Epstein Secrets

e of phrases like "the government" or "the United States." United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2004). Those are common shorthand. A plea agreement need not painstakingly spell out "the Office of the United States

ns—i.e., the elements" of the relevant offense to determine if the provision applies "and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions." Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a statute requires a categorical or case-specific approach i

e of phrases like "the government" or "the United States." United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2004). Those are common shorthand. A plea agreement need not painstakingly spell out "the Office of the United States

ns—i.e., the elements" of the relevant offense to determine if the provision applies "and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions." Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a statute requires a categorical or case-specific approach i

e of phrases like "the government" or "the United States." United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2004). Those are common shorthand. A plea agreement need not painstakingly spell out "the Office of the United States

ns—i.e., the elements" of the relevant offense to determine if the provision applies "and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions." Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a statute requires a categorical or case-specific approach i