Epstein Secrets

however, is not only to legitimate Iran's quest for nuclear weapons but also accelerate it. That's precisely what happened when the Israelis struck Saddam Hussein's plutonium reactors in 1981. And the Israelis know that, too. 3. Let America do it What the Israelis really want is to persuade the United States t

precisely what happened when the Israelis struck Saddam Hussein's plutonium reactors in 1981. And the Is

ly what happened when the Israelis struck Saddam Hussein's plutonium reactors in 1981. And the Israelis kn

endorsed Netanyahu and chided President Obama for taking an independent U.S. position, saying at a campaign rally Monday: "The president throwing Bibi Netanyahu under the bus was totally unacceptable. Him negotiating for Israel, our friend, totally unacceptable, in my view." Here's the situation in the neg

pecially the US. Under Begin, we'd already bombed Saddam Hussein's nuclear reactor without telling the Ame

ady to carry out. Several of the most complex centered on the new threat posed by Palestinian groups in Lebanon. Before the civil war in Jordan, King Hussein had accused Fatah, the PFLP and the equally militant Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine of trying to create "a state within a state" an

nments had always calculated that we needed at least some measure of support from foreign allies, especially the US. Under Begin, we'd already bombed Saddam Hussein's nuclear reactor without telling the Americans beforehand. Shortly after I returned to the kirya, he provoked further anger in Washington by announcin

kest way in. I planned to command the operation from the left of the aircraft, because both the front and tail doors also faced that way. I entrusted Bibi Netanyahu and his team with breaking in through the main wing door on the far side of the plane. By noon, we got a further boost. With the resumption of incomi

1981, when we'd launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein's 402 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028250 / BARAK /

hen we'd launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein's 402 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028250 / BARAK / 117 reac

s arrived on site and it could begin producing bomb-ready material. Just as under Menachem Begin in 1981, when we'd launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein's 402 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028250 / BARAK / 117 reactor near Baghdad, there was never any question that we would take any and all possible measures to pre

also ran the risk of our soldiers being abducted, or killed. Pressure was building for a major military operation. With the election drawing nearer, Bibi Netanyahu was reminding voters that he'd been against the pullout from Gaza, and saying that we should now hit Hamas hard. Both Olmert and Tzipi, along with mo

might not present a conventional threat. Yet while I’d been with my tank company in the Sinai, they were fighting a full-scale civil war against King Hussein’s army in Jordan. The catalyst: a multiple hijacking in September 1970, a sign that they were turning to non-conventional warfare, and to acts of ter

nments had always calculated that we needed at least some measure of support from foreign allies, especially the US. Under Begin, we'd already bombed Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactor without telling the Americans beforehand. Shortly after I returned to the kirya, he provoked further anger in Washington by announcin

pecially the US. Under Begin, we'd already bombed Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactor without telling the Ame

kest way in. I planned to command the operation from the left of the aircraft, because both the front and tail doors also faced that way. I entrusted Bibi Netanyahu and his team with breaking in through the main wing door on the far side of the plane. By noon, we got a further boost. With the resumption of incom

reports in the weeks after the training accident made secrecy impossible. We were planning to infiltrate a Sayeret Matkal unit into Iraq, and to kill Saddam Hussein. The Gulf War had blunted any immediate threat from Iraq. But Saddam had proven he could launch missiles into the heart of Israel. We knew from our

urate at long range. But they could reach Israeli towns and cities, and could carry not just conventional explosives but chemical warheads. Moreover, Saddam had used chemical weapons: during the Iran-Iraq war, and to kill thousands of his own restive Kurdish population in the town of Halabja in the spring

t reminded me of how my father had spoken to me when I was growing up — minus the “well-off family” part. 232 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011703 When we got to Hussein’s country home, we were greeted by an impressively self-assured man in his late 20s who, like Hussein, had studied at Britain’s military academy in S

nsky acolyte — had recently taken his first steps into the political limelight. After a two-year stint as Israel’s number-two diplomat in Washington, Bibi Netanyahu had become our ambassador to the United Nations. With both Arens and Shamir, I built a solid relationship, based on mutual respect, and it would dee

s arrived on site and it could begin producing bomb-ready material. Just as under Menachem Begin in 1981, when we’d launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein’s 402 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011873 / BARAK / 117 reactor near Baghdad, there was never any question that we would take any and all possible measures to pr

1981, when we’d launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein’s 402 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011873 / BARAK /

hen we’d launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein’s 402 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011873 / BARAK / 117 rea

also ran the risk of our soldiers being abducted, or killed. Pressure was building for a major military operation. With the election drawing nearer, Bibi Netanyahu was reminding voters that he’d been against the pullout from Gaza, and saying that we should now hit Hamas hard. Both Olmert and Tzipi, along with mo

reports in the weeks after the training accident made secrecy impossible. We were planning to infiltrate a Sayeret Matkal unit into Iraq, and to kill Saddam Hussein. The Gulf War had blunted any immediate threat from Iraq. But Saddam had proven he could launch missiles into the heart of Israel. We knew from our i

urate at long range. But they could reach Israeli towns and cities, and could carry not just conventional explosives but chemical warheads. Moreover, Saddam had used chemical weapons: during the Iran-Iraq war, and to kill thousands of his own restive Kurdish population in the town of Halabja in the spring

t reminded me of how my father had spoken to me when I was growing up - minus the "well-off family" part. 232 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028080 When we got to Hussein's country home, we were greeted by an impressively self-assured man in his late 20s who, like Hussein, had studied at Britain's military academy in S

nsky acolyte - had recently taken his first steps into the political limelight. After a two-year stint as Israel's number-two diplomat in Washington, Bibi Netanyahu had become our ambassador to the United Nations. With both Arens and Shamir, I built a solid relationship, based on mutual respect, and it would deep

0s, he and his fighters had been expelled by King Hussein’s army from Jordan and were re-based in Lebanon.

e, four years later with a force of nearly two dozen Matkal commandos. The shooting was over within 90 seconds. One of my men —a junior officer named Bibi Netanyahu — was wounded. By one of our own bullets. But we managed to kill two of the heavily armed hijackers, capture the others, and free all 90 passengers u

0s, he and his fighters had been expelled by King Hussein’s army from Jordan and were re-based in Lebanon.

e, four years later with a force of nearly two dozen Matkal commandos. The shooting was over within 90 seconds. One of my men —a junior officer named Bibi Netanyahu — was wounded. By one of our own bullets. But we managed to kill two of the heavily armed hijackers, capture the others, and free all 90 passengers u