Epstein Secrets

he fedayeen in Gaza, but arming and training them and helping organize cross-border attacks. Then, in 38 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011509 the summer of 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which had been owned by the British and French. Ben-Gurion was emboldened to go war by the fact that both Britain and F

point in shooting back. We didn’t need to fight, and it was clear that the Egyptians didn’t really want to. Shortly before dark, Lieutenant-Colonel Eitan brought our column to halt. The road we were on cut through tall sandunes on either side. We knew there 90 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011561 were still Egypti

ns of the Egyptians’ increased anti-aircraft capability — even though we’d begun losing planes and pilots to the new surface-to-air missile batteries Nasser had received from the Soviets. And I 108 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011579 could see that a similar myopia, or denial, was affecting the armored corps. On pat

hem agreed Israel needed a specially trained commando force. But not everyone felt Sayeret Matkal could, or should, take on that role. Rafael “Raful” Eitan was perhaps the most strident. He had fought with the Palmach in 1948. He was an officer in Unit 101 and a commander of the parachutists’ Battalion 8

he fedayeen in Gaza, but arming and training them and helping organize cross-border attacks. Then, in 38 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_027886 the summer of 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which had been owned by the British and French. Ben-Gurion was emboldened to go war by the fact that both Britain and F

e point in shooting back. We didn't need to fight, and it was clear that the Egyptians didn't really want to. Shortly before dark, Lieutenant-Colonel Eitan brought our column to halt. The road we were on cut through tall sandunes on either side. We knew there 90 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_027938 were still Egyptia

ns of the Egyptians' increased anti-aircraft capability - even though we'd begun losing planes and pilots to the new surface-to-air missile batteries Nasser had received from the Soviets. And I 108 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_027956 could see that a similar myopia, or denial, was affecting the armored corps. On pat

hem agreed Israel needed a specially trained commando force. But not everyone felt Sayeret Matkal could, or should, take on that role. Rafael "Raful" Eitan was perhaps the most strident. He had fought with the Palmach in 1948. He was an officer in Unit 101 and a commander of the parachutists' Battalion 8