Epstein Secrets

uring her deposition. In fact, the Second Circuit squarely addressed and rejected the argument Maxwell currently makes in Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). In Lugosch, "[t]he district court suggested that [a] 10 EFTA00075037 CasqaPIRWM43P4AlaleDiggrfieAnag041401§/234,26a

RCC/MHD, 2006 WL 3016311 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2006) 5 In re Pannalat Sec. Litig., 258 F.R.D. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) passim Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006) 10, 11, 12 Lytle v. JPMorgan Chase, 810 F. Supp. 2d 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) passim Martindell v. Intl Tel. & Tel. Cor

[B]road allegations of harm unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning fail to satisfy the test." In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 258 F.R.D. at 244; see also Tr. of Jan. 16, 2020 Conf. at 7:9-12, 21-23 ("[W]hat we are looking for from you is a specific Plaintiff is cognizant of the Court

igation" did "not lend itself to reasonable reliance that [the Protective Order] will afford permanent secrecy." See also Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006), where, in view of a provision that said, "This Confidentiality Order shall not prevent anyone from applying to t

is more difficult to show a party reasonably relied on a blanket order in producing documents or submitting to a deposition." Id (quoting EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 319). The second factor—the language of the Protective Order itself—similarly weighs in favor of modification. The Protective Order provided tha

in a court is whether it is a "judicial document." Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, 940 F.3d 146, 150-51 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006)). Merely filing a document with a court "'is insufficient to render that paper a judicial document subject to the

ore difficult to show a party reasonably relied on a blanket order in producing documents or submitting to a deposition.') (quoting In re EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 319). Since the Protective Order does not address specific deposition testimony or exhibit documents, the parties do not have demonstrated relian

in a court is whether it is a "judicial document." Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, 940 F.3d 146, 150-51 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006)). Merely filing a document with a court "'is insufficient to render that paper a judicial document subject to the

ore difficult to show a party reasonably relied on a blanket order in producing documents or submitting to a deposition.') (quoting In re EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 319). Since the Protective Order does not address specific deposition testimony or exhibit documents, the parties do not have demonstrated relian

igation" did "not lend itself to reasonable reliance that [the Protective Order] will afford permanent secrecy." See also Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006), where, in view of a provision that said, "This Confidentiality Order shall not prevent anyone from applying to t

is more difficult to show a party reasonably relied on a blanket order in producing documents or submitting to a deposition.' Id. (quoting EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 319). The second factor—the language of the Protective Order itself-similarly weighs in favor of modification. The Protective Order provided tha