Epstein Secrets

yptians, with the exception of Mr. Chedli Klibi of Tunisia, who assumed the post after the League's headquarters were moved to Tunis upon President Sadat's signing of the Camp David Agreements with Israel. The issue will be a test for Egypt at a time when it is trying to restore its stature as the for

of Minister al-Arabi came after two important decisions were taken by the new ruling Military Council: (1) it allowed two Iranian warships to cross the Suez Canal on their way to Syria; and (2) it permitted Hamas officials to travel though Rafah's crossing, thus reversing President Mubarak's policy on this iss

in an unprecedented phase of strong bilateral cooperation between the two former enemies, but it was also a major cause of the unpopularity of both Sadat and Mubarak. Israel benefited from the cold peace by neutralizing the most powerful conventional force in the Arab world. It even coordinated close

n by peaceful relations -- or less tense relations -- with Iran." Just weeks after the downfall of Mubarak, Egypt allowed Iranian warships to cross the Suez Canal, provoking uproar among Israelis and even Americans. In succeeding months, the diplomatic flirtation between the two countries took an even more i

kers within the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) -- the party created in 1962 to administer the state and serve as a source of power for Nasser -- forced Sadat to accept limits on his own presidential authority. The most important of these was a stipulation that he rule collectively, which meant that he w

om his handpicked minister of war, General Muhammad Sadiq, due to differences over war planning. But after sacking Sadiq and successfully crossing the Suez Canal in 1973, Sadat became his EFTA_R1_00298265 EFTA01883846 own man. From then on, he was able to initiate fundamental changes to Cairo's foreign po

hter jets, Golda contacted the Americans to propose a cease-fire in the south. But having retaken the Suez Canal and pushed into the Sinai, President Sadat was in no mood to call a halt to the fighting. The only way we were going to end the war was to retake the canal and defeat the even larger Egyptian

t of the intelligence base our military engineers had built after the war into a 2,400-feet-high mountain called Gebel Um-Hashiba, 20 miles back from the Suez Canal. When I radioed in to tell him I’d decided to abandon the operation, I could hear the surprise in his voice, and what seemed reluctance as well. “If

ithout an air force capable of breaching our defences and striking towns and cities deep inside Israel. No one pressed the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sin

the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sinai. In the Lebanon war, the inquiry suggested, Yehoshua Saguy did try to warn the generals, and the government, about major ris

hter jets, Golda contacted the Americans to propose a cease-fire in the south. But having retaken the Suez Canal and pushed into the Sinai, President Sadat was in no mood to call a halt to the fighting. The only way we were going to end the war was to retake the canal and defeat the even larger Egyptian

t of the intelligence base our military engineers had built after the war into a 2,400-feet-high mountain called Gebel Um-Hashiba, 20 miles back from the Suez Canal. When I radioed in to tell him I'd decided to abandon the operation, I could hear the surprise in his voice, and what seemed reluctance as well. "If

ithout an air force capable of breaching our defences and striking towns and cities deep inside Israel. No one pressed the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sin

the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sinai. In the Lebanon war, the inquiry suggested, Yehoshua Saguy did try to warn the generals, and the government, about major risk

ly orchestrated by Di. Kissinger, who managed to create enough distance between the Unit- ed States and Israel to allow some negotiating room. Mr. Sadat felt confident enough as the "hero of the crossing" to make his famous trip to Jerusalem. Even the terrorist group of the day, the Palestine Libe

er 1973. That long-ago war, like the cur- rent one in Lebanon. began with an Arab sneak attack — a potentially devastating Egyptian thrust across the Suez Canal, cruelly launched on Israel's holiest day. The Israelis initially fumbled against a surpris- ingly ferocious Arab assault and then recovered thank