Epstein Secrets

for a Republican. EFTA_R1_02032791 EFTA02691174 Article 3. The National Interest Israel's Rightward Turn Benny Morris July 5, 2011 -- Perhaps Shimon Peres's worst mistake was back in November 1995, when he failed to throw the book at — or even mildly harrass — the coterie of right-wing leaders and rabbi

. For both, a death sentence was seen as apt. Amir later hinted that he had consulted one or more rabbis before embarking on the assassination. But Peres, taking over from Rabin at that chaotic time, failed to move against those who had paved the way for the assassination, and the chance to subordina

essful, it proffers doubtful leverage in his tug of war with Tel Aviv. Although Syria is an independent state, in 44 years it hasn't managed to pry the Golan Heights away from Israel; a Palestinian state is unlikely to do better with the 60 percent of the West Bank that remains under full Israeli control. Legall

he two of us actually met — shortly after the assassination of my longtime comrade and friend Yitzhak Rabin, when I had become Foreign Minister under Shimon Peres. But in the intervening years, Arafat was rarely off of my radar. By the early 1970s, he and his fighters had been expelled by King Hussein’s army fr

, when I had become Foreign Minister under Shimon Peres. But in the intervening years, Arafat was rarely

ldiers crossed the border on an intelligence mission. It had happened in 1954, and it ended in a failure even more serious than Rotem. The target was the Golan Heights, inside Syria. The special technology unit attached to military intelligence had developed a bugging device designed to be placed on a telephone pole

ssment report. Then, we’d join Motta’s operations meeting with the general staff, often attended by the man who’d followed Dayan as defense minister, Shimon Peres. The analysis of military intelligence included separate teams for Egypt and Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, Iraq and other neighboring states, as well a

chute assault off the Israeli coast in Haifa later in the day, but if that went well, it seemed the only practical alternative. Motta and I went met Peres around 8:30am. Shimon had no first-hand military experience, having played a political role alongside Ben-Gurion from Israel’s early years. So he was

urprise attacks by Syria and Egypt — armies we’d not just defeated, but humiliated, six years earlier — had pinned down and pushed back our forces on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai. Without any advance call-up, many reservists were only now reaching the front lines. As hundreds of people pressed for seats on th

July. Just as the trauma of the 1973 war had helped Begin end Likud’s three decades in opposition, the polls and the pundits were now suggesting that Shimon Peres might bring Labor back to power. There was no prospect he’d win an outright majority in the 120-seat Knesset. No one had ever done that, not even Ben

ng being used as our military headquarters in the south Lebanese city of Tyre, killing more than 60 people. Yet the election ended up as a near-tie. Peres did lead Labor back into top spot for the first time since Begin’s victory in 1977. But he got only 44 seats, to the Likud’s 41. After weeks of horse

ade with him. The substance in any agreement, though politically difficult, was also more straightforward. We knew what Assad wanted: the recovery of the Golan Heights, in return for the absolute minimum level of political normalization with Israel. We knew what we wanted: security guarantees and assurances regardin

e on a unity government. To my amusement, if not altogether to my surprise, I got word that Bibi was putting out separate political feelers to Shimon Peres. But before long, it became clear there was a specific political motivation behind his approaching me. It was indeed the peace process. But it wasn’t

Israel... A short time ago, I spoke with Prime Minister Netanyahu and thanked him for his service to the State of Israel.” Then — with both Leah and Shimon Peres at my side — I paid tribute to “that one special person who had a unique role in our reaching this moment — somebody who was my commander and guide,

so wanted my assessment about whether the army could work out arrangements to safeguard the country’s security if we handed back most, if not all, of the Golan Heights. If so, what kind of security arrangements, with what timeline? We met through the summer, as the 301 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011772 / BARAK / 16 talks wi

he two of us actually met — shortly after the assassination of my longtime comrade and friend Yitzhak Rabin, when I had become Foreign Minister under Shimon Peres. But in the intervening years, Arafat was rarely off of my radar. By the early 1970s, he and his fighters had been expelled by King Hussein’s army fr

, when I had become Foreign Minister under Shimon Peres. But in the intervening years, Arafat was rarely

ldiers crossed the border on an intelligence mission. It had happened in 1954, and it ended in a failure even more serious than Rotem. The target was the Golan Heights, inside Syria. The special technology unit attached to military intelligence had developed a bugging device designed to be placed on a telephone pole

ssment report. Then, we'd join Motta's operations meeting with the general staff, often attended by the man who'd followed Dayan as defense minister, Shimon Peres. The analysis of military intelligence included separate teams for Egypt and Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, Iraq and other neighboring states, as well as

achute assault off the Israeli coast in Haifa later in the day, but if that went well, it seemed the only practical alternative. Motta and I went met Peres around 8:30am. Shimon had no first-hand military experience, having played a political role alongside Ben-Gurion from Israel's early years. So he was

urprise attacks by Syria and Egypt - armies we'd not just defeated, but humiliated, six years earlier - had pinned down and pushed back our forces on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai. Without any advance call-up, many reservists were only now reaching the front lines. As hundreds of people pressed for seats on the

July. Just as the trauma of the 1973 war had helped Begin end Likud's three decades in opposition, the polls and the pundits were now suggesting that Shimon Peres might bring Labor back to power. There was no prospect he'd win an outright majority in the 120-seat Knesset. No one had ever done that, not even Ben

ing being used as our military headquarters in the south Lebanese city of Tyre, killing more than 60 people. Yet the election ended up as a near-tie. Peres did lead Labor back into top spot for the first time since Begin's victory in 1977. But he got only 44 seats, to the Likud's 41. After weeks of horse

ade with him. The substance in any agreement, though politically difficult, was also more straightforward. We knew what Assad wanted: the recovery of the Golan Heights, in return for the absolute minimum level of political normalization with Israel. We knew what we wanted: security guarantees and assurances regardin

e on a unity government. To my amusement, if not altogether to my surprise, I got word that Bibi was putting out separate political feelers to Shimon Peres. But before long, it became clear there was a specific political motivation behind his approaching me. It was indeed the peace process. But it wasn't

Israel... A short time ago, I spoke with Prime Minister Netanyahu and thanked him for his service to the State of Israel." Then - with both Leah and Shimon Peres at my side - I paid tribute to "that one special person who had a unique role in our reaching this moment - somebody who was my commander and guide,

so wanted my assessment about whether the army could work out arrangements to safeguard the country's security if we handed back most, if not all, of the Golan Heights. If so, what kind of security arrangements, with what timeline? We met through the summer, as the 301 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028149 / BARAK / 16 talks with

the Sinai peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and about 1,150 square kilometres of Syrian territory on the Golan Heights. 1 September 1967 Khartoum Resolution of the three ‘Noes’. 22 November 1967 UN Security Council Resolution 242. 21 March 1968 The battle of Karame

in Oslo, and develop into full-scale official negotiations in May that year. Secret signing of the Oslo Accords in Oslo by Israeli Foreign Minister Peres, Palestinian Chief Negotiator Qorei and Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst. Israel and the PLO exchange letters of recognition. Signature of the Decl

nt on the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Oslo II. 31 October 1995 Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement. 4 November 1995 Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin assassinated. Shimon Peres becomes Prime Minister. 20 January 1996 Yasir Arafat is elected president of the Palestinian Authority (PA). 25 February- 4 March 1996 A series of