Epstein Secrets

air the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction"); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 807 (11th Cir. 2000). Thus, the only real purpose in seeking the plea negotiations is to offer them in evidence against M

orts because "[a]bsent complete and honest reports, effective accident evaluation may be impaired and the prevention of future accidents hampered." Southern Railway Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 131 (5th Cir.1968). H. THE COMMON LAW MEDIATION PRIVILEGE It seems self-evident that no system of mediation can function

titled to discovery or use of the plea negotiations because plea negotiations enjoy an evidentiary privilege, as recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995). Additionally, because plea negotiations are rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust, and because

eports because (a)bsent complete and honest reports, effective accident evaluation may be impaired and the prevention of future accidents hampered. Southern Railway Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 131 (5th Cir.1968). H. The Common Law Mediation Privilege It seems self-evident that no system of mediation can function

General or any officer under his direction." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). The Act codifies the long-standing principle that "[t]he Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad discretion to enforce the Nation's criminal laws." United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). This is due in large

orts because "[a]bsent complete and honest reports, effective accident evaluation may be impaired and the prevention of future accidents hampered." Southern Railway Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 131 (5th Cir.1968). H. THE COMMON LAW MEDIATION PRIVILEGE It seems self-evident that no system of mediation can function