Epstein Secrets

ringing a prosecution, and they do not justify dismissing an indictment. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325-26 (1971); see United States v. Elsbery, 602 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1979). Finally, the Court finds no substantial prejudice from the pretrial publicity this case has garnered. Maxwell

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

ringing a prosecution, and they do not justify dismissing an indictment. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325-26 (1971); see United States v. Elsbery, 602 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1979). Finally, the Court finds no substantial prejudice from the pretrial publicity this case has garnered. Maxwell

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

ringing a prosecution, and they do not justify dismissing an indictment. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325-26 (1971); see United States v. Elsbery, 602 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1979). Finally, the Court finds no substantial prejudice from the pretrial publicity this case has garnered. Maxwell

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury