so then- Chief Judge McMahon heard the Government's ex parte application. In a hearing on March 26, 2019, Judge McMahon explained that she believed the Second Circuit's decision in Martindell v. International Telephone & Telegraph Coip., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979), governed the Government's application. Martindell

ns to the memorandum decision, order, and transcripts. Any proposed redactions shall be narrowly tailored and shall be supported with reference to the Second Circuit's opinion in Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). The parties' proposed redactions should not include any information that

so then- Chief Judge McMahon heard the Government's ex parte application. In a hearing on March 26, 2019, Judge McMahon explained that she believed the Second Circuit's decision in Martindell v. International Telephone & Telegraph Coip., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979), governed the Government's application. Martindell

y communications about how to interact with the public may be subject to the deliberative process privilege and concluding, including by relying on the Second Circuit's decision in ACLU, 844 F.3d at 133, that "[a's long as communications are pre-decisional and deliberative, internal agency communications about publ

jections to unsealing. Maxwell's objections are inconsistent with the Court's May I, 2020 Order, the presumption of public access to documents, and the Second Circuit's instructions when it remanded this matter nearly a year ago. Further, Maxwell's objections are extraordinarily general and vague, and cannot defeat

re "unjustified obstacles" or that the public will never have access to these documents -- reflect unjustified criticisms of the Protocol itself and the Second Circuit's decision in Brown, both of which fairly outline the legal process for parties and Non-Parties alike to be heard with respect to unsealing. Notably,

19) (emphasis supplied; footnote omitted; quoting United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Amodeo r')). Amodeo I, the inception of the Second Circuit's principle that a file stamp is not a judicial-document talisman, is instructive. There an appointed Court Officer tasked parties; DE 204-1 referenc

y communications about how to interact with the public may be subject to the deliberative process privilege and concluding, including by relying on the Second Circuit's decision in ACLU, 844 F.3d at 133, that "[a's long as communications are pre-decisional and deliberative, internal agency communications about publ

Cr. 330 (AJN) (the "Criminal Action"). The information implicates Ms. Maxwell's right to due process and fairness in this civil action and affects the Second Circuit's review of the Court's unsealing order of July 23, 2020. Additionally, the information implicates her rights as a criminal defendant guaranteed unde

0 Cr. 330 (MN) (the "Criminal Action"). The information implicates Ms. Maxwell's right to due process and fairness in this civil action and affects the Second Circuit's review of the Court's unsealing order of July 23, 2020. Additionally, the information implicates her rights as a criminal defendant guaranteed unde

ff in the New York State Office of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority Inspector General. Milton was the longest-serving circuit executive in the Second Circuit's history and the first woman to hold the post. A 2001 graduate of New York University School of Law, Jordan began his legal career as clerk to Circu

Messages involving the defendant. Portions of this document were redacted and released by the Second Circuit. So whatever happened with respect to the Second Circuit's release, we will abide by its ruling. 339. Response in opposition to the motion to compel. Unseal and redact the names, identifying information, a

e Court will permit the parties 48 hours to propose any redactions to the Court's Opinion and Order and to justify those redactions by reference to the Second Circuit's decision in Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110(2d Cir. 2006). After determining which, if any, portions of the Opinion and Order shoul

0 Cr. 330 (MN) (the "Criminal Action"). The information implicates Ms. Maxwell's right to due process and fairness in this civil action and affects the Second Circuit's review of the Court's unsealing order of July 23, 2020. Additionally, the information implicates her rights as a criminal defendant guaranteed unde

ation, but you can hear it in the questioning, you can read it in the press reports, you can intuit it from the order. I don't know if you've seen the Second Circuit's order that issued last week, but -- MR. : I have, your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. You can intuit that something kind of unfavorable to Judge Sweet i

ns to the memorandum decision, order, and transcripts. Any proposed redactions shall be narrowly tailored and shall be supported with reference to the Second Circuit's opinion in Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). The parties' proposed redactions should not include any information that

so then- Chief Judge McMahon heard the Government's ex parte application. In a hearing on March 26, 2019, Judge McMahon explained that she believed the Second Circuit's decision in Martindell v. International Telephone & Telegraph Coip., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979), governed the Government's application. Martindell

so then- Chief Judge McMahon heard the Government's ex parte application. In a hearing on March 26, 2019, Judge McMahon explained that she believed the Second Circuit's decision in Martindell v. International Telephone & Telegraph Coip., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979), governed the Government's application. Martindell

y communications about how to interact with the public may be subject to the deliberative process privilege and concluding, including by relying on the Second Circuit's decision in ACLU, 844 F.3d at 133, that "[a's long as communications are pre-decisional and deliberative, internal agency communications about publ

t offer "testimony regarding any specific victim." Dkt. No. 386 at 3. The Defense has the law backwards on this point. As explained above regarding the Second Circuit's Nimely decision, an expert may not testify as to a specific witness's credibility. 414 F.3d at 398. And as other courts have explained in admitting