Epstein Secrets

Even if the act of production were testimonial for purposes of Doe , production can be refused only if the act of production also is incriminating . Butcher , 753 F.2d at 469-70. In other words, the act of authentication is incriminating only if the documents are incriminating. As explained above, Epstei

s or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn v. United States , 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over factual matters. The Co

Even if the act of production were testimonial for purposes of Doe , production can be refused only if the act of production also is incriminating . Butcher , 753 F.2d at 469-70. In other words, the act of authentication is incriminating only if the documents are incriminating. As explained above, Epstei

s or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn I United States , 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over factual matters. The Cou

Even if the act of production were testimonial for purposes ofDoe, production can be refused only if the act of production also is incriminating. Butcher, 753 F.2d at 469-70. In other words, the act of authentication is incriminating only if the documents are incriminating. As explained above, Epstei

or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an -18- EFTA00179117 attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over fact