Epstein Secrets

uous control) to EFTA_R1_02029175 EFTA02689634 27 the north, Israel's territory never stretched as far as Damascus, although it frequently held the Golan Heights. Israel extended many times to both sides of the Jordan but never deep into the Jordanian Desert. It never extended southeast into the Arabian Peni

tside imperial power, Israel does not face a threat from the southwest. Israel is similarly protected from the southeast. The deserts southeast of Eilat-Aqaba are virtually impassable. No large force could approach from that direction, although smaller raiding parties could. The tribes of the Arabia

on the governments of =afez and Bashar Assad to enforce the Separation of Forces Agreement from 1=74, in which both sides agreed to a cease-fire in the Golan Heights, the disputed vantage point along the=r shared border. Indeed, even when Israeli and Syrian forces were briefly =ocked in fierce fighting in 1982 d

> =/span> <=span> 10 May 2013 -- The rocket strike= that a militant Islamist group recently fired from the Egyptian Sinai int= the Israeli city of Eilat served as yet another reminder of how delicate bilateral relations remain two years afte= Egypt's revolution. Terrorist activity could easily cause

ldiers crossed the border on an intelligence mission. It had happened in 1954, and it ended in a failure even more serious than Rotem. The target was the Golan Heights, inside Syria. The special technology unit attached to military intelligence had developed a bugging device designed to be placed on a telephone pole

peace talks, or recognition of the State of Israel. And in October, Egyptian missile boats attacked and sunk Israel’s largest warship, the destroyer Eilat, killing nearly 50 people on board. Without this renewed violence, perhaps, we in Israel might have been able to consider more deeply the future imp

urprise attacks by Syria and Egypt — armies we’d not just defeated, but humiliated, six years earlier — had pinned down and pushed back our forces on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai. Without any advance call-up, many reservists were only now reaching the front lines. As hundreds of people pressed for seats on th

didn’t rein in Arafat’s men, Israel would take whatever action necessary. But the decisive moment came on the eighteenth of March. A school bus near Eilat, in the far south of Israel, hit a Fatah landmine, killing the driver and a teacher, and injuring 10 of the children. I was called up the night befo

ldiers crossed the border on an intelligence mission. It had happened in 1954, and it ended in a failure even more serious than Rotem. The target was the Golan Heights, inside Syria. The special technology unit attached to military intelligence had developed a bugging device designed to be placed on a telephone pole

peace talks, or recognition of the State of Israel. And in October, Egyptian missile boats attacked and sunk Israel's largest warship, the destroyer Eilat, killing nearly 50 people on board Without this renewed violence, perhaps, we in Israel might have been able to consider more deeply the future impli

urprise attacks by Syria and Egypt - armies we'd not just defeated, but humiliated, six years earlier - had pinned down and pushed back our forces on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai. Without any advance call-up, many reservists were only now reaching the front lines. As hundreds of people pressed for seats on the

didn't rein in Arafat's men, Israel would take whatever action necessary. But the decisive moment came on the eighteenth of March. A school bus near Eilat, in the far south of Israel, hit a Fatah landmine, killing the driver and a teacher, and injuring 10 of the children. I was called up the night befor