Epstein Secrets

conviction to determine the present punishment or immigration consequences would encounter logistical and constitutional obstacles. Id. (noting an Apprendi problem and "daunting practical difficulties and potential unfairness"). None of those concerns is present here, where the relevant facts will be p

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's reliance on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C

conviction to determine the present punishment or immigration consequences would encounter logistical and constitutional obstacles. Id. (noting an Apprendi problem and "daunting practical difficulties and potential unfairness"). None of those concerns is present here, where the relevant facts will be p

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's reliance on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C

r conviction to determine the present punishment or immigration consequence would encounter logistical and constitutional obstacles. Id. (noting an Apprendi problem and "daunting practical difficulties and potential unfairness"). None of those concerns are present here, where the relevant facts will be

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's relianTI on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C

conviction to determine the present punishment or immigration consequences would encounter logistical and constitutional obstacles. Id. (noting an Apprendi problem and "daunting practical difficulties and potential unfairness"). None of those concerns is present here, where the relevant facts will be p

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's reliance on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C