLO fighters out of south Lebanon, though not without costs and casualt

s, and at the dinner held at one of King Juan Carlos’s palatial estates, and, for me, a first opportunity to meet not only Arab foreign ministers but Yasir Arafat. My first, brief encounter with Arafat began a bit embarrassingly. I’d arrived a few minutes early for the conference dinner and was led into an imp

d to offer brief hope that Hamas would reposition itself away from the "resistance" camp in the region and toward the camp of Islamist movements in North Africa that were dedicated to making political Islam the basis of a practicable governing system. That would have required taking reconciliation with Isr

00464345 EFTA01977729 manifestation of Palestinian nationalism. Had Yasir Arafat still been alive, Hamas would never have come as far as it has. Arafat's death left a huge leadership vacuum in a political culture where persona, not institutions, figures prominently. Abbas had electoral legitimacy b

credible peace process created an opening for Hamas -- the religious EFTA_R1_00464345 EFTA01977729 manifestation of Palestinian nationalism. Had Yasir Arafat still been alive, Hamas would never have come as far as it has. Arafat's death left a huge leadership vacuum in a political culture where persona,

kers" in Sharm al- Sheikh with the participation not just of an equally concerned King Hussein, and of course Arafat, but leaders of Arab states from North Africa to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. The only significant holdout was Syria's Hafez al-Assad. He objected because he said the conference was too focused on

be at stake for Damascus, I certainly couldn't see the Phalangists being able to drive them out by force. The more immediate, open question involved Arafat and the Palestinians. Our other two invasion forces had driven almost all the PLO fighters out of south Lebanon, though not without costs and casualt

s, and at the dinner held at one of King Juan Carlos's palatial estates, and, for me, a first opportunity to meet not only Arab foreign ministers but Yasir Arafat. My first, brief encounter with Arafat began a bit embarrassingly. I'd arrived a few minutes early for the conference dinner and was led into an impr

owers. The Levant was also important to any empire originating to the north or south of Israel. If Egypt decided to move beyond the Nile Basin and North Africa eastward, it would move first through the Sinai and then northward along the coastal plain, securing sea lanes to Egypt. When Asia Minor powers suc

as in particular. It will also bring Hamas—next year and for the first time—into the PLO, the body charged with negotiating peace with Israel. Even Yasser Arafat resisted that development when he headed the PLO, and it seems obvious that Israel cannot negotiate peace with an anti-Semitic terrorist group ben

nce over a Middle East peace agreement, even as the Administration continued to try to manage the post- revolution transitions across the region and North Africa. Obama doesn't believe that there is much he can do to change EFTA_R1_02204192 EFTA02720663 the status quo in North Korea. Meanwhile, the situat

k the first steps to withdraw its forces and settlers from Palestinian territories. Despairing of any possibility for productive negotiations while Yasir Arafat led the PLO, but under heavy pressure to make some move, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon turned to Gaza, which the old general viewed as a military bu

ement) (28 September 1995) 145 Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH Agreement) (9 May 1996) 324 Declaration by PM Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat following their first meeting (4 September 1996) 327 Hebron Protocol (17 January 1997) 329 Note for the Record (17 January 1997) 336 HOUSE_OVERSIGH

is the author of Talking to Arab Youth: Revolution and Counterrevolution in Egypt and Tunisia. Nur focuses on the transitions in the Middle East and North Africa, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and issues related to US foreign policy. She has worked as a senior policy analyst at the International Peace Inst

n which case the world's irritation and futile Palestinian unilateralism will harden. Yitzhak Rabin did not stand on the White House lawn with Yasser Arafat for a photo-op. The Israeli warrior understood the necessity of a two-state peace. To get there at last, "It's essential that we become more sophisti

rab countries than notions based on imported ideologies such as communism, nationalism, and socialism. Ibn Khaldun's analysis was based on his native North Africa, but it can be adapted to the conditions of the Mashreq, or Levant-where similar historical conditions prevailed. As Albert Hourani explained in his

mas in particular. It will also bring Hamas—next year and for the first time— into the PLO, the body charged with negotiating peace with Israel. Even Yasser Arafat resisted that development when he headed the PLO, and it seems obvious that Israel cannot negotiate peace with an anti-Semitic terrorist group bent o

n powers. The Levant was also important to any empire originating to the north or south of Israel. If Egypt decided to move beyond the Nile Basin and North Africa eastward, it would move first through the Sinai and then northward along the coastal plain, securing sea lanes to Egypt. When Asia Minor powers such