Epstein Secrets

here is no support for CEOS's view that the courts or a jury should ultimately decide whether a "novel" construction of the law is correct. Instead, the Executive Branch itself has a non-delegable obligation not to exceed its authority; the power of other branches to check or remedy such usurpation does not legitimi

A00209852 KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP Congress to speak more clearly and keeps courts from making criminal law in Congress's stead." Slip op. at 6.I In Cuellar, the Court examined the link between the money-laundering statute's mens rea requirement and the underlying elements of the offense. After a careful

o Suprems Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen'. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

here is no support for CEOS's view that the courts or a jury should ultimately decide whether a "novel" construction of the law is correct. Instead, the Executive Branch itself has a non-delegable obligation not to exceed its authority; the power of other branches to check or remedy such usurpation does not legitimi

sufficient—cannot survive either a "plain language" test or the rule of lenity as they have been authoritatively construed in the recent Santos and Cuellar cases. The statute cannot be read otherwise. As the Cuellar decision makes clear, a proper interpretation of a federal criminal statute is guided "

upreme Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

here is no support for CEOS's view that the courts or a jury should ultimately decide whether a "novel" construction of the law is correct. Instead, the Executive Branch itself has a non-delegable obligation not to exceed its authority; the power of other branches to check or remedy such usurpation does not legitimi

it is not in accord with the principles of justice. Indeed, as noted, just a few weeks ago, the Supreme Court underscored this point in Santos and Cuellar. The Court made clear that prosecutorial discretion does not provide the USAO cart blanche to expand criminal statutes as they seek to do here with

upreme Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

d not be countenanced. That is all the more true under the circumstances where the duly appointed U.S. Attorney opined that, in effect, the “unitary” Executive Branch was driving this prosecution. We now know that is not so. What I respectfully request, and what I hope you will provide, is a truly “de novo” review

to the facts in this case. Importantly, we note that the CEOS review was conducted prior to the Supreme Court’s very recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar, which we believe—illuminating as they do the Court’s interpretive methodology when it comes to federal criminal law—powerfully demonstrate the subst

to the facts in this case. Importantly, we note that the CEOS review was conducted prior to the Supreme Court’s very recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar, which we believe—illuminating as they do the Court’s interpretive methodology when it comes to federal criminal law—powerfully demonstrate the subst

There is no support for CEOS’s view that the courts or a jury should ultimately decide whether a “novel” construction of the law is correct. Instead, the Executive Branch itself has a non-delegable obligation not to exceed its authority; the power of other branches to check or remedy such usurpation does not legitimize

e shown that Mr. Epstein violated any of the three federal statutes identified by prosecutors. As the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar make clear, federal law may not be stretched in that manner, and the current federal investigation relies, as its foundation, on impermissibly elas

here is no support for CEOS's view that the courts or a jury should ultimately decide whether a "novel" construction of the law is correct. Instead, the Executive Branch itself has a non-delegable obligation not to exceed its authority; the power of other branches to check or remedy such usurpation does not legitimi