Epstein Secrets

rd was sober. Huddling with the inner core of my negotiating team — my policy co-ordinator Gilad Sher, security aide Danny Yatom and Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami — I could see that the way the summit ended had hit them hard. It was probably true, as all three often reminded me, that the greatest pressure fell

ded by the Sinai Desert. Militarily, it went to plan. On October 29, 1956, Yigal and other paratroopers from Battalion 890 were dropped deep into the Sinai. They landed near the entrance to the Mitla Pass, a sinuous route between two lines of craggy hills 25 miles from the canal. British and French air s

Yitzhak was always punctilious in not broaching before I’d left the army. Shimon had also taken to including me — usually along with Yossi Beilin and Shlomo Ben-Ami, a bright young historian who would become our ambassador to Spain before entering politics himself — in a coterie of “youngsters” he would bring alo

dat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sinai. In the Lebanon war, the inquiry suggested, Yehoshua Saguy did try to warn the generals, and the government, about major risks. But individual minis

oted, we attended an event for Labor supporters north of Tel Aviv, before flying to Beersheva to spend the final hours in the Negev. I’d arranged for Shlomo Ben-Ami to go to Kiryat Shmona in the north — emphasizing, as throughout the campaign, our determination to broaden our support beyond Labor’s heartland. The

. After all, before Begin and Sadat went to Camp David in 1978, an almost equally tiny minority of Israelos had been in favor of withdrawing from the Sinai. Yet once they had seen the other side of the equation — full, formal peace with our most powerful neighbor — the opposition all but evaporated. The

rd was sober. Huddling with the inner core of my negotiating team — my policy co-ordinator Gilad Sher, security aide Danny Yatom and Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami — I could see that the way the summit ended had hit them hard. It was probably true, as all three often reminded me, that the greatest pressure fell

ded by the Sinai Desert. Militarily, it went to plan. On October 29, 1956, Yigal and other paratroopers from Battalion 890 were dropped deep into the Sinai. They landed near the entrance to the Mitla Pass, a sinuous route between two lines of craggy hills 25 miles from the canal. British and French air s

Yitzhak was always punctilious in not broaching before I'd left the army. Shimon had also taken to including me - usually along with Yossi Beilin and Shlomo Ben-Ami, a bright young historian who would become our ambassador to Spain before entering politics himself - in a coterie of "youngsters" he would bring alo

dat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sinai. In the Lebanon war, the inquiry suggested, Yehoshua Saguy did try to warn the generals, and the government, about major risks. But individual minist

oted, we attended an event for Labor supporters north of Tel Aviv, before flying to Beersheva to spend the final hours in the Negev. I'd arranged for Shlomo Ben-Ami to go to Kiryat Shmona in the north - emphasizing, as throughout the campaign, our determination to broaden our support beyond Labor's heartland. The

. After all, before Begin and Sadat went to Camp David in 1978, an almost equally tiny minority of Israelos had been in favor of withdrawing from the Sinai. Yet once they had seen the other side of the equation - full, formal peace with our most powerful neighbor - the opposition all but evaporated. The