DOJ-COURT-012 is a legal document, specifically a Defendant's Motion for Stay filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
The document pertains to the case of JANE DOE NO. 2 versus Jeffrey Epstein. It argues for a mandatory stay of the civil action due to two pending parallel criminal actions related to the alleged sexual assault of a minor. The motion cites Title 18, United States Code, Section 3509(k), which mandates a stay in civil suits until all phases of related criminal actions are completed.

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Glenn M. Anderson, Lyle Cook, Jack Goldberger, et al., Appellants, v. Frank M. Jordan, as Secretary of State of the State of California. U.S. Supreme ... of Record with Supporting Pleadings
Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 12 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/20/2008
Page 1 of 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA-JOHNSON JANE DOE NO. 2, Plaintiff, vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Defendant. I DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR STAY Defendant Jeffrey Epstein respectfully moves for a mandatory stay of this action under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3509(k). As discussed below, this action is subject to a mandatory stay based on the existence of two pending parallel criminal actions. Introduction This civil action is a private counterpart to two ongoing criminal actions, one in Palm Beach state court, the other in Miami federal court. Both cases purport to arise from the same occurrence: the alleged sexual assault of a minor, Jane Doe No. 2. A federal statute directly on point provides that when an alleged sexual assault involving a child victim results in a "criminal proceeding," a commonly Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 12 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/20/2008
Page 2 of 6 derived civil suit "shall be stayed until the end· of all phases of the criminal action." 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). 1 A stay of this case is required until there is no longer a pending criminal action derived from the same underlying allegations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k). Discussion The parallel state criminal action pending in Palm Beach Circuit Court is still in the discovery phase. State of Florida v. Jeffrey Epstein, Case No. 2006 CF 09454 AXX (Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County). Meanwhile, there is also a parallel federal criminal grand jury action pending in the Southern District of Florida. In re Grand Jury, No. FGJ 07-103(WPB) (S.D. Fla.) Both cases arise out of the same occurrence and allege that the minor plaintiffis a victim. The language of section 3509(k) of title 18, United States Code, is clear: a parallel "civil action shall be stayed until the end of all phases of the criminal 1 The full text of the mandatory-stay provision reads: If, at any time that a cause of action for recovery of compensation for damage or injury to the person of a child exists, a criminal action is pending which arises out of the same occurrence and in which the child is the victim, the civil action shall be ~tayed until the end of all phases of the criminal action and any mention of the civil action during the criminal proceeding is prohibited. As used in this subsection, a criminal action is pending until its final adjudication in the trial court. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k). 2 Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 12 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/20/2008
Page 3 of 6 action." 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). When it comes to statutory construction, the mandatory nature of the word "shalf' is well-settled. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' "use of a mandatory 'shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Mi/berg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that "the mandatory 'shall' ... normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion") (emphasis added). Cf Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 350 (2000) ("Through the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act], Congress clearly intended to make operation of the automatic stay mandatory, precluding courts from exercising their equitable powers to enjoin the stay. And we conclude that this provision does not violate separation of powers principles.") (emphasis added). One district court within the Eleventh Circuit, facing the identical issue with a pending state prosecution, recently construed "the plain language of§ 3509(k)" as "requir[ing] a stay in a case . . . where . . . a parallel criminal action [is] pending." Doe v. Francis, No. 5:03 CV 260 MCR/WCS, 2005 WL 950623, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2005) (Francis II) (emphasis added). Accord Doe v. Francis, No. 5:03 CV 260 MCR/WCS, 2005 WL 517847, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2005) (Francis I) (staying federal civil action in favor of "a criminal case currently pending in state court in Bay County, Florida, arising from the same facts and involving the same parties as the Instant action," noting that "the language of 18 3 Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 12 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/20/2008
Page 4 of 6 U.S.C. § 3509(k) is clear that a stay is requzred in a case such as this where a parallel criminal action is pending which arises from the same occurrence involving minor victims") ( emphasis added). There is no contrary opinion from any court. In determining that the federal stay provision is mandatory, the Francis II court expressed that there was apparently no case law supporting, or even "discussing the [avoidance] of a stay [under the command of] § 3509(k)." Francis II, 2005 WL 950623, at *2. Deferring to the statute as written, the Francis II court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that some of the alleged victims had already reached their majority. See id. The court similarly rejected the plaintiffs' argument that it would be in the victims' best interests to avoid a stay so as to counteract the victims' "ongoing and increasing mental harm due to the 'frustrating delay in both the criminal case and [the civil] case."' Id. The Francis II court, in adhering to the plain language of the statute, also adhered to the "well established priority of criminal proceedings over civil proceedings." Cf United States v. Hanhardt, 156 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1000 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 50(a)). Conclusion Because this civil action arises from the same allegations as two pending criminal actions, § 3509(k) mandates a stay ofthis civil action. . 4 Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 12 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/20/2008
Page 5 of 6 WHEREFORE, Defendant Jeffrey Epstein respectfully requests that the Court enter a stay under 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k), coextensive with the state and federal criminal actions. Respectfully submitted, ATTERBURY, GOLDBERGER & WEISS, P.A. 250 Australian A venue South, Suite 1400 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Tel: 561 659 8300 Fax: 561 835 8691 By: Isl Jack A. Goldberger Jack A. Goldberger Fla. Bar No. 262013 [email protected] Attorneys for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein 5 Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 12 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/20/2008



