Epstein Secrets

ill alive?” He looked first at Raful, then at me, and added: “When I was 20 years younger than you are, I never waited for someone like Ben-Gurion or Dayan to ask me to plan an operation. I would plan it! Then I’d take it to them and say, you’re the politicians, you decide, but if you say yes, we'll do i

ted plan — a raid by helicopter into a Fatah-dominated area in southeastern Lebanon, during one of Arafat’s intermittent, morale-boosting visits from Beirut — to assassinate him. My immediate superior, the army’s head of operations, was all for our doing it. But the chief of military intelligence said no.

ns. “A plane has been hijacked,” he said. “It’s heading for Lod. It will land in about 30 minutes. They’ve got hostages. Get to the airport. Dado and Dayan are on their way.” I called Danny Yatom and told him to get whoever was at the sayeret base to Lod as soon as possible. But most of the men were on

te within a state” and deliberately weakening his government. Now, they were doing much the same in Lebanon. Their headquarters buildings in southern Beirut were spawning hiyackings or terror attacks. From bases in southern Lebanon, the Palestinians were also firing Katyusha rockets into Israel. One of t

ndable. I was by no means the only former general to enter Israeli politics. Other chiefs-of-staff had gone on to play prominent roles in government: Dayan, Motta Gur and, of course, Rabin. But the fact that I was going directly into the cabinet, and so soon after leaving the army, was seen by the Israel

d itself in a fierce firefight with the Syrians, and lost eleven men. We were now just three hours from the cease-fire. We did advance nearer to the Beirut-Damascus road. An hour before noon, our dedicated anti-tank unit destroyed 20 of Assad’s top-tier tanks, Soviet-made T-72s. Under different circumsta

ill alive?” He looked first at Raful, then at me, and added: “When I was 20 years younger than you are, I never waited for someone like Ben-Gurion or Dayan to ask me to plan an operation. I would plan it! Then I’d take it to them and say, you’re the politicians, you decide, but if you say yes, we'll do i

ted plan — a raid by helicopter into a Fatah-dominated area in southeastern Lebanon, during one of Arafat’s intermittent, morale-boosting visits from Beirut — to assassinate him. My immediate superior, the army’s head of operations, was all for our doing it. But the chief of military intelligence said no.

ns. "A plane has been hijacked," he said. "It's heading for Lod. It will land in about 30 minutes. They've got hostages. Get to the airport. Dado and Dayan are on their way." I called Danny Yatom and told him to get whoever was at the sayeret base to Lod as soon as possible. But most of the men were on t

te within a state" and deliberately weakening his government. Now, they were doing much the same in Lebanon. Their headquarters buildings in southern Beirut were spawning hijackings or terror attacks. From bases in southern Lebanon, the Palestinians were also firing Katyusha rockets into Israel. One of th

ndable. I was by no means the only former general to enter Israeli politics. Other chiefs-of-staff had gone on to play prominent roles in government: Dayan, Motta Gur and, of course, Rabin. But the fact that I was going directly into the cabinet, and so soon after leaving the army, was seen by the Israel

nd itself in a fierce firefight with the Syrians, and lost eleven men. We were now just three hours from the cease-fire. We did advance nearer to the Beirut-Damascus road. An hour before noon, our dedicated anti-tank unit destroyed 20 of Assad's top-tier tanks, Soviet-made T-72s. Under different circumsta