Epstein Secrets

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

cific concerns. "[I]n most criminal cases, pretrial disclosure will redound to the benefit of all parties, counsel, and the court." United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 1974). In general, the Court will require the parties to negotiate a final, omnibus schedule to propose to the Court. T

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

cific concerns. "[I]n most criminal cases, pretrial disclosure will redound to the benefit of all parties, counsel, and the court." United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 1974). In general, the Court will require the parties to negotiate a final, omnibus schedule to propose to the Court. T

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

cific concerns. "[I]n most criminal cases, pretrial disclosure will redound to the benefit of all parties, counsel, and the court." United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 1974). In general, the Court will require the parties to negotiate a final, omnibus schedule to propose to the Court. T

me that the defendant will have a reasonable opportunity to act upon the information efficaciously." United States v. Rodriguez, 496 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2007). Immediate disclosure of such material is not warranted simply because the defendant prefers it. See, e.g., United States v. Wey, 15 Cr. 611

tates ex rel. Lucas v. Regan, 503 F.2d 1, 3 n.I (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Sebastian, 497 F.2d 1267, 1268-69 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 1974). Further, disclosure of any statements of alleged co-conspirators would necessitate the identification of co-cons