Epstein Secrets

.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that "the mandatory `shall' . . . normally creates an obligation imperv

by the corporations which are defendants in the civil case, the considerations . . . militating against disclosure are beside the point.") (citing Douglas Oil Co. of Calif. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211 (1979)). In response to such third-party subpoenas to law-enforcement witnesses, we anticipate that it

g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' "use of a mandatory 'shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that "the mandatory 'shall' . . . normally creates an obligation imperv

by the corporations which are defendants in the civil case, the considerations . . . militating against disclosure are beside the point.") (citing Douglas Oil Co. of Calif. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211 (1979)). In response to such third-party subpoenas to law-enforcement witnesses, we anticipate that it

e.g., Lopez' Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' "use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. I. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that "the mandatory `shall' . . . normally creates an obligation imperv

by the corporations which are defendants in the civil case, the considerations . . . militating against disclosure are beside the point.") (citing Douglas Oil Co. of Calif. I Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211 (1979)). In response to such third-party subpoenas to law-enforcement witnesses, we anticipate that it