Epstein Secrets

he two of us actually met — shortly after the assassination of my longtime comrade and friend Yitzhak Rabin, when I had become Foreign Minister under Shimon Peres. But in the intervening years, Arafat was rarely off of my radar. By the early 1970s, he and his fighters had been expelled by King Hussein’s army fr

, when I had become Foreign Minister under Shimon Peres. But in the intervening years, Arafat was rarely

to get the top job. He was already Head of Operations. In practical terms, that made him the number-two man in the armed forces. But the job went to Tzvi Tzur, Laskov’s deputy. Amit decided to accept 62 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011533 the post of Head of Military Intelligence. He knew the importance of intelligenc

ssment report. Then, we’d join Motta’s operations meeting with the general staff, often attended by the man who’d followed Dayan as defense minister, Shimon Peres. The analysis of military intelligence included separate teams for Egypt and Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, Iraq and other neighboring states, as well a

chute assault off the Israeli coast in Haifa later in the day, but if that went well, it seemed the only practical alternative. Motta and I went met Peres around 8:30am. Shimon had no first-hand military experience, having played a political role alongside Ben-Gurion from Israel’s early years. So he was

ered hello. Ina way, his arrival reminded me of my first operation in the sayeret when, before heading north to the Golan, I'd been summoned to brief Tzvi Tzur, the chief of staff. Tzur had seemed less interested in the details than in confirming that / was confident the mission would work. Dayan, of course,

he two of us actually met — shortly after the assassination of my longtime comrade and friend Yitzhak Rabin, when I had become Foreign Minister under Shimon Peres. But in the intervening years, Arafat was rarely off of my radar. By the early 1970s, he and his fighters had been expelled by King Hussein’s army fr

, when I had become Foreign Minister under Shimon Peres. But in the intervening years, Arafat was rarely

to get the top job. He was already Head of Operations. In practical terms, that made him the number-two man in the armed forces. But the job went to Tzvi Tzur, Laskov’s deputy. Amit decided to accept 62 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_027910 the post of Head of Military Intelligence. He knew the importance of intelligenc

ssment report. Then, we'd join Motta's operations meeting with the general staff, often attended by the man who'd followed Dayan as defense minister, Shimon Peres. The analysis of military intelligence included separate teams for Egypt and Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, Iraq and other neighboring states, as well as

achute assault off the Israeli coast in Haifa later in the day, but if that went well, it seemed the only practical alternative. Motta and I went met Peres around 8:30am. Shimon had no first-hand military experience, having played a political role alongside Ben-Gurion from Israel's early years. So he was

red hello. In a way, his arrival reminded me of my first operation in the sayeret when, before heading north to the Golan, I'd been summoned to brief Tzvi Tzur, the chief of staff. Tzur had seemed less interested in the details than in confirming that I was confident the mission would work. Dayan, of course,