Renter | GOVERNMENT ETHICS Year (Annual Report only): i el * Date of Appointment/Termination: January 20, 2017 Preventing Conflicts of Interest in the Executive Branch Executive Branch Personnel Public Financial Disclosure Report (OGE Form 278¢e) iler's Information ast Name First Name Agency Trump President of t

d not be countenanced. That is all the more true under the circumstances where the duly appointed U.S. Attorney opined that, in effect, the “unitary” Executive Branch was driving this prosecution. We now know that is not so. What I respectfully request, and what I hope you will provide, is a truly “de novo” review

There is no support for CEOS’s view that the courts or a jury should ultimately decide whether a “novel” construction of the law is correct. Instead, the Executive Branch itself has a non-delegable obligation not to exceed its authority; the power of other branches to check or remedy such usurpation does not legitimize

regard this provision as legally binding would impair the Executive's constitutional role and would constitute an abdication of the responsibility of the Executive Branch." Id. at 734. It should be noted that the legislation in question was pending in Congress, and the possibility that President Carter would sign the l

n features of the new Rule. This is the second of three rounds of guidance to be pub- lished by the DOL prior to the effective date of the new Rule. The Executive Branch also issued responses to the Rule on January 20, 2017. The White House issued a Memorandum from Reince Priebus to the heads of the executive departme

s by which problems and conflicts associated with such acts could be resolved. Id.; see also S. Rev. No. 105-277, at 2 (1998) (describing efforts by Executive Branch to encourage U.S. trading partners to enact legislation similar to FCPA following 1988 amendments) [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 105-277]. ! Convention on

terrorism, which basic principles of customary international law, a considerable range of judicial decisions, and the determinations of Congress and the Executive Branch all establish as acts that violate international law for purposes of establishing an ATS claim. While plaintiffs perhaps did not adequately allege a

methods and national defense. See, e.g., Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988). In order to facilitate appropriate congressional oversight, the Executive Branch may entrust classified information to the appropriate committees of Congress, as it has done in connection with the Committee’s oversight activities

tion, it could con- sider whether allowing the lawsuit would jeopardize the organization's ability to carry out its public interest tasks. In a word, the Executive Branch, under a static interpre- tation, would have the authority needed to separate law- suit sheep from lawsuit goats. Under the majority's interpretation

owers of the [United States attorneys] in their control over criminal prosecutions."). The decision whether to prosecute Epstein lies solely within the Executive Branch, and any order today, by this Court, as to what the government must do in the future would be wholly inappropriate. 26 EFTA00010567 --- PAGE BR

here is no support for CEOS's view that the courts or a jury should ultimately decide whether a "novel" construction of the law is correct. Instead, the Executive Branch itself has a non-delegable obligation not to exceed its authority; the power of other branches to check or remedy such usurpation does not legitimi

to materials within prosecutors' possession, custody or control or, in appropriate cases, that of the Department of Justice, perhaps another part of the Executive Branch, or a comparable state authority involved in the federal prosecution.' (quoting United States v. Blaszczak, 308 F. Supp. 3d 736, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 2018