Epstein Secrets

tebbe, he said that if we couldn’t be reasonably confident of success, we would negotiate. Now that we knew where Waschsman was being held, I ordered Shaul Mofaz, the commander with responsibility for the West Bank, to prepare for a possible rescue. Before going to brief Rabin, I arranged for another commando

n groups grounded not in nationalism, but fundamentalist Islam: Hamas in Gaza, which opposed Israel’s presence on any part of “Muslim Palestine,” and Islamic Jihad on the West Bank. And in Lebanon, we were confronting the Iranian-backed Shi’ ite militia fighters of Hizbollah. Each of us in the small group on wh

s difficult as possible. They were also targeting our local surrogates, the Maronite-led South Lebanese Army militia. I’d been meeting regularly with Shaul Mofaz, the former paratroop officer who 337 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011808 / BARAK / 52 was now chief of staff, to ensure we had a plan to get our troops out as

w if we could, however difficult or reluctant Arafat was as a negotiating partner. If we waited, we’d end up having to deal with Islamists: Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Oded Eran, the career diplomat whom I'd put in charge of frustrating, formal talks with the Palestinians in the months preceding the summit , said h

tebbe, he said that if we couldn't be reasonably confident of success, we would negotiate. Now that we knew where Waschsman was being held, I ordered Shaul Mofaz, the commander with responsibility for the West Bank, to prepare for a possible rescue. Before going to brief Rabin, I arranged for another commando

n groups grounded not in nationalism, but fundamentalist Islam: Hamas in Gaza, which opposed Israel's presence on any part of "Muslim Palestine," and Islamic Jihad on the West Bank. And in Lebanon, we were confronting the Iranian-backed Shi'ite militia fighters of Hizbollah. Each of us in the small group on whom

s difficult as possible. They were also targeting our local surrogates, the Maronite-led South Lebanese Army militia. I'd been meeting regularly with Shaul Mofaz, the former paratroop officer who 337 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028185 / BARAK / 52 was now chief of staff, to ensure we had a plan to get our troops out as

w if we could, however difficult or reluctant Arafat was as a negotiating partner. If we waited, we'd end up having to deal with Islamists: Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Oded Eran, the career diplomat whom I'd put in charge of frustrating, formal talks with the Palestinians in the months preceding the summit, said he