ore difficult to show a party reasonably relied on a blanket order in producing documents or submitting to a deposition.') (quoting In re EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 319). Since the Protective Order does not address specific deposition testimony or exhibit documents, the parties do not have demonstrated relian

[B]road allegations of harm unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning fail to satisfy the test." In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 258 F.R.D. at 244; see also Tr. of Jan. 16, 2020 Conf. at 7:9-12, 21-23 ("[W]hat we are looking for from you is a specific Plaintiff is cognizant of the Court

ore difficult to show a party reasonably relied on a blanket order in producing documents or submitting to a deposition.') (quoting In re EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 319). Since the Protective Order does not address specific deposition testimony or exhibit documents, the parties do not have demonstrated relian

is more difficult to show a party reasonably relied on a blanket order in producing documents or submitting to a deposition.' Id. (quoting EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 319). The second factor—the language of the Protective Order itself-similarly weighs in favor of modification. The Protective Order provided tha

is more difficult to show a party reasonably relied on a blanket order in producing documents or submitting to a deposition." Id (quoting EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 319). The second factor—the language of the Protective Order itself—similarly weighs in favor of modification. The Protective Order provided tha

icipation of litigation, and certainly not litigation about the Crime Victims' Rights Act. See, e.g., Southern Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 205 F.R.D. 542, 549 (D. Ariz. 2002) (documents not protected by work product because not prepared in connection with case at hand). II. Specific Responses to

ket 07/06/2015 Page 12 of 51 if they were created by or for a party to the subsequent litigation," Underwriters Ins. Co. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 248 F.R.D. 663,668 (N.D. Ga. 2008). These cases rely on the Supreme Court's dicta in Federal Trade Communication I. Grolier, Inc., that "the literal language o

to embody a general federal policy against indiscriminate disclosure of tax returns from any source. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Krueger, 55 F.R.D. 514-15 (N.D. Ill. 1972X"it is the opinion of this court that [§6103] reflect[s] a valid public policy against disclosure of income tax returns. This

to embody a general federal policy against indiscriminate disclosure of tax returns from any source. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Coro. v. Krueger, 55 F.R.D. 514-15 (N.D. III. 1972X"it is the opinion of this court that (§6103] reflect[s] a valid public policy against disclosure of income tax returns. This

to embody a general federal policy against indiscriminate disclosure of tax returns from any source. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Krueger, 55 F.R.D. 514-15 (N.D. III. 1972)("it is the opinion of this court that [§6103] reflect[s] a valid public policy against disclosure EFTA00729517 of income

to embody a general federal policy against indiscriminate disclosure of tax returns from any source. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Krueger, 55 F.R.D. 514-15 (N.D. III. 1972)("it is the opinion of this court that [§6103] reflect[s] a valid public policy against disclosure EFTA00586226 of income

07/06/2015 Page 12 of 51 if they were created by or for a party to the subsequent litigation," Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 248 F.R.D. 663,668 (N.D. Ga. 2008). These cases rely on the Supreme Court's dicta in Federal Trade Communication v. Grolier, Inc., that "the literal language o

l defense interest, which cloaks related communications in privilege, and a common problem, to which the privilege does not apply. Cgiazaryan, 290 F.R.D. at 434 (citing Finkeiman v. Klaus, 2007 WL 4303538, at *4 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Nov. 28, 2007)). "IA] limited common purpose (that) necessitates disclosure"

vernment is required to demonstrate that there are grounds for a hearing under the specific provisions of either 3142(f)(1) or (f)(2)." Butler, 165 F.R.D. at 71. "When there exists one or more grounds for holding a hearing under those provisions, the government may proceed on the theory of risk of fli

ere, preventing Epstein from identifying Plaintiffs' in subpoenas and other type discovery overwhelmingly inhibits discovery. Ees Doe v. Evans, 202 F.R.D. at 176 (E.D. P.A. 2001) (denying protective order where alleged sexual assault victim did not demonstrate a serious specific injury and allowing De

to Orig. US Gov. Works. https://web2.westlaw.contrint/printstream.aspers=WLW11.07&pbc=8C6E23F9,Sidecti n ObAPIAI EFTA00177915 Page 10 of 25 183 F.R.D. 458,51 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 35 (Cite as: 183 F.R.D. 458) L . way that the attorney client priv- ilege can. Whether the information involved is fac

icipation of litigation, and certainly not litigation about the Crime Victims' Rights Act. See, e.g., Southern Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 205 F.R.D. 542, 549 (D. Ariz. 2002) (documents not protected by work product because not prepared in connection with case at hand). II. Specific Responses to