Epstein Secrets

for a Republican. EFTA_R1_02032791 EFTA02691174 Article 3. The National Interest Israel's Rightward Turn Benny Morris July 5, 2011 -- Perhaps Shimon Peres's worst mistake was back in November 1995, when he failed to throw the book at — or even mildly harrass — the coterie of right-wing leaders and rabbi

. For both, a death sentence was seen as apt. Amir later hinted that he had consulted one or more rabbis before embarking on the assassination. But Peres, taking over from Rabin at that chaotic time, failed to move against those who had paved the way for the assassination, and the chance to subordina

197 36 (first a victim at age six) in the campaign against female genital mutilation, her eminence had won her international notice. Then by the Sadat regime she was dismissed from her fourteen-year job in the Ministry of Health. When she wrote a memoir about her time in jail, she began it using a

ssment report. Then, we’d join Motta’s operations meeting with the general staff, often attended by the man who’d followed Dayan as defense minister, Shimon Peres. The analysis of military intelligence included separate teams for Egypt and Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, Iraq and other neighboring states, as well a

chute assault off the Israeli coast in Haifa later in the day, but if that went well, it seemed the only practical alternative. Motta and I went met Peres around 8:30am. Shimon had no first-hand military experience, having played a political role alongside Ben-Gurion from Israel’s early years. So he was

hter jets, Golda contacted the Americans to propose a cease-fire in the south. But having retaken the Suez Canal and pushed into the Sinai, President Sadat was in no mood to call a halt to the fighting. The only way we were going to end the war was to retake the canal and defeat the even larger Egyptian

July. Just as the trauma of the 1973 war had helped Begin end Likud’s three decades in opposition, the polls and the pundits were now suggesting that Shimon Peres might bring Labor back to power. There was no prospect he’d win an outright majority in the 120-seat Knesset. No one had ever done that, not even Ben

ng being used as our military headquarters in the south Lebanese city of Tyre, killing more than 60 people. Yet the election ended up as a near-tie. Peres did lead Labor back into top spot for the first time since Begin’s victory in 1977. But he got only 44 seats, to the Likud’s 41. After weeks of horse

ithout an air force capable of breaching our defences and striking towns and cities deep inside Israel. No one pressed the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sin

e on a unity government. To my amusement, if not altogether to my surprise, I got word that Bibi was putting out separate political feelers to Shimon Peres. But before long, it became clear there was a specific political motivation behind his approaching me. It was indeed the peace process. But it wasn’t

Israel... A short time ago, I spoke with Prime Minister Netanyahu and thanked him for his service to the State of Israel.” Then — with both Leah and Shimon Peres at my side — I paid tribute to “that one special person who had a unique role in our reaching this moment — somebody who was my commander and guide,

were not willing or ready to make peace. We might, initially at least, have to settle for a more incremental step. “Right here in Camp David, Begin, Sadat and Carter couldn’t complete the process,” I pointed out. “They signed a “framework agreement’ and it took months of further diplomacy to reach a pea

ssment report. Then, we'd join Motta's operations meeting with the general staff, often attended by the man who'd followed Dayan as defense minister, Shimon Peres. The analysis of military intelligence included separate teams for Egypt and Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, Iraq and other neighboring states, as well as

achute assault off the Israeli coast in Haifa later in the day, but if that went well, it seemed the only practical alternative. Motta and I went met Peres around 8:30am. Shimon had no first-hand military experience, having played a political role alongside Ben-Gurion from Israel's early years. So he was

hter jets, Golda contacted the Americans to propose a cease-fire in the south. But having retaken the Suez Canal and pushed into the Sinai, President Sadat was in no mood to call a halt to the fighting. The only way we were going to end the war was to retake the canal and defeat the even larger Egyptian

July. Just as the trauma of the 1973 war had helped Begin end Likud's three decades in opposition, the polls and the pundits were now suggesting that Shimon Peres might bring Labor back to power. There was no prospect he'd win an outright majority in the 120-seat Knesset. No one had ever done that, not even Ben

ing being used as our military headquarters in the south Lebanese city of Tyre, killing more than 60 people. Yet the election ended up as a near-tie. Peres did lead Labor back into top spot for the first time since Begin's victory in 1977. But he got only 44 seats, to the Likud's 41. After weeks of horse

ithout an air force capable of breaching our defences and striking towns and cities deep inside Israel. No one pressed the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sin

e on a unity government. To my amusement, if not altogether to my surprise, I got word that Bibi was putting out separate political feelers to Shimon Peres. But before long, it became clear there was a specific political motivation behind his approaching me. It was indeed the peace process. But it wasn't

Israel... A short time ago, I spoke with Prime Minister Netanyahu and thanked him for his service to the State of Israel." Then - with both Leah and Shimon Peres at my side - I paid tribute to "that one special person who had a unique role in our reaching this moment - somebody who was my commander and guide,

were not willing or ready to make peace. We might, initially at least, have to settle for a more incremental step. "Right here in Camp David, Begin, Sadat and Carter couldn't complete the process," I pointed out. "They signed a "framework agreement' and it took months of further diplomacy to reach a pea

e Palestinians is the root of all the troubles in the Middle East — the original sin! - I say: this is not true! Even if I, in 2000 (or Rabin and Peres in 1994 or Olmert in 2008), were to have reached a peace treaty with the Palestinians — which would have been implemented a long time ago the "M

. Secular and religious. Rich and poor. Center and periphery. Old and new. This is dangerous. The late Tunisian President Bourguiba (and later on Sadat in his debates with Assad just before the peace treaty with Israel) made the argument that there's no need to defeat Israel by force. Give them t

moved to Tunis. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023152 --- PAGE BREAK --- OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi Chronology xxi 10 December 1978 President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin are awarded jointly in Oslo the Nobel Peace Prize. 16 January 1979 Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi leaves Iran after months of do

in Oslo, and develop into full-scale official negotiations in May that year. Secret signing of the Oslo Accords in Oslo by Israeli Foreign Minister Peres, Palestinian Chief Negotiator Qorei and Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst. Israel and the PLO exchange letters of recognition. Signature of the Decl

nt on the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Oslo II. 31 October 1995 Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement. 4 November 1995 Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin assassinated. Shimon Peres becomes Prime Minister. 20 January 1996 Yasir Arafat is elected president of the Palestinian Authority (PA). 25 February- 4 March 1996 A series of

h the Palestinians is the root of all the troubles in the Middle East - the original sin! - I say: this is not true! Even if I, in 2000 (or Rabin and Peres in 1994 or Olmert in 2008), were to have reached a peace treaty with the Palestinians - which would have been implemented a long time ago the "Muslim

rabs. Secular and religious. Rich and poor. Center and periphery. Old and new. This is dangerous. The late Tunisian President Bourguiba (and later on Sadat in his debates with Assad just before the peace treaty with Israel) made the argument that there's no need to defeat Israel by force. Give them the o