Epstein Secrets

where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment." After (but not before) the original statute of limitations had expired, a party such as Stogner was not "liable to any punishment." California's new statute therefore "aggravated" Stogner's alleged crime, or made it "greater than it was, when

Post Facto clause precludes the revival of claims predicated on past crimes. The precise concerns animating Stogner are present in this case. As in Stogner Defendant was "liable to punishment" under § 2255 before Plaintiff turned 18, but once she attained that age, he no was longer "liable to punishmen

Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 8 of 36 B. Masha's Law Does Not Apply To This Case. The presumption against retroactivity and the Ex Post Facto clause preclude application of Masha's Law in this case, where the alleged predicate conduct was completed before 2006. 1. Congress Dld Not Intend

1) 109, 113 viii EFTA00099949 Silver, 15 Cr. 93 (VEC) 275 Skelos, 15 Cr. 317 (KMW) 275 Smith y. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) 117, 118 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003) 45 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) 300 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) 299,300 Taylor v. U

of limitations for such crimes through the lifetime of the victim. 30 EFTA00099997 the resurrection of time-barred prosecutions, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.14 But that concern is entirely separate from extending the statute of limitations for live claims, which is what Congress did here. Critica

01) 109, 113 viii EFTA00077614 Silver, 15 Cr. 93 (VEC) 275 Skelos, 15 Cr. 317 (KMW) 275 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) 117, 118 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003) 45 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) 300 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) 299, 300 Taylor v.

Leahy's comments indicate that Congress declined to add language that would allow for the resurrection of time-barred prosecutions, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.14 But that conduct in 2000). Indeed, that is precisely what Congress authorized when it extended the statute of limitations for such crimes

01) 109, 113 viii EFTA00039429 Silver, 15 Cr. 93 (VEC) 275 Skelos, 15 Cr. 317 (KMW) 275 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) 117, 118 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003) 45 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) 300 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) 299, 300 Taylor v.

Leahy's comments indicate that Congress declined to add language that would allow for the resurrection of time-barred prosecutions, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.14 But that conduct in 2000). Indeed, that is precisely what Congress authorized when it extended the statute of limitations for such crimes

1) 109, 113 viii EFTA00103007 Silver, 15 Cr. 93 (VEC) 275 Skelos, 15 Cr. 317 (KMW) 275 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) 117, 118 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003) 45 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) 300 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) 299, 300 Taylor v.

of limitations for such crimes through the lifetime of the victim. 30 EFTA00103055 the resurrection of time-barred prosecutions, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.14 But that concern is entirely separate from extending the statute of limitations for live claims, which is what Congress did here. Critica