Epstein Secrets

s.") (emphasis added). One district court within the Eleventh Circuit, facing the identical issue with a pending state

se discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Mi/berg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S

njoin the stay. And we conclude that this provision does not violate separation of powers principles.") (emphasis added). One district court within the Eleventh Circuit, facing the identical issue with a pending state prosecution, recently construed "the plain language of § 3509(k)" as "requirfing] a stay in a case

.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that "the mandatory `shall' . . . normally creates an obligation imperv

njoin the stay. And we conclude that this provision does not violate separation of powers principles.") (emphasis added). One district court within the Eleventh Circuit, facing the identical issue with a pending state prosecution, recently construed "the plain language of § 3509(k)" as "requirfing] a stay in a case

g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' "use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that "the mandatory `shall' . . . normally creates an obligation imperv

njoin the stay. And we conclude that this provision does not violate separation of powers principles.") (emphasis added). One district court within the Eleventh Circuit, facing the identical issue with a pending state prosecution, recently construed "the plain language of § 3509(k)" as "requirfing] a stay in a case

.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that "the mandatory `shall' . . . normally creates an obligation imperv

njoin the stay. And we conclude that this provision does not violate separation of powers principles.") (emphasis added). One District Court within the Eleventh Circuit recently construed "the plain language of § 3509(k)" as "regaining" a stay in a case . . . where . . a parallel criminal action [is] pending." Doe

g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' "use of a mandatory 'shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that "the mandatory 'shall' . . . normally creates an obligation imperv

njoin the stay. And we conclude that this provision does not violate separation of powers principles.") (emphasis added). One district court within the Eleventh Circuit, facing the identical issue with a pending state prosecution, recently construed "the plain language of § 3509(k)" as "requirtingl a stay in a case

g., Lopez I. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' "use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. I Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that "the mandatory `shall' . . . normally creates an obligation impervi

njoin the stay. And we conclude that this provision does not violate separation of powers principles.") (emphasis added). One District Court within the Eleventh Circuit recently construed "the plain language of § 3509(k)" as "requirfing/ a stay in a case . . . where . . . a parallel criminal action [is] pending." D

e.g., Lopez' Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' "use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. I. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that "the mandatory `shall' . . . normally creates an obligation imperv