Epstein Secrets

-cv-80119-KAM Document 149 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/09/2009 Page 7 of 13 Doe 101 v. Epstein Page? must be shown with specificity. See Doe v. Evans, 202 F.R.D. 173, 176 (E.D. P.A. 2001). Thus, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of persuasion. Id. Plaintiffs fail to show good cause in that the

ication poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting party or even more critically, to innocent non-parties. Doe. No. 2 v. Kolko, 242 F.R.D. 193, 195-98 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), citing, Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule l0(a), 28 U.S.C.A. Further, Plaintiffs cite cases wherein a psychologist o

vate Jewish school when he was a child, was entitled to proceed anonymously because he feared retaliation and ostracism from his community); Doe v. Evans, 202 F.R.D. 173, 176 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (sexual assault victim granted use of pseudonym); Doe v. Smith, 105 F. Supp. 2d 40, 44 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (victim

hough some Plaintiffs no longer live in the Palm Beach area, this should not undermine Plaintiffs’ need for anonymity. As the Court in Doe No. 2 v. Kolko, 242 F.R.D. 193, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (internal citation omitted), points out, “[I]t is now possible to ‘determine whether a given individual is a pa

e deterred from reporting such crimes. See Doe v. Evans, 202 F.R.D. 173, 176 (E.D.Pa.2001) (granting ano

ntitled to a grant of anonymity. See Doe No. 2 v. Kolko, 242 F.R.D. 193 (E.D. N.Y. 2006); Doe v. Blue Cr

ong interest in protecting the identities of sexual assault victims so that other victims will not be deterred from reporting such crimes. See Doe', Evans, 202 F.R.D. 173, 176 (E.D.Pa.2001) (granting anonymity to sexual assault victim); Doe No. 2I Kolko, 242 F.R.D. 193 (E.D. N.Y. 2006). That is partic

Co., 123 F.R.D. 437, 439 (S.D.N.Y.1988). Sexual assault victims are a paradigmatic example of those entitled to a grant of anonymity. See Doe No. 21 Kolko, 242 F.R.D. 193 (E.D. N.Y. 2006); Doe'. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisc., 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir.1997) ("fictitious names are allowed w