Epstein Secrets

der the "well-settled rule that actions upon penal statutes do not survive the death of the wrongdoer." United States v. Wright, 160 F.3d 905, 908 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted). This rule applies with full force here, and requires the dismissal of the Indictment. See Transcript of Aug. 27,

from the courts, over whose functioning the courts do not preside." United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 45-46 (1992); see also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I, 17-18 (1973) (holding that the grand jury must remain "free to pursue its investigations unhindered by external influence or supervisi

the laws in the Executive. See Art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 138 (1976). Indeed, the Second Circuit has emphasized that judicial review and regulation of prosecutorial decisions would place courts in the "injudicious posture of becoming `superpros

nited States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1979) 13, 14 United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972) 10 United States v. Dionisio, 503 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2007) 12 United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2002) 6, 7, 10 United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268 (2d Ci

e's the only one who takes the blame for what happened").3 The government further asserts that Ms. Maxwell's position is not supported by subsequent Second Circuit cases that apply Annabi. (Opp. 5-6). But this argument simply begs the question. Although courts in this Circuit have applied Annabi to evaluate whe

ccordingly, it is a well-recognized principle that courts should not intervene in the grand jury process absent compelling reason. United States v. Dionisio , 410 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1973). A district court also should be mindful of a target's attempts to "saddle a grand jury with mini-trials and preliminary

would effectively insulate discoverable acts merely because they were enacted in the presence of an attorney.") (emphasis added). Just a month ago, the Second Circuit addressed this issue when a defendant tried to disqualify prosecutors who had seen four documents that the defense alleged were privileged. United

Accordingly, it is a well-recognized principle that courts should not intervene in the grand jury process absent compelling reason. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1973). A district court also should be mindful of a target's attempts to "saddle a grand jury with mini-trials and preliminary

ould effectively insulate discoverable acts merely because they were enacted in the presence of an attorney.") (emphasis added). Just a month ago, the Second Circuit addressed this issue when a defendant tried to disqualify prosecutors who had seen four documents that the defense alleged were privileged. -19- EF

442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) passim United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) 6 United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) 6 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) 2, 15 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) 9, 10 United States v. Oshatz, 700 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 16 United

h Amendment provides protection against a grand jury subpoena duces tecum too sweeping in its terms `to be regarded as reasonable.' United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1973) (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906), abrogated in part on other grounds by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New

would raise constitutional issues, and that principles of fairness mandated enforcement of the protective order." Id. The government appealed, and the Second Circuit affirmed. The Second Circuit was blunt in explaining the government's missteps: The government may not ... simply by picking up the telephone or wr